|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 28 Records
-
1956 (1) TMI 40 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rts below, was a complete stranger to the family of Awadh Behari. Her suit cannot be considered a representative suit. It must be treated as if the suit had been directed simpliciter to a declaration of the deceased plaintiff's individual right. The original plaintiff being dead, and her right to sue not having survived, her suit abated, and, 'therefore, her suit could not be deemed to be still pending so as to entitle Mahinder to claim to be transposed, and to continue the suit. In my opinion, therefore, the suit of Mt. Nunawati on her death was dead, and, therefore, it could not be revived, or continued by Mahinder, the present plaintiff No. 1. The plaintiffs, therefore, had been rightly non-suited, and their suit held not maintainable. I, therefore, uphold the contention of Mr. sahay on this point. 38. For the reasons given above, the second contention of Mr. Dayal must also be overruled 39. In the result, this appeal also fails, and is dismissed but without costs.
-
1956 (1) TMI 39 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s available and punitory consequences; (2) that it must be shown that the law is purposeful and intentional and would be administered to the disadvantage of the complainant; (3) that the good faith of the officials acting within the ambit of a statute is to be presumed and mere suspicion that they may act in another manner is not enough; and (4) that the mere fact that under a particular statute one particular person is proceeded against and another is not is not destructive of the equal protection clause unless what I have said in Nos. (1), (2) and (3) is established. In my view and for the reasons I have given above the two Sub-sections by themselves do not contain any element of discrimination and affect neither the procedure nor the remedies, nor do they increase the punitory burden on an assessee. 30. I would therefore dismiss this petition and discharge the rule. The petitioners must pay the costs of the opposite party. Counsel fee Rs. 250/-. S.S. DULAT, J. 31. I agree.
-
1956 (1) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e creditors and that the 1st respondent herein was closely related to the 2nd respondent herein. Unfortunately no evidence was let in on behalf of the respondents. The Subordinate Judge accepted the evidence, of the petitioner's witnesses and adjudged the 2nd respondent as an insolvent. On appeal the District Judge held that the transfer of all the properties of the debtor could not be regarded as being, for the benefit of the creditors generally. As the parties have not placed the entire evidence, bearing on this point viz., as to whether the alienation amounts to an act of insolvency under Sections 6 (a) and/or 6 (d) of the Act, I think if is just and necessary to remand this petition to the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada. 8. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the orders passed by the District Judge and the Subordinate Judge are set aside and the Subordinate Judge is directed to dispose of the application in the light of the observations aforesaid.
-
1956 (1) TMI 37 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n any case the Tribunal in the present case has come to the conclusion that by dealing in stocks and shares the company did not change the nature of its business. We have also been requested to ask the Tribunal to refer another question to us, namely as to whether there is any material on the record on which the Tribunal could find that the respondent's loss on the sale of shares in 1948 was in the same business as comprised in the respondent's business in sewing machines and accessories in which it made profits in 1949. This question was not agitated before the Tribunal itself and cannot be agitated before us in this application. In any case, I am of the opinion that there is abundant material on the record to show that the Tribunal were justified in coming to the conclusion on which they arrived. This petition appears to me to be wholly misconceived and must, therefore, be dismissed with costs, which I assess at ₹ 150. FALSHAW, J.--I agree. Petition dismissed.
-
1956 (1) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stances appearing therein. Here the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the community is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and its undertaking. A break down in the organisation of the Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road transport system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of the interest of the community. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the road transport system and it must, therefore, be held that the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. 14. In the result the appeal is allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside. 15. Costs in the appeal in this Court shall be paid by the appellant to the respondent as directed by the order granting Special Leave. Each party, however, will bear his own costs in the High Court.
-
1956 (1) TMI 35 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Petitioner and no arguments were advanced on this point before us. 76. Question No. (4) This question is discussed in detail while dealing with the writ petitions. It is discussed as third question. 77. Question No. (5) This question deals with the question of apportionment of the tax according to the extent to which material other than cotton is used in the texture, borders or Pallas. 78. As I held above if the admixture of other material is small or negligible the essential description or quality of cloth is not altered. But if the material other than cotton is used to a substantial extent or in a manner so as to increase its value materially principle of apportionment will have to be followed as in my opinion Sales Tax Act is a fiscal statute and taxing provisions and exemptions have got to be strictly construed. The extent and value of apportionment of tax will in each case be a question of fact. 79. The references are answered accordingly. S.M. Samvatsar, J. 80. I agree.
-
1956 (1) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e to express that would be the language of the two cases just mentioned, namely, "at the option of" so and so. The Arbitration clause in the instant case does not express whose option it is to call for Arbitration. If it is the option of one party as against the other, then that option must in my view be clearly recognised in the language of the Arbitration agreement. If it is the option of both, that is, both must, agree to go to Arbitration before Arbitration can be enforced, then the present Arbitration clause becomes a contract to enter into a contract and, therefore, bad. From the business point of view, it does not seem to me at all unreasonable that two business men would agree to this course of action, namely, that they will not force an Arbitration against an unwilling party, but if both the parties agree, they would decide to have their disputes settled by Arbitration and accept their decision as final. 6. I, therefore, dismiss this application with costs.
