|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 54 Records
-
1956 (4) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d Reforms Act 30 of 1950, the Estate of Ramgarh became vested in the State of Bihar, which thereafter intervened in these appeals. At the hearing, the State filed a memo in the following terms State of Bihar recognises and accepts as valid the leases granted to the Appellant Company whether granted by the Court of Wards or the Raja under the licence of 26th March 1915 (as extended by the supplementary documents of 1917 and 1937). Nothing in this compromise shall preclude the State of Bihar in future from modifying the terms and conditions of the leases in accordance with law empowering the State Government to do so. The Respondent raised the contention that the State had no 'locus standi' to intervene in these proceedings and at the stage of appeal, but in the view which we have taken of the rights of the parties, a discussion of this point is purely of academic interest. It is sufficient to direct that the above memorandum be filed and included as part of the record.
-
1956 (4) TMI 76 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the plaintiffs' share or interest therein would be very much less. Therefore, it is not possible to grant a certificate to the effect that the value of the subject-matter of the dispute is not less than Rs. 20,000/-. 15. In the alternative Mr. Paras Ram contended that the case was a fit one for appeal under Art. 133(l)(c), Constitution of India. As already pointed out, the dispute is regarding a piece of land, mostly forest, situated in the interior of Rainuka Tehsil. I am unable to see that the case involves any question of great public or general importance. Before I can certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to show that the case involves any exceptional features. They have not succeeded in doing this. ORDER 16. The petition fails and is rejected with costs assessed at Rs. 30/-, payable to the respondent No. 1. The costs of the Commissioner would also be paid by the petitioners, if not already paid.
-
1956 (4) TMI 75 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... gment of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil First Appeal No. 45 of 1945 (MB)(A)(Balmukund and Raojibhai v. Radhabai and Kundanmal) regarding validity of the anti-adoption agreement dated 14-2-1933 between Radhabai and Motilal, natural father of Kundanmal, will not come in the category of a judgment in rem so as to be binding against the whole world. 9. So far as the objections in execution application are concerned, the whole case-law has been reviewed by a full Bench of the Madras High Court in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi AIR 1945 Mad 333 (I) and it has been held that an order on a claim petition filed under Order 21 Rule 58 Code of Civil Procedure, or a decree in a suit filed under Rule 63 does not extend beyond the execution of the decree which has given rise to those proceedings I respectfully con-cur in this view. 10. The result is that the revision will be al-lowed with costs and the order of the learned Civil Judge, 1st Class, Barwani, will be set aside.
-
1956 (4) TMI 74 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . In that view of the matter also, the sale held on 16-8-1955, cannot be allowed to stand. The mistake, as pointed out above, which arose in the order of the learned Registrar on 11-8-1955, was due to the mistake on the part of the Court itself. And it is a well established rule of law that the order which operates is one which the Court decides to pass and not one which is clearly proved to have been dictated as a result of some mistake. In this case, as already stated, the applications filed by the judgment-debtors and other facts on the record clearly establish that the order which the learned Registrar on 11-8-1955, decided to pass was the stay of sale and not the stay of delivery of possession. And, therefore, that order has to be read in that corrected form and the case has to be disposed of on that basis. 9. For the reasons stated above, I think the appeal should be allowed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Misra, J. 10. I agree.
-
1956 (4) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... us that the decision not to disclose particulars is mala fide and that such mala fides has to be imputed in a case where no particulars are at all furnished. It is suggested that the power not to disclose facts considered against public interest cannot be so exercised as to nullify the constitutional right of the detenue for being afforded a proper opportunity of representation. Such a contention as to the mala fide exercise of the power is untenable in the present case having regard to the nature of the grounds on which the detention is based and the nature of activities imputed therein to the appellant. It is unnecessary, therefore, to deal in this case with a theoretical contention as to whether or not article 22(6) of the Constitution overrides the constitutional right to be furnished particulars under article 22(5) to the extent of denying all particulars and leaving the grounds absolutely vague. 16. All the contentions raised before us fail and this appeal is dismissed.
-
1956 (4) TMI 72 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... village munsif in respect of the land in dispute, as evidencing the payment of the assessment by the defendant from faslis 1360 onwards. I have dismissed that application holding that the requirements of Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, have not been satisfied. Under that provision in order that additional evidence may be allowed to be produced, the Court must be satisfied that, it is necessary for the disposal of the case that the document sought to be admitted must be received in the evidence or in the alternative, there must be sufficient cause. I am not satisfied that either of the requirements is satisfied in this case. The document now sought to be produced also requires proof, and i do not see any valid reason why this document should be received. 13. For all the reasons given above, I am satisfied that 'the conclusions reached by the lower appellate Court are correct. This second appeal must therefore fail, and it is dismissed with costs. No leave.
