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TMI Blog2019 (8) TMI 1917X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... out of the aforesaid suit for recovery of damages, carries a peculiar and chequered history of its own, with assortment of several undisputed actual facts, a few disputed facts, and varied rounds of litigations. In a brief outline of the subject matter, it may be noticed that the Plaintiff-Appellant had allegedly taken certain parcels of land Comprising field Nos. 805/1, 805/3, 805/4, 806, 807, 808 & 809 in Kalakkadu Village and field No. 495 in Malayadipudur Village (Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelveli District), in all admeasuring 197.36 acres-Hereinafter referred to as 'the land in question' or 'the subject land'. on lease (initially for a period of 5 years in the years 1961-1972 and later, for a period of 25 years in the years 1977-1978) from its owner Sri Nanamamalai Jeer Mutt, Nanguneri Hereinafter referred to as 'the Mutt'. for plantation and co-related purposes. The case of the Plaintiff-Appellant has been that by virtue of a notification dated 06.03.1976, as issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, the land in question was proposed to be included in a wild life sanctuary under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Appellant has preferred this appeal. The relevant background and factual matrix 2. The relevant background and factual aspects of the matter could be briefly summarised as follows: 2.1. The Appellant, a partnership firm, had taken the land in question, admeasuring 197.36 acres, on lease from its owner, the Mutt, for the purpose of cultivating commercial crops such as tea, coffee and cardamom over 80 acres of the total available land. The Appellant has alleged that the land in question was given on lease on 15.11.1971 but the registered lease deed in that regard was executed by the Mutt on 01.07.1972, for a period of 5 years i.e., from 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977. 2.2. By G.O. Ms. No. 183 dated 06.03.1976, issued Under Section 18(1) of the Act of 1972, the Government of Tamil Nadu stated its approval of the proposal of Chief Conservator of Forests to notify Kalakkadu Reserve Forest in Tirunelveli District as a sanctuary for the protection and development of wild life therein. This allegedly included the aforesaid 197.36 acres of land leased to the Appellant. 2.3. On 23.03.1975 and on 17.09.1976, the Appellant applied for clear felling of trees in 10 acres of land out of the sai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and the Mutt made several attempts to get the subject land excluded from the proposed sanctuary and on the other hand, on 24.06.1984, the Appellant filed a written statement in the award inquiry along with the claim in Form No. 8 under the Rules of 1975, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 41,36,866/-. The authorities concerned also exchanged various interdepartmental communications for the purpose of assessment of the amount of compensation. All these proceedings and communications need not be elaborated herein but it may be noticed that on 01.08.1985, the Collector rejected an application filed by the Appellant for registration of Cardamom Estate in the land in question on the ground that the land was to be acquired for the purpose of setting up of the wild life sanctuary. Thereafter, on 23.03.1990, the Collector addressed a communication to the Special Commissioner and the Commissioner of Land Administration that the compensation together with solatium and interest for the land belonging to the Mutt was estimated at Rs. 72,98,661/-. On 03.12.1990, the said Special Commissioner reduced the total estimated compensation to Rs. 65,06,453/- and requested the Government to pass a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the building constructed. The Appellant also claimed 30% solatium and 12% p.a. interest from the date of notification until the date of award and 15% p.a. future interest on the total amount of compensation. 2.11. On 16.04.1992, the award proceedings were completed and a draft award was forwarded by the District Revenue Officer to the Special Commissioner. However, since the Respondent did not take further steps for making the award, another writ petition, being W.P. No. 6931 of 1993, was preferred, jointly by the Mutt and the Appellant, seeking directions for early making of the award. This writ petition was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 11.08.1993 with directions for making the award within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. The learned Single Judge directed in the order dated 11.08.1993 thus: "Hence I direct the competent authority, viz., Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration to take into consideration the valuation proposals sent in Collector's Office reference K2/1498/83 dated 20.6.1990 and 12.9.1990, and approved by the Special Administration and due representations of the 2nd Petitioner dated 10.7 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... clude the land in question from the limits of the proposed sanctuary under Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 1972; and thus the Collector issued the questioned order dated 19.11.1993. 