TMI Blog1968 (2) TMI 121X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 66. in Writ Petition No. 216 of 1966 there are 71 petitioners who also own lands in the same village. Their complaint is based on the same notification under s. 4 and a notification dated July 12, 1966 under s. 6 of the Act. In Writ Petition No. 223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid Moth, Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively within the union territory of Delhi. His complaint is based on a s. 4 notification dated September 3, 1957, a notification dated April 15, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act and several awards of Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi made in 1961. In Writ Petition No. 252 of 1966, there are eight petitioners who owned lands in village Kotla at Patparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi. Their grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 and a notification dated June 14, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act. In Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura Road within the union territory of Delhi. His grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959, a notification dated July 27, 1961 under s. 6 of the A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent scheme, (c) land already notified either under S. 4 or under s. 6 for house building cooperative societies mentioned in annexure (iii) to the notification and the land under graveyards, tombs, shrine-, and those attached to religious institutions and wakf property, The notification stated that land was required by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, the planned development of Delhi. As already noted, there were several notifications under s. 6 made from time to time, the earliest one in this series of petitions being dated June 14, 1961. It is clear that on the basis of the judgment of this Court the validity of the notifications under s. 6 of the Act after the first of the series could not be upheld in A court of law. On January 20, 1967 an Ordinance was promulgated by the President of India styled The Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance (1 of 1967). The scheme of the Ordinance was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was to have effect, subject to the amendments specified in ss. 3 and 4 of the Ordin- ance. Section 3 purported to amend s. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) by enabling ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the principal Act; (ii)that one or more reports have been made under subsection (2) of section 5-A of the principal Act, whe- ther in respect of the entire land, or different parcels thereof, covered by the same notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act; (iii) that one or more declarations have been made under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the principal Act; (b) any acquisition in pursuance of any notification published under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1967, may be made after such commencement and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done (including any order made, agreement entered into or notification published), whether before or after such commencement, in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the grounds referred to in clause. (a) or any of them. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub-section (1), no declaration under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4. (2) The Validation Act violated Art. 31( 2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to authorise acquisitions without fresh notifications under s. 4 thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of the dead notification under s. 4. It was argued that once a notification under s. 4 was exhausted Government had to make a fresh one under the said section; as a result thereof compensation had to be assessed on a different basis altogether. (3) The Validation Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution in various ways (a) It- made discrimination inasmuch as a notification under-s. 4 made before the commencement of the Ordinance had to be followed by a declaration under s. 6 within two years of the said date, whereas if a notification under s. 4 was made after 20th January 1967 i.e. the date of the Ordinance, the declaration under s. 6 could be made within a period of three years from the date of the notification under s. 4. The discrimination lay in the fact that whereas a declaration under s. 6 had to be made in respect of a notification under s. 4 bearing date subsequent to 20th January 1967 within three years, a much longer period of time might elapse between a da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... S.C.R. 557) was not removed by s. 4 of the Amending Act. It was urged that Acts seeking to validate past transactions can only be effective if the amendment introduced had retrospective operation so as to cure the lacuna in the enactment from a date anterior to that of the impugned transactions. If the Amending Act had no retrospective operation, it could not protect past transactions which would still have to be declared invalid inasmuch as the notification under S. 4 made on November 13, 1959 having exhausted itself after the first declaration under S. 6 was not resusciated by any provision ,of the Amending Act. On the second point, the broad contention urged was that the amendment was hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as its whole purpose was to avoid payment of enhanced compensation which would be necessitated if a fresh notification had to be issued under s. 4. The notification dated November 13, 