TMI Blog2016 (9) TMI 967X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... odies and they were controlled by Mr. S.S. Bhatia and his family and therefore the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that they had to be treated as one single entity as they were being used as cloaks behind which Mr. Surinder Singh Bhatia and his family were using the devise of incorporation as ploy adopted for preventing execution of the international award which was passed against BIL and in favour of Respondent No.2 Vitol.. It has to be noted that the learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the material on record which indicated that the BILL and the BIL was a single entity and has come to the said conclusion after piercing the corporate veil of both the companies. It has to be noted that the learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the material on record which indicated that the BILL and the BIL was a single entity and has come to the said conclusion after piercing the corporate veil of both the companies. Learned Single Judge was justified in lifting the corporate veil in this case and was further justified in coming to the conclusion that BILL and BIL was a single economic entity. No interference is called for in the order passed by the learned Sin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the learned Single Judge. We have held that it was permissible to lift the corporate veil even in respect of execution proceedings. Secondly, we have held that the learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that BIIL and BIL was a single economic entity. We have therefore refused to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while exercising our appellate jurisdiction under clause 15 of the Letters Patent since the view taken by the learned Single Judge is not perverse and is a plausible view under the facts and circumstances of the case. JUDGMENT : ( Per V.M. Kanade, J. ) 1. Appellant is challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge who was pleased to extend the precept order which was passed under Section 46 of the Civil Procedure Code in execution proceedings taken out by the RespondentAward Holder/Judgment Creditor. 2. The questions which fall for consideration in this Appeal are as under:( i) In which cases corporate veil can be lifted by the Court and whether the concept of lifting of corporate veil is also available in execution proceedings? (ii) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in lifti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the conclusion that the coal was owned by BIIL, had yet issued precept order by holding that BIL was the owner of the coal which was imported at Tuticorin Port. Thirdly, it is submitted that the concept of lifting of corporate veil is not available in execution proceedings. He submitted that if the said concept is admitted, there are thousands of Companies which are formed by families and in all such cases the property of another Company would then be attached in execution of an Award. He submitted that the Respondent No.2 Vitol S.A. were merely Creditors/Award Holders and as such the concept of limited liability of shareholding in Public/Private Limited Company could not be circumvented. He then submitted that finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in para 14 of the Order was not based on well recognized principles. He then submitted that the the reliance which was placed by the learned Single Judge on certain judgments which were not cited by either parties was not correct since these judgments did not support the case of the Respondent No.2 and were in fact in favour of the Appellant. He submitted that the two judgments cited by the Appellant, though they were referr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... group companies/companies have been used to perpetuate a fraud or illegality. This can be seen from the following case: (i) Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction (2000) 10 SCC 130 (C ) where interest of public / revenue / public policy is involved. Reference can be made to the following cases : (i) Vodafone International Holdings vs. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613 . (ii) Juggilal Kamlapar vs. Commissioner of Incometax (1969) 1 SCR 988 . (iii) DeBeers Consolidated Mines Ltd vs. Howe Surveyor of Taxes 1906 AC 455 (D) where residence of a company has to be determined for the purpose of ascertaining common law offence of trading with the enemy. Reference can be made to the following case : (i) Daimler Co. Ltd. vs. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. (1916) 2 AC 307 (E) where execution proceedings have been initiated. Reference can be made to the following cases : (i) Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd. vs. Ashok Chauhan and Others 1999 (1) AD (Delhi) = 1998 (76) DLT 817 (ii) Sai Sounds Private Limited vs. Kiran Contractors Private Limited (2016) 1822 PLR 518 (F) where business realities of the situation require the veil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, Korba [(1982) 1 SCC 125]. The facts of that case were, however, entirely different and it is useless to refer to them but at page 17 of the report, Chandrachud, C.J. speaking for the Court quoted the observations in APSRTC v. ITO [1964) 7 SCR 17], where this Court had held that though the Transport Corporation was wholly controlled by the State Government it had a separate entity and its income was not the income of the State Government. While delivering the judgment in that case Gajendragadkar, C.J. referred to the observations of Lord Denning in Tamlin v. Hannaford [(1950) 1 KB 18] where Lord Denning had observed that the Crown and the corporation were different and the servants of the corporation were not civil servants. 52. Chandrachud, C.J. relied on the aforesaid observations and referred to Pennington s Company Law , 4th Edn., pages 5051, where it was stated that there were only two cases where the court had disregarded the separate legal entity of a company and that was done because the company was formed or used to facilitate the evasion of legal obligations. 