2.15. The said order dated 19.11.1993 was challenged jointly by the Mutt and the Appellant by way of a writ petition in the High Court, being W.P. No. 21721 of 1993. The present Appellant also filed a contempt petition (No. 340 of 1994) complaining of disobedience of the orders earlier passed by the High Court. On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the said order dated 19.11.1993; and also held the officers concerned guilty of contempt and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each of them. However, the order so passed by the learned Single Judge was questioned by the Respondent-State by way of an intra-court appeal, being WA No. 1041 of 1995, that was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 18.09.1997 but with several remarks and observations against the Respondent-State and while leaving it open for the writ Petitioners to approach the civil Court for recovery of damages. 2.16. The observatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... We do not propose to say that the Government is blemishless. On the otherhand, the Government had acted thoughtlessly both at the stage of the notification Under Section 18 and at the stage of withdrawal from the notification. The Government must suffer the consequences of their action, both issuing declaration Under Section 18 and in committing inordinate delay in passing the award and ultimately withdrawing from the notification. But the damages suffered by the Respondents on account of the Government's acts of commission and omission has to be proved in a Court of law. The Respondents have no doubt, a valid case against the Government for their acts of commission and omission. The question is what is the actual remedy of the Respondents. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy), is no doubt applicable on the facts of the present case. But, we are only pointing out that the remedy of the Respondents is elsewhere. They have no right to insist on the Government completing the acquisition proceedings and proceeding with the project as a sanctuary. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we concede the power of the Government to withdraw fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for in W.P. No. 21721 of 1993 cannot be granted and the writ petition will stand dismissed. The appeal is allowed in the above manner, leaving it open to the Respondents to agitate their rights in an appropriate forum. Contempt appeal No. 6 of 1995 is also allowed. There will be no order as to costs." 2.17. In order to complete the chronicle of background, it may also be noticed that the present Appellant alone preferred a petition for Special Leave to Appeal before this Court against the said judgment dated 18.09.1997, which was dismissed in limine on 23.02.1998. 2.18. Only after conclusion of the aforesaid litigation with dismissal of the petition for Special Leave to Appeal by this Court on 23.02.1998 that the Appellant took up the action in civil Court for recovery of damages. 2.19. Before dilating on the facts and events relating to the action for recovery of damages, it would be apt to summarise the material facts and features noticed in the preceding paragraphs. Put in a nut-shell, the sum and substance of the matter is that the land in question, said to have been taken by the Plaintiff-Appellant on lease from the Mutt, was proposed to be included in the sanctuary for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion. 3.1. As regards the measure and quantum of damages, the Appellant referred to the alleged loss of earnings @ Rs. 2.31 lakhs per annum on the basis of valuation worked out in the award inquiry for the very same land. The Appellant also claimed interest at the rate of 18% per annum and yet further claimed the cost of re-plantation and rearing operations as also the loss of profit for a period of 3 years that was likely to be taken for the crops to yield the fruits. The Appellant claimed the total loss of earning for 22 years from 06.03.1976 and other components of loss as follows: Rs. "(a) Total on loss for 22 years (Rs. 2.31 lacs xx 22 years) 50.82 lakhs (b) Interest on loss of income for 22 years 70.13 lakhs (c) Cost of replantation and rearing operations for 3 years @Rs. 5000/- per acre for 75.52 acres (restricted to) 7.00 lakhs (d) Repairs to Factory/Office and Labour Sheds to make it fit for use (restricted to) 1.00 lakhs (e) Loss of Revenue for three years (Rs. 2.00 lakhs x 3 years) (the period that would be taken for re-planting the rearing plantation and to put them to yield) (restricted to) 3.00 lakhs Total 1,31,95,000/-" 4. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Defendant. 4.2. The Defendant-Respondent also submitted that even if the land in question was notified, the cause of action, in any case, accrued to the Plaintiff on 19.11.1993 and, therefore, the suit for damages was barred by limitation. The Defendant further submitted that the Division Bench, while allowing the writ appeal (by its judgment dated 18.09.1997), though had kept it open to the Plaintiff to rely on the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Limitation Act'. for excluding the period during which the matter was pending in the Court but, the Limitation Act was of no assistance to the Plaintiff inasmuch as what was being prosecuted earlier was a challenge to the proposal of acquisition and then for compensation for the alleged take-over of the land in question whereas, what was being prosecuted in the suit was the claim for damages for the alleged loss of earnings from 06.03.1976. The Defendant also raised the objections of want of territorial jurisdiction and non-joinder of necessary parties. 