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2023 (10) TMI 1371 - SUPREME COURTMurder - Death due to poisoning - onus to prove - Failure on the part of the appellant-convict in offering any plausible explanation in his further statement recorded u/s 313 of CrPC - shifting the burden on the accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the date his wife died - whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order? - HELD THAT:- What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with counter-vailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one - although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution Prima facie in the context of section 106 of Evidence Act - HELD THAT:- Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death - The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved - In the case on hand it has been established or rather proved to the satisfaction of the court that the deceased was in company of her husband i.e., the appellant-convict at a point of time when something went wrong with her health and therefore, in such circumstances the appellant-convict alone knew what happened to her until she was with him. Failure on the part of the appellant-convict in offering ant plausible explanation in his further statement recorded u/s 313 of CrPC - HELD THAT:- The appellant-convict was expected to lead some evidence as to what had transpired at the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital. He has maintained a complete silence. It is only the appellant-convict who could have explained in what circumstances and in what manner he had taken his wife to the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital and who attended his wife at the hospital. If it is his case, that his wife was declared dead on being brought at the hospital then it is difficult to believe that the hospital authorities allowed the appellant to carry the dead body back home without completing the legal formalities. Even where there are facts especially within the knowledge of the accused, which could throw a light upon his guilt or innocence, as the case may be, the accused is not bound to allege them or to prove them. But it is not as if the section is automatically inapplicable to the criminal trials, for, if that had been the case, the Legislature would certainly have so enacted - more than a prima facie case to enable the prosecution to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shift the burden on the accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the date his wife died. These appeals reminds of what this Court observed in the case of Dharam Das Wadhwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1974 (3) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT] “The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from evidence, circumstantial or direct.” The role of courts in such circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities, perfunctory investigation or insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women. Both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.
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