1962 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT

Whether the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) is unconstitutional and void inasmuch as it is beyond the legislative competence of the U.P. Legislature, and this contention raises the question about the construction of entry 49 in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution?

Held that:- The fact that agricultural income having been specifically provided by entry 46 cannot be deemed to be included in entry 49, does not justify the argument that the word " lands " in the latter entry does not include agricultural lands. There can be no doubt that the Act was within the legislative competence of the U.P. Legislature and so, the challenge to its validity on the ground that it has been passed without legislative competence must be rejected.

Whenever the validity of a taxing statute is challenged on the ground that it contravenes article 14 or article 19, the challenge cannot be thrown out on the preliminary ground that a tax law is beyond such challenge, but its merits must be carefully examined. Therefore, in our opinion the challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground that it contravenes article 31(2) is not well-founded.

The petitioner has not stated the extent of the rent which he is required to pay for his land-holdings. He holds the lands as bhumidar and the respondents contend that the rent recovered from bhumidars is very law. It was even suggested during the course of argument by Mr. Aggarwal that the rent recovered from the bhumidars would not exceed 1% of the gross income and in some cases it may even be less. Unfortunately, the petitioner has not made any statement about this important particular. The operation of the rates prescribed by the Schedule is based on the annual valuation of the lands, and the said valuation is determined ultimately on the basis of the rent, so that unless the rent is known, the extent of the impost cannot be adequately judged. Therefore, in our opinion, on the material adduced by the petitioner before us, it is impossible to accept the argument that the tax levied by the Act is confiscatory. Besides, as we have already seen, the scheme of the present Act does not disclose any constitutional infirmity either in its charging sections or in the sections providing for the procedure for the levy of the tax and its recovery. That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that there is no substance in the plea that the Act is a colourable piece of legislation. Appeal dismissed.