Home Case Index All Cases Indian Laws Indian Laws + SC Indian Laws - 2009 (1) TMI SC This
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
2009 (1) TMI 889 - SUPREME COURTRight to speedy trail - callous and inordinate delay of 17 years in investigations and the trial - Demand of illegal gratification - offence punishable under Sections 161 (before its omission by Act 30/2001), 109 and 120B of the I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - seeking to quash the entire criminal proceedings pending against him - High Court dismissed the petition u/s 482 - Whether appellant's constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution are violated? - HELD THAT:- We are of the opinion that having regard to the factual scenario, noted above, and for the reasons stated hereafter, it is a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. (In particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr.[1978 (1) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT], in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [1979 (2) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT], this Court had observed that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just'; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means (reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. It is pertinent to note that even till date, learned counsel for the State is not sure whether a sanction for prosecuting the appellant is required and if so, whether it has been granted or not. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the period from 7th December, 1990 till 28th February, 2007 there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even the direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no effect on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the State, far from being established to show that the delay in investigation or trial was in any way attributable to the appellant. The prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning a callous and inordinate delay of more than two decades in investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot, in any way, be said to be arising from any default on the part of the appellant. Thus, on facts in hand, in our opinion, the stated delay clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. We feel that under these circumstances, further continuance of criminal proceedings, pending against the appellant in the court of Special Judge, Muzaffarpur, is unwarranted and despite the fact that allegations against him are quite serious, they deserve to be quashed. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the proceedings pending against the appellant in Special Case are hereby quashed.
|