5. On the pleadings of parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which were carried out for the purpose of assessment of the amount of compensation. Ultimately, the learned Judge accepted the submissions of the Plaintiff that loss of earnings was calculated by the officers concerned at the rate of Rs. 2.31 lakhs per annum; and held the Plaintiff entitled to this amount for 22 years i.e., a sum of Rs. 50.82 lakhs. The learned Judge though rejected the other claims of the Plaintiff but allowed another sum of Rs. 1 lakh towards repairs of factory office. In this manner, the Plaintiff-Appellant was held entitled to the total sum of Rs. 51.82 lakhs towards damages. On issue No. 6, the learned Judge awarded another sum of Rs. 35.06 lakhs being interest @ 6% p.a. from 06.03.1976 to 18.09.1997 and also held the Plaintiff entitled to the interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing until realisation. Issue No. 7 was separately decided in favour of the Plaintiff in view of the findings on issue Nos. 4 and 5. The Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit 8. Being aggrieved by the decree so passed by the learned Single Judge for damages and interest, the Defendant-Respondent preferred an appeal, being OSA No. 193 of 2002, before the Division ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Plaintiff after issuance of notification Under Section 18. Since the Plaintiff claims right on the basis of subsequent lease for 25 years, which was admittedly executed by the original owner after notification Under Section 18, it is doubtful whether the Plaintiff had acquired any right at that time, at least against the State. At any rate, even assuming that the Plaintiff had any right as a lessee, there was no statutory embargo debarring the Plaintiff from exercising his rights. *** *** *** 24. In the present case, there is nothing on record to indicate that in respect of the area claimed, the Plaintiff and the original owner had ever been dispossessed and prevented from exercising any right, save and except the refusal to grant permission for felling the trees way back in 1976. It is of course true that there are several correspondence on record which indicate that for ascertaining the compensation, the Collector and other authorities were asking for allotment of higher amount for the purpose of finalising the compensation and award, but, there is no material on record to indicate that the award proceedings, so far as the Plaintiff and the land owner are concerned, h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on Under Section 18 of the Act or the fact that some enquiries were pending, is not a ground to award damages. 8.2. The Division Bench of the High Court also examined the purport and effect of the previous judgment dated 18.09.1997 and pointed out that the observations therein did not mean that the rights and liabilities of the parties had been decided and only quantification of the amount of damages was to be made. The Division Bench held, in the following, that the Plaintiff-Appellant, having failed to plead and prove the specific case of unlawful activity on the part of the State or its officials, was not entitled to recover any amount as damages: 28. It is no doubt true that in the Division Bench decision, while deciding the writ appeal in favour of the Government, certain observations have been made indicating that it is open to the aggrieved party to seek for adequate compensation. Such observations cannot, however, construed to mean that rights and liabilities of the parties had been decided and only quantification is to be made. On the other hand, it was only made clear that even though the Government cannot be forced to acquire the land for the purpose of sanctuary, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the matter and the relevant provisions of the Act of 1972; and has strenuously contended that the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in law as also on facts in reversing the considered decision of the learned Single Judge and in dismissing the suit filed by the Appellant. The learned Senior Counsel has referred to the jurisprudential concepts of ownership and property; and has contended that the lease hold rights on the subject land and plantations thereon had been the valuable property of the Appellant; and deprivation of the usufruct of the subject land had been in direct violation of the Appellant's right to property for which, the Appellant is entitled to claim damages. The learned Counsel has particularly referred to the letter dated 28.05.1987 by the Collector to the Deputy Secretary to the Government in Forest and Fisheries Department stating and acknowledging the facts that the land was developed by the Appellant from the years 1972 to 1978; and the Appellant was not allowed to continue with his work on the land in question after declaration of the area as wild life sanctuary due to the land acquisition proposal. The learned Counsel has contended that there b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n deprived of using the land in question and prevented from taking the usufruct, the quantum of damages had rightly been assessed on the basis of the loss of earnings assessed by the officers of the Respondent-State during the award inquiry; rather the assessment had been on the lower side, looking to the loss and deprivation suffered by the Appellant. 