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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 31 Records
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1956 (11) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... /2, Lansdowne Road, his enjoyment is further restricted inasmuch as it is subject to the right of residence of Ramendra and his heirs in the said premises until the obligation to provide alternative accommodation is discharged by Rajes or his heirs. 23. We are clearly of the opinion that the objection raised to the execution (1) on the ground that the properties charged are to be proceeded against, in the first instance, and (2) on the ground that the interest which Rajes gets under the trust deed either as regards the general properties covered by the deed or as regards premises No. 44/2, Lansdowne Road, is contingent, are untenable. If, as a fact, either the debts remain undischarged or the alternative accommodation has not so far been provided, how the rights of persons affected thereby are to be safeguarded is not a matter that arises for consideration before us and we express no opinion thereupon. 24. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 25. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is reasonable to assume that standardization of retrenchment compensation and doing away with a perplexing variety of factors for granting retrenchment compensation may well have been the purposes of Section 25F though the basic consideration must have been the granting of unemployment relief. However, in our view of the construction of Section 25F. no compensation need be paid by the Appellants in the two appeals. It is unnecessary therefore to decide whether, in other cases of a different character Section 25F imposes a reasonable restriction or not. In the result we must allow the two appeals and set aside the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the two cases. Wo hold that the Appellants in the two appeals are not liable to pay any compensation Under Section 25F of the Act to their erstwhile workmen who were not retrenched within the meaning of that expression in that section. In the circumstances of these two cases, the parties must bear their own costs throughout.
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1956 (11) TMI 47 - THE CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... that in consideration of those deductions of rent the tenants agreed to do work which otherwise the landlord might have been required to do, and they did work which represented a capital expenditure required on the acquisition of the premises by them for the purposes of their trade. It was work and expenditure of a capital nature, being in respect of the accumulation of repairs or alterations (of a small nature, perhaps, but none the less alterations) of the premises to suit their business. It had, therefore, nothing in common with the current expenditure on repairs of the property which call to be made normally under a lease. Consequently, the only possible and reasonable conclusion on the facts in this case is that this work and expenditure was of a capital nature, and the commissioners must have misdirected themselves in law, as it is not a conclusion which seems to me a reasonable one in the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on." It is difficult to escape the conclusion that there was here a process of give and take, and a settlement of the matter via media. If so, it ought not to be open to any one side to resile unilaterally. Analogy may, if necessary, be drawn from section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure precluding appeal from decisions passed by court with the consent of parties. Such decisions could be set aside only on grounds which would invalidate an agreement such as misrepresentation, fraud or mistake and that again, by suit. In the absence here of any exceptional case of this sort, it should follow that the order of the Tribunal must, as between the parties to it, stand. That means, that the Income-tax Officer had no authority to modify the order by himself and on the ground ascribed. 8. I, therefore, issue a writ of certiorari as prayed for, quashing Exhibit F order. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents, with counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nder s. 14 and that his case should not go to the Advisory Board. We see no warrant for the contention that this decision of the Government must be communicated to the detenue. It has not been shown how the communication of this decision would have been beneficial to the detenue. Indeed in the case of Achhar Singh v. The State of Punjab (1) this Court has expressed the opinion that the omission to convey the order made under s. 1 1 of the Indian Preventive Detention Act does not make the detention illegal or result in infringement of the petitioner's fundamental right. If that be the position under s. 1 1 of the Indian Preventive Detention Act, which provides for the making of a formal order, all the more must the position be the same under s. 14 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, which does not in terms require any formal order to be made. In our opinion there is no substance in this application, which must accordingly be dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n is based on the ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful smuggling activities relating to three commodities, cloth, zari and mercury of which two are found not to be essential articles. No material is placed before us enabling us to say that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury and that the smuggling as regards the other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature. On the other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to the detenu on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates that probably the smuggling of these two items was not of an inconsequential nature. 10. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order of detention in this case is bad and must be quashed. We have accordingly quashed the order and directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956. 11. Petition allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ument. A Court in order in find out what has pushed at a Sheriff's sale looks into the order directing the sole, the proclamation of sale and the surrounding circumstances. The surrounding; circumstance in this case is the higher value paid and the appellant never applied to set aside such sale on the ground of any alleged irregularity and defect. All these factors taken individiually find together leave no doubt in our mind that the goodwill of the business oe D. Mullick & Co. of 46/A, Netaji Subhas Road as a going concern including the monthly tenancy rieht of that shop room was In fact sold in this particular instance. We see nothing in the decision of Das J., in the matter of - 'H. C. Gupta v. Mackertich John', 49 Cal WN 322 (AIR 1946 Cal 140) CE), which supports Mr. Das's contention in this appeal. In fact, Das J., refers to some of the decisions that we have mentioned above. 18. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs. Bachawat, J. 19. I agree.
