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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 23 Records
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1951 (5) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897). 34. The word "Prosecution" in Article 20(2) means judicial proceedings before a Court or a legal tribunal. It cannot have reference to departmental or disciplinary proceedings taken for inflicting departmental penalty or punishment on an officer belonging to the department for any misconduct. 35. Rule 863 of the Police Regulations clearly provides that "An order of discharge or acquittal of a police officer by a Court shall not be a bar to the award of departmental punishment to that officer in respect of the same cause or matter." 36. This contention of Mr. Chaudhuri must fail. 37. In view of my finding, however, that the order of dismissal of 6-5-1950 was made without jurisdiction, being made by a person not competent to make it this petition must succeed. The Rule is made absolute and the Order of dismissal dated 6-5-1950 is quashed and can celled. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of the present proceedings.
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1951 (5) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dot think that the evidence of witnesses is of such a character as to be inconsistent with the medical evidence". The test rather is whether it is inconsistent with the medical evidence and, if not, whether the accused should not get the benefit. 7. Interference with an order of acquittal made by a Judge who had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their demeanour can only be for compelling reasons and not on a nice balancing of probabilities and improbabilities, and certainly not because a different view could be taken of the evidence or the facts. As stated already, we feel that the grounds which have been given by the High Court for setting aside the order of acquittal are not such as to show that the conclusion arrived at by the Sessions Judge was not the proper one to reach. 8. We allow the appeal and restore the order of the Sessions Judge, which means that the appellants will stand acquitted of the charges against them. They will be set at liberty.
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1951 (5) TMI 21 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o prohibition also must fail. 92. As regards the application by the Amin Agency Limited (writ Application NO. 288 of 1950) we have pointed out that under the Evacuee Property Act it is possible under certain circumstances to declare an incorporated Company an evacuee. Whether such circumstances exist which would entitle the Custodian to take charge of the property of the Amin Agency Limited is a matter for decision by the Deputy Custodian Judicial, It is not necessary at this stage for us to go into the matter when the applicant can have his rights determined by another Tribunal. Lack of jurisdiction, if any, cannot be said to be patent, but it may be a latent defect on the proof of facts and circumstances into which it is not possible for us to go. 93. We, therefore, dismiss both the applications, but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. 94. We certify that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
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1951 (5) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not owned by Government, but is on the other hand owned by the Carlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Company Limited. It is carried on their behalf and for their benefit and any control of Government only arises because of the terms of the contract which this company has entered into with Government a contract which gives them an exclusive right to sell certain articles on railway property. The business or industry is carried on by the appellants and therefore there was an industrial dispute between the appellants who are a limited company in Calcutta and their employees. This could clearly be referred for adjudication by the State Government of West Bengal under Section 10(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 13. That being so the petition for a writ of 'mandamus' or 'certiorari' was bound to fail and the petition was rightly dismissed by Banerjee J. 14. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel. Das, J. 15. I agree.
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1951 (5) TMI 19 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the contractor is precluded by the said clause from claiming any damage on that account. The award is, therefore, bad on the face of it. It is accordingly set aside. 'Claim No. 8.' 23. This claim corresponds to claim No. 4 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 252 of 1950 which I have disallowed. For the reasons given therein, the award in respect of this claim is set aside. 'Claim No. 17.' 24. Claim No. 17 of this appeal corresponds to claim No. 17 of Miscellaneous Appeal No. 252 of 1950, which has been disallowed for the reasons given there in. For the same reasons the award in respect of this claim is disallowed. 25. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part. In appeal No. 252 the decree of the lower court will be modified by excluding claims Nos. 4 and 17, and in appeal No. 253 the decree of the lower court will be modified by excluding claims Nos. 5, 8 and 17. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs in each case. Chatterji, J. 26. I agree.
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1951 (5) TMI 18 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioner being produced before that Magistrate once a fortnight for remand. Therefore this case is distinguishable from the Bombay case reported in on which Mr. P.V.B. Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied. 24. The Board is going to deal with the case of the petitioner very soon and it is likely that further materials regarding the antecedents and other activities of the petitioner may be available before it which are not before us now. Under these circumstances I would, in agreement, with my learned brother, hold that this is not a case for interference at this stage. 25. On the bigger question as to whether an order under the Preventive Detention Act can be passed against a person on the basis of those acts in respect of which a regular prosecution for a substantive offence is pending against him which has been discussed elaborately by my learned brother, I would reserve my opinion. That question does not arise for consideration at this stage in the present case.