9.3. The learned Counsel has also referred to the contentions sought to be urged on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent with reference to Section 60 of the Act of 1972 and has contended that such a plea was neither taken in the written statement nor any issue was framed in that regard nor any such contention was urged before the Single Judge and hence, the Respondent cannot take such a plea at the later stage. Without prejudice to these submissions, the learned Counsel has also contended that the principles of the decision of this Court in Kasturi Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 1039 are not of investing the State with a blanket or absolute immunity in relation to the tortious act of its officers; and has particularly referred to the decisions in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. (1994) 6 SCC 205 and Union of India v. Sancheti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that in terms of Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Tamil Nadu Act of 1959', the alleged lease for a term of 25 years was null and void because such a lease could not have been made unless sanctioned by the authority concerned; and, in this regard, only a cursory statement was made by PW1 of having obtained permission but no documentary proof of the requisite sanction was adduced. 10.1. The learned Counsel has also contended that with the State and its officers having exercised their powers under the statute i.e., the Act of 1972 in a legal manner, the suit for damages was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 60 of the Act of 1972. The learned Counsel has also referred to the decision in Kasturi Lal's case (supra) and submitted that the land in question having been excluded from the proposed sanctuary on relevant considerations, including the interest of public exchequer, the impugned action would not lead to any cause for claiming damages. The learned Counsel has further referred to the statement of PW-1 in cross-examination that he was never dispossessed and has contended ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... regards validity of the alleged second lease in favour of the Appellant on the anvil of the Tamil Nadu Act of 1959 (as urged before this Court); and as regards immunity from any action as per Section 60 of the Act of 1972 (as urged before the Division Bench of High Court) cannot be said to be wholly without substance. We would hasten to observe that the case of the Appellant is not being rejected on these grounds for the reason that such contentions were not urged at the trial stage but, in the given set of facts and circumstances, we feel rather impelled to make prima facie observations in regards to these aspects. 12.1. As per the case of the Appellant, the second lease deed dated 20.03.1978 in relation to the land in question was executed in its favour by the Mutt for a period of 25 years. The self-explanatory provisions of Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Act of 1959 The relevant parts of Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Act of 1959 read under: "34. Alienation of immovable trust property.-(1) Any exchange, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding five years of any immovable property, belonging to, or given or endowed for the purposes of, any religious institution shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the said lease deed was even otherwise impermissible and in any case, even on the basis of this questionable second lease, the Plaintiff-Appellant has no right to claim damages. 12.2. Secondly, by virtue of Section 60 of the Act of 1972, The relevant parts of Section 60 of the Act of 1972 read as under: 60. Protection of action taken in good faith.-(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any officer or other employee of the Central Government or the State Government for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act. (2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or the State Government or any of its officers or other employees, for any damage caused or likely to be caused by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act. *** *** ***" no civil suit in relation to any action taken in good faith under the Act of 1972 is maintainable. Although, this aspect was not pleaded in specific terms on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent nor any issue in that regard was struck but, prima facie, we have reservations if any action of the present nature could have been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntained in Section 18(1) came to be amended by Act No. 44 of 1991 with effect from 02.10.1991. The amended provisions of Section 18(1) read as follows: "18. Declaration of sanctuary.