TMI Blog2018 (2) TMI 487X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid grace period. As has been held by us above, it is the second period, which is a special inbuilt kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the special statute, which lays down that beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further condonation of delay. In view of the language of the proviso to Section 421(3) which contains mandatory or peremptory negative language and speaks of a second period not exceeding 45 days, which would have the same effect as the expression but not thereafter used in Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hall, as far as may be, apply to Appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and that therefore, Section 5 would be applicable to condone the delay beyond the period of 90 days. He has buttressed his submission by referring to various decisions of this Court. 3) Before coming to the judgments of this Court, it is important to first set out Section 421(3) and Section 433 of the Act. These provisions read as follows: 421. Appeal from orders of Tribunal.- **** **** **** (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved and shall be in such form, and accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the argument of learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature. 6) We are fortified in this conclusion by the judgment of this Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission , 2010 (5) SCC 23 . The language of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which is similar to the language contained in Section 421 (3) of the Companies Act, 2013, came up for consideration in the aforesaid decision. The issue ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l appearing on behalf of the appellant. The first is the judgment in Guda Vijayalakshmi vs. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry , (1981) 2 SCC 646. In that case, a Transfer Petition was filed under Section 25, CPC, 1908 in this Court. A preliminary objection was taken stating that in view of Sections 21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 25 would not be applicable. This was turned down by this Court stating that Section 21 would not apply to substantive provisions of the Code as apart from procedural provisions. Equally, Section 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 only dealt with transfers in certain cases . This being so, the wide and plenary power conferred on this Court to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the expression so far as may be only means to the extent possible. If not possible, obviously the Limitation Act would not apply. We have already held that it is not possible for Section 5 of the Limitation Act to apply given the peremptory language of Section 421(3). 10) The third judgment is Mangu Ram vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi , (1976) 1 SCC 392. In this judgment, Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provided for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. Section 417 (4) required that the application for special leave should be made before the expiry period of 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal. Applying Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, this Court held that Section 5 of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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