TMI Blog1965 (11) TMI 149X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... S. 3(1) is that a landlord can evict his tenant if he satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that he must obtain the permission of the District Magistrate to file such a suit; and the second condition is that he must provethe existence of one or the other of the seven grounds; enumeratedin clauses (a) to (g) of S. 3(1). We shall presently refer to therelevant provisions of this section. In their plaint, the appellants pleaded that they needed the premises in suit to carry on their own business in the shop, and they alleged that they had applied for permission-to the District Magistrate, Moradabad, under S. 3 (1) of the Act; that the said permission had been refused by him, whereupon they had moved the Commissioner in his revisions jurisdiction under S. 3(2) of the Act; and that the Commissioner had given them permission to file the suit. That is how the appellants claimed to have satisfied both the, conditions prescribed by S. 3 (1). The appellants further claimed ejectment of the respondents and asked for a decree for damages. for use and occupation of the suit premises from 11th April, 1953 to 11th July, 1954 ₹ 35/- per month. The suit (No. 349, of 1954) was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me to this Court. At the hearing of this appeal, the first point which Mr. Goyal for the appellants has raised for our decision is that the courts below had no jurisdiction to consider the question about the validity of the permission granted by the Commissioner. He contends that s. 3 of the Act provides a self-contained code for the grant of permission, and all questions in relation to the grant or refusal of the said permission have to be decided by the appropriate authorities constituted under the Act. Once the question about the grant of permission asked for by a landlord is determined by the appropriate authorities, their decision is final and cannot be questioned in a civil court. In support of this argument, Mr. Goyal has based himself on the provisions contained in S. 3 (4) and s. 16 ,of the Act. Section 3 (4) provides that the order of the Commissioner under subsection (3) shall subject to any order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F, be final. Similarly, S. 16 provides that no order made under this Act by the State Government or the District Magistrate shall be called in question in any Court. The combined effect of these two provisions, according to Mr. Goyal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government may pass under s. 7-F of the Act. Section 7-E provides for the revisional powers of the State Government in very wide terms. It reads thus :- The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in section 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under section 7 and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice . It is clear that the power conferred on the State Government by s. 7-F to revise the orders passed by the Commissioner under s. 3 (3 ) is very wide. In the first place, the State Government need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf. It may call for the record suo moto and it can exercise its powers in the interests of justice. In other words, whenever it is brought to the notice of the State Government either by a party aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner, or otherwise, that the order passed by the Commissioner is unfair or unjust, the State Government may in the ends of justice pass an appropriate order revising -the order made by the Commissioner. That, in brief, is t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the District Magistrate, or the Commissioner, or the State Government, can never be raised in a civil court. In our opinion, the bar created by the relevant provisions of the Act excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot operate in cases where the plea raised before the civil court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity. Take,, for instance, the case of an order purported to have been passed by a District Magistrate who is not a District Magistrate in law. If it is shown by a party impeaching the validity of the order in a civil court that the order was passed by a person who was not a District Magistrate,-the order in law would be a nullity, and such a plea cannot be ruled out on the ground of the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. Similarly, if an order granting permission to a landlord is passed by a District Magistrate of one District when the property in question is situated in another district outside his jurisdiction, a party would be entitled to urge before a civil court that the permission purported to have been granted by the District Magistrate is wholly invalid and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... egard to the bar created by sections 3 (4) and 16 of the Act, was not raised and has not been considered. We ought to point out that the provisions contained in sections 3(4) and 16 undoubtedly raise a bar against pleas which, challenge the correctness or propriety of the orders in question. The merits of the order are concluded by the decision of the ,appropriate authorities under the Act and they cannot be agitated in a civil -court. But where a plea seeks to prove that the impugned order is a nullity in the true legal sense, that is a plea -which does not come within the mischief of the bar created by sections 3(4) and 16 of the Act. Similar questions have often been considered by judicial, decisions to some of which we will now refer. In The Secretary ,of State for India in Council v. Roy Jatindra Nath Chowdhury -and Anr., (A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 175.) dealing with the effect of s. 6 of the Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Act (IX of 1847), the Privy Council observed that -the finality of the orders specified in the said section had to be read subject to two conditions; the first was that the said orders -should not suffer from any fundamental irregularity, that is to -say, a defi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Allahabad High Court is in favour of the respondents; and Mr. Goyal s argument is that the said decision is inconsistent with the true scope and effect of the provisions prescribed by s. 3 (3) of the Act. The decision of this point lies within a very narrow compass. The majority decision is that the jurisdiction conferred on the Commissioner under s. 3(3) is exactly similar to the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It will be recalled that. 115 of the Code confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court to make such order as it thinks fit in a given case, if the subordinate court whose order is brought before the High Court under s. 115 appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or- (c) to have acted in exercise of its -jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity . There is no doubt that the requirements of clauses (a), (b) (c) all centre round the question about the jurisdiction of the subordinate court, and the view which has been accepted by the majority decision under appeal is that the same limitation must be impo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs need not necessarily be correlated with questions of jurisdiction. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in introducing a-limitation pertaining to questions of jurisdiction in determining the scope of the width of the revisional-,visional power conferred on the Commissioner by S. 3 (3). That is why it must be held that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the permission granted by the Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred on him by s. 3 k 3) is invalid in law. As we have already emphasised, the only plea which can be raised before a civil court in relation to orders passed under the relevant provisions of the Act can be a plea which, if sustained, would render the order wholly invalid and as such, a nullity. No other plea can be raised, because all other pleas are barred by ss. 3 (4) and 16 of the Act. In this connection, we may incidentally point out that by a subsequent amendment of s. 3(3), the Legislature has made it clear that its intention is to confer wide jurisdiction on the Commissioner. The amendment in question has been introduced by Act 17 of 1954. The amended provision reads thus :- The Commi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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