|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 49 Records
-
1955 (3) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... But the exact dates do not matter because the representation to the first defendant was made in 1910 before the first defendant's purchases. It was made by Kanhaiya Lal and Mukand Ram as as well as by other members of the family. We have already referred to the first defendant's evidence. This case would therefore be governed by Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore(1952 S.C.R. 478.) in any event. But we need not elaborate this further because of the other principle which, in our opinion, is sufficient to dispose of both the present cases. The result is that both appeals are allowed. The decrees of the High Court -are set aside and those of the first Court dismissing the plaintiff's claims in those suits out of which Civil Appeals 92 and 94 of 1950 arise are restored. Costs here and in the High. Court will be paid by the plaintiff-respondent but there will be only one set of costs and they will be divided half and half between the two sets of appellants. Appeals allowed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ns of Order XXI, rule 16 contemplate the actual transfer by an assignment in writing of a decree after it is passed and that while a transfer of or an agree- ment to transfer a decree that may be passed in future may, in equity, entitle the intending transferee to claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it is passed, such equitable transfer does not render the transferee a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. In this respect the decisions of the Madras High Court in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(1) and of the Calcutta High Court in Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Mandal(1) and Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji (2) are correct. As at present advised, I would like to express no opinion as to whether the expression "by operation of law" can be given the interpretation suggested by my learned brother Das, J., as it is unnecessary to do so in the present appeal. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... yee the way in which he is to do the work upon which he is engaged". (1) 1947 A.C. 1, As indicated above, in the present case the direction and control of the appellant and of the ministerial staff in charge of the Cash Department of the Bank was entirely vested in the Bank through its manager or other superior officer. We have therefore no hesitation in differing from the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal and in holding that the appellant was an employee of the Bank. That being so, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to make the directions it did in respect of the appellant. The respondent did not at any stage of the proceedings challenge the orders of the Tribunal on its merits. That conclusion being reached, there is no difficulty in upholding the orders of the Tribunal in respect of the appellant. It is therefore not necessary to pronounce upon the other points raised by the parties. The appeal is accordingly allowed wit costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nst his conviction after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties on notice being issued by the High Court in that behalf. This right of his is not curtailed by anything contained in the earlier provisions of section 439 nor by anything contained in either section 369 or section 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the decision reached by the High Court of Bombay in the case under appeal was wrong and must be reversed. We accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter back to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay with a direction that it shall allow the Appellant to show cause against his conviction and dispose of the same according to law. BY THE COURT.-The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court of Bombay is set aside, and the matter is sent back to the High Court with a direction that it shall allow the appellant an opportunity to show cause' against his conviction and dispose of the matter according to law.
-
1955 (3) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by the license. Similarly, in the Bengal Excise Act, Act V of 1909, Section 45 refers not only to contravention of a provision of the Bengal Excise Act or any rule made thereunder, but also refers to default in complying with any condition imposed upon a licensee by a license granted under the Excise Act. It is clear that unless the penal section itself includes the contravention of a condition of the license as an offence, it is not possible to hold that the licensee by merely committing breach of a condition imposed by a license has committed the offence which consists in contravention of an order made or deemed to be made under this Act. In this view, therefore, although the reasons given by the learned Magistrate have not been considered by us as sound, it is clear that the prosecution of the opposite party under Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, must fail. 28. Accordingly this application fails and the Rule is discharged. Mitter, J. 29. I agree.
-
1955 (3) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wise dealt with "according 'to the provisions hereinafter contained". To the extent that no valid machinery is set up under the U.P. Panchayat Raj' Act for the trial of any Particular case, the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court under section 5 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be held to have been excluded. Exclusion of jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction, can be brought about by the setting no of a court of limited jurisdiction, in respect of the limited field, only if the vesting and the exercise of that limited jurisdiction is clear and operative. Where, as in this case, there is no adequate machinery for the exercise of this jurisdiction in a specific case, we -cannot hold that the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of such a case by the Court of general jurisdiction is illegal. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Railway Magistrate had the jurisdiction to try the case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 33 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... money-lending and banking business. It was also found that the loss of decision of this case has also been doubted by the Rangoon High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Hajee Abdul Gany Ayoob##. Mr. R.J. Bahadur also referred to an Orissa case Bansidhar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa###. But the loss was not allowed in that case because the High Court agreed with the Tribunal that the loss of money by theft was not incidental to the business nor could it be held to be loss of stock-in-trade, and could not therefore be allowed as a trading loss. For the reasons we have expressed, we hold that the amount of ₹ 35,000 should be deducted from the total income of the assessee for the purpose of income-tax, and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax department. The Income-tax department must pay the cost of the reference; hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (3) TMI 32 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... for periods amounting in all to more than 2 years during the 7 years preceding that year". (Travancore Income-tax Manual, p. 229). 6. The decisions cited before us were Mari Muthu Pillai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 1945 13 I.T.R. 186, Swaminathan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 1947 15 I.T.R. 418, and Manibhai S. Patel v. Commissioner of Income- tax, Bombay North 1953 23 I.T.R. 27. It is agreed that the first portion of section 4B(a) did not directly arise for consideration in those cases and it is hence unnecessary for us to discuss them in this judgment. 7. In the light of what is stated above the assessee has to be considered as "not ordinarily resident" in the accounting years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 within the meaning of section 6(a) of the Travancore Income-tax Act, 1121, and we answer the reference accordingly. The assessee will have his costs from the Department; advocate's fee ₹ 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (3) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plaintiff was in fact misled or could have been misled if he had acted with due diligence and caution?