-
1956 (1) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... skets at 3 annas per day. The Petitioner in his affidavit says that the 2nd Respondent is collecting huge amounts from the Petitioner and Ors. similarly situated. The Municipality or the 2nd Respondent who must be in a position to satisfy the Court did not attempt to place before it the nature of the services rendered and the income realized by the 2nd Respondent. Indeed, the Municipality, presumably because they could not sustain the levy on the basis of a fee pleaded that the road margins were leased out temporarily to tire Petitioner and Ors. . We cannot therefore hold on the scanty material placed before us, that the levy is commensurate with the services rendered by tire Municipality. It follows that tire levy is unreasonable and is, therefore invalid. 23. In this view it is not necessary to consider the other questions raised. 24. In the result we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 200.
-
1956 (1) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 8377; 3,01,397-4-3 is held by the company for a specific purpose in the nature of a trust for the benefit of the applicant firm and itself and in lieu of the order for payment made by the learned Judge it is ordered that the applicant firm will be entitled to repayment of the aforesaid sum out of the entire assets of the company, less such sum, if any, as" may be found due from it to the company on account of transactions had under the agreement. Upon the amount due to the applicant firm be ing determined, it will be entitled to apply to the Court for payment of such amount within six weeks from the date of such determination. The rest of the order of the learned Judge will stand. There will be no order for costs in this appeal, but the Official Liquidators shall be entitled to retain and pay their own costs of this appeal as well as other costs, if any, ordered to be made costs in the appeal as between Attorney and Client out of the assets of the company in their hands.
-
1956 (1) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... company being included, the members get the benefit of being able to deal in its shares, it can be said that when the assessee enlists the name of a new company, it performs a specific service for its members as contemplated by section 10(6). Less can it be said of the fee received that it is remuneration definitely related to the specific service, because although it is definitely related to the enlistment, it cannot properly be said to be remuneration therefor, as the wages or monetary reparation charged particularly for the labour undergone or the trouble taken. For the reasons given above the answer to the question referred should, in my opinion, be as follows Clause (a) As to the sum of ₹ 15,687... No. As to the sum of ₹ 60,750... No. Clause (b) As to the sum of ₹ 16,000... No. As to the sum of ₹ 600... Not pressed. The assessee will have the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. Sarkar, J. - I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (1) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hans of silk. The case about the remaining 10 thans stands on a different footing. Admittedly the appellant firm has taken delivery of them. Its version, viz., that it had taken delivery as the respondent's agent, has been disbelieved by the lower Court and that finding has not been challenged before us. We, therefore, take it that these 10 thans were taken as part of the sale transaction and had not been paid for. Their price comes to ₹ 1,353-3-9. The interest from the date of contract till the date of institution of the suit at the stipulated rate of ten annas per cent, per mensem on ₹ 1,353-3-9 comes to ₹ 44-8-0. 13. We, therefore, allow this appeal in part, modify the decree of the Court below and decree the suit for a sum of ₹ 1,397-11-9 with interest at 3 per cent, per annum from the date of the suit till the date of deposit of the amount in Court. Parties shall receive and pay costs in proportion to then- success and failure in both Courts.
-
1956 (1) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... low these observations and hold that it was the duty of the Subordinate Judge to have decided the question as to the admissibility of the documents objected to by the Petitioner. He ought not to have marked them tentatively and reserved the question of the admissibility for arguments at the final stage. 5. In Venkata Narasayyamma v. Venkata Rattamma, 1955 AP WR 87 (C) I held that ant order of this description is liable to be set aside in revision. T therefore interferes under the provisions' of Section 115 (c). Code of Civil Procedure and direct the Subordinate Judge to decide the admissibility of the documents forthwith and proceed with the trial. 6. It is represented that the suit was adjourned to March, 1956 on the ground that the Civil Revision Petition is pending in this Court. It is open to the learned Subordinate Judge to advance the part heard suit and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible. 7. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition ' is answer costs.
-
1956 (1) TMI 28 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ercised its discretion properly in not permitting the assessee to take the additional ground. There is no necessity to discuss the other cases on the point involved. The Tribunal, in this case has passed a rather cryptic order while jettisoning the prayer of the assessee. It is difficult to understand the reasons and the grounds which led the Tribunal to reject the prayer of the assessee. In these circumstances, regard being had to the nature of the ground urged by the assessee, it is difficult to hold that the Tribunal had acted either judicially or properly. Accordingly, the question referred to the High Court is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The case should now go back to the Appellate Tribunal which should consider the point raised in the additional ground in the light of the decision given by a Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa v. P. Darolia & Sons 1955 27 ITR 515 . Choudhary, J.- I agree.
