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Showing 1 to 20 of 25 Records
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1952 (1) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ich is free from defects and duly complies with the requirements of the law in that behalf. 11. As regards the observations in Naranjan Singh's case. We do not understand them as laying down any general proposition to the effect that no fresh order of detention could be made when once a petition challenging the validity of an earlier order has been filed in court. The learned Judges appear to have inferred from the facts of that case that the later order was not made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner's detention was still necessary but it was obviously to defeat the present petition . The question of had faith, if raised would certainly have to be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case, but the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases. 12. We accordingly remit the case for further hearing. This order will govern the other petitions where the same question was raised. 13. Petitions remitted.
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1952 (1) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
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... ... ..... conclusive for the application of Clause 13(3)(vii) which covers the case of those alterations which are required for adding additional weight to the existing structure. 9. In our opinion this case is wrongly decided because the amplitude in item (vii) of Clause 13(3) of the Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, is not grasped. This being a speaking order and erroneous on its face because of a misapprehension of the law on the subject is capable of being interfered with by a writ of certiorari as was held by a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (Hidayatullah J.) was a member see - Sagatmal v. M.V. Deo, A.D.C. 1951 Nag LJ 566. 10. We allow the petition and confirm the writ. The order of the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner is quashed and the proceedings are sent back to him for decision according to law in the light of the remarks made above. Non-applicant No. 2 shall bear the costs of these proceedings. Counsel's fee ₹ 50, it certified.
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1952 (1) TMI 29 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... strikes us that in cases where the citizen has been left by an Act without any remedy in the shape of an ordinary suit, it may be desirable, in the interest of safeguarding the liberties for which these writs, directions or orders are intended, to help the citizen by the issue of a proper writ, direction or order. We have come to the conclusion that in the interest of justice it is necessary to interfere with the order of the learned Additional Collector in this case. 13. Arguments were addressed to us on a number of other points; but we do not think it necessary to deal with them as we are deciding this case on the narrow point of notice. We must not be understood to have decided anything which would affect the case of opposite-party No. 2. 14. For the reasons given above, we quash the order of the learned Additional Collector dated 8th April 1950 allotting the land to Sardar Kartar Singh, opposite-party No. 2. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.
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1952 (1) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but remain passive, it cannot be said that there was fighting between the members of one party and the members of the other; and offence of affray cannot be said to have been established. To constitute an affray there must be a fight and it is not a fight when one side is aggressive and the other side is passive. 25. In view of the above position, it must be held that the offence under Section 160, Penal Code, was not made out against any of the accused. Having gone through the entire facts and circumstances of the case and having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, I have come to the conclusion that this application must be allowed. In view of the fact that I have held that no offence has been made out against the accused, even if the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted, I do not consider it necessary to order a retrial. 25. I accordingly allow this application, set aside the convictions of the accused and order that the fine, if paid, shall be refunded.
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1952 (1) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... period as seven days should not be one over which the High Court in a proper case should have any power of control or dispensation but it is necessary to base our construction of the Ordinance and of the Limitation Act upon principle and it is not possible for us on the ground of hardship to give another meaning to the Ordinance." The same view of the law has been taken by the other High Courts. See Chheda Lal v. Officer Commanding, Meerut, I.l.r. (1941) ALL. 356 ; Mittoor -Moideen Hajee, In re, A. I. R. 1923 Mad. 95 and Hasan Imam v. Brahmdeo Singh, 9 pat. 747. Therefore, in giving the construction to Section 29 which we are giving we find that we are taking the same view which the other High Courts in India have taken. 8 The result, therefore, is that we must hold that the appeal is out of time, that Section 5 does not apply, and, therefore, we have no power to condone the delay on the part of the petitioners. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. 9 Rule discharged.
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1952 (1) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in that behalf. As regards the observations in Naranjan Singh's case, we do not understand them as laying down any general proposition to the effect that no fresh order of detention could be made when once a petition challenging the validity of an earlier order has been filed in court. The learned Judges appear to have inferred from the facts of that case that the later order was (1) Since reported as 1952 S.C.R. 368. not made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner's detention was still necessary but it was "obviously to defeat the present petition". The question of bad faith, if raised would certainly have to be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case, but the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases. We accordingly remit the case for further hearing. This order will govern the other petitions where the same question was raised. Petitions remitted. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta.
