1964 (8) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT

Whether High Court of Bombay was correct in setting aside the conviction of the respondent under section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, hereinafter called the "Act", read with a notification of the Reserve Bank of India dated November 8, 1962, and directing his acquittal

Held that:- In our opinion, the very object and purpose of the Act and its effectiveness as an instrument for the prevention of smuggling would be entirely frustrated if a condition were to be read into section 8(1) or section 23(1-A) of the Act qualifying the plain words of the enactment, that the accused should be proved to have knowledge that he was contravening the law before he could be held to have contravened the provision.

If a person chooses to carry on his person what is not personal baggage or luggage understood in the legal sense but what should properly be declared and entered in the manifest of the aircraft there can be no complaint of the unreasonableness of the Indian law on the topic. The result, therefore, is that we consider that the learned judges of the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent. The appeal has, therefore, to be allowed and the conviction of the respondent restored.

The respondent was accordingly arrested and though the Magistrate directed his release on bail pending the disposal of the appeal in this court, the respondent was unable to furnish the bail required and hence suffered imprisonment, though it would be noticed that such imprisonment was not in pursuance of the conviction and sentence passed on him by the Magistrate. Such imprisonment continued till May 8, 1964, when the decision of this court was pronounced, so that virtually the respondent had suffered the imprisonment that had been inflicted on him by the order of the Presidency Magistrate. In these circumstances, we directed that though the appeal was allowed, the sentence would be reduced to the period already undergone which was only a technical interference with the sentence passed by the Presidency Magistrate, though in substance it was not.