-
1956 (4) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... er of Income Tax, Bombay South v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., Where a receipt by cheques which was subsequently honoured was held to be a payment which related back to the date on which the cheque was received. The facts of the case were different and it is not necessary to say whether the present case is governed by that decision. We are of opinion that deposit of the fee in the treasury within the period of limitation as required under section 66 (1) of the Income Tax Act is a good payment within the meaning of that section, and where the application is made within the period of limitation, the two taken together satisfy the requirements of the section. The result, therefore, is that we allow these applications, set aside the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and direct the Tribunal to decide the applications of the petitioner under section 66 (1) as required by law. The applicant is entitled to his costs, which we assess at ₹ 100 in each case. Petitions allowed.
-
1956 (4) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... al (being Special Leave Petition No. 426 of 1955) from the judgment and orders of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated the 24th August 1954 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 45 of 1954, after their application for leave to appeal to this Court had been dismissed by that Court's order dated the 5th August 1955. This petition was not filed within the time limited by the rules of this Court and on their own showing there was a delay of 44 days in filing the petition for special leave. The only ground urged in support of the application for condonation of delay (being Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1402 of 1955) is that they had to collect money from amongst a large number of petitioners who were interested in the case. In our opinion, that is not a sufficient ground for condoning the delay. 7. In the result, both the petition under article 32 of the Constitution and the petition for special leave to appeal are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1956 (4) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ecause of different scales of compensation which have been prescribed for different estates. It is not difficult to find a rational basis for such classification of proprietors of different income groups. We need not, however, dilate on this point, for we have already held that the Act is not open to challenge on the ground of contravention of any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. 27. There was in the Raja's T. S. No. 1 of 1955, a prayer for injunction restraining the State from taking possession of his estate. The High Court has rejected that prayer on grounds which appear to us to be quite cogent and convincing and as we see no substantial risk of irreparable loss to the Raja we do not consider it right to reverse even that order of the High Court. 28. For reasons stated above both these appeals are dismissed with costs. As the two appeals were heard together there will be one set of costs of hearing to be apportioned equally between the two appellants.
-
1956 (4) TMI 68 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d to maintain petitions for the fixation of rent under the Rent Control Act. In this view of the matter the petitions of the Municipal Committee must be allowed and tile order of the lower Court set aside. I would therefore allow these petitions and dismiss all the applications for fixation of rent, but in the circumstances of the case I would make no orders as to costs. Dulat, J. 19. I agree, but I do so with considerable reluctance. I feel that we are now un doing what the parties to these transactions fully intended to do, but since I can find no escape-from the legal consequences of the express provisions contained in Section 47, Punjab Municipal Act as applied to Delhi, I have to accept the conclusion, that in law no relationship of landlord and tenant ever came into being between the parties, and that being so the petitions under Section 8 of the Rent Control Act are not maintainable and have to be dismissed. I agree of course that there should be no orders as to costs.
-
1956 (4) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e charges, although the referring Judges had expressly mentioned that convictions under Section 323/34, I. P. C. are to be maintained. The opinion of the third Judge is binding on the Division Bench. So the Division Bench had to acquit the appellants under Section 323, I. P. C., also. 53. Thus on merits, and also in view of the opinion already expressed by the third Judge (Mr. Justice V. Bhargava), the Division Bench should not maintain the appellants' conviction under Section 323, I. P. C. I am of the opinion that the appellants' conviction under Section 323, I. P. C. should also fee set aside, and the three appellants should be acquitted of all the charges. Let the record be returned to the Division Bench with this opinion. Desai and Bhargava, JJ. 54. In view of the opinion of the third Judge, we allow the appeal of the appellants and acquit them of all the charges of which they have been convicted. Their sentences are set aside and their bail bonds are discharged.
-
1956 (4) TMI 66 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s held that he was an investor and the profits made were not business profits. The taxpayer has my sympathy in this case, because different conclusions were arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal for the different assessment years; and if in the case of his brother another conclusion has been arrived at, there is perhaps a case of hardship. Hard cases should not, however, make bad law. The question before us is the short question whether for the five years under consideration there were materials before the Appellate Tribunal from which they could come to the finding at which they came. Once that question is answered against the assessee we have no power to interfere with the findings of the Appellate Tribunal. In the result, I would answer both the questions against the assessee. The Income-tax Department are entitled to their costs and we assess the hearing fee at ₹ 250 only. There will be one consolidated hearing fee for all the five cases. Kanhaiya Singh, J.-I agree.
-
1956 (4) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 23A of the Act. We consider it unnecessary in this case to examine the correctness of that view. The alternatives which we have to choose in this case are the end of the accounting year and the end of the assessment year. It should be sufficient to say that we are unable to find any basis in the language of section 34 taking the scheme of assessment in the Income-tax Act, as a whole also into account to sustain the plea of the petitioners that the period of limitation should be computed from the end of the accounting year of the assessee. We are clearly of opinion that the expression "any year" in section 34(1)(b) should be construed as the assessment year. That suffices to reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the notices dated 23rd March, 1955. were issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed by section 34(1) of the Act. The rule in each of the petitions is discharged, and we direct that the petitions be dismissed with costs.