1959 having spent itself, a fresh one in the normal course would have to be issued and compensation be paid not on the basis of valuation on November 13, 1959 but on that prevailing at least 8 or 9 years afterwards which would be substantially higher. It was argued t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntil the price is ascertained the land remains the property of the l andowner. Both parties have the right to have the price ascertained and the purchase completed in manner provided by the Lands Clauses Acts. It was said that the English procedure ensured the payment of just equivalent of the property to the person who was deprived of it and that issue of a declaration under s. 6 made years after the notification under s. 4 the date of which alone was to be considered for fixing the value of the property, ignored the rights of the person to the lawful compensation aimed at by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Reference was made to the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India(1) where on a reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act as they then stood, it was observed : that the expert official charged with the duty of fixing a value should-be possessed of all the information in the hands of the department, and should at the same time avail himself of all that is offered at the enquiry, his ultimate duty being not to conclude the owner by his so-called award, but to fix the sum, which in Ms best judgment is t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s excluded from the purview of the notification issued under s. 4 of the Act. On June 14, 1961 the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, issued the first notification under s. 6 of the Act in respect of 97 bighas and 4 biswas of land in village Kilokri as required by the Government for a public purpose at the public expense, namely, the planned development of Delhi. The petitioners land was not covered by this notification. The Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, purported to issue another notification dated 26/27th July, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act declaring that land specified therein in village Kilokri was required to be taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose. This notification covered the petitioners land in question in village Kilokri. On January 9, 1962 the petitioner was informed by a letter issued by the office of the Town Planner, Municipal Corporation, Delhi, that the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation by its resolution No. 1190 dated December 18, 1961 had rejected the lay out plan of the petitioner s colony. According to the petitioner, this resolution went to show that his land was sought to be acquired bec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e and it was for the Judiciary to declare the limits of the legislative powers enshrined in the Constitution. To quote Mr. Mani s words : The Legislature exercises judicial power if its legislative action retroacts on past controversies and overrides or reverses the decisions of the Judiciary. Such an act, argued Mr. Mani, bad to be struck down in courts of law. Mr. Mani s main argument was that inasmuch as ss. 2 and 3 of the Amending Act had not been given retrospective effect, the validation sought to be effected by s. 4 with respect to the past transactions was of no avail as the impugned actions, i.e., the subsequent declarations under s. 6 of the Act, had no legal basis. In our opinion no useful purpose will be served by referring to the clear demarcation between the judicial powers and legislative powers in America and attempt to engraft the said principle in the working of our Constitution. This development of the law, as pointed out in A. K. Gopalan v. State([1950] S.C.R. 88 at 198.) was due to historical reasons. In that case it was pointed out by Das, J. (see, at p. 286) that the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Mars ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d, to a certain extent, rules of evidence may be changed and, as changed, made appli cable to past transactions,...... But substantial rights may not thus be interfered with. Willoughby seeks to fortify his statement quoting from Cooley again : The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so it may dispense, with any of those formalities which are not essential to the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dispense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it and, for the same reason it would be incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Relying on the above Mr. Mani proceeded to argue that the wording of s. 4 of the Amending Act was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d it) had plenary powers of legislation as much, and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself and If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions. In that case the question before the Judicial Committee was whether Act XXII of 1869 of the Indian Legislature which excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court within certain specified districts was not inconsistent with the Indian High Courts Act or with the Charter of the High Court and so in its general scope within the legislative power of the Governor-General in Council. Under s. 4 of that Act the territory known as Garo Hills was removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature and from the control of the officers of revenue, constituted by the regulations. of the Bengal Code and the Acts passed by any Legislature establis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... occasions. In the case of The United Provinces, V. Atiqa