Held that:- Tribunal will consider this question above. It will take in-to consideration the fact that the defendant did enter an appearance and did file a written statement and that issues were framed in his presence; also that the case was fixed for the "Petitioner's" evidence only and not for that of the appellant; and that the petitioner examined all the witnesses he had present on the 17th and the 18th and did not give up any of them; that he was given an adjournment on 19-3-1953 for the examination witnesses who did not come on that date and that the examined three more on 20-3-1953 after the defendant had entered an appearance through counsel an( claimed the right to plead; also whether, when the appellant's only protest was against the bearings a Udaipur on dates fixed for the petitioner's evidence alone, it would be legitimate for a party acting with due caution and diligence to assume that the other side had abandoned his right to adduce his own evidence should the hearing for that be fixed at some other place or at some other date in the same place.
The Tribunal will also consider and determine whether it will be proper in the circumstances of this case to allow the appellant to adduce his own evidence.
-
1955 (3) TMI 30 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... clause (2) of that Article would not apply. This argument is doubtless attractive but it is somewhat academic in view of the findings of fact of the Sales Tax Authorities. There is no finding to the effect that the first sale to the petitioner was for the purpose of re-sale by him in Madras. On the other hand, the clear finding is that at the time of the first sale the petitioner falsely represented to the Orissa dealers that he was purchasing the goods for re-sale in Orissa. It is true that subsequently the petitioner changed his mind and sold the goods in Madras. But from the mere fact that he subsequently chang- ed his mind it could not be reasonably inferred that the first sale to him was also in the course of inter-State trade or commerce . Fur- ther materials are necessary for supporting such a view and they are totally wanting in the present case. Hence, I would hold that clause (2) of Article 286 of the Constitution would not help the petitioner. Petition dismissed..
-
1955 (3) TMI 29 - PEPSU HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ioner was under section 18 of the Ordinance and secondly the peti- tioners themselves had in the grounds of the revision petition before the Financial Commissioner (Taxation) stated, Thus the question arises as to whether the petitioner is a dealer or not which shall be determined by your honour under section 18 of the Pepsu General Sales Tax Ordi- nance, 2006. Your petitioner s contention is that he is not a dealer and as such is not required to be registered as a dealer under section 7 of the said Ordinance and consequently no assessment can be made on him . The Commissioner had determined the application of the peti- tioners under section 18 of the Ordinance and the case was not before him in revision against any order of the assessing authority. I, there- fore, agree with the learned Financial Commissioner (Taxation) that a revision petition in this case did not lie to him. No other point has been urged. The petition is dismissed though without costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 28 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ities, including the Board of Revenue, had proceeded upon the view that the assessee had not produced documentary evidence to substantiate his claim of deduction to the extent of Rs. 24,00,000 and odd. The Board of Revenue now admits that this assumption has been proved to be completely unfounded and therefore the order of the Board of Revenue dated the 18th July, 1950, refusing the claim of deduction to the full extent is a legally invalid order. We hold, therefore, that the question referred to the High Court must be answered against the State of Bihar and in favour of the assessee, and it must be held that the assessee is entitled under section 5(2)(a)(v) to a deduction of Rs. 24,78,890-8-6 instead of the amount of Rs. 12,40,493-8-6 which has been allowed on the basis of an estimate. As the assessee is also to blame for not producing documentary evidence before the Commissioner we do not think we should make an order for costs in this case. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1955 (3) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... such relief was necessary since if the requisite writs are issued against the opposite parties 1 and 2 adequate relief would be granted to the petitioner. The application is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari will issue quashing the order of assessment dated 16th March, 1952, passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Banaras, against the petitioner and also quashing the order of the Collector of Banaras initiating certificate proceedings against the petitioner company on foot of that order. A writ in the nature of mandamus shall issue restraining respondents 1 and 2 from enforcing the said assessment order dated 16th March, 1952, and directing them to withdraw the certificate proceedings pending with the respondent No. 4 on foot of the said assessment order. Considering the expenses to which the petitioner company must have been put in the present case, consolidated costs of Rs. 300 are awarded to it against respondents I, 2 and 3. Application allowed. (1) 1954 5 S.T.C. 115.
