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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 22 Records
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1956 (5) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roduces documents containing admissions by his opponent, which documents are admitted by the opponent's counsel, and the opponent enters the witness box, it is not obligatory on the party who produces those documents to draw in cross-examination the attention of the opponent to the said admissions before he can be permitted to use them for the purpose of contradicting the opponent provided that the admissions are clear unambiguous but where the statements relied on as admissions are ambiguous or vague it is obligatory on the party who relies on them to draw, in cross-examination the attention of the opponent to the said statements before he can be permitted to use them for the purposes of contradicting the evidence on oath of the opponent. Question No. 2.--The party producing these documents can be permitted under Section 21, Evidence Act to use them as substantive evidence in the case without drawing in cross-examination the attention of the opponent to those admissions.
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1956 (5) TMI 39 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of this Act. It is obvious that the Bihar Coal Control Order under Act 24 of 1946 cannot be governed by Section 16 of Act 10 of 1955. I have already pointed that General Clauses Act cannot refer to the Bihar Coal Control Order which was under Act 24 of 1946. In other words, so far as the prosecution of the petitioners is concerned, whether it be under Section 8 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance of 1955, which did not exist at the time of the alleged. occurrence, or under Act 10 of 1955, there being no Coal Control Order under these two laws it cannot be said that on the alleged date of occurrence the petitioners can be said to have committed any offence. 5. For the reasons stated above, therefore, the reference must be accepted and the order of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate dated 14-9-1955, summoning the petitioners to stand their trial under Section 8 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, must be upheld to be without jurisdiction, and must be set aside.
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1956 (5) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... veyance they are admitted facts and do not become non-existent by the omission to mention them in the conveyance. The expression "discharged from all Government land revenue" in the conveyance has therefore to be interpreted in the light of the agreement. So read the conveyance would not show that the land was conveyed without assessment to land revenue but that it had been assessed and an agreement had been made not to realise in future the revenue due under the assessment. It may also be said that the conveyance added nothing for the land was already vested in the Justices by the delivery of possession to them on 10th November, 1865. I have for the reasons aforesaid some doubts in the matter. I do not feel however that I should for these doubts differ from my Lord the Chief Justice. At the same time I feel it right to express these doubts. With these observations I agree with the answer to the question for our consideration, proposed by the learned Chief Justice.
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1956 (5) TMI 37 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... substance, cannot be raised and made the substance of a reference under section 66 because it "does not arise out of" the appellate order. This could lead to unfortunate consequences, and I do not think that the remedy suggested by Mr. Pathak for the aggrieved party, that he should go to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for a mandamus directing the Tribunal to write a fresh appellate order dealing with the point in question, is very satisfactory. It is certainly cumbersome, and in my opinion it would be much simpler to allow the point to be raised under section 66 by deeming it to have been decided against the party raising it by the omission to mention it in the judgment. In this way it could be said to arise out of the judgment. With these qualifying remarks I agree that the first of the questions referred to us should be answered in the negative. Bhandari, C.J.-I agree that the first question referred to us should be answered in the negative.
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1956 (5) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... accept the construction advanced by Mr. Mitter, it is not an error on the face of the record on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The record would include the record which had been called for including the assessment order. On the face of the record, it is found that the Income-tax Officer did make an error of law in construing certain provisions of the Income-tax Act. In my opinion it should be set right. The result is that the rule must be made absolute and there will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing and setting aside the notice under section 46(5A), of the Income-tax Act, issued by the respondents, dated 10th March, 1954, or 15th March, 1955 (Exs. A and E to the petition). There will also be a writ of mandamus and prohibition prohibiting the respondents from giving any further effect to the said notices and/or orders and/or realising the sums mentioned therein or any part thereof from the petitioners. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.
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1956 (5) TMI 35 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the other is penal. That it is penal even in the case of breach of contract is shown by the words of Section 74, Contract-Act which supports the notion of penalty in the case of suits for compensation of breach of contract. In my opinion, therefore, the suit for damages is not within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal because the word "debt" in Section 2(6) of the Act does not include damages for breach of contract. 17. If such a wide interpretation as is sought to be put by the petitioner is given to the words "pecuniary liability", then all cases in which ultimately a defendant is ordered to make a money payment whether it is based on a debt, as ordinarily understood, or it arises out of a breach of contract or a personal injury or is imposed as a fine in a criminal case it would be included which, in my opinion, is not within the contemplation of the statute. 18. I would, therefore, dismiss this petition and discharge the rule. Bhandari, C.J. 19. I agree.