Begum([1940] F.C.R. 110) a question arose as to whether, the Regularisation of Remissions Act, 1938 of the United Provinces Legislature was within its competence. There was an Act in force, namely, the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 the purpose whereof was to consolidate and amend the law relating to agricultural tenancy and certain other matters. Section 73 of that Act provided that when for any cause the Local Government or any authority empowered by it, remitted or suspended for any period the whole or any part of the revenue payable in respect of any land, a Collector might order that the rents of the tenants should be remitted or suspended to an amount which shall bear the same proportion to the whole of the amount payable in respect of the land as the revenue of which the payment has been so remitted or suspended bears to the whole of the revenue payable in respect of such land. In 1931 there was a catastrophic fall in agricultural prices followed by threats on the part of tenants to withhold rent on a large scale. The Government of the United Provinces devised a scheme for the systematic reduction of rents, varying with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gislation to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. In this case the facts were as follows. The appellants had been convicted by courts functioning under the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (Ordinance No. 11 of 1942). On 4th June, 1943, the Federal Court held that the courts constituted under that Ordinance had not been duty invested with jurisdiction, in view of the nature of the provisions contained in ss. 5, 10 and 16 of that Ordinance. The next day, the Governor-General made and promulgated another Ordinance (Ordinance No- XIX of 1943) whereby Ordinance No. 11 of 1942 was repealed and certain provisions were made in respect of sentences which had been passed by the special courts and in respect of cases which were pending before them on that date. By sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the new Ordinance, a right of appeal against sentences which had already been passed by the special courts was given and appeals were accordingly preferred to the High Court in some cases. In certain other cases applications for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus were made. In both sets of cases, it was contended on behalf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le such legislation might seek to aid and support judicial proceedings, the legislature could not under the guise of legislation be permitted to exercise judicial power, and (b) that it was not competent to the legislature by retrospective legislation to make valid any proceedings which had been held in the courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Spens, C. J., observed (see at p. 100): As a general proposition, it may be true enough to say that the legislative function belongs to the legislature and the judicial function to the judiciary. , Such differentiation of functions and distribution of powers are in a sense part of the Indian law as of the American law. But an examination of the American authorities will show that the development of the results of this distribution in America has been influenced not merely by the simple fact of distribution of functions, but by the assumption that the Constitution was intended to reproduce the provision that had already existed in many of the State Constitutions positively forbidding the legislature from, exercising judicial powers . . . . One result of the application of this rule in the United States ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion was, whether the Ordinance was covered by any of the entries in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act. It was not contended said the Chief Justice that the mere absence of a specific provision about validating laws was by itself of much significance. As observed by this Court in Atiqa Begum s case([1940] F.C.R. 110), the power of validation must be taken to be ancillary or subsidiary to the power to deal with the particular subjects specified in the Lists. There is nothing in Basanta Chandra Ghose s case ([1944] F.C.R. 295) which detracts from the propositions of law laid down in Atiqa Begum s case([1940] F.C.R. 110) or Piare Dusadh s case([1944] F.C.R. 61). In Basant Chandra Ghose s case([1944] F.C.R. 295) Cl. (2) of s. 10 provided : If at the commencement of this Ordinance there is pending in any Court any proceeding by which the validity of an order having effect by virtue of section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance is called in question, that proceeding is hereby discharged. Spens, C.J. said with regard to this clause that here there has been no investigation or decision by any Tribunal which the legislating authority can be deemed to ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ade, decisions or directions given, notifications issued, proceedings taken and acts or things done, in relation to anyundertaking taken over, if they would have been validly made, given, issued, taken or done, had the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1949 (Madras Act XLIII of 1949), and the rules made thereunder been in force on the date on which the said orders, decisions or directions, notifications, proceedings, acts or things, were made, given, issued, taken or done are hereby declared to have been validly made, given, issued, taken or done, as the case may be, except to the extent to which the said orders, decisions, directions, notifications, proceedings, acts or things are repugnant to the provisions of this Act. It was held by this Court that this was