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Showing 1 to 20 of 32 Records
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1953 (4) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y Section 4 of the Act and no right to bequeath the property by will exists. The power of alienation is restricted and limited. The doctrine, therefore, of surrender cannot be applied to this case and no case has been cited before us relating to an impartible estate to which the doctrine has been applied. On the face of it, the doctrine, even if it is treated as a surrender, seems to me a clear device to divide the estate. It does not merely contain a provision for maintenance but there are also provisions for lump sum payments to the zamindar and his second Rani. The second contention also therefore fails. 13. We are, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal that appellant l did not become the owner of the impartible estate of Sivagiri and that he is not entitled to the payment of the advance compensation deposited by the Government with the Tribunal is correct and the decision must be affirmed. 14. The appeal is dismissed with costs which we fix at Rs. 750.
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1953 (4) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... discretion was to select a bidder and he did that without any outside pressure. Thereafter his authority was to "settle" the fishery with the selected bidder once his act was sanctioned and the mere fact that he wear directed by another to do that which he would have been bound to do under the law in any event cannot divest the settlement of its legal and binding character. 39. On the merits the High Court was abundantly right. We accordingly uphold its order and dismiss the appeal with costs payable to the first respondent. 40. Civil Appeal No. 176-A of 1952. Vivian Bose, J. 41. For the reasons given in our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1952 pronounced to-day, we dismiss the appeal without costs. 42. Appeals dismissed. Agent for the appellant in Appeal No. 176 Naunit Lal. Agent for respondent No. 1 in Appeal No. 176 and respondent in Appeal No. 176-A A.D. Mathur. Agent for respondent No. 2 in Appeal No. 176 and appellant in Appeal No. 176-A K.R. Krishnaswamy.
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1953 (4) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... qual strength and the difficulty placed in the way of subordinate Courts administering justice, there are the additional factors of the loss of money and the waste of judicial time.” The conclusion reached by the learned Judges, that the dispute was not one within Section 51 of the Act is, in our opinion, erroneous. The learned Judges also went into the question, whether a writ of mandamus. could be issued against a body like a co-operative Society which is not a public body. It is unnecessary for us to go into that question as it docs not arise for consideration in the present case. 26. We are, therefore, of opinion, that the adjudication of the Deputy Registrar setting aside the election of the petitioners and respondent 5 in the present case was within his jurisdiction and cannot be set aside or quashed in these proceedings. 27. It follows that W. P. NO. 632 of 1951 should be dismissed with costs, ₹ 250; W. P. No. 79 of 1952 is also dismissed but without costs.
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1953 (4) TMI 36 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an Income Tax Act the decision of the Appellate Tribunal on facts is final. The High Court has no authority to investigate facts raised for the first time at the stage of the reference nor is it possible for the High Court to take the arguments of the Standing Counsel as if they were facts and to base its conclusion on those arguments. Such a practice has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in -- 'Commr. of Income Tax. West Bengal v. Calcutta Agency Ltd.' AIR 1951 SC 108 (H). It is manifest that in the present case the necessary facts have not been investigated or established before the Appellate Tribunal and it is not possible to entertain the argument raised by the Standing Counsel on this point. 12. In the light of these considerations I think that the question referred by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the assessee. The Income Tax Department must pay the cost of the reference; hearing fee ₹ 250/-. Chaudhuri, J. 13. I agree.
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1953 (4) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ss authority. Nor is there any evidence on record of implied authority. There was, therefore, no delivery to the 3rd defendant, and the negotiation of the hundi to him was not completed. The property in the hundi never in fact passed out of the plaintiff, and it remained his property when it reached the hands of the 1st and 2nd defendants. Moreover, the 3rd defendant never claimed any property in the hundi. On the contrary, he enforced his claim by a suit against the plaintiff in the Residency Court. 9. I, therefore, hold that the property in the hundi was in the plaintiff at the date of suit, and pass judgment against the 1st and 2nd defendants for ₹ 1,500, costs including costs of commission and costs reserved, and interest on judgment at six per cent. per annum. 10. Plaintiff's attorneys to be at liberty to withdraw ₹ 800 being the amount deposited by the plaintiff as security for the costs of the 1st defendant after the expiration of the period of appeal.
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1953 (4) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. It cannot be said that as a result of the order of the Appellate Tribunal any new facts came to the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer which were not in his possession at the time when he made the assessment. If the Income-tax Officer had made a mistake with full knowledge of the facts, the mistake could not be rectified by him by issuing a notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The fact that the Appellate Tribunal had held that the sum of ₹ 2,06,695 was allowable expenditure of the Kanpur Dyeing and Cloth Printing Co. Ltd., under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act could not be said to be a definite information which led to the discovery that the assessee's income had escaped assessment. The facts were fully known to the Income-tax Officer and if he had made a mistake at the time of the assessment there were other methods of correcting that error. We, therefore, answer the reference in the negative.