-(1) The State Government may, by notification, declare its intention to constitute any area other than an area comprised within any reserve forest or the territorial waters as a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life or its environment." 19. Collector to determine rights.- Whenever any area is declared to be a sanctuary, the Collector shall inquire into and determine, the existence, nature and extent of the rights of any person in or over the land comprised within the limits of the sanctuary. Section 19 was also amended by Act No. 44 of 1971 and the amended Section 19 reads as follows: "19. Collector to determine rights.- When a notification has been issued Under Section 18 the Collector shall inquire into, and determine, the existence, nature and extent of the rights of any person in or over the land comprised within the limits of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... proved in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894). By the said amendment Act No. 44 of 1991, Sub-clause (c) was added to Section 24 as follows: "(c) allow, in consultation with the Chief Wild Life Warden, the continuation of any right of any person in or over any land within the limits of the sanctuary." *** *** *** 27. Restriction on entry in sanctuary.- (1) No person other than,- (a) a public servant on duty, (b) a person who has been permitted by the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer to reside within the limits of the sanctuary, (c) a person who has any right over immovable property within the limits of the sanctuary, (d) a person passing through the sanctuary along a public highway, and (e) the dependents of the person referred to in clause(a), clause(b) or Clause (c), shall enter or reside in the sanctuary, except under and in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted Under Section 28. (2) Every person shall, so long as he resides in the sanctuary, be bound- (a) to prevent the commission, in the sanctuary, of an offence against this Act; (b) where there is reason to believe that any such offence against this Act has been com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of proclamation by the Collector; inquiry by the Collector; and the Collector's powers for the purpose of inquiry remained essentially the same. It may, however, be pointed out that in view of modification in the scheme of the process of declaration of a sanctuary, whereby, after the amendment, the notification Under Section 18 is only a declaration of the intention of Government, the provisions were inserted by way of Section 26-A to the Act of 1972 to provide for the declaration of area as a sanctuary, essentially after disposal of the claims, if any made after issuance of the notification Under Section 18. For the present purpose, suffice would be to take note of the principal part of Sub-section (1) of Section 26-A, (while omitting the proviso and other sub-sections), as under: "26-A. Declaration of area as sanctuary.- (1) When- (a) a notification has been issued Under Section 18 and the period for preferring claims has elapsed, and all claims, if any, made in relation to any land in an area intended to be declared as a sanctuary, have been disposed of by the State Government; or (b) any area comprised within any reserved forest or any part of the territorial wate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and was not included in the said notification Under Section 18(1) of the Act, it had been the specific assertion of the Appellant that it was so included and the entire matter, including the claim of the Appellant, has proceeded on the basis that it was indeed included therein. That being the position, there was absolutely no occasion for the Appellant acquiring any further right in the land in question after expiry of the term of his lease on 30.06.1977. For this reason alone, we are clearly of the view that the so called second lease deed, said to have been executed in favour of the Appellant on 20.03.1978 was of no effect. In other words, the notification Under Section 18(1) having been issued on 06.03.1976 (which included the land in question as per the own assertion of the Appellant), no right in the land in question could have been acquired except by succession and hence, acquiring of any right by the Appellant in the subject land, said to be covered by the said notification dated 06.03.1976, by way of a lease, was absolutely out of question. 16.1. In our view, the entire substratum of the case of the Appellant is knocked to the ground once it is found that the Appellant had ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 02.2007, and rightly so, that even as per the admission of the PW-1, the Appellant had not been dispossessed. So far as the restriction on entry is concerned, as per Section 27 of the Act of 1972, a person having any right over the immovable property within the limits of sanctuary is not debarred from entering into or residing within the sanctuary. At the most, the duties as contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 27 are to be performed. Such duties, essentially to protect the sanctuary and its habitants, cannot be said to be leading to any debarment from exercising any legal right. 