a saving and validating provision and it clearly intends to validate actions taken under the relevant provisions of the earlier Act which was invalid from the start. The fact that s. 24 does not use the usual phraseology that the notifications issued under the earlier Act shall be deemed to have been issued under the Act, does not alter the position that the second part of the section has and is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... otwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force,- (i) no tax on circumstances and property imposed before the commencement of this Act under clause (ix) of sub-section (1) of section 128 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, or, clause (b) of section 108 of the United Provinces District Boards Act, 1922, shall be deemed to be, or ever to have been invalid merely on the ground that the tax imposed exceeded the limit of ₹ 50/- per annum prescribed by the said Act, and the validity of the imposition of any such tax shall not be called in question in any Court; (2)The Hindu Marriages (Validation of Proceedings) Act, 1960 (Act 19 of 1960) was passed to obviate the short comings in the Hindu Marriage Act pointed out by the Punjab High Court in Janak Dulari v. Narain Das (A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 50). There the High Court held that the court of an additional Judge cannot be regarded as a principal court of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act and that a District Judge to whom a petition under the Act is presented cannot transfer it to an additional Judge for trial. The object of the Validation Act was to va ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Constitution. As shown above, there have been instances where the latter course had been adopted by the Indian Parliament in the past. Section 4 of the Amending Act being within the legislative competence of Parliament, the provisions thereof are binding on all courts of law notwithstanding judgments, orders or decrees to the contrary rendered or made in the past. We find ourselves unable to accept the contention about the violation of Art. 31(2) of the Amending Act. It is not suggested that the Validating Act in express words enacts. any law which directly affects compensation payable in respect of the property acquired or lays down any principles different from those which were already in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. After the amendment of the Constitution in 1955 the question of adequacy of compensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the law provides that a person expropriated must be given compensation for his property or lays down the principles for the determination thereof. There is not a word about compensation in s. 4 of the Validating Act. Indirectly however, it would affect a person s right to compensation,, inasmuch as but for the Validating Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the forms and the manner in which such compensation is to be given. In Mrs. Bela Banerjee s case([1954] S.C.R. 558) s. 8 of the impugned West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 provided that the compensation to be awarded for acquisition of land was not to exceed the market value thereof on December 31, 1946. This provision was held to be arbitrary by this Court inasmuch as it fixed the ceiling on compensation by reference to the market value of the land on the above-mentioned date no matter when and how long afterwards the acquisition took place. Similarly in dismissing the appeal of the State in State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Mudaliar ([1964] 6 S.C.R. 936) where the Madras Act XI of 1953 provided that compensation was payable on the basis of the valuation of the land on April 28, 1947 together with some improvements made thereon up to the date of notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act because of the discovery of the presence of lignite in certain taluks in 1947 and the announcement by Government by a press note that it proposed to undertake legislation to compel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he date for valuation. Sections 4 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by Art. 31(5) (a) of the Constitution.. Only sections 5-A and 6 of the Act have been amended. The amendments do not alter the principle of compensation fixed by the Act nor contravene Art. 31 of the Constitution in any way. The Amending Act does not really derogate from the principle that the valuation on the date of issue of notification affords the criterion for determining compensation of all lands to be acquired. It only keeps alive the said notification for sustaining more than one declaration under s. 6 to meet the exigencies of the situation where it was not possible to make one comprehensive declaration under s. 6 and where the State has been obliged to validate actions which could not be supported under the principal Act. It cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was fixing an arbitrary date for the valuation of the property which bore no relation to the acquisition proceedings. At the same time when the notification under s. 4 was issued on 13th November 1959, the State had considered that a very large area round about Delhi-would have to be acquired so that the development of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on provided by that law is not adequate; and if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the property acquired or to the value of the property at or about the time it is acquired, it may be said that they are not principles contemplated by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. In that case it was also