-
1956 (1) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e effect that the institution was to be declared a Math but that the then Mahant was to be recognised as the hereditary trustee thereof. This compromise was recognised by the Commissioner by his order dated the 12th May, 1947, formally making the above declarations. It was on the basis of this that, later on, a scheme was framed on the 22nd May, 1948. It does not appear that the Mahant filed any suit which was then available to him. But it is stated to us by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner that an application was filed in the High Court for a writ to qudsh the scheme, and that it was dismissed by the High Court on the 16th November, 1954. The scheme became final under the original Act of 1939 as it stood before the 1953 amendment. Obviously, with reference to the facts of such a case, no argument of the kind that has been addressed to us in the other four petitions was available. In the result, therefore, all the five petitions must be dismissed with costs.
-
1956 (1) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ich Mr. Meyer himself cited. The real substance in Mr. Meyer's submission that the trust was illusory was that it was not a bona fide trust at all. According to him, father and sons had combined to put on cloaks of a so-called trusteeship and had put away a part of their assets in the hands of themselves in their character as trustees and under those clocks, to remain there safely for six years and to earn income, which the arms of the taxing authorities would not be long enough to reach. If, however, the Department wanted to impugn the trust on the ground that it was not a bona fide trust at all, it should have taken that point in a straightforward manner. The attack through the conduction of the trust deed itself must, in my judgment, fail. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred must, in my opinion, be in the affirmative. The respondent will be entitled to its costs of this reference. SARKAR, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1956 (1) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n the results question Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are answered in the following manner Question No. 2--Not pressed. Question No. 3--Yes. Question No. 4--No. Question No. 5--No. As regards question Nos. 1 and 6, we remit the case to the Tribunal under section 66(4) of the Act in order that the Tribunal may drew up and forward to this Court a further statement of case, incorporating therein its findings on the several matter we have indicated in this judgment as also such other matter as the Tribunal may consider relevant. The annexure to that statement should, if possible, contain a copy of the schedule to the agreement of the 12th August, 1946. As the assessee is reported to be in England, the Tribunal is directed to submit the further statement of case by the 30th November, 1956. The order for costs will be made at the time of the final disposal of the references. SARKAR, J.--I agree. Questions Nos. 2 to 5 answered. Case remitted for further statements as to questions Nos. 1 and 6.
-
1956 (1) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 7; 25,381 had been paid and that those dates were all within the accounting year. Had this point been raised before the Tribunal, the necessary investigation of facts might have been made and there would have been a finding as to whether the Income-tax Officer had had before him any other material and whether the dates on which the various sums had been contributed were ascertainable and, if so, what those dates were. As I have said, the point was not raised and no investigation with regard to it having been called for, none was made. In those circumstances, it seems to me quite impossible to entertain the point sought to be raised by Mr. Pal and less possible to give a decision on it. For the reasons given above, the answers to the questions referred must, in my opinion, be as follows Question 1 "Yes". Question 2 "Yes". The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, will have his costs of this reference. SARKAR, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (1) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s been drawn to the decision in -- 'Amardas v. Sri Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha' where the learned Judge came to the conclusion, that a nominee did not become the owner of the money payable under the Policy merely by reason of the nomination but the policy-holder continued to be the owner up to the end of his life and had full power of disposal over it. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that such moneys payable under the policy should be treated as part of the testator's assets. The case there arose on the point of Court-fees payable. The decision appears to me not to be in conflict with the conclusions that I have reached. 16. In the circumstances and for the reasons stated, this application must fail. I, therefore, dismiss this application, I shall not, however, make in the special circumstances of this case the applicant liable for the costs, but I direct that the respondent's costs of the application will be add ed to his costs in execution of the decree.
-
1956 (1) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... here no return had been filed. The case was also one where income had escaped assessment. If so, clause (a) of section 34(1) clearly applied and the second notice under section 34 was given within the period allowed by law. The assessment originally made on the 29th June, 1951, was, therefore, not a time-barred assessment, although it might be bad on the merits, as it was in fact held to be ; and since the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, after setting aside that assessment, directed a re-assessment to be made under section 31(3)(c) of the Act, the second proviso to section 34(3) would apply and, therefore, no reassessment made hereafter would be barred by limitation. For the reasons given above, the answers to the questions should, in my opinion, be as follows Question (1) " No ". Question (2) " No, as to both parts. " The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, will have his costs of this reference. SARKAR, J.- I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (1) TMI 21 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... so another reason why I consider that the present petitioner should proceed to avail himself of the remedies provided by the Act and in due course, if so advised, take steps to have a case stated and a reference made on the legal aspect of the matter by the Chief Com- missioner. I find that neither from the description of the petitioner s business given in the petition nor from the reply filed on behalf of the authorities is it at all possible to form any clear picture of the exact nature of the transactions regarding which the legality of the imposition of sales tax is challenged and in my opinion before any decision could possibly be given on this point, a clear and comprehensive statement of the case is necessary such as presumably would be made available in case of a reference under section 21. I thus do not see sufficient reason to interfere by way of any order under Article 226 and dismiss the petition, but leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
|