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1952 (1) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learly an expenditure incurred in the year previous to the relevant account year. The question, however, as framed requires us only to answer whether there was any evidence to prove that the expenditure (Rs. 1,39,561) was incurred in the previous account year? From what we have stated above it is clear that the fact that the coal was purchased and was consumed in the year previous to the relevant account year was admitted and the admission could, therefore, be treated as good evidence for the finding that coal was received and consumed in the year previous to the relevant account year. The question as to when the liability to pay the price arose was a question of law covered by Section 32 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act and it was for the assessee, if he wanted to prove that there was an agreement to the contrary, to give such evidence. This is our answer to the reference. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (1) TMI 24 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purposes of the business. On the facts stated above which we have taken from the statement of the case and from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, it is clear that it is impossible to hold that the amount was spent wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business. It was not necessary for the assessee for purposes of his trade or business to declare the value of his goods at a figure far below their proper value. He did it not for the purpose of his business but for the purpose of making dishonest gain and when he compounded the matter with the Central Government, he did so to escape criminal prosecution. We think that, on the facts stated in the Statement of the Case, the only answer possible is that the amount of ₹ 11,265 was not deductible under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. We answer accordingly. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (1) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... crued to him if the contract had not been discontinued or terminated, for cash payment. In the case before us, there was a contract entered into by the assessee firm on the 9th of April, 1940, which was to run for a period of five years. It was to regulate the conditions under which the assessee-firm was to carry on the trade or business. It acquired, under this agreement, certain rights and was not put under certain liabilities. By the cancellation agreement of the 22nd of November, 1941, all these congeries of rights that it had acquired under the first agreement were terminated for a certain consideration. The compensation paid for termination of those rights is not taxable income and income-tax cannot be charged on that sum. The amount of ₹ 37,248 cannot, therefore, be said to be a revenue receipt. This is our answer to the question formulated by the Tribunal. The assessee-firm is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (1) TMI 22 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en year or time, but inasmuch as it has never been argued or even suggested that such expenses should be taken into consideration, in ascertaining the difference between the cost of production and the money realised during the course of the year by the sale of the beer, for the purposes of the income-tax, I do not think we ought to deal with this in the way suggested." The expenses incurred in entertainment, photographs and invitaTion cards are more or less for the same purpose, i.e., advertisement. We may make it clear that we have assumed as it was not open to us to go into the question, that these expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the sums of ₹ 89,870 and ₹ 24,675 were in the nature of revenue expenditure and were admissible to deduction under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 500. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (1) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t has been taken as a mere technical offence, and not much weight has been placed upon it. It is further argued that a very good reason has been advanced for not keeping the books up-to-date. Apart from the fact that I am myself not satisfied about the explanations offered, I do not think that these are matters upon which this Court should interfere. These are objective facts which the officers were fully capable of investigating and which they have determined in a manner by no means unsatisfactory. It is impossible to convert this Court into a Court of appeal on such facts. 27. Similarly, even if I were to consider the appeal to the Board of Revenue as competent, the same reasoning would apply and it would be useless to send the matter back or to set aside the order passed by the Board of Revenue. 28. For the reasons stated, the application must fail and should be dismissed. The Rule is accordingly discharged but I make no order as to costs. The interim order is discharged.
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1952 (1) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nstruction of the compendious expression--"no election shall be called in question" in its context and setting, with due regard to the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Evidently, the argument has no bearing on this method of approach to the question posed in this appeal, which appears to me to be the only correct method. We are informed that besides the Madras High Court, seven other State High Courts have held that they have no jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution to entertain petitions regarding improper rejection of nomination papers. This view is in my opinion correct and must be affirmed. The appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed. In view of the nature and importance of the points raised in this appeal, there should be no order to costs. PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.--I agree. MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN J.--I agree. MUKHERJEA J.--I agree. DAS J.-I agree. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (1) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tial and valuable privileges of defence which others, similarly charged, are able to claim. It matters not to me, nor indeed to them and their families and their friends, whether this be done in good faith, whether it be done for the convenience of government, whether the process can be scientifically classified and labelled, or whether it is an experiment in speedier trials made for the good of society at large. It matters not how lofty and laudable the motives are. The question with which I charge myself is, can fair-minded, reasonable unbiassed and resolute men, who are not swayed by emotion or prejudice, regard this with equanimity and call it reasonable, just and fair, regard it as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the conditions which obtain in India today ? I have but one answer to that. On that short and simple ground I would decide this case and hold the Act bad. Appeals dismissed.
