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2024 (1) TMI 632 - CESTAT MUMBAICENVAT Credit - input services - goods transport agency - denial on the ground of ineligibility of tax paid on utilization of ‘goods transportation agency service’ for outward movement of manufactured goods, is the determination of scope of ‘input service’ in relation to domestic clearances up to March 2008 and on goods cleared for export for the period thereafter. HELD THAT:- It is evident from the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX, BANGALORE VERSUS M/S ABB LTD. AND OTHERS [2011 (3) TMI 248 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], which was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BELGAUM VERSUS M/S. VASAVADATTA CEMENTS LTD. [2018 (3) TMI 993 - SUPREME COURT], that, for the period prior to April 2008, that coverage of ‘outward transportation’ within the definition of ‘input service’ in rule 2 (l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is beyond dispute. It is also evident from the records that the first appellate authority deliberately preferred resort to interpretation afforded by decisions of the Tribunal over the ruling of the Hon’ble High Court. The reversal of the order of the original authority, dropping proceedings for the period prior to April 2008, by the first appellate authority is contrary to law and is, therefore, set aside. The eligibility of credit on ‘outward transportation’ in relation to export goods has not been examined by the first appellate authority who has restricted the findings to the applicability of the decision in re ABB Ltd which, for the period upto March 2008, has attained finality. Thus, it is constrained in examining the legality and propriety of the conformation of demand by the first appellate authority for the period after March 2008. This needs rectification and, for that limited purpose, the matter remanded back to the first appellate authority for rendering a finding in accordance with law as settled. The appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order in full for the period prior to April 2008 and for remaining by remand to the first appellate authority.
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