-
1955 (3) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ction 7 of the General Sales Tax Act. From the section which we have (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 133 (1953) 1 M.L.J. 743. extracted above, it will be seen that two conditions are necessary before the exemption can be invoked. One is that the terms of the contract should provide for delivery outside the State and secondly that in pur- suance of such a contract the goods must have been (actually) delivered outside. It will thus be noticed that the requirements of section 7 of the General Sales Tax Act are even stricter and the exemption narrower than that embodied in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a). Therefore in a case to which the latter provision is not attracted, the provisions of section 7 cannot possibly apply. In the present case, the contract stipulates for delivery inside the State and so the terms of section 7 of the General Sales Tax Act are not brought into play. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion that when there was a contract for printing the second edition of a book and the printer was to find the materials including the paper, it was not a contract for the sale of a thing to be delivered at a future time, nor was it a contract for making a thing to be sold when completed, but it was a contract to do work and labour, furnishing the materials. From this, it is clear that it is a works contract. So far as the present case is concerned, I have no doubt whatever that when a person entrusts a press to print, say stationery like letter paper or visiting cards, and the press itself supplies the material, the transaction is nothing but a works contract in which the allocation of 70 per cent. and 30 per cent. as defined in the Act will apply. Viewed in that light, the taxable amount in question in each of the years would be less than Rs. 10,000 and therefore the plaintiff was wrongly taxed. The second appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 24 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... xplanation I under section 2(g) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, is ultra vires the Constitution of India. This question does not arise at all because the present transaction is not one of hire-purchase. Even if it did it would not be for the Board of Revenue to decide the question, which is for the High Court to do. The petition is allowed. The petitioners are not dealers in respect of the financial transactions between them and the actual purchasers of motor cars from the French Motor Car Co. Ltd. But if the petitioners want to enter into hire-purchase agree- ments with the actual purchasers, they may get themselves registered as dealers under the Act so that they may in the first instance buy the motor car outright from M/s French Motor Car Co. Ltd. as registered dealers without paying sales tax, which in that case will be realised from the petitioners when they sell the cars to the actual purchasers on the hire-purchase or instalment system. Petition allowed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Manufacturers Association(1). Besides the co- operative society was a dealer in milk and the distribution of oil cakes could not be brought as an item of business it carried on, even inde- pendent of the question, whether the disposal of the oil cakes constituted sales or not. The petition is allowed with costs and the order of the Appellate Tribunal in relation to turnover of Rs. 91,491-8-7 is set aside. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1955 (3) TMI 22 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he meaning of the Assam Sales Tax Act read with Article 286 of the Constitution. Mr. Ghose sought to point out some distinction between the definition of sale and dealer in the Assam Sales Tax Act and in the Bihar Sales Tax Act with a view to avoid the application of the principles laid down in The Bengal Immunity case(1), but, in my opinion, the distinction is without any difference and does not merit examination. The application therefore fails and must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. I have already shown that the Assam Sales Tax Act was entirely within the competence of the State Legislature and in making the law, the Legislature has not violated any of the Articles of the Constitution nor has it affected any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. It is now too late in the day to raise those contentions which stand sufficiently answered by the decisions aforesaid on sound and adequate grounds. DEKA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed. (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 43.
-
1955 (3) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e to be taxed under section 3(2) (viii). These motors were not in fact sold or even valued separately when the goods were sold by the assessee. In our opinion, the view taken by the learned Chairman was the correct one, that for purposes of taxation the unity of the goods sold should not be impaired and that if the machine taken as a whole did not fall within the category of electrical goods , a component part thereof, which was not sold as an independent item of goods could not be treated as the goods sold such a fictional sale could not furnish any basis for a computation of taxable turnover. The order of the Tribunal will therefore be varied to this extent. The turnover of the sales of item 2 of list 1(c) and of all items other than item 9 of list 1(a) inclusive of the value of the component electrical motors is liable to be taxed only under section 3(1)(b) of the Act on the basis that they are not electrical goods. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
-
1955 (3) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... , the order cannot be held invalid if it resulted in a reduction of tax liability but held invalid and beyond their jurisdiction if the recompu- tation resulted in enhancing the tax. Whether the expression thereon in section 12A(4) read in the light of the second proviso to sub-section (5) would include the entire assessment order or only those grounds which are raised for consideration of the Appellate Tribunal by any particular appellant, in the present case the claim to deduction under rule 18(2) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules and the constitutional exemp- tion under Article 286(1)(a) were so inter-related to each other that it would not be possible for the Tribunal to pass any order on the appeal other than that which they have passed. In the result, we hold that the order of the Appellate Tribunal was within their jurisdiction and that was the proper order to pass. The revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
|
