TMI Blog1965 (8) TMI 95X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e questions in favour of the respondent and against the appellant Municipality. On the first question the learned Judge has relied upon Ghanaya Lal v. Municipal Committee, Montgomery, AIR 1928 Lah 540, Mula Mal v. Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 607, and Wariam Singh, v. Municipal Committee, Nabha, AIR 1953 Pepsu 127, the ratio of which cases completely supports the view taken by the learned Judge. On the second question the learned Judge has relied upon a case to a considerable extent similar to the facts of the present case, Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163, not accepting the applicability of the ratio to the facts of the present case in Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 220, because that case related to the sale of liquor in consequence of an auction according to the relevant excise law in that case. 3. In the official publication of the Municipal Committee of Malerkotla of 1959, bye-laws with regard to fruits and vegetables appear at page 23. It is stated that those bye-laws have been made under Sections 197 and 188 (e) (ii) of Punjab Act 3 of 1911. Bye-laws 5, 6 and 7 concern the matter of licence fee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es. This provision was, how ever, repealed in 1923 as has been pointed out in Mula Mal's case, AIR 1929 Lah 607. Clause (a) of Section 1.97 was, previous to that repeal, slightly differently worded and its pre sent form now is--- - 197. The committee may, and shall if so required by the State Government, by bye-law-- (a) prohibit the manufacture, sale, or preparation or exposure for sale, of any specified articles of food or drink, in any place or premises not licensed by the committee. It is obvious that the power under this clause is to prohibit such sale except in premises licensed by the committee, but it is not a power, as was the case in the old Clause (d), to fix a particular place or places for that purpose. It is clear that the scope and nature of the power is entirely different from what was the power under old Clause (d) that has been taken away. The power to fix place or places for the sale of articles of food or drink having been once granted and specifically taken away, cannot be read by implication in the words of Clause (a). Otherwise, as has been pointed out above, the scope of Clause (a) is quite different from what was the scope of old Clause (d). ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... word 'regulation' as given in 76 Corpus Juris Secundum 615, and takes from the variety of meanings given there only this that this word is same as restriction and then relies upon Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430, to press that the word 'restriction' includes prohibition. The contention of the learned counsel thus is that under the provision now under consideration the appellant Municipality while regulating the markets has been given power to make the impugned bye-laws whereby they practically prohibit the carrying on a trade of selling, wholesale or by auction, fruits and vegetables in Malerkotla excepting at the four shops assigned for that purpose in the Sabzi Mandi. The word 'regulation' has to be read in the context in which it has been used. It appears from the very meaning of this word in 76 Corpus Juris Secundum 615 that it is variously defined as meaning a rule prescribed for conduct; a rule or order prescribed for management or Government; a rule, order, or direction from a superior or competent authority; a governing direction; a regulating principle, a precept; a law; a prescription; a method. The word is also defined as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hing whatsoever; whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing or trading which he had before. A monopoly consists in the ownership or control of so large a part of the market-supply or output of a given commodity as to stiffle competition, restrict the freedom of commerce, and give the monopolist control over prices. This completely meets the argument of the learned counsel that a monopoly must necessarily be confined to one person. There can be a monopoly in the case of more persons, than one, so long as exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade or the like is granted as a privilege to such persons. The learned counsel for the appellant Municipality has, as was his case before the learned Judge, relied, with some emphasis, upon Cooverjee B. Bharucha's case, AIR 1954 SC 220, but the learned Judge very rightly points out that the observations in that case are confined to the particular type of business of liquor which in the interests of the public at large is necessarily controlled by the State to a very large measure and such business has nothing parallel with the ordinary business of selling fruits and veget ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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