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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 17 of 17 Records
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1952 (11) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... kesa Aiyar J. now under appeal. In O.S. A. No. 17 of 1948 Horwill and Raghava Rao JJ. held that the true scope of Expl. I was only to nullify the decision in -- 'Duraiswami Mudaliar v. Md. Anwaruddin', 1948-1 Mad L. J. 441 and that it had not the effect of overruling the line for authorities which had held that settlement made by parties involving appropriation of payments could not be reopened. This decision was followed by Govinda Menon Ramaswaini JJ. in C. M. A. No. 180 of 1950 and by Subba Rao J. in S. A. No. 2115 of 1947. We agree with the views expressed in these decisions and do not find sufficient reason for upsetting the construction which had been put upon the explanation in a long course of decisions. We are accordingly of opinion that appropriations made by a debtor as part of a settlement are not liable to be reopened under Expl. I to Section 8. 9. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the decree of the Courts below are restored with costs throughout.
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1952 (11) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n a representation that it is of a different character, then it is wholly void and inoperative. Such a deed does not require to be set aside under Article 91 and a suit to recover possession of the properties comprised therein would be governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act. The fact that there is a prayer for a declaration that the deed is void or that it should be set aside does not affect the position, such prayers being ancillary to the substantive prayer for possession. As observed in the decisions already cited, such prayers might be regarded as mere surplusage. We accordingly hold on issue No. 3 differing from the lower Court, that the suit is not barred by limitation under Article 91. 8. In the result this appeal is allowed and the suit is remanded for disposal on all the issues excepting issue No. 3. As the appeal has been filed in forma pauperis no order is necessary for refund of court-fee. The costs of this appeal will abide the result of the suit.
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1952 (11) TMI 21 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te. Such a certificate would entitle the Respondent to obtain possession under Rule 95 of Order 21. There is nothing in that rule to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file the certificate along with his application. On the confirmation of the sale it is compulsory to issue the certificate. The failure to issue the certificate - whether the delay arises due to the action of the Court or to the inaction of the purchaser - has no bearing on the limitation for the application under Article 180. The purchaser cannot seek to extend the limitation on the ground that the certificate has not been issued. It is patent, therefore, that the issue of a certificate is not the 'sine qua non' of the application. The application being properly within limitation, the evidence of title could be supplied later and this is what has happened. The order passed by the learned Judge is, therefore, correct and we see no reason to interfere. 6. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1952 (11) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... Disputes Act, 1947, clearly laid upon the Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta the duty to determine whether the petitioner was or was not a workman and consequently, even if a wrong decision was given, that decision cannot be interfered with by a writ of certiorari. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed various grounds before us to show that the decision that the petitioner was not a workman was incorrect. One of the grounds was that there had been a previous decision by an adjudicator appointed in pursuance of the order passed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Another ground was that, on the facts before the Tribunal, the finding that the petitioner was not a workman was unjustified. These are only questions relating to the correctness or incorrectness of a decision by the Tribunal in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it, and, as we have said above, we cannot investigate these circumstances. 14. This petition is, therefore, not maintainable and is dismissed.
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1952 (11) TMI 19 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e duty was payable to the State of Rajasthan under the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance No. 25 of 1949. An argument was addressed to us that in view of the fact that no valid rules can be said to have been framed under Ordinance No. 25 of 1949, the State of Rajasthan could not recover cotton excise duties from the applicant. That is a question on which we need not express any opinion while answering the first question put to us, as we take it that the question assumes that the duty was payable to the State of Rajasthan. 16. Our answer, therefore-, to the first question addressed to us is that the Union of India is not entitled to levy and recover arrears of excise duty on cotton cloth held in stock or manufactured before 1-4-1950, by the applicant, by virtue of Articles 278 and 295 of the Constitution of India, and the agreement entered into between the President of India and the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan. Let these answers be returned to the Bench concerned.