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1951 (5) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... borne in mind, however, that this is not a case where a deduction is being claimed in respect of sums actually spent on the payment of pensions to employees, whether or not the trust, under which the payments purported to have been made, was valid or created an obligation to grant pensions. If the claim had been of the nature indicated above, quite different considerations might apply. No actual grants or payments were proved or relied on. In the result, I hold that the view taken by the Tribunal as regards the effect and validity of the trust is correct and the Tribunal was right in rejecting the claim of the assessee to deduction of the sum of ₹ 2,00,000 on the basis of the trust deed under the provisions of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income Tax Act. The answer to the question referred must therefore be in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, is entitled to costs of this Reference. Das Gupta J. - I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1951 (5) TMI 16 - LAHORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the business carried on by Banka Mal Lajja Ram & Co., of which the assesses who is a Hindu undivided family is merely one of the members, was the same business, which is being carried on under the name of Banka Mal Niranjan Das and in which the loss in question was suffered. In the statement of the case, there is nothing to show whether the nature of the business of Banks Mal Niranjan Das is different from that of the business of Banka Mal Lajja Ram & Co., but assuming that the character of both these businesses is the same, persons who own them were different. The two businesses cannot therefore, be described, as the same business, and the profits or losses of Banka Mal Niranjan Das are not the profits and losses of Banka Mal Lajja Ram & Co. or of all of the persons who constitute that association of persons. Our reply, therefore, to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second in the negative. The assessee will have its costs from the department.
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1951 (5) TMI 15 - LAHORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to another Income-tax Officer who amalgamated the income of that company with the income of another company, which amalgamation was set aside by a superior competent authority, with the result that the assessment of Burn & Company was resumed by the order of that authority. A further distinction between that case and the present one is that the assessment file of Burn & Company had remained pending right up to the resumption of the proceedings under the direction of the High Court. In the present case, however, the assessee’s assessment was completed when by his order dated 21st September, 1938, the Income-tax Officer decided not to include in his income the other half share of the income from the firm. Our reply, therefore, to the main question, which figures as question No. 2 in the statement of the case, is in the affirmative. As the reply to this question would be sufficient to dispose of the case, it is unnecessary to return a reply to the other questions.
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1951 (5) TMI 14 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... they were wrongly debited with ₹ 1,136/4/- entitled to recover from the defendants the amount that has been over charged by the defendants & this amount according to the counsel of the parties comes to ₹ 1,042/5/6 to which interest at the contractual rate of Rs. -/9/- per cent. per mensem must be added. The interest from the date of which the amount became due to the date of the institution of the suit, comes to ₹ 149/- The appeal is accordingly accepted and a decree for ₹ 1,171/5/6 is passed in favour of the Plaintiffs with proportionate costs through out. They will also be entitled to recover interest on ₹ 1,042/5/6 at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the institution of the suit till realisation. In the cross revision petition the facts and the points of law are the same and as the appeal of the Plaintiffs has partially succeeded, that revision petition must fail and is dismissed with costs. Teja Singh, C.J. 11. I agree.
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1951 (5) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... other point which remains to be considered is whether in the circumstances of the case the applicants should be allowed to remain at liberty. Having given our earnest attention to the points made at the Bar, we think that in the case of Bachchu Lal, in view of the apprehension of tampering and intimidation of witnesses, which in our opinion are not unjustified, it would be risky to allow him to remain at large. Acting, therefore, under the powers possessed by this Court by virtue of Section 561-A, Criminal P. C., we cancel his bail bonds and order that he should be kept in custody pending the result of the inquiry. As regards Debi Dayal, we are not satisfied that he is likely to tamper with or intimidate witnesses and there are no grounds for cancelling his bail. We order that he be enlarged on his furnishing two sureties in sums of ₹ 1000 each and a personal bail bond in like amount to the satisfaction of the learned District Magistrate, Sitapur Kidwai, J. 9. I agree.
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1951 (5) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ked at the outset, it is a matter of some doubt whether the plaintiffs sought partition in this suit or whether they merely wanted a declaration here that the compromise decree in the suit of 1924 does not bind them and consequently is no bar to their demanding partition of the whole estate in the first defendant's suit No. 29 of 1936. We need not consider whether the present suit is for partition and separate possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between the same parties for the same relief. It will be more convenient and proper to have these matters decided there. Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs throughout, but make it plain that in doing so we do not adjudicate upon their right to seek partition of such properties as they contend are omitted to be partitioned under the compromise decree in the pending suit. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellants R. C. Prasad. Agent lot respondent No. 1 P.K. Chatterjee.
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1951 (5) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s light and adopting a broad construction, it appears to me that what Mrityunjoy had in mind when he executed the indenture was, as made clear in the proviso, that his issue (born of his loins) or any person whom his wife may adopt on his authority, should succeed to the shebaiti in the first instance; and secondly, in default of such contingency, the shebaitship should go to any person who may be nominated in this behalf by his will; and thirdly, in default of issue (born or adopted) and in default of nomination by will (which is necessarily implied), the right was to devolve upon his heirs under the Hindu law. In other words, the proviso explains what he means by his heirs in the preceding clause. In this view, the respondent will succeed to the office in preference to the appellant. 33. But the construction placed on the indenture by my learned brothers is also a possible one and I do not desire to express any dissent from the result they have reached. 34. Appeal allowed.