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1953 (4) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice. The lower Court held that a notice was not necessary in view of the fact that the subject matter of the suit was not waqf property. We have already come to the definite conclusion that the property is waqf property and any suit claiming relief in respect of the waqf property should have been preceded by the statutory notice provided under Section 53, Muslim Waqfs Act. o p /o p 21. One other small point which was raised in arguments on behalf of the respondents is that that committee of management and the board of trustees was not a committee of supervision and it was not open to the defendant to threaten their removal. It is not necessary to express any opinion on this point in view of the finding that the property in this case was waqf property. o p /o p 22. No other point has been pressed in arguments. o p /o p 23. As a result, the appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the lower Court is set aside. The suit stands dismissed with costs in both the Courts. o p /o p
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1953 (4) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al decree would be the date of the decree passed in appeal or revision. An application for execution, however, would not be premature if it is made before the decree becomes final in the sense which has been indicated earlier. 14. In the view taken by me above it appears to me that the decree-holder in this case was entitled to put his decree into execution even though an appeal was pending against the decree I would, therefore, allow the application for revision No. 180 of 1951 and set aside the order of the learned Assistant Collector dated 30-9-1950, and of the Civil Judge, dated 2-6-1951, and dismiss application No. 5 of 1949. 15. Before taking leave of this case I would however, like to point out that the learned Civil Judge who decided the case to which revision application No. 5 of 1949 relates should have followed the decision of the Bench of the Chief Court of Avadh even though he did not agree with its correctness. Kidwai, J. 16. I agree. Chaturvedi, J. 17.I agree.
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1953 (4) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sources of income." On these facts he held that income from undisclosed sources included the sum of ₹ 75,000. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner set this finding aside but the Appellate Tribunal restored it and held that it was undisclosed income and directed the amount to be added back to the taxable income of the assessee. The assessment being under Section 23(4) all that we are required to see is whether the Income-tax Officer's order was a reasonable order or he had made the assessment capriciously (Vide our decision in Singh Engineering Works, Kanpur v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Since reported at page 93 supra) , Miscellaneous Case No. 300 of 1949). We, therefore, do not feel disposed to direct the Appellate Tribunal to make any reference in this case. The other questions proposed in these applications do not, in our view, arise. The assessee must pay costs to the Department which we assess at ₹ 400 in each case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (4) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e on the area of open land.... shall be levied at 1 per cent. of the valuation based on capital," in Rule 350-A. I feel no doubt that in saying that the rate on the area of open land shall be levied at 1 per cent. of the valuation based on capital the rule really provided that the capital value shall be a measure of taxation and not the subject-matter of taxation. 39. For reasons stated above, I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother that the impugned tax is not a tax on capital value, but is a tax on lands, a tax falling under Entry 42 of List II and, therefore, a tax within the competence of the Provincial Legislature and the municipality to levy. That being so, Rule 350-A of the taxation rules of the Ahmedabad Municipality must be held to be 'intra vires' of the powers of the municipality. 40. In the end therefore, I agree with my learned brother that this appeal must be allowed and the decree of the trial Court must be set aside. 41. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (4) TMI 29 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quidator, acted wisely and exercised his discretion correctly. 33. So far as the other appeal is concerned, namely, the appeal against the winding up order, no argument was addressed to us and as the learned Judge points out, there was no affidavit against the application at all. That was natural, because it is common ground of all parties that the company must be wound up and if it is not going to be wound up by means of a scheme to be worked out by the proposed agents, it must be wound up officially as prayed for by Dharam Chand Jain and as ordered by the Court. (His Lordship considered other circumstances of the case and concluded ) 34-35. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel where two Counsel appeared. The Official Liquidator will get his costs out of the assets. Let two orders be drawn up, but there will be one set of costs. (Further portion of judgment is omitted as not material for reporting.--Ed.) Sarkar, J. 36. I agree.