observed by this Court that in the context of continuous rise in land prices from year to year depending upon abnormal circumstances it cannot be said that fixation of average price of over five years is not a principle for ascertaining the price of the land in or about the date of acquisition. The decision is also an authority for the proposition that the omission of one of the elements that should properly be taken into account in fixing the compensation might result in the inadequacy of compensation but such omission in itself did not constitute fraud on power. it is also to be noted that in this case this Court upheld the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961 although the said Act substituted a new clause for the first clause in s. 23 ( 1 ) of the Land Acquisition Act. The substituted clause provided for payment of compensation on the basis of the market value o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sfy the dual test of intelligible classification and rationality of the relation with the object of the law, it will not be subject to judicial interference under Art. 14. Invalidity of legislation is not established by merely finding faults with the scheme adopted by the Legislature to achieve the purpose it has in view. Before scrutinising the provisions of the Amending Act, we must examine the objects of the Act., They may be summed up as follows :- (a) To amend the Act for the future by empowering the making of more than one declaration under s. 6. (b) To validate completed acquisitions on the basis of more than one declaration under that section. (c) To authorise more than one declaration under the said section in cases where there is already in existence a notification under s. 4. (d)To prescribe a time limit for future acquisitions as also pending proceedings not yet completed; and (e) To provide additional compensation by way of interest in all cases where acquisition has not yet been completed and where a declaration under s. 6 is issued more than three years after the notification under s. 4. There is nothing arbitrary or irrational about the said o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e even more than 3 years before 20th January 1967 and such cases obviously could not be treated in the same manner as notifications issued after, that date. Art. 14 does not strike at a differentiation caused by the enactment of a law between transactions governed thereby and those which are not so governed. As was pointed out by this Court in Hatisingh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of India([1960] 3 S.C.R. 528 at 543). When Parliament enacts a law imposing a liability as flowing from certain transactions prospectively, it evidently makes a distinction between those transactions which are covered by the Act and those which are not covered by the Act, because they were completed before the date on which the Act was enacted. With respect, the dictum can also be applied as between cases where the transaction was in the course of completion and those which had to be started after a particular date. On the whole the Amending Act seeks to improve the legislation which covered the field of acquisition of land. The Legislature might have made more liberal provisions for improvement but it is not for this court to strike down a piece of legislation because the improvement falls sh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad approached the Administration for release of their lands from the notification and a proposal for de-notification of the colonies was considered at a high level. It appears that a meeting was held on 29th June 1960 at which were present a number of persons including the Chief Secretary, Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority, Engineer-Member, Architect, Town Planning Organisation, Deputy Commissioner, Delhi Municipal Corporation, Architects of Delhi Municipal Corporation, Secretary, Local Self Government and Under Secretary to the State Government. The records show that the case of each notified colony was considered separately and it was felt that cases in which the layout and service plans had been finally approved in all respects before 13th November, 1959 should be recommended for de-notification. On 1st of July, 1960, the Commission, Delhi Municipal Corporation went into the matter and recommended that All those colonies in respect of which both lay-out plans and service plans had been approved by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority the Delhi Development, Authority or the Delhi Municipal Corporation may be denotified irrespective of whether security was dem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 894 (hereafter referred to as the Principal Act) notifying that land measuring 34070 acres marked in blocks A to T and X in the map enclosed there with was required by the Delhi Administration for the planned development of Delhi. In pursuance of that notification, the Delhi Administration issued sec. 6 notification dated June 14, 1961 in respect of the land situate in village Kilkori measuring 97 bighas 14 biswas only from out of the said notified area. The notification directed the Collector to take order for its acquisition under s. 7 of the Act. The Collector thereafter made his award on August 31, 1961 in respect of the said 97 bighas of land at ₹ 2500 a bigha, the total amount including the solatium awarded being ₹ 2,80,887.50. Nothing thereafter was done till March 18; 1966 when another notification under sec. 6 was issued in respect of 1752.2 bighas of land situated in Mandawali Fazilpur, Khuraj Khas and Shakarpur Khas. On February 9, 1966 this Court delivered its judgment in M. P. State v. V. P. Sharma (([1966] 3 S.C.R. 557) where facts were similar to the facts in the present cases and where the land was required for the erection of a steel plant in public ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng that he could not imagine a government which has vast resources not being able to make a complete plan of its project, at a time. Indeed, I think, when a plan is made it is a complete plan. I should suppose that before the government starts acquisition proceedings by the issue of a notification under sec. 4 it has made its plan for otherwise it cannot state in the notification, as it has to do, that the land is likely to be needed. Even if it had not then completed its plan it would have enough time before the making of a declaration under section 6 to do so. I think therefore that the difficulty of the government, even if there is one, does not lead to the conclusion that the Act contemplates the making of a number of declarations under sec. 6. In the view taken Sharma s case(1) sec. 6 notification dated March 18, 1966 was invalid as sec. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 on which it was founded ceased to be efficacious and became exhausted after sec. 6 notification dated June 14, 1961 wag issued and the rest of the land not covered by it became as a result released from acquisition. Depending on the declaration of law made in this decision the petitioners filed th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to be invalid or ever to have become invalid on the ground that (i)one or more collectors have performed the functions of collector in respect of the entire land covered by s. 4 notification. (ii) one or more reports have been made under s.5A(2) whether in respect of the entire land or different parcels thereof covered by the same notification, and (iii) that more than one declaration are made under sec . 6 in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under sec. 4(1). Clause (b) of sec. 4(1) provides that any acquisition in pursuance ,of a sec. 4 notification published before 20-1-67 may be made after that date and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done including any order, agreement or notification made or published whether before or after 20-1- 67 in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the said grounds mentioned in clause (a). Sub-sec. (2) of, sec. 4. provides that no declaration under sec. 6 shall be made in respect of land covered by sec. 4 notification published before 20-1-67 after the expiry of two years from that date, that is, 20-1-69. Sec. 4(3) provides for payment of interest in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ses to make sec. 6 declaration Whether it will ultimately be acquired or not. Under the Principal Act as construed in Sharma s Case([1966] 3 S.C.R. 557) once a sec. 6 notification is issued sec., 4 notification would become exhausted and the land not declared as needed thereunder would be relieved from acquisition. If government then desires to acquire any land in addition to. the one so declared it would have to be notified a fresh and the government would be obliged to pay compensation at the market rate prevailing on such date. The practical effect of the Amendment Act is that by keeping alive sec. 4 notification and by declaring the declarations made after the first declaration valid, the legislature dated back the basis of compensation which would have been, put for this validation, the rate prevailing at the date of sec. 4 notification howsoever belatedcessary. The real purpose of enacting sec.4 is thus to enable government to freeze an unlimited area by first notifying it under sec. 4 and then to acquire bit by bit and pay compensation at the rate prevailing at the date of sec. 4 notification howsoever belatedly it may choose to acquire such bits, provided it does so before ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Principal Act or by making secs. 2 and 3 of the Amendment Act retrospective. and by a fiction deeming it to have been made under such amending provision. Counsel for the petitioners raised the following contentions:-- (1) that Act 13 of 1967 does not revive sec. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 which became exhausted after the first sec. 6 declaration in 1961 was made and therefore no acquisition in respect of the rest of the land could be made without a fresh sec. 4 notification. The contention was that secs. 2 and 3 being prospective they did not resuscitate the sec. 4 notification though subsequent acquisitions including orders and declarations under sec. 6 are validated and that such validation has no efficacy as there would be no basis by way of a sec. 4 notification for such acquisition or order or declaration. (2) that Act 13 of 1967 is in derogation of the requirements of Art. 31(2) as it purports to authorise acquisition without a fresh sec. 4 notification thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of an exhausted sec. 4 notification and on the value of the land prevailing on the date of such exhausted notification. (3) that the Amendment Act is i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hem a construction of law according to its views. The legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon past transactions and controversies and reverse decisions which the courts in exercise of their undoubted authority have made,.for, that would mean not only exercise of a judicial function but in effect to sit as a court of review to which the past transactions and controversies are referred to. The question as formulated by him is whether a statute which simply validates acts and orders pronounced upon by a court as invalid is sustainable without a