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1952 (11) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
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... ... ..... was the contract that was the source of income but the construction which was in the nature of an asset or business capable of yielding the income. The Madras High Court in a case in --'Commr. of Income Tax, Madras v. Anamallais Timber Trust Ltd.', 1950 18 ITR 333(Mad) (C) in which the facts are very similar, and which has referred to and relied on has taken the same view as we do and fully supports the assessee in this case. We are, therefore, entirely in agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal. 8. In the result our answer to the question raised before us is that the Tribunal was right in holding that the income assessed by the Income Tax Officer or any part thereof with which we are concerned in this case was not taxable under the Indian Income Tax Act as applied to Civil and Military Station, Bangalore. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of this reference. 9. Order accordingly.
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1952 (11) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. We have not been able to see that any compelling or substantial reasons existed for reversing the acquittal order in this case and none has been pointed out by the High Court in its decision. No attempt has been made in the judgment to discuss the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or to explain satisfactorily the discrepancies that were of a material nature and which had been pointed out in those statements by the Sessions Judge in his careful and detailed judgment. We are satisfied that this was not a case for interference with the acquittal order in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal P. C. 11. For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of the Sessions Judge acquitting the appellant.
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1952 (11) TMI 16 - MADHYA BHARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rve the order of injunction on the Income-tax Officer, a clerk in the office refused to accept service and informed him that the Income-tax Officer was not in the office; and that when thereupon, the process-server inquired about the residence of the Income-tax Officer, he was not given the necessary information to enable him to go to the residence of the Income-tax Officer for effecting service of the order. I hope that this state of things is remedied soon by the Income-tax Officer. In the result the order dated 29th February, 1952, of the Income- tax Officer imposing the penalty of ₹ 25,000 is declared illegal and without jurisdiction and is set aside. The petitioners' application under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the provisional assessment and the notice of demand dated 19th February, 1952, is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. SHINDE, C.J.-I agree. MEHTA, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (11) TMI 15 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... there was succession to the business within the meaning of Rule 9, sub-rules 1 and 2. Applying the principle of these authorities it is clear that in the present case there has been succession to the business within the ambit of Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the argument on behalf of the assessee on this part of the case must prevail. For the reasons we have expressed we hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that there was not a discontinuance of the business but that the Tribunal was not right in holding that there was no succession to the petitioner's business as contemplated under Section 25(4) of the Income-tax Act. The reference is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee. But since the question of discontinuance has been answered in favour of the department there will be no order as to costs. The assessee is entitled to withdraw the amount of ₹ 100 which he has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (11) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... formal letter that Limsey wrote to Dattu on 8th October inviting him to come to his house and Dattu's response to his call suggest that apparently at that moment they were on good terms. There was thus no strong motive for Limsey to murder Dattu. No doubt, a very strong suspicion arises against Limsey by reason of the existence of the tomb of Dattu in his house but we are unable to hold that the High Court after taking into consideration all the circumstances in the case was wrong in not treating this circumstance as conclusive of the guilt of Limsey. As against the other two respondents, there is not the slightest evidence to hold that they are in any way responsible for the murder of Dattu. 10. For the reasons given above we think that it is not a case which calls for interference with the acquittal order of the High Court in exercise of this Court's powers under Article 136 of the Constitution and we accordingly dismiss the appeal and maintain the acquittal order.
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1952 (11) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pply. Surely that could not possibly be the case, for it would mean that the Government or a local authority will always be bound by the Act in respect of the building put up by the lessee under building leases granted by it in respect of land belonging to it. In that case the immunity given to the Government or a local authority will be wholly illusory and worthless. In’ our view in the case before us the demised premises including the building belong to a local authority and are outside the operation of the Act. This Act being out of the way, the appellants were well within their rights to file the suit in ejectment in the City Civil Court and that Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to pass the decree that it did. I The result, therefore, is that we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree passed by the City Civil Court. The appellant will be entitled to costs throughout in all Courts. Appeal allowed.