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1951 (5) TMI 10 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a profit or a loss, and there was nothing already appearing in his accounts which would be an impediment to his omission to enter in his accounts any transaction which had resulted in a profit. The Income-tax authorities also were entitled to take into consideration the circumstances that except for one of the eight transactions all purported to have been entered into at Indore or Bikaner where it would be almost impossible for the Income-tax Department at that time to obtain any information. It cannot be said therefore that there was no material upon which this claim for loss could be disallowed. As I have said, there is no question of an arbitrary assessment. It is merely a question whether an assessee has established a particular fact. I do not think therefore there is any question of law upon which we can require a reference to be made. I would therefore dismiss this application with costs which I would assess at ₹ 150. FALSHAW, J.--I agree. Application dismissed.
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1951 (5) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... belief in principles if you apply them to cases with which you have no sympathy at all.'' and as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said, speaking of the American Constitution, "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought--not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.." I respectfully dissent from the majority view and consider that section 11 (1) is ultra vires. It follows, in my view, that the present detentions are bad. I am of opinion that the petitioners in these cases are entitled to immediate release. Petitions dismissed. Agent for the petitioner in Petition No. 303 Subrahman- yam. Agent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 618, 619, 621,622 and 624 to 631 V.P.K. Nambiyar. Agent for the State of Madras P.A. Mehta. Agent for the State of Assam Naunit Lal. Agent for the Union of India P.A. Mehta.
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1951 (5) TMI 8 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... irectors and shareholders. Two years later, there was an exactly similar set of transactions with regard to another piece of land. The Special Commissioners held that in selling the lands the wives had not traded and Wrottesley, J., held that since there was evidence both ways, he could not disturb the finding of the Commissioners, though he himself might have taken a different view. Mr. Meyer relied on the observation of the learned Judge that there was evidence of trading. That, however, could be of no assistance to Mr. Meyer, because the learned Judge proceeded to point out what the evidence of trading was. There is no evidence of a similar kind in the present case. In the result, in my opinion, the question referred to this Court must in all the nine cases be answered in the negative. The assessees will have the costs of the Reference, but there will be only one set of costs to be shared equally by the 8 assessees. DAS GUPTA, J.--I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1951 (5) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion. I have however, for the reasons given in the foregoing, although not without regret that I am differing from my learned brother, arrived after an anxious consideration of the whole matter at the conclusion that the assessee is not entitled to the deduction claimed by him. It is true that no tax can be imposed on the subject without words in the Act clearly showing an intention to lay a burden upon him. On the other hand, it is equally true that tax and equity are strangers, and an equitable construction cannot be put upon the words of a taxing statute, which is not justified by accepted canons of legal interpretation of such words. For the reasons given in the foregoing, I answer the question referred in the affirmative. SATYANARAYANA RAO, J.--As there is a difference of opinion between us my judgment which agrees with the opinion of the Tribunal prevails under Section 98, Civil Procedure Code, read with Section 66A of the Income-tax Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (5) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... use you have that from which you would infer continuity. The company is formed for that purpose and for nothing else. In this case the exploitation of the trees in the estate was made by the company in partnership with a timber merchant and the operations of cutting and sizing the timber, transporting it for sale and selling it in the timber market in Kallai were carried on in the same way as those which are characteristic of ordinary trade in the line of business of a timber merchant. Consequently we hold that the profits realised from the sale of timber, including therein the kuttikanam fee credited to the estate in the accounts, are trade profits which are liable to income-tax. They are not exempt from taxation as casual profits. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax on this reference which we fix at ₹ 350. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1951 (5) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ria Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. v. Dignan, 46 C.L.R. 73 at p. 99) that "it may be considered that the exigencies which must be dealt with under the defence powers are so many, so great and so urgent and so much the proper concern of the executive that from its very nature the power appears by necessary intendment to authorise delegation otherwise generally forbidden by the legislature." It may be mentioned here that the decision in In re Gray(57 S.C.R. 150.) was sought t6 be distinguished in a subsequent Canadian case on the ground that in case of emergency it was possible to pass legislation of this sort by taking recourse to the residuary powers conferred on the Dominion Parliament by section 91 of the North America Act (Vide-Credit Froncier v. Ross, (1987) 3 D.L.R. 365. (4) 1919 A.C. 935). In point of time, the case of In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(4) comes immediately after that of In re Gray(1). The dispute in this case related to an Act.
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1951 (5) TMI 4 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... ich were acquired here, and out of the transactions in which the profit in question arose, were acquired for the purpose of effecting a transaction on revenue account. No doubt the deposits were a part of the arrangements under which the agents were appointed and the appointment of the agents was a necessary step in establishing the structure which was required to carry on the business of dealing in petroleum products. The trading activity of this company was the dealing in petroleum products; the receipts of such dealings would of course be a revenue receipt, but I agree with my brother Jenkins that the dollars deposited for the purposes indicated in the agency agreements were in the nature of loans and were not part of a transaction on revenue account. For those reasons, I agree that the appeal fails and should be dismissed. SINGLETON, L.J.--I am of the same opinion, and there is nothing which I wish to add to the judgment which has been given. Appeal dismissed with costs.
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