|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 31 Records
-
1952 (10) TMI 56 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he period of limitation is to run from the time when the mistake is first discovered. But it was also held that where a Patnidar sues the landlord for return of the money paid in excess of the amount of cesses, the relief being based on mistake, Article 62 was applicable and not Article 96. This case, in my opinion, does not help the plaintiff in any way. 10. Reference was next made to -- 'Gorakhpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Nariman and Co.', AIR 1948 All 75, where in a different set of circumstances Article 120 was applied. 11. After considering all these cases and the arguments of counsel, I am of the opinion that the learned Small Cause Court Judge had erroneously applied Article 96 to the "facts of the present case. The Article applicable is 62. 12. I would therefore allow this petition, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismiss the plaintiff's suit, but in the circumstances of this case I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
-
1952 (10) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... , as the interlocutory remand order of the High Court was one without jurisdiction and that being so, the subsequent proceedings taken in consequence of it, viz., the order of the Subordinate Judge restoring the application for execution to the extent of ₹ 92,000, and the further order of the High Court on appeal restoring the execution case on terms, are null and void and have to be set aside and the order of the executing court dated the 25th April, 1945, restored. We order accordingly. Appeal No. 13 of 1951 is dismissed. 31. In the peculiar circumstances of this case we direct that the parties be left to bear their own costs through-out, that is, those incurred by them in the High Court in the proceedings which terminated with the remand order, the costs incurred in the subordinate court after the remand order, and the costs thereafter incurred in the High Court and those incurred in this court in these appeals. 32. Appeal No. 12 allowed. 33. Appeal No. 13 dismissed.
-
1952 (10) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
... ...
... ... ..... o the Advocate on the other side, we consider that copy of the application made by the Police Inspector, Shri Abbas, to the Magistrate requesting for the issue of search warrants, may also be granted. We accordingly direct that certified copies be granted of the Magistrate's order dated 14th June 1952, and of the application dated 13th June 1952, made by the Inspector, Shri S. W. Abbas, for the issue of the search warrants. 5. In view of the above decision we think that both sides should have a further opportunity to place before us any additional arguments that they may have as to the legality of the searches in the light of the consents of the application for the issue of search warrants. 6. These petitions will, therefore, be heard again at a very early date. Any of the petitioners may apply to this Court and obtain before the next hearing date certified copies of any of the documents whose copies have been hereby directed to be granted. R.L. Narasimham, J. 7. I agree.
-
1952 (10) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the head office as was carried on in Kanpur and Calcutta. It had to be conceded on behalf of the Department that if the assessee's head office was at Mirzapur and he had merely branches at Kanpur and Calcutta for carrying on the same business, then he was entitled to deduct from his business income the expenses incurred in connection with the maintenance of the staff for the realisation of the outstandings at Kanpur and Calcutta and in connection with the rent of the premises at these two places. We, therefore, with the consent of the counsel, re-frame the question as follows Q. Whether the expenses of the branches at Kanpur and at Calcutta can, in the circumstances of the case, be legally allowed as business expenses of the year under consideration? Our answer to this question is also in the affirmative. 10. In view of the fact that, we have answered one question in favour of the Department and another in favour of the assessee, we direct parties to bear their own costs.
-
1952 (10) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ult on this occasion does not cease to be a wilful default on account of his being regular in payment in the past. 10. The argument that there was no default, or no wilful default, because the respondent had refused to accept the money orders for the arrears before the decree was passed is devoid of force. The refusal of the respondent to accept the money orders did not wipe off the appellant's liability. The appellant remained liable to pay the arrears though he might not be liable to pay the costs of the suit brought by the respondent to recover them. In spite of the previous refusal, the appellant was bound to pay the decreed arrears; that was the decree passed against him. Further when the respondent demanded the decreed arrears through notice, the appellant was bound to pay them. He could not refuse to pay them on the ground that the respondent had refused the previous tender. 11. The decree passed by the lower appellate Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
-
1952 (10) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... eceased husband on the 12th December, 1943. 19. Having regard to the observations which we have made above, we have come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was estopped from contending that Gangabai had the right to adopt him as a son to her deceased husband on the 12th December, 1943. This estoppel prevails in spite of the fact that both the courts below have found that he was validly adopted by Gangabai as a son to her deceased husband on the 12th December, 1943. 20. The result therefore is that the Plaintiff's suit is barred by estoppel, that he is not entitled to any relief which he has prayed for in his plaint, that the decree which has been passed by the Trial Court in his favour and which the High Court has confirmed is liable to be set aside and that his suit is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly allow this appeal, reverse the decree which has been passed by the High Court in favour of the Plaintiff and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.