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1952 (11) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeal being taken away if all that Had happened is a change in the conditions and requirements to be fulfilled before the right of appeal can be enforced. The argument is no doubt attractive, but I am afraid it is not open after the ruling of the Full Bench in -- 'AIR 1929 Mad 381 (B)', for there too it could have been argued on the same analogy that the right of filing an appeal under Clause 15, Letters Patent was not taken away but only a condition imposed, namely, that leave should be obtained. 23. My conclusion is that Article 133(1) of the Constitution applied to this case and therefore the requirements as to valuation must be determined by the provisions of Clause (a), viz., that the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than ₹ 20,000. 24. With this expression of opinion the petition will go before the learned Judges who referred the matter to the Full Bench.
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1952 (11) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ions of article 19(1)(d) and (e) and article 21. This matter is concluded by the majority decision of this court in Gopalan's case ( 1950 S.C.R. 88.) and 'the High Court quite correctly negatived this contention. Sri Dadachanji has not sought to support the views of Bhandari J. regarding the Act being inconsistent with article 19 (1)(g). Nor has learned counsel seriously pressed the objection of unconstitutionality based on article 15, which, in our view, was rightly rejected by the High Court. Although we hold that the High Court erred on the construction they Put upon article 22 and the appellant has succeeded -on that point before us, this appeal will, nevertheless, have to be dismissed on the ground that the Tribunal was not properly constituted and its order was without jurisdiction, as conceded by the learned Solicitor- General. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal on that ground. We make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed Agent for the appellant P. A. Mehta.
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1952 (11) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n or any direction of law, and it was not stated also what these directions of law were. We think, therefore that we must accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant that even on the prosecution evidence, as it stands, the accused could rot be convicted of criminal breach of trust. The result is that the appeal should be allowed. In our opinion, it would not be proper to make an order for retrial in this case. In the first place, the charge of accepting illegal gratification upon which alone any retrial could be ordered, was definitely abandoned by the prosecution at the time of the trial. In the second place, the accused has fully served out the sentence of imprisonment during the period that the appeal was pending in this court and a further trial would not be proper in the interests of justice. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the accused be acquitted. The fine if paid, should be refunded to him.
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1952 (11) TMI 9 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cles of luxury and therefore the word glass-ware must be understood to apply only to such articles made of glass as are used for luxury. I do not think that all the articles specified in this Schedule can be properly regarded as luxury articles. Even assuming that Schedule I is confined to only articles of luxury, that is to say, the articles used by the well-to-do classes, it seems difficult to hold that glass panes would not fall within the term glass-ware . It is common knowledge that glass panes are not used by the poorer classes of people. For, they are not affixed to windows or doors of their houses. In my opinion, therefore, the term glass-ware whether it is interpreted in a narrow sense or otherwise, would necessarily include glass panes. I answer the second question accordingly. 9.. The answers be sent to the Board of Revenue. Costs of this reference will be borne as incurred. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641. (2) 1914 1 K.B. 641 at 647.
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1952 (11) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip The obtaining of the consent is a condition precedent to the making of the petition. In other words, consent must have been obtained prior to the presentation of the application. The two sets of shareholders, who subsequently gave their consent, have clearly indicated in the document embodying their consent that the petition had already been filed and that they were expressing their approval thereof. Their subsequent consent is not a valid consent under sub-section (3). I am, therefore, of the opinion that the requirements of law regarding the obtaining of consent in writing have not been complied with and consequently this petition is not maintainable. It should fail on the preliminary ground. The opposite parties are entitled to their costs. Opposite parties 1 and 2 shall receive a sum of Rs. 500 each as costs and such of the remaining opposite parties as have engaged separate counsel shall get a sum of Rs. 200 each as costs.
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1952 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 14,00,000 was the assessee company's income within the meaning of Section 2(6C) of the Indian Income-tax Act and liable to pay income-tax under the Indian Income-tax Act?
Held that:- Te High Court was right in holding that the ₹ 14,00,000 is assessable to tax. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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