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1956 (11) TMI 42 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rpose of that rule. We are of opinion that seven clear days' interval is required between the date of announcement of the notice and the date of election under Rule 4. and as in the present case the interval comes to only six days even if 14th of October, 1955, is taken to be the date of announcement, a case of contravention of Rule 4 has been made out. Dis-regard of the provision of Rule 4 which is a mandatory provision renders the proceedings of election illegal. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the election, in the present case, cannot be regarded as valid on account of disregard of the mandatory provision of Rule 4. 13. This petition succeeds. The proceedings of election of the Panchas and Sarpanch held on the 21st of October, 1955 of Village Panchayat, Choru are quashed and a direction is issued to the Chief Panchayat Officer to hold fresh elections in accordance with the provisions of law. Under the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1956 (11) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o accused acted in concert by virtue of a common intention and of a criminal conspiracy, their entire activities cannot, in the very nature of things, be brought out in evidence. Obviously such daring offences would necessarily have called for active planning and co-operation of both these appellants together and probably of others We are, therefore, not able to make any distinction between them even as regards the sentence. We accordingly maintain the convictions and sentences against both the appellants under Sections 364 and 386, Penal Code taken with Sections 120B-B and 34, Penal Code. 12. In the result the convictions of both the appellants under Sections 302/34 and 201/34, Penal Code and the sentence of death, and rigorous imprisonment for seven years there for, are hereby set aside and the appellants are acquitted of these charges Their convictions and sentences in respect of the other charges are confirmed. Subject to this modification both the appeals are dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 40 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... o ; as, however, on the true construction of the agreement, some part at least of the £1,00,000 related to the imparting of information as to the secret processes, that part, in my judgment, reflects the diminution in value of a capital asset of the company and is, accordingly, not subject to tax. The case should therefore be remitted to the commissioners so as to afford to the company an opportunity for proving what proportion of the £100,000 should be treated, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, as referable to the secret processes which were imparted to the Government ; and that part, when ascertained, should be deducted from the assessment which has been made upon the company. Case remitted to commissioners to call further evidence and to determine what part, if any, of the amount of £100,000 should be attributed to the imparting of the secret processes, such part to be treated as a capital receipt, and to adjust the assessment accordingly.
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1956 (11) TMI 39 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anything by our deciding merely the question of penalty. The penalty has been imposed because the tax has not been paid. Whether the tax has been properly levied is a question which is under appeal. Any order under section 46(1) would fail if it is held that the tax is not properly levied. Therefore, the main question which has to be decided is whether the applicant has been properly assessed on a notice under section 34(1), and that question is before the proper appellate authority. We have held that that question should not be gone into by this court at this stage. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that it is not worthwhile going into the question of penalty at this stage for the penalty will fall with the assessment immediately the applicant succeeds. If the applicant fails on the question of assessment, all that we need say is that we would not be disposed to interfere with the penalty. We, therefore, dismiss the application in limine. Application dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, it is the High Court of Judicature at Madras that is constituted as the authority which may impose suspension pending enquiry into grave charges under rule 17(e) against the Members of the State Judicial Service. The order in question, therefore, falls within-this rule, and is perfectly intra vires. It was lastly contended for the appellant that even if the High Court could hold a preliminary enquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer, it had no jurisdiction to decide the matter finally, that the findings given by Balakrishna Ayyar J. should not be held to conclude the question against the appellant, and that the Government was bound to hold a fresh enquiry and decide for itself whether the charges were well- founded. No such question was raised in the petition or in the High Court, and we must, therefore, decline to entertain it. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 37 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his subject has, in our opinion, been fairly and rightly stated by the Lahore High Court in the a case of Seth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab 1944 12 I.T.R. 393." In our view the mere statement of the Income-tax authorities that on the enquiries instituted by the Income-tax Officer they were reliably informed that the assessee was not only in the habit of omitting transactions from his books, but was known to charge much higher rates of interest than the prescribed one, is not sufficient. It is not in the first place shown that the assessee was given an opportunity, nor is it sufficient to justify the assessment which not only does not furnish the basis on which the estimate is made but which, without doubt, can be said to be a guess. In the result our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The reference is answered accordingly with costs to the assessee-applicant which we assess at ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1956 (11) TMI 36 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rpose of that rule. We are of opinion that seven clear days' interval is required between the date of announcement of the notice and the date of election under Rule 4. and as in the present case the interval comes to only six days even if 14th of October, 1955, is taken to be the date of announcement, a case of contravention of Rule 4 has been made out. Dis-regard of the provision of Rule 4 which is a mandatory provision renders the proceedings of election illegal. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the election, in the present case, cannot be regarded as valid on account of disregard of the mandatory provision of Rule 4. 13. This petition succeeds. The proceedings of election of the Panchas and Sarpanch held on the 21st of October, 1955 of Village Panchayat, Choru are quashed and a direction is issued to the Chief Panchayat Officer to hold fresh elections in accordance with the provisions of law. Under the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1956 (11) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h a construction will ensure Harmonious operation of ss. 8, 10 and 14. These aspects of the matter do not appear to have been pointedly bought to the notice of the Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court and in our opinion that decision cannot be accepted as correct. There is nothing in the affidavits filed by the respondent showing that there was any particular circumstance or reason for which the declarations could riot have been made earlier than June 30, 1956, when they were actually made. For reasons stated above the detention of the petitioners became illegal and they may well complain of having been deprived of their liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure established by the Act, which embodies the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. In the premises the petitioners are entitled to the relief they pray for. We accordingly allow both the petitions and direct the petitioners to be released forthwith. Applications allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is reasonable to assume that standardisation of retrenchment compensation and doing away with a perplexing variety of factors for granting retrenchment compensation may well have been the purposes of a. 25F, though the basic consideration must have been the granting of unemployment relief. However, on our view of the construction of s. 25F, no compensation need be paid by the appellants in the two appeals. It is unnecessary therefore to decide whether, in other cases of a different character, s. 25F imposes a reasonable restriction or not. In the result, we must allow the two appeals and set aside the decisions of the High Court of Bombay in the two cases. We hold that the appellants in the two appeals are not liable to pay any compensation under s. 25F of the Act to their erstwhile workmen who were not retrenched within the meaning of that expression in that section. In the circumstances of these two cases, the parties must bear their own costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ery well consider what relief, if any, may possibly be granted to them having regard to all the circumstances of the case and may not be able to regulate the work to be done by the aqarias and the remuneration to be paid to them by the employer in the manner it is used to do in the case of other industries here the conditions of employment and the work to be done by the employees is of a different character. These considerations would necessarily have to be borne in mind while the Industrial Tribunal is adjudicating upon the disputes which have been referred to it for adjudication. They do not, however, militate against the conclusion which we have come to above that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the effect that the agarias are workmen within the definition of the term contained in s. 2 (s) of the Act was justified on the materials on the record. We accordingly see no ground for interfering with that decision and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ption in s. 4(2) is that if it is found in the possession of a person, he should be presumed to have committed the offence under s. 4(1)(a), unless he could give satisfactory explanation therefor, as for example, that it must have been foisted in the place without his knowledge. Likewise, it would be an offence under s. 4(1)(g) to be in possession of materials, still, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor. Under s. 4(2)(a), if a person is found to be in possession of materials or other things mentioned in the sub-section, there is a presumption that he has committed an offence under s. 4(1)(g), but it is open to him to account satisfactorily therefor. The contention, therefore, that there is no reasonable relation between the presumption and the offence is, in our opinion, based on a misreading of the section. Both the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants having failed, these appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are invested with the power of adjudging confiscation, increased rates of duty or penalty, the highest penalty which can be inflicted is ₹ 1000. With great respect we cannot agree that Bhagvati J. by this sentence meant to decide the question which now falls for decision, In the case before the Supreme Court no question even arose with regard to the interpretation of Section 167 (8). The sentence occurs in that part of the judgment in which the scheme of the Sea Customs Act is described. We therefore hold that the amount of ₹ 1000 is not the maximum limit of the penalty which can be imposed by the Customs Authorities. 29. We cannot refrain from remarking that the Collector might well have taken a more lenient view of the respondents' case having regard to the fact that they were misled by the advice of the Supenintendent of Central Excise. The appeal is allowed and W.P.No. 642 of 1954 is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1956 (11) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ith Government. We have come to this conclusion without reference to the admission of the plaintiff contained in para. 22 of the indenture (Ex. D-4) quoted above. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the plaintiff was bound by that admission or whether that admission is vitiated by any pressure of circumstances or duress as pleaded by the plaintiff. Certainly that admission is a piece of evidence which could be considered on its merits even apart from the question of estopped which had not been specifically pleaded or formed the subject matter of a separate issue. In view of our finding that the market, as also the land on which it stands, is the property of Government, the conclusion follows that the operative provisions of the Control Act do not apply to the premises in question. That being so, it must be held that there is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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