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2018 (2) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURTCondonation of delay of 9 days - Section 5 of the Limitation Act - application to the peremptory language of Section 421(3) of the companies act, 2013 - period of limitation - appeal against the order of NCLT - Held that:- In the present case, the Section 417(3) does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days, Section 417(3) goes on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period given by the legislature which cannot be exceeded, alone would apply, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid grace period. As has been held by us above, it is the second period, which is a special inbuilt kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the special statute, which lays down that beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further condonation of delay. In view of the language of the proviso to Section 421(3) which contains mandatory or peremptory negative language and speaks of a second period not exceeding 45 days, which would have the same effect as the expression “but not thereafter” used in Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature. - Decided against the appellant.
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