-
1956 (4) TMI 64 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 1935 3 ITR 208 , Mohammad Aslant v. Commissioner of Income-tax, United Provinces 1936 4 ITR 412 , and Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. M. A. Baporia and Others 1939 7 ITR 225 has been approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income- tax, M. P. and Bhopal v. Cloth Semi-wholesalers, Akola 1956 29 ITR 500 . In that case certain semi-wholesale dealers were associated together under an order of the Deputy Commissioner for taking over certain quotas of cloth bale, and for distributing them amongst retailers. It was held that in the circumstances it could not be said that those persons had agreed to carry on the business or to share the profits. This case is not in any material way distinguishable from the present one. 17. We, therefore, answer the first question in the negative. 18. In view of the answer to the first question, the remaining ques tions do not arise and need not be answered. 19. The costs of this application shall be borne by the Department.
-
1956 (4) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e should answer the question referred to us in this reference at all, since the assessees are hot appearing before us." Earlier at page 191 (of ITR) (at p. 370 of AIR), the learned Chief Justice observed, "It appears to us that when the party who had caused a reference to be made chooses not to appear at the hearing this Court is not bound to answer the question and should not do so." In view of the final conclusion recorded by the learned Chief Justice, we do not understand him to have laid down as an inflexible rule, even of practice, that where the assessee defaults appearance before the Court, it has no option but to refuse to answer the question referred to it. The jurisdiction to refuse to answer the question is there . But its exercise in any given case is a question of discretion. 3. In the circumstances of this case we refrain from answering the questions referred to us. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1956 (4) TMI 62 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tended before us that any part of the Income Tax Act is ultra vires, and in consequence he is entitled to any remedy. It would have been a different matter if we had held that any part of the Income Tax was ultra vires, for in that case we would give relief to the applicant as it is not possible for authorities constituted under the Income Tax Act to give him relief by holding any part of the Act ultra vires. But where as in this case no part of the Act is being attacked, there is, in our opinion, no justification for us to intervene at this stage when other re-medics which are not necessarily onerous are still open to the applicant under the Act. We, therefore, refuse to intervene at this stage in this case, and leave it to the applicant to pursue his remedies under the Income Tax Act so far as the question of his charge-ability to Income Tax under the Act, or other matters are concerned. 20. The application is hereby dismissed with one set of costs to the opposite parties.
-
1956 (4) TMI 61 - CHANCERY DIVISION
... ...
... ... ..... carry on its business of wholesale druggists there by selling its products made in this country, in Burma through its usual agents. But it was parting for ever with part of a valuable asset, and was doing so to enable an entirely new and competing industry to be set up there. That industry established by the skill and "know-how" of the company, could embark on an export trade which could compete with the company's own products in other countries. In that sense the company was dissipating its asset, and it must be remembered that a secret process once communicated to another is in jeopardy; if it gets into the wrong hands, the grantor has no protection. Even if it be a necessary ingredient to support a capital payment to show some dissipation of a capital asset (which, in my judgment, it is not), that element seems to me to be present here. I allow the appeal. The matter must be remitted to the Commissioners to adjust the figures on that footing. Appeal allowed.
-
1956 (4) TMI 60 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... quite clear and it was open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment on the basis that the registration order was invalid. I do not agree that if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did so, he would be travelling beyond the subject matter of the appeal. As I have already said, the order of registration in this case was indissolubly connected with the order of assessment; and after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had disposed of the appeal with regard to the order of assessment, it was not open to the Commissioner to cancel the order of registration under section 33B of the Indian Income-tax Act. I would accordingly answer the question (question No. 4) in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The net result is that I am in agreement with my learned brother Misra, J., though for reasons somewhat different from those given by him. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (4) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tached to the absence of an express mention by the Income-tax Officer that the profits could not be properly deduced from the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. The Income-tax Officer has given reasons for making the addition, and his order shows the basis on which he arrived at the taxable profits. Besides, the Income-tax Officer did not dispute the purchase or expenses. What he found to be wrong was the value given to the opening and closing stocks. He re-valued the stocks on a proper basis. The action taken by him can only be attributed to the powers vested in him under the proviso to section 13 and we are of opinion that in determining the taxable profits in that manner he was exercising these powers. In the circumstances we do not think any question of law arises. The Appellate Tribunal cannot be held to be wrong in refusing to refer the case. The application, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs, which we assess at ₹ 100. Application dismissed.
-
1956 (4) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ld the claim under rule 12 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act. That question does not really arise for determination, because we have held that the requirements of section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act have not been satisfied. Even if payments were made, if those payments were not correlated to any services rendered by the recipients, no question of deduction either under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act or rule 12 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act can arise for further consideration in view of the case put forward by the assessee. Our answer to question No. 1 and that part of question No. 2, which referred to Krishnaram, Kamadhenu and Company and Sekhar and Company in R.C. No. 97 of 1953 is against the assessee. Similarly, our answer to questions Nos. 1 and 2 in R.C. No. 93 of 1955 is also against the assessee. Since neither side has wholly succeeded in its contentions, we direct that there be no order as to costs in either of the two references.
|