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1953 (4) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed to draw between the case before the Judicial Committee and the present case. It was then urged that a right of fishery has been treated as a right in immovable property and, therefore, the right to win chanks may also be treated as conferring an interest in immovable property and that, therefore, the present case falls within the exception contemplated by Lord Greene in Mohanlal's case 1949 17 I.T.R. 473. We do not think that the right to collect chanks from the sea stands on the same footing as an exclusive fishery right, and on that ground refuse to apply the principle of the decision of the Judicial Committee. We are, therefore, of opinion in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mohanlal's case 1949 17 I.T.R. 473 that the item of expenditure is revenue expenditure. The question has to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner of Income-tax. The petitioner is entitled to his costs ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (4) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in Malda in the district of West Bengal but it has to pay a single Government revenue at Purnea. It is further alleged that the appellant company has let out portions of the estates on Patni leases, each of the Patnis comprising land situate both within and outside Bihar. The acquisition of that part of the estate, which is situate in Bihar has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the appellant company to pay its revenue or recover its rent. That part of the estate which is in Bihar cannot be severed from the rest and therefore the notification covering only the portion of the estate situate in Bihar is invalid. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. As stated by the High Court it is a simple case of apportionment of the revenue and also apportionment of the rent. The necessity for such apportionment cannot possibly affect the validity of the notification. For reasons stated above these appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assessee expected to realise the decretal amount in future and with that hope he went on filing successive execution petitions to keep the decree alive. In my opinion the assessee was entitled to treat the amount of ₹ 14,518 as a bad debt within the meaning of Section 10(2)(xi), Income-tax Act, in the year of assessment when all hopes for its realisation were lost. 9. I also agree with Mr. Dutt that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal is vitiated on account of its having misread and misconstrued exhibit P. From exhibit P, it is clear that the amount of cash intro duced is not more than the amount withdrawn by Rai Bahadur Balmiki Prasad Singh. The finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the introduction was more, than the withdrawal was thus based on misreading of the account. In my opinion such an error on the part of the Appellate Tribunal can be taken into consideration by us. In my opinion the cash introduced can be referable to the amounts withdrawn previously.
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1953 (4) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dentical. In the assessment proceedings, the Income-tax Officer, after hearing the evidence on specified points, assesses the total income of the assessee and all that is necessary for him to find out is what items can be treated as income of the assessee. It is not at all necessary for him to give a finding that there has been concealment of the particulars of his income or, that the assessee has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, as is necessary for imposing a penalty under Section 28(1)(c). Since the facts which have to be found are entirely different, findings given during the assessment proceedings cannot operate as res judicata in proceeding for imposition of penalty where entirely different facts have to be found. The second question must, therefore, be answered in the negative. Since we are answering one question in favour of the assessee and the other in favour of the Department we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (4) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the petitioner has the right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him." We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of article 22. That not having been done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of grounds, the petitioner's detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed.
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1953 (4) TMI 23 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... law, as the object of the Act is clearly not to exclude from taxation income whenever it is found within the taxable territory. We are, therefore, of opinion that once money representing income, profits of gains is brought into any part of British India, the department is entitled to assess it to income-tax even though it is not meant for retention or investment at that place. As the case comes within the letter of the law, it is not within our province to enquire into the intention of the legislature in enacting it or speculate on its underlying spirit. The answer to the reference should, therefore, be in the affirmative. We hold that, in the circumstances of the case, the amount of ₹ 16,650 remitted by the Sanawad shop of the assessee to Upleta by a draft on the Imperial Bank, Khandwa, can be included in the total income of the assessee for the assessment year 1944-45. Costs shall be paid by the assessee. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (4) TMI 22 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 10. As regards sales of standard cloth, the assessee was entitled to a profit of 3 per cent. on the ex-mill price. In the absence of any details, the Income-tax Officer determined the trading profits at 1.5 per cent. making allowance for the expenses and margin of profits paid to sub-dealers. It was really very easy for the assessee to give proper details of the trading income and expenditure under this head and he has not chosen to do so. 11. The orders of the Income-tax Officer were scrutinized minutely by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and he accepted the assessee's contention regarding the trading profits of yarn business. 12. Under these circumstances we hold that there is material on record to warrant an estimate of the profits at the several rates adopted in this case. 13. Under the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 66(5) of the Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (4) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rred to the Full Bench in this case, and it was distinctly said in the order disposing of the leave petition that leave would not have been granted had the scope of the appeal been limited to the merits of the case. It was observed that having regard to the findings recorded by the final court of fact, as also the evidence in the case the elements of both the offences had been fully established. The learned counsel for the appellants attempted to argue that on the facts found no offence under section 297 could be said to have been made out. This point, in our opinion, is not open at this stage, it having been hold that all the ingredients of the offence had been established on the record. Even otherwise there is no substance in the contention because the prosecution evidence is sufficient to hold the offence proved against all the appellants. For the reasons given above we hold that there is no substance in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant had the authority of the umpire to file the awards on his behalf into court in terms of section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act?
Whether in view of subsection (3) of section 31 of the Act it can be said that the awards were filed in the Calcutta High Court earlier than in the Gauhati court?
Whether the scope of section 31, sub-section (4) of the Act is limited to applications under the Act during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings only?
Held that:- Section 31 (4) would vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court in which an application for the, filing of an award has been first made under section 14 of the Act.
It is undisputed that the application by the respondent Union of India was made before the Gauhati court on the 10th August, 1949, and the earliest move by the appellant before the Calcutta court was on the 17th August, 1949. All these facts and on the view of the interpretation of section.31, sub-section (4), which we are inclined to take, it is clear that the Gauhati court only has the jurisdiction and not the Calcutta High Court as regards the present dispute. In the result, the two appeals must be dismissed
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