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1956 (5) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or three reasons. 1. Clause (a) of section 57 of the Act not being confined to offences serious in their nature or with reference to the attendant circumstances within the Chapters specified therein, prevention of the repetition thereof cannot be considered a reasonable restriction. It is in excess of what may be considered justifiable. 2. The previous commission of an offence ,of the category specified, without any reference to the time, environment and other factors has no rational relation to the criterion of "reasonableness in the interest of public". 3. The exercise of the power not being limited by the consideration of non-availability of witnesses is also not rationally related to the criterion of "reasonableness in the interest of the public". For all the above reasons I consider that section 57 of the Act is constitutionally invalid. ORDER BY THE COURT-In accordance with the Judgment of the majority this Petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (5) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r and Go. and ho left there also and at the time he was employed in the Anti-Corruption Department. He was also not mentioned in the police charge-sheet. He admitted that all the papers sent to the Regional Pood Controller from the Hindustan Oil Mills were signed by the manager. As the Sessions Judge has remarked, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why he had been visiting the mills after his removal from there. In any way, he being in the service of the Anti-Corruption Department for the last three years, an employee who had been discharged from the mills, no reliance can be placed on his testimony. We find no reason, therefore, to differ from the finding of the Sessions Judge that the prosecution has failed to prove by satisfactory evidence that the opposite party Sheo Prasad Jaiswal had knowledge that the fortnightly statements submitted by that firm were false and incorrect. 14. In our opinion, therefore, there is no force in these appeals and they are dismissed.
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1956 (5) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... three months or six months, is prima facie unreasonable. Externment might appear on the surface -not to be as serious an interference with personal liberty as detention. But in actual practice it may be productive of more serious injury to the person concerned-or the rest of his family if he is the earning member. An externed person is virtually thrown on the streets of another place where be has got to seek his livelihood afresh. He has to start in a new society with the black-mark -of externment against him and may be driven thereby to more criminality. On the other hand, in the case of a person under detention, the State normally takes or is bound to take care of him, and in appropriate cases provides also for his family. In view, however, of the previous decision of this Court which is binding on me, I am prepared to accept the validity of section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, and of the orders of externment passed thereunder in these two cases. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (5) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is anything in the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, which overrides this jurisdiction?
Whether in view of the fact that the original execution application to the Tribunal was made before the Banking Companies (Amendment) Ordinance and Act of 1953, came into force., there has been any valid order under section 45-C of the Banking Companies Act by the Punjab High Court transferring the pending execution proceeding to itself?
Held that:- The view taken by the High Court that it bad exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the present matter and that there was a valid transfer to itself by its order dated the 25th June, 1954, is correct.
In the proceedings before the High Court a good deal has been made as to the alleged suppression of material facts by the appellant from the Bombay High Court, in obtaining the impugned order of attachment from that Court and the learned Judge's order also indicates that be was to some extent influenced thereby. It appears to us that the alleged suppression has no bearing on the questions that arose for decision before the learned Judge, on this application. The learned Attorney-General frankly conceded the same. We have been told that there has been some application for contempt in the Court on the basis of the alleged suppression. We do not, therefore, wish to say anything relating to that matter which may have any bearing on the result of those proceedings. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (5) TMI 30 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ur, milk and sugar, and, therefore, I am of opinion that both the points under reference should be answered in the negative. Apart from the points I have already discussed, there is another aspect of the question which, to my mind, is not totally negligible, and that is what might have been the intention of the Legislature in having section 7 of the Act and Schedule III in connexion therewith. The schedule gives a list of articles exempted form taxation and, on a close scrutiny, it will appear that it relates mainly to the common necessities of life. Milk, ghee or butter may be rich food, but even then they are common man s food. The list speaks of no combination thereof as exempted, and any sweets or other preparations cannot be included in the list without doing violence to the words of the statute. For reasons I have already indicated, I agree with my learned brother that the questions under reference should be answered in the negative. Reference answered in the negative.
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1956 (5) TMI 29 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erent principles. The two Acts there- fore could co-exist but the Government decided to remove manufactured tobacco from the scope of the General Sales Tax Act. For the intervening period 1st April, 1954, to 26th September, 1954, sales tax was to be paid and the petitioners were directed to file their accounts. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Punjab Government notified the petitioners that no sales tax would be levied. This information was, however, given in September, 1954, and there was no scope for any misunderstanding. The petitioners were not called upon to take out a licence during the year 1954-55. A licence for the sale of tobacco was issued to them for the year 1955-56 on payment of the necessary licence fee. The petitioners therefore have no grievance of any kind. The Punjab Government has acted entirely in accordance with law and no hardship has been caused to the petitioners. I therefore dismiss this petition with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (5) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1, which makes it clear that a reference can be made to the High Court only in a suit or an appeal in a suit. Secondly, section 141 extends only the procedure provided in the Code to the proceedings specified in that section it does not confer any substantive rights not given elsewhere by the Code and accordingly it does not authorise a Court to invoke the jurisdiction of another Court unless such power be expressly conferred by statute Damodara Menon v. Kittappa Menon I.L.R. 36 Mad. 16. . For these reasons we are of opinion that the reference made by the Judge (Revisions) is incompetent and we decline to answer the reference made to us. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the Judge (Revisions) is a Court within the meaning of section 141 of the Code, and on that question we express no opinion. The references are rejected. The respondents are entitled to their costs, which we assess at one hundred rupees in each case. References rejected.