17.2. In our view, the Division Bench has rightly observed in the impugned judgment that there is nothing on record to establish that the original owner and the Plaintiff were prevented from going inside the forest and collecting the usufructs. In a comprehension of the facts on record and the law applicable, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff-Appellant was prevented from exercising its lawful rights in any unlawful manner by the State. Hence, there appears no basis for the Appellant to maintain an action for damages. 18. There had, of course, been one instance where the Appellant was denied the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o case for granting any decree for damages is made out. Limitation 21. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the question of limitation naturally arises for consideration. If the actions of the officers of the Respondent-State under the Act of 1972 at all gave rise to the claim for damages, the matter was directly covered by Article 72 of the Limitation Act providing for the limitation of one year for such a suit, which begins to run when the act or omission takes place. Article 72 of the Limitation Act reads as under: For compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this Act extends. One year When the act or omission takes place. 21.1. In the case of Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (supra), this Court has pointed out that if the act or omission complained of is not alleged to be in pursuance of the statutory authority, Article 72 would not apply; and this Article would not protect a public officer acting malafide under the colour of his office. Although in the present case, there is no specific allegation of malafide against any particular officer/officers and hen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... intiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the Defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it. 21.4.1. We may usefully refer to the relevant decisions pointing out the basic requirements for applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Madhavrao Narayanarao Patwardhan v. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu and Ors. AIR 1958 SC 767, this Court pointed out the requirements on Plaintiff for the purpose of Section 14 in the following: 6. .....In order to bring his case within the Section quoted above, the Plaintiff has to show affirmatively: (1) that he had been prosecuting with due diligence the previous suit in the court of the Munsif at Miraj. (2) that the previous suit was founded upon the same cause of action, (3) that it had been prosecuted in good faith in that court, and (4) that that court was unable to entertain that suit on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like na ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the company was unable to pay its debts Section 163(1) shows that the expression "unable to pay its debts" embraces three distinct concepts. There is nothing to show that the application was confined to this particular debt. But even if it was, the cause of action in winding up proceedings Under Section 163(1) is the inability of the company to pay its debts and not as here, as the recovery of the debt. The question of recovery does not arise until the winding up order has been made and a liquidator appointed. It is at that stage that the claims against the company are enquired into and decided. Therefore the cause of action in those proceedings and the cause of action here were not the same. It follows that Section 14 is not attracted. 21.4.5. The decisions referred by learned Counsel for the Appellant had been of different situations. In Rameshwarlal (supra), the claim was of salary by the Petitioner that was not entertained in the writ petition on the ground that the claim was recoverable in civil action and the civil suit was filed thereafter. This Court indicated the normal principle that the Court dealing with the matter in the first instance must be found lacking jurisdi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g, the Plaintiff-Appellant joined the Mutt to assert that the Respondent-State was not entitled to exclude the land in question from sanctuary; and that the State ought to take the land and ought to pay compensation as proposed by some of its officers. On the other hand, the claim in the present suit is founded on the ground that the Plaintiff has suffered loss due to the proceedings under the Act of 1972 and then, due to exclusion of the subject land from acquisition. The relief claimed in the present suit and matter in issue herein cannot be said to be the same as had been in issue in the earlier proceeding i.e., the said writ petition against the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993. Apart from the fact that the earlier proceeding i.e., the said writ petition was for a different relief for quashing the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993, it is also pertinent that the said writ petition was dismissed on merit and not for want of jurisdiction. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is totally ruled out in this case. 21.6. We may also observe that if the said order dated 19.11.1993 had at all given any cause to the Appellant to claim damages/compensation, the limitation had b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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