retrospective law providing that such acts and orders are deemed to have been made under the validating Act and as, if such validating Act was in existence at the date of such acts and orders. On the question whether the Amendment Act is in derogation of the requirements of Art. 31(2), the contention of the Solicitor-General was that it is not the law contemplated by Art.31(2) as it merely amends ss. 5A and 6 of the Principal Act and does not touch either s. 4 or s. 23 which deal with compensation,.that it amends only the procedural provisions and that sec. 4 thereof merely validates acquisitions including orders and notifications ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d only because government can now acquire it at a subsequent date. The deprivation of the appreciated value to different owners or to the same owner if both the parcels of land belong to the same would vary depending upon when government chooses to acquire each of such parcels. Therefore, from the mere fact that the impugned Act does not amend sec. 4 or sec. 23 it is not possible to say that it is not an Act dealing with or affecting compensation. Besides, by amending sees. 5A and 6 and validating acquisitions, orders and declarations the Amendment Act brings about changes of a fundamental character in the Act by converting the unitary character of an acquisition into a diversified one, in that instead of one inquiry and one report by the same officer,. one declaration under sec. 6 and one award, it permits several inquiries and several reports by different officers, several declarations and even several awards thus altering the very structure of the Principal Act. It is thus impossible to say that the impugned Act is not the law of acquisition contemplated by Art. 31(2)., It was, however, contended that even so, (1) the impugned Act does not alter the principle in s. 23 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ference. The impugned Act being a legislation after the 4th Constitution amendment of 1955 the question as to the adequacy of compensation is no longer amenable to judicial scrutiny but the amendment of Art. 31(2) in 1955 has not affected the constitutional requirement that no property can be compulsorily acquired except under a law providing for compensation or which provides principles fixing such compensation. As to what the term compensation in Art. 31 means has been the subject-matter of several decisions of this Court and the term has as a result acquired a well settled interpretation. In Bela Banerjee s Case([1954] S.C.R. 558. at p. 563-64.) Patanjali Sastri C.J. in repelling the contention that compensation in Entry 42 of List III could not mean full cash equivalent laid stress on the distinction between the word compensation in Art. 31 and the said Entry and the words the acquisition of property on just terms in s. 51 (XXXI) of the Australian Constitution Act and held that compensation meant just equivalent and the principles which should govern the determination of compensation amount to be given to the expropriated owner must ensure that what is determined m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt, and (v) that the legislature must provide for a just equivalent or lay down principles fixing such just equivalent and if that is done, such a law cannot be questioned on the ground of inadequacy of compensation. As to how and in what manner the question of adequacy would arise was illustrated by giving various examples. Article 31(2) as amended means therefore that if the impugned Act either fixes just equivalent as compensation or lays down principles for fixing such just equivalent it cannot be impeached on the ground that such compensation is inadequate or that when working out those principles the resultant compensation is inadequate. But this does not mean that the amendment permitted the legislature, to fix inadequate compensation or to lay down principles fixing compensation which is not just equivalent. Such a theory attributes an intention to the legislature to enact a law in terms of. contradiction, for, compensation which, is not just equivalent is no compensation as interpreted by this Court and understood when Art. 31(2) was amended and giving any such meaning to that Article would be contrary to the well settled principle of construction that where the legisla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the average of prices during those 5 years the Act actually took into account the appreciation in value during the 5 years preceding the acquisition for fixing the compensation. The position in the instant cases is quite different. The impugned Act does not provide for any such average price as was done in Vajravelu s Case.( [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614) Though s. 4 apparently validates acquisitions, orders and notifications made on the basis of s. 4 notification issued before 20-1-67, in effect and substance it seeks to treat such a notification under s. 4 which had lost its efficacy and had become exhausted where s. 6 declaration has been made. for a part of the land covered by such s. 4 notification as still outstanding. This is sought to be done without any legislative provision in the impugned Act revitalising the notification which had become dead and inefficacious. Such a thing could not be done by merely validating acquisitions, orders and declarations without revitalising by some provision the notifications under s. 4 which had become exhausted and on which such acquisitions including orders and declarations are founded. Nor could it validate inquiries and reports under s. 5A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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