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1956 (5) TMI 27 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thin the words sale of goods into a sale. The question is one of interpretation of these words which cannot be affected by what is done under another Act. It was next contended that the real nature of the transaction is that there are two sales one by the dealer to the company and the other by the company as a dealer to the hirer. It is not on this basis that the tax has been levied. Besides in the present case we are only concerned with the constitutionality of the explanation on which alone we have given our opinion and which alone is the point we are deciding. As to whether the tax is leviable at any other stage or point is not before us. I would, therefore, allow this petition and issue a mandamus to the State to forbear from enforcing its notice for the realisation of sales tax. The petitioner will have its costs of these proceedings. Counsel fee Rs. 300. BHANDARI, C.J.-I agree. Petition allowed. (1) 1954 S.C.R. 634 5 S.T.C. 115. (2) Since reported at 1955 6 S.T.C. 446.
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1956 (5) TMI 26 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... also seems to me that the Financial Commissioner could have given an opportunity to the petitioners to produce copies of the previous order of the 4th January, 1955, or he could have sent for the depart- mental files and looked at the orders to satisfy himself whether there was any force in the appeals or not. He seems to have taken too technical a view of the matter in rejecting the appeals simply because the reasons for cancellation were not placed before him. For these reasons, I allow these petitions and quash the orders of the Financial Commissioner and of the Excise and Taxation Commis- sioner by which the latter cancelled the registration certificates of the two petitioners. The Commissioner is of course at liberty to proceed afresh in the matter and deal with the question of cancellation after hearing the petitioners and taking into consideration such factors as have a bearing on the matter. The petitioners will recover costs of these proceedings. Petitions allowed.
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1956 (5) TMI 25 - AJMER JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER S COURT
Regsiter of directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... ection 87(2) which says that the period within which the said return is to be sent shall be a period of fourteen days from the appointment of the first directors of the company and the period within which the said notification of a change is to be sent shall be fourteen days from the happening thereof. A form although prescribed by statute cannot control the specific language of a particular section of the Act. I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that by re-election of the same directors there has been no change in the directorship and it was not necessary to send to the Registrar a notification under section 87(2). The second ground in support of the reference has no force. Where a statute requires a certain thing to be done and provides for penalties in case there is a default, the default itself entails the penalties and it is immaterial whether it was wilful or otherwise. The references are accepted and the conviction and the sentences of the applicants are set aside.
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1956 (5) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not there was mens rea in this case?
Whether the necessary element of a criminal offence have been made out?
Held that:- As there was no mistake about the basic fact, the provisions of section 79, Indian Penal Code, are not attracted to this case.
For a prosecution for breach of trust even by a director of a company no such condition precedent as the previous sanction of any authority is contemplated by law, unless it is a prosecution in the name and on behalf of the company by the official liquidator who has to incur expenses out of the funds of the company. Section 179 is an enabling provision to enable the liquidator to do certain things with the sanction of the court. It does not control the general law of the land.
For a prosecution for breach of trust even by a director of a company no such condition precedent as the previous sanction of any authority is contemplated by law, unless it is a prosecution in the name and on behalf of the company by the official liquidator who has to incur expenses out of the funds of the company. Section 179 is an enabling provision to enable the liquidator to do certain things with the sanction of the court. It does not control the general law of the land. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (5) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... t is entitled to claim that he must be ranked as a preferential creditor in respect of the surplus of Rs. 3,112-14-3. For the reasons given above, this appeal is allowed. We set aside the order of Banerjee J. appealed from and hold that the petitioner must be treated as a preferential creditor in respect of the sum of Rs. 3,112-14-3 and he is entitled to receive the said amount from the liquidator on the aforesaid basis. The petitioner s application will, therefore, be allowed in terms of prayer (a) subject to the modification that instead of Rs. 4,000 it will be Rs. 3,112-14-3 and the appellant will be entitled to be paid his dues pari passu with other preferential creditors. The appellant will be entitled to his costs of this appeal and before the learned trial Judge. The liquidator will be entitled to retain his costs of this appeal as also of the trial court as between attorney and client out of the assets of the bank in liquidation in his hands. Sarkar, J. mdash I agree.
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1956 (5) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is any material to justify the assessment of ₹ 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) from out of the sum of ₹ 61,000 (Rupees sixty-one thousand) (for income-tax and excess profits tax and business profits tax purposes) representing the value of high denomination notes which were encashed on the eighteenth day of January one thousand nine hundred and forty-six ?
Whether in any event by reason of the orders of the Revenue Authorities not having found that the alleged item was from alleged undisclosed business profits the assessment of ₹ 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) is in law justified for excess profits tax and business profits tax purposes ?
Held that:- The High Court was in error in answering the first referred question in the affirmative. It ought to have answered it in the negative and held that there were no materials to justify the assessment of ₹ 30,000 from out of the sum of ₹ 61,000, for income-tax and excess profits tax and business profits tax purposes, representing the value of the high denomination notes which were encashed on 18th January, 1946.
In view of the above it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the High Court ought to have answered the second referred question also. The answer to the first referred question being in