TMI Blog2016 (4) TMI 680X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 67 of the Act in a manner not contemplated by the clear language of the statute, which is clearly not permissible in law. The interpretation made by the Tribunal on the basis of equitable considerations, that the period of limitation for exercise of powers under section 67 of the Act would commence from the date of knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, is inconsistent with the language of section 67(1)(a) of the Act, which clearly and unambiguously provides for a period of limitation of three years from the date of the order, for invoking revisional jurisdiction. The Tribunal, therefore, was not justified in holding that the notice for revision was not time barred as the period of limitation would commence from the knowledge o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the composition permission orders previously granted to the appellant. The appellant opposed the said proceedings on the ground of limitation. The revisional authority, however, passed an order cancelling the composition permission granted to the appellant. 3. The appellant carried the matter in appeal before the Tribunal, which by the impugned order dismissed the revision application of the appellant holding that the exercise of revisional powers was not time barred as the period of limitation would start when any purported mischief is noticed by the Commissioner. 4. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 5. This court, by an order dated 11.4.2007, had admitted the appeal on the following two questions of law: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t justified in holding that the period of limitation would be the date of knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and if that is considered then the revision application is well within three years and therefore, it cannot be treated being barred by limitation. 6.1 As regards the second question, it was submitted that the Tribunal while considering the matter on merits had exceeded its jurisdiction in giving findings on the aspects which were beyond the scope of appeal and without there being any material on record or investigation thereto. It was, accordingly, submitted that the impugned order being inconsistent with the provisions of section 67(1)(a) of the Act, deserves to be quashed and set aside and the questions are requir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cts the Tribunal was justified in holding that the date of knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax is required to be considered for the purpose of computing of the period of limitation of three years. It was, accordingly, urged that the appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. 8. As noted hereinabove, the appeal has been admitted on two questions. However, if the first question is answered in the negative that is in favour of the appellant and against the respondent, it would not be necessary to enter into the merits of the second question. 9. The controversy that has been raised by the first question is as to whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the notice for revision was not time barred as the per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m the date of such order, that is, from 19.12.2000. Therefore, such period would come to an end on 18.12.2003. In the present case, it is an undisputed position that the Commissioner had taken the order dated 19.12.2000 in revision by issuing notice dated 2.2.2005. Evidently therefore, the exercise of powers under section 67 of the Act by the Commissioner was beyond the period of limitation. 11. The Tribunal, in the impugned order has proceeded on the basis that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be equitable to consider that the date of knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax is the starting point of limitation. In this regard it may be germane to refer to the following extract from the decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction of the words is not permissible (Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts, 1928 AC 143, p. 162), a principle entrenched in our jurisprudence as well. 12. Thus, it is a settled legal position of law that in a taxing statute one has to go by the clear language of the statute and equity has no role to play while interpreting a taxing statute. One can only look fairly at the language used. To try to stretch the law to meet hard cases is not merely to make bad law but to run the risk of subverting the rule of law itself. The Tribunal, in the present case, to meet with a hard case, has tried to stretch the law by interpreting the provisions of section 67 of the Act in a manner not contemplated by the clear language of the statute, which is clear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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