1988 (5) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT

Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable in the present case because it was found by the Government of Karnataka that the concessions granted under the said order dated June 30, 1969, were being misused and undue advantage was being taken of the same?

Whether the concessions granted by the said order dated June 30, 1969, were of no legal effect as there is no statutory provision under which such concessions could be granted and the order of June 30, 1969, was ultra vires and bad in law?

Held that:- In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that any such misuse was being made or undue advantage taken of the said concessions by the newly established industries. The Government had, therefore, failed to establish the requisite ground or the basis on which it might be allowed to go back on its promise. The first submission of learned counsel for the appellants must, therefore, fail.

There is no substance whatever in the contention that the State Government had no authority to provide for the grant of refunds. Again, the mere fact that the order of June 30, 1969, did not specify the power under which it was issued will make no difference because such power is clearly there in section 8A and where the source of power under which it is issued is not stated in an order but can be found on the examination of the relevant Act, the exercise of the power must be attributed to that source. The second submission of learned counsel for the appellants must, also, therefore, be rejected. Thus the doctrine of promissory estoppel must be regarded as good law. Appeal dismissed.