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1952 (1) TMI 18 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll and at his request two more weeks have been granted to him. In the circumstances, we do not propose to wait for hearing the arguments in these two petitions also before pronounc- ing this judgment. Applying the principle which we have recognised, the transactions in the cases which we are now dealing with are exempted from the levy of sales tax and there will, therefore, be orders granting the writs prayed for to the petitioners therein with costs and advocate s fee which we fix at Rs. 250 in each case. We may add that we have not referred in this judgment to the details which were mentioned in the course of argument which are not material in dealing with the question of law which has arisen in these petitions. We have also not mentioned the points that were conceded on behalf of the State by the learned Advocate-General. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted under Article 132(1) of the Constitution as prayed by the learned Advocate-General. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (1) TMI 17 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n acting upon it. I further agree with their Lordships view that the sooner it is understood that these are questions of fact the better it is and that the application to state cases must be discouraged in matters which, on ultimate analy- sis, are really only questions of a fair figure of assessment. The Privy Council decision in Malik Damsaz Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab and N.W.F.P.(2) also adds strength to the view which I have taken. If in substance there is no difference between an assessment under Section 23(3) and an assessment under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, on the same principle there is no real difference (1) (1928) 3 I.T.C. 48. (2) 1947 15 I.T.R. 445. between an assessment under Section 10(2)(b) and an assessment under Section 10(4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. In the result, the question raised is answered in the affirmative. There will be no order for the costs of this proceeding. REUBEN, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1952 (1) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enactments being reduced to a nullity. But, as it actually happened, however, the Legislature provided neither for mention of the officer s predecessor-in-officer, nor naturally of the circumstances in which review of the predecessor s order was permis- sible. The implication of Section 22(6) therefore would be to construe the person referred to therein by office or by designation and not by name. In other words, all that it means in the context of the present case, is that the Commissioner may review any order passed by the Commissioner. If, for example, A has been succeeded in office by B, B is competent to review an order passed by A. B s powers of review are not restricted to reviewing orders passed by B alone. 4.. For the reasons given above, I hold that the Commissioner has taken an incorrect view of the legal position and I, therefore, set aside his order and direct that he should now dispose of, on merits, the application for review made to him. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (1) TMI 15 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the Akola and Malkapur shops, after giving due consideration to the misclassification made by the assessee in the accounts of other branches. In the circumstances in which he found himself by the inability of the assessee to produce his account books, it is difficult to see how he could have given his reasons at any great length. It is, of course, possible that another officer may have viewed the case from a different angle but that possibility by itself does not vitiate the proceedings of the officer who actually handled the case. Moreover, the contention that a particular figure of percentage enhance- ment was appropriate and that another figure was not cannot be said to raise any substantial question of law, which is the only ground on which revision can be considered. 5.. For the reasons given above, I see no case for interference with the findings and decisions of the departmental officers and I, therefore, reject this application for revision. Application rejected.
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1952 (1) TMI 14 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ally arise and we do not propose to attempt any answer to those questions. It is necessary to add that Mr. R.J. Bahadur pointed out that the assessment in this case is based upon the figures for the quarter ending 31st March, 1945, which is subject matter of M.J.C. 131 of 1948 in which we have called for a further statement of case. It was contended by the learned counsel that if the Sales Tax Authorities revise the figure of assessment for the quarter ending 31st March, 1945, the position with respect to the assessment in this case will be affected. The argument is not really relevant for the disposal of this reference. Should the assessment in M.J.C. No. 131 of 1948 be revised in favour of the assessee it will however be open to him to make a claim before the taxing authorities in regard to the period covered in this case. There will be no order as to costs of this reference but the assessee will not be entitled to a refund of the amount in deposit. Reference not answered.
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1952 (1) TMI 13 - VINDHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... taken under the Ordinance with the provisions given in it can be deemed to take away the jurisdiction of the Court. The case reported in Bai Marium v. Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Jetpur(4), is also similar to the Bombay ruling referred to above. The principle is that a special law takes away the general jurisdiction of the civil Court only in regard to acts done under that Act. The same principles also apply to limitation. The special rule of limitation can only apply to the acts done in the special law. If the act has been done outside the special law then the general law of limitation comes in. In regard to limitation and jurisdiction the fact that the taxing authority was not aware of the illegality at the time of the collection, but became aware of it subsequently makes no difference. The result is that the appeals are without substance, and are dismissed. Costs to the plaintiffs-respondents and pleader s fee at 31/2 per cent in each case. Appeals dismissed.
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1952 (1) TMI 12 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... usion, had the present Rule 5(iv) of the rules made under the Act been in existence during the period to which this assessment relates. What apparently has escaped the notice of the learned Commissioner as also of the learned counsel, who represented the applicant before me, is Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, the principles of which are more or less embodied in Rule 5(iv). Even in the absence of Rule 5(iv), Section 24 applies to cases of goods supplied on approval . On this ground, therefore, the application succeeds, so far as the point of law urged is concerned. As to the exact amount qualifying for exclusion, I do not propose to give a decision in these proceedings. That decision should be given by the Commissioner, to whom I remand the case, after examining the particulars of each of the transactions involved, in order to see whether it is covered by the provisions of Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, read with Rule 5 (iv), referred to above. Ordered accordingly.
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