53. The learned Editor of Penningt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ] where this Court held that a company registered under the Companies Act was a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the company was not the property of the shareholders. These propositions, in our opinion, do not have any application to the facts of the instant case. Shri Trivedi also drew our attention to Bank voor Handel en Schee pvaart N.V. v. Slatford [(1953) 1 QB 248] where in the context of the international law property belonging to or held on behalf of a Hungarian national came up for consideration and the distinction between a shareholder and a company was emphasised and highlighted. 55. In Kodak Ltd. v. Clark [(197) 1 SCC 248] the Court of appeal in England while dealing with an English company carrying on business in the U.K. owned 98 per cent of the shares in a foreign company, which gave it a preponderating influence in the control, election of directors etc. of the foreign company. The remaining shares in the foreign company were, however, held by independent persons, and there was no evidence that the English company had ever attempted to control or interfere with the management of the foreign company, or had any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as that one. So that DHN are entitled to claim compensation accordingly. It was not necessary for them to go through a conveyancing device to get it. I realise that the President of the Lands Tribunal, in view of previous cases, felt it necessary to decide as he did. But now that the matter has been fully discussed in this Court, we must decide differently from him. These companies as a group are entitled to compensation not only for the value of the land, but also compensation for disturbance. I would allow the appeal accordingly. 56. Lord Justice Goff proceeded with caution and observed as follows at pages 468 and 469 of the report: Secondly, on the footing that that is not in itself sufficient, still, in my judgment, this is a case in which one is entitled to look at the realities of the situation and to pierce the corporate veil. I wish to safeguard myself by saying that so far as this ground is concerned, I am relying on the facts of this particular case. I would not at this juncture accept that in every case where one has a group of companies one is entitled to pierce the veil, but in this case the two subsidiaries were both wholly owned; further, they had no sepa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... My third citation is from the judgment of Danckwerts, L.J. in Merchandise Transport Ltd. v. British Transport Commission [(1961) 3 ALL ER 495] where he said that the cases - (All ER p. 518) show that where the character of a company, or the nature of the persons who control it, is a relevant feature the court will go behind the mere status of the company as a legal entity, and will consider who are the persons as shareholders or even as agents who direct and control the activities of a company which is incapable of doing anything without human assistance. The third ground, which I place last because it is longest, but perhaps ought to come first, is that in my judgment, in truth, DHN were the equitable owners of the property. In order to resolve this matter, it will be necessary for me to refer in some detail to the facts. 57. Shaw, L.J. also observed at page 473 as follows: Even if this were not right, there is the further argument advanced on behalf of the claimants that there was so complete an identity of the different companies comprised in the socalled group that they ought to be regarded for this purpose as a single entity. The completeness of that iden ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he appellant company, by taking any necessary formal steps, could make any arrangements, they pleased in regard to the management of the business of (for instance) British Textile. They owned all the issued capital and the directors were their nominees. 59. Lord Reid at pages 73738 observed as follows: It was argued that the subsidiary companies were separate legal entities, each under the control of own board of directors, that in law the board of the appellant company could not assign any duties to anyone in relation to the management of the subsidiary companies, and that, therefore, the agreement cannot be construed as entitling them to assign any such duties to the respondent. My Lords, in my judgment, this is too technical an argument. This is an agreement in re mercatoria , and it must be construed in the light of the facts and realities of the situation. The appellant company owned the whole share capital of British Textile Manufacturing Co. and, under the agreement of 1947, the directors of this company were to be the nominees of the appellant company. So, in fact, the appellant company could control the internal management of their subsidiary companies, and, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ss, accept as a result of having formed such a subsidiary an obligation so to conduct what are in a sense its own affairs as to deal fairly with its subsidiary. At the opposite pole to this standard may be put the conduct of a parent company which says 'our subsidiary company has served its purpose, which is our purpose. Therefore let it die ' and, having thus pronounced sentence, is able to enforce it and does enforce it not only by attack from without but also by support from within. If this section is inept to cover such a case, it will be a dead letter indeed. I have expressed myself strongly in this case because it appears to me to be a glaring example of precisely the evil which Parliament intended to remedy. 61. Similarly, at page 84 of the report, Lord Keith s observations are also relevant to the facts of this case: My Lords, if the society could be regarded as an organisation independent of the company and in competition with it, no legal objection could be taken to the actions and policy of the society. Lord Carmont pointed this out in the Court of Session. But that is not the position. In law, the society and the company were, it is true, separate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and in furtherance Shri Trivedi drew our attention to the profits of the two companies which were separately computed and also referred to Vol. C, p. 641 where the profits of Renusagar were separately indicated and Vol. C at p. 642 where the profits of Hindalco were separately indicated. 