-
1952 (10) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nal. Therefore, far from there being any finding that any firm of the name of Vasantsen Dwarkadas is in existence, there is a clear finding that the business of Vasantsen Dwarkadas is the business of Purshottam Laxmidas and that there is no separate entity like Vasantsen Dwarkadas and no firm of the name of Vasantsen Dwarkadas which could be assessed under Section 23(5) or whose total income can be ascertained under that section. Therefore this particular argument is not open to Sir Nusserwanji. Therefore we hold that in this particular case, as the firm of Purshottam Laxmidas has already been assessed and its total income ascertained, it was not open to the Department to separately assess the assessee as a partner of the firm of Purshottam Laxmidas on his partnership income which did not form part of the total income of Purshottam Laxmidas as ascertained by the Department under Section 23(5). Therefore the answer we give to the question submitted to us is in the affirmative.
-
1952 (10) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... business or whether it merely reduces the liability to the tax or the rate of the tax. With very great respect to the learned Judges, when we turn to the judgment they assume that there is no doubt that a transaction can be avoided under Section 10A irrespective of the circumstance whether the effect of that transaction is to make the Act altogether inapplicable to the business or part of the business or whether it merely reduces the liability to the tax or the rate of the tax. Not only is there a doubt but there is a very serious doubt whether that is the true interpretation of Section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act, and we feel certain that if the matter had been fully argued before the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court they would have taken a different view of the matter or at least they would have realised that the matter is certainly not so clear as they thought it was. The result therefore is that we must answer the question submitted to us in the negative.
-
1952 (10) TMI 48 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... een the obtaining of probate and the taking of possession of the property by the executor. The will indicates that he was unwilling that his property should be in the direct possession and management of his wives and he cannot have contemplated that following his death they should remain in possession until in due course his son-in-law obtained probate. The directions in his will about obtaining probate and about managing the properties are two separate directions, not connected with each other. He was aware that in the usual course, if the executor was to act under the will at all, he would have to take out probate, and he was merely emphasizing the necessity for the probate in directing his son-in-law to take out probate. He was certainly not making the taking of possession of the estate by his son-in-law dependent upon the son-in-law first obtaining probate. 25. For the reasons I have given the appeal fails and I would dismiss it with costs. Sarjoo Prasad, J. 26. I agree.
-
1952 (10) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... greement on which the assessee firm relied and the agreement merely showed the consideration for which the commission was shared. But, as we said before, the mere fact that there is consideration for sharing the managing agency commission is not sufficient to lead to the inference that the commission was shared exclusively and wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business. The Tribunal has taken the view that on that decision no question of law arises and that the decision turns purely on appreciation of evidence and is nothing more than a decision on a question of fact. We agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and therefore in our opinion no question of law arises out of the decision of the Tribunal. The result is that the answer to the first question submitted to us is, "For each assessment". The answer to the second question is "See Judgment". Assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismissed with costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1952 (10) TMI 46 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as the Advocate General gave an undertaking that the Government would rehear the case according to law. This decision demonstrates the necessity of issuing orders and directions on quashing the order on 'certiorari'. In this case no final order could be passed by the High Court as the tribunal had not reached any findings of fact uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. The case was rightly sent back for rehearing. This is what a High Court does in second appeals. This decision cannot be used as an authority for the proposition that a 'mandamus' cannot issue to a judicial tribunal and that the jurisdiction of the High Court ends with advising the tribunal on the state of law and quashing its orders. 170. I, therefore, agree with Hemeon and Mudholkar JJ. that the High Court has power to pass an order granting permission to the Petitioner or to direct the Rent Controller to grant the permission and that in the instant case an order granting permission should.
-
1952 (10) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to the truth or helped the Tribunal in determining what the true profits and gains of the assessee were. It is also important to note that the Tribunal makes it a point of drawing our attention to the fact that very often assessees disclose those sales where the profits are less and do not disclose those sales where the profits are higher, or they show the profits on sales where the profits are small and do not disclose the profits on sales where the profits are higher. This aspect was also present to their mind when they determined upon the average rate of 18 per cent. Therefore on these facts in our opinion the Tribunal did not adopt a wrong method in assessing the profits as the did, nor did the Tribunal reject or not take into consideration any evidence which was material or relevant evidence placed before the Tribunal by the assesses. We therefore answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. Assessee must pay the costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1952 (10) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y be on his case falling under Section 4(3)(i). Therefore we do not think it necessary to construe Section 4(3)(ia) for the purposes of this reference. It may be said that the result we have come to is rather unfortunate because in a case where the trust is admittedly a charitable trust and where the commission earned by the trustees is admittedly applied to charitable purposes, the income cannot be held to be exempt from tax. But perhaps it is necessary to point out that the Income-tax Act unfortunately does not permit an assessee to give his income in charity and to claim exemption by reason of that generous impulse except under Section 15B of the Act. It is only in very restricted cases that an income is exempted from tax under Section 4(3)(i) or Section 4(3)(ia). In the result the answer to question (1) is that the commission earned by the assessee is not exempt under Section 4(3)(i). Question (2) is unnecessary. Assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1952 (10) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that the assessee was being under-assessed. It cannot, therefore, be said that the fact was discovered later that the assessee had been under-assessed. In this view of the matter notice under Section 34 was clearly wrong and the Income-tax Officer had no authority to reopen the assessment already made by him. 6. Learned counsel for the assessee has referred us to -- 'Chuni Lal v. Commr. of Income-tax', 1951-20 ITR 568 (Punj), a decision of the Punjab High Court and -- 'Fazal Dhala v. Commr. of Income-tax, Behar and Orissa', 1944-12 ITR 341 (Pat), a decision of the Patna High Court. The decisions do, to some extent, support the contention of the assesses. The case before us is clearly a case where the Income-tax Officer wanted to make the assessment piecemeal which, in our view, he was not entitled to do under the Indian Income-tax Act. 7.The question, therefore, is answered in the negative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 300.
