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2018 (11) TMI 1529 - SUPREME COURTCondonation of a delay caused on the account of alleged fraud played on the objector beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 - applicability of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Held that:- This Court in several pronouncements has extended Section 14 of Limitation Act to Section 34 of Arbitration Act and thereby excluded the time spent in bonafide pursuing proceedings in a Court which lacks jurisdiction - Similarly, this Court also extended Section 12 of the Limitation Act to the Arbitration Act and excluded the day on which the Award was received from computing the starting period under Section 34(3). Extending Section 17 of the Limitation Act would go contrary to the principle of ‘unbreakability’ enshrined under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. Section 17 does not defer the starting point of the limitation period merely because the Appellants has committed fraud. Section 17 does not encompass all kinds of frauds and mistakes. Section 17(1)(b) and (d) only encompasses only those fraudulent conduct or act of concealment of documents which have the effect of suppressing the knowledge entitling a party to pursue its legal remedy. Once a party becomes aware of the antecedent facts necessary to pursue a legal proceeding, the limitation period commences. In the context of Section 34, a party can challenge an award as soon as it receives the award. Once an award is received, a party has knowledge of the award and the limitation period commences. The objecting party is therefore precluded from invoking Section 17(1)(b) & (d) once it has knowledge of the Award. Section 17(1)(a) and (c) of Limitation Act may not even apply, if they are extended to Section 34, since they deal with a scenario where the application is “based upon” the fraud of the respondent or if the application is for “relief from the consequences of a mistake”. Section 34 application is based on the award and not on the fraud of the respondent and does not seek the relief of consequence of a mistake. Thus, Once the party has received the Award, the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act commences. Section 17 of the Limitation Act would not come to the rescue of such objecting party. In the present case, the Respondents had a right to challenge the Award under Section 34 the moment they received it. In this case, Respondents received the Award on 21.02.2010. The alleged MoU was executed on 09.04.2010. Once the Respondents received the Award, the time under Section 34(3) commenced and any subsequent disability even as per Section 17 or Section 9 of Limitation Act is immaterial. Merely because the Appellant had committed some fraud, it would not affect the Respondents right to challenge the Award if the facts entitling the filing of a Section 34 Application was within their knowledge - The moment the Respondents have received the Award, the three months period prescribed under Section 34(3) begins to commence. It was incumbent on the Respondents to have instituted an application under Section 34 challenging an award. Therefore, in light of the discussion above, there would not have been any point for meaningful remand as the question of law is answered against the Respondents herein. Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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