64. We are, however, of the opinion that these tests are not conclusive tests by themselves. Our attention was also drawn to the decision of the Madras High Court in Spencer Co. Ltd. Madras v. CWT [(AIR 1969 Mad 359] where Veeraswami, J. held that merely because a company purchases almost the entirety of the shares in another company, there was no extinction of corporate character for each company was a separate juristic entity for the tax purposes. Almost on similar facts, are the observations of P.B. Mukharji, J. in Turner Morrison Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. [AIR 1969 Cal 238], where he held that holding company and subsidiaries are incorporated companies and in this context each has a separate legal entity. Each has a separate corporate veil but that does not mean that holding company and the subsidiary company within it, all constitute one company. 65. Mr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d order the profits of Renusagar have been treated as the profits of Hindalco. 67. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the corporate veil should be lifted and Hindalco and Renusagar be treated as one concern and Renusagar s power plant must be treated as the own source of generation of Hindalco and should be liable to duty on that basis. In the premises the consumption of such energy by Hindalco will fall under Section 3(1)( c ) of the Act. The learned Additional AdvocateGeneral for the State relied on several decisions, some of which have been noted. 68. The veil on corporate personality even though not lifted sometimes, is becoming more and more transparent in modern company jurisprudence. The ghost of Salomon case [1897 AC 22] still visits frequently the hounds of Company Law but the veil has been pierced in many cases. Some of these have been noted by Justice P.B. Mukharji in the New Jurisprudence [Tagore Law Lectures, p.183] 69. It appears to us, however, that as mentioned the concept of lifting the corporate veil is a changing concept and is of expanding horizons. We think that the appellant was in error in not treating Renusagar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... adhered to. The Delhi Delhi High Court in Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd. vs. Ashok Chauhan and Others 1999 (1) AD (Delhi) = 1998 (76) DLT 817 and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sai Sounds Private Limited vs. Kiran Contractors Private Limited (2016) 1822 PLR 518 have held that this doctrine can be applied even in execution proceedings. 14. The Delhi High Court in Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd. (supra) has in terms held in para 45 as under: 45. The question whether the assets and the properties in question are owned and/or possessed by Chauhan and/or the names in which they may have been acquired are fictitious or fraudulent or merely cloaks can be decided after parties have led evidence. The Court has always the power of lifting the corporate veil or mere cloaks where device is employed and the properties have been acquired fictitiously in others names for the purpose of committing illegalities or for defrauding others so as to enable it to pass appropriate orders to do justice between the parties concerned (See DDA Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 2005. 15. Brief facts in the said case were 'Formosa' and 'KOA' entered into agree ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpany offering to make the payment before the Company Court, while prefering the appeal, but failed to comply with the direction of the Company Court's order. A plea of undertaking and default persisted even before the Appellate Court against the decree when the Company was preferring an appeal through the Managing Director and seeking for stay. There was a direction for payment but he failed to comply with the direction. The decreeholder was, therefore, saying that the Managing Director of the Company had approached the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court only with a motive to buy time and after the dismissal of appeals, the Managing Director was operating from House No.703, Sector 3, Chandigarh, but evading all types of liabilities. 17. We concur with the view taken by the Delhi Court in Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd. (supra) and of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sai Sounds Private Limited (supra) that the concept of lifting the corporate veil can be resorted to even in execution proceedings. 18. In our view it is not necessary to refer to the judgment in DHN Food Distributors (supra), Juggilal Kamlapar (supra) since these judgments have already b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m of US$ 68,435,250.00 towards damages for breach of the Master Agreement together with interest thereon and legal costs. Respondent No.2 filed execution proceedings in this Court and filed an application seeking an order of precept under section 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking attachment 54,300 MT of coal at the Tuticorin Port at Tamil Nadu. Application was made made by Sharp Corporation Limited objecting to the attachment levied under the Judges Order 215 of 2014. The said application filed by Sharp Corporation Limited was heard by the learned Single Judge and by judgment dated 02/09/2015 in Judges Order 215 of 2014 the learned Single Judge held that 34,300 MT of coal was under the ownership of Sharp and the remaining cargo was under the ownership of the Appellants / BIIL and directed Respondent No.2 Vitol to issue notice to BIIL inviting them to object to the attachment / extending the precept with respect to the remaining 34,300 MT of cargo. The learned Single Judge, after giving an opportunity to BIIL and BIL of being heard, came to the conclusion that BIIL and BIL was a single entity after going through the exercise of piercing veil of two companies and oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mbers