-
1952 (10) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ht Bruce in Haigh v. Haigh(1) "It is true that he states in his affidavit that he did not allow those explanations to influence him in -his report upon the accounts, and I have no doubt he honestly intended this to be the case; but it is impossible to gauge the influence which such statements have upon the mind. We must hold, without meaning the least reflection the arbitrator, that he was guilty of legal misconduct and that was sufficient to vitiate the award. Shri S. P. Sinha then urged that the plaintiff had waived her right if any to challenge the award the ground of legal misconduct. No waiver however was pleaded by the defendant I and it was not competent to him to urge this contention at this stage before us. The result therefore is that the judgment of the High Court cannot stand. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court with costs throughout' Appeal allowed.
-
1952 (10) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uake, and if that is true, as it seems to be from the letter written by the' M.L.A. to the Additional District Magistrate the 1st November, 1950, it appears to us harsh, if not unjust, to ask him to produce the same paddy or a similar quantity of paddy. The order-of the High Court sending back the case to the Magistrate for taking action according to law under section 514 will, therefore, stand set aside. We generally do not interfere in the matter of sentence, but in this case we find that the Magistrate has held that the appellant's plea that he was ignorant of the provisions of the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947, was a genuine one. Having regard to this circumstance and the fact that from a fine of ₹ 50 to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 1,000 is a big jump, we think it is appropriate that the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the High Court should be set aside and we order accordingly. The fine of ₹ 1,000 will stand.
-
1952 (10) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ce of opinion. The reason is obvious. On the new point based on Section 16(3) (a) (iii) of the Income-tax Act there is only the opinion of the third Member. The two other members of the Tribunal had no opportunity of going into that question and, if the point had been raised before them, they might not have taken the same view as the third Member took. The jurisdiction of the third Member, it appears to us, is clearly defined in Section 5-A(7) of the Income-tax Act and he cannot, therefore, take it upon himself to decide the appeal by either dismissing or by allowing the same. 3. The result, therefore, is that, in our view, the case has never been properly disposed of by the Tribunal and there is no order of the Tribunal from which the reference under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act could arise. The case must, therefore, go back to the Tribunal for decision according to law. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, parties should bear their own costs of this case.
-
1952 (10) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the plaintiff and they only succeeded before us in regard to the claim of the plaintiff which had been allowed by the trial Court. If an order for proportionate costs of this appeal were made it would certainly work to the prejudice of the heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff. We are not disturbing the order which had been made by the High Court in regard to the costs of the appeal before it. No time was taken up before us in arguing the appeal on other points except the one in regard to the resolution for the suspension of the plaintiff being ultra rites and we think that under the circumstances of the case the proper order to pass in regard to the costs of this appeal before us should be that each party should bear its own costs. The only order which we need pass in this appeal before us under the circumstances is that the appeal is allowed, the decree of the trial court is restored, and each party do bear and pay its own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
-
1952 (10) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oncern may have a lull during the period of its activity, when it is waiting to acquire a new business, or when it is prospecting for business that is going to be started, and in such a case it may be possible to say, though it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the point, that the assessee was still carrying on business. On the facts admitted by learned counsel that question does not arise in this case. It was admitted that the business activities that the assessee was carrying on had ceased. The mere fact that he had maintained a staff to pay some of the cane growers from whom he had purchased cane on credit cannot be said to be an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. We have pointed out that the last part of the question does not arise in this case. The answer to the rest of the question can only be in the negative. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1952 (10) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ts. It does not say that the proceedings must be treated as having freshly commenced. What is contemplated in the latter part of the section is a notional commencement, if such a term could be used. The section obviously means that all rights which arose or are likely to arise in the future shall remain intact notwithstanding the new set-up, and that they would be dealt with by the Union Courts in place of the Courts of the Covenanting State. There is nothing in the section to justify the view that any taking away of a vested right of appeal retrospectively was intended. The decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving( 1905 A.C. 369) clearly applies to the facts, and the order of the High Court that the appeals are not competent is, in our opinion, erroneous. The result is that Appeal No. 152 of 1951 is dismissed with costs throughout, while Appeals Nos. 167 and 167A of 1951 are allowed with costs throughout. Appeal No. 125 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 167 and 167A allowed.
|