of his family viz his brothers Gurvinder Singh Bhatia and Manjeet Singh Bhatia were also Directors in both the companies and subscribers to the Memorandum of Association of the companies. (D) The learned Single Judge has also noticed that the Bhatia Group companies were listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. She has noted that the report was made by the Bombay Stock Exchange upon disclosure made by the BIIL which was one of the Bhatia Group companies as BIL. She has noted that the report makes a reference to BIIL as Bhatia Group Companies amongst others. (E) The learned Single Judge has then relied on the report given by the Credit Rating Institute viz ICRA. She has noted that the report states that BIIL was a part of the stronger promoter group i.e. BIL . She has further noted that the report stated on the basis of statistical data that BIIL has high dependence on BIL's management decision for its operation. (F) The learned Single Judge has then relied upon the financial statement contained in balancesheet of the two companies and has examined the coal purchased by BIL in the financial year 201314 and also intercorporate deposits taken and given by BIIL and other ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... doctrine of lifting the corporate veil in revenue and taxation matters (See Dal Chand and Sons vs. CIT [ (1944) 12 ITR 458 (Lah)] and Juggilal Kamlapat vs. CIT [AIR 1969 SC 932: (1969) 1 SCR 988 : (1969) 73 ITR 702] . 27 The corporate veil indisputably can be pierced when the corporate personality is found to be opposed to justice, convenience and interest of the revenue or workman or against public interest (See CIT v. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [AIR 1967 SC 819 : (1967) 1 SCR 934], Workmen v. Associated Rubber Industry Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC 114 : 1985 SCC (L S) 957, New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of India [(1995) 1 SCC 478], State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. [(1988) 4 SCC 59], Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union [(1978) 4 SCC 257 : 1978 SCC (L S) 506] and Secy. H.S.E.B. v. Suresh [(1999) 3 SCC 601 : 1999 SCC (L S) 765. 27. Similarly, the Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd and Another (1996) 4 SCC 622 has observed in para 28 as under:- 28. The concept of corporate entity was evolved to encourage and promote trade and commerce but not to commit illegalities or to defraud people. Where, therefore, the corpor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd therefore the cargo could be attached. It is not possible to accept this contention. Perusal of the affidavit clearly discloses that in para 4 it is clearly stated that Bhatia International and Bhatia Industries are part of Bhatia Global Trading Limited, Bhatia Coal and Energy Limited and Bhatia Coal Washeries Limited. Further various instances show that Bhatia International and Bhatia Industries is a single economic entity and it has been mentioned from paras 5 to para 12 of the said affidavit. There is therefore no substance in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant that an attempt was made by Respondent No.2 to mislead the Court. In our view, Respondent No.2 had come out with a specific case that though the cargo at Tuticorin Port was in the name of BIIL, it could be attached since Bhatia International Limited (BIL) Award Debtor and BIIL was single economic entity. It is also not possible to accept the submission of the Appellant that Vitol had not pleaded any case to contend that the coal in question belonged to BIL. 29. It was then contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant that the find ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ubmitted that in any case BIIL cold not be held liable for the debt of BIL. It was submitted that the BILL was incorporated in 1993 and is a registered Company on the Bombay Stock Exchange since 5/4/2001. It was further submitted that 34% of the equity shares of the Company were held by public at large. It was further contended that BILL, from the time of its incorporation, has been carrying on business with regard to coal. It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge had relied on the following judgments to arrive at a conclusion that BIIL is an alterego of BIL. a. Adams vs. Cape Industries Plc (1990) Ch.433 CA. b. D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. vs. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council (1976) 1 W.L.R. 852. c. New Horizon Limited vs. Union of India (1997) Co. cases 785 (Del). d. New Horizon Limited vs. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 478. e. State of U.P. vs. Renu Sagar Power Company (1988) 4 SCC 59. f. Jones vs. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442. g. Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. vs. Horn (1933) ALL ER REP 109. It was submitted that none of the said judgments was an authority to support the proposition that the creditor was entitled to recover its due ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o Companies or group companies is a single entity or not and it is no longer restricted to the cases where principle of corporate veil is used to evade taxes or opposed to justice, convenience. 34. It was then submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant that the impugned judgment is contrary to Division Bench Judgment of this Court dated 27/03/2015. It is necessary to mention brief background regarding the circumstances under which the said judgment was delivered by Division Bench. 35. Initially, an application was made by Respondent No.2 for issuance of precept under section 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of attachment of cargo at Tuticorin Port. An application was filed by Sharp Limited for opposing the order of issuance of precept and it was submitted by Sharp that the cargo belonged to them and not to BIL. The learned Single Judge, however, issued an order of precept, directing attachment of the cargo. Being aggrieved by the said order, Sharp Limited filed an appeal. The Division Bench by its order dated 27/3/2015 set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge by giving dir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eration. A judgment, as is well known, must be read in its entirety and the observations made therein should receive consideration in the light of the questions raised before it. (See Punjab National Bank v . R.L. Vaid (2004) 7 SCC 698). 255. Although decisions are galore on this point, we may refer to a recent one in State of Gujarat v . Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal (2004) 5 SCC 155 wherein this Court held : (SCC p. 172, para 19) It is trite that any observation made during the course of reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from the context in which it was used. 256. It is further well settled that a decision is not an authority for a proposition which did not fall for its consideration. It is also a trite law that a point not raised before a court would not be an authority on the said question. In AOne Granites v. State of U.P . (2001) 3 SCC 537 it is stated as follows : (SCC p. 543, para 11) 11. This question was considered by the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941) 1 KB 675 and it was laid down that when non consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... owind was prima facie a party to the arbitration agreement and was bound by it even though it was not a signatory to the agreement dated 24/2/2006. The Apex Court framed two issues which are found in para 10 of the said judgment which reads as under:- 10 On the contentions urged the following two questions arise for consideration: (i) Whether an arbitration clause found in a document (agreement) between two parties, could be considered as a binding arbitration agreement on a person who is not a signatory to the agreement? (ii) Whether a company could be said to be a party to a contract containing an arbitration agreement, even though it did not sign the agreement containing an arbitration clause, with reference to its subsequent conduct? In the context of these two questions, the Apex Court in para 17 has observed as under: 17. It is not in dispute that Subuthi and Indowind are two independent companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Each company is a separate and distinct legal entity and the mere fact that the two Companies have common shareholders or common Board of Directors, will not make the two Companies a single entity. Nor will the existence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 was terminated. The Petitioner in his application relied upon the arbitration clause contained in Article 11.14 of the shareholders agreement and pleaded that the agreement between Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 was a part of the contract entered into by the Petitioner with Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 by way of shareholders agreement. The Petitioner, obviously, was not a party to this license agreement which was revoked by notice dated 22/04/2009. It was in the context of these facts, Delhi High Court made the following observations. 5. The first requirement of Section 7 is that there should be a contract between petitioner and respondent, if there is no contract between petitioner and respondent the arbitration clause between them cannot be inferred. In the present case, the contract is there only between petitioner and respondent no.1 in the form of a Shareholder's Agreement. There is no contract between petitioner and respondents no.2, 3 4. Can such a contract be inferred between petitioner and respondents no.2, 3 4 merely on the ground of economic unity of respondents 1 to 4? Every company which is incorporated under relevant law of a country is a sep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at it is open for the Court to lift the corporate veil and the Court has after examining the facts and circumstances on record has come to the conclusion that two companies are single entity then general rule of limited liability and separate entity of companies would not apply in such case. Reliance was also placed on the Judgment in Vodafone International Holdings (supra) and more particularly paras 101, 102 and 103 in which the Apex Court has observed as under: 101. A company is a separate legal persona and the fact that all its shares are owned by one person or by the parent company has nothing to do with its separate legal existence. If the owned company is wound up, the liquidator, and not its parent company, would get hold of the assets of the subsidiary. In none of the authorities have the assets of the subsidiary been held to be those of the parent unless it is acting as an agent. Thus, even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company it is not just a puppet of the parent company. The difference is between having power or having persuasive position. Though it may be advantageous for parent and subsidiary companies to work as group, ea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eering influence on the subsidiary's core activities then that would be an exception to the general rule. 44. Lastly, it needs to be seen whether there was sufficient material on record to come to the conclusion that the there were several cases which showed that the Appellant was in fact a single entity. The learned Single Judge, after examining the record as rightly come to the conclusion that BIIL and BIL was a one single economic entity We therefore answer the question No.2 in the affirmative. Scope for interference by the Division Bench while exercising its jurisdiction in Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 45. It is well settled that the scope of interference with the finding given by the learned Single Judge in appeal filed under Letters Patent is limited and this Court, as an appellate Court, is not expected to substitute its own view to the view taken by the learned Single Judge and if this Court comes to the conclusion that the finding given by the learned Single Judge is not perverse or contrary to the law, it should not interfere with the said order. The Apex Court in Wander Ltd and Another vs. Antox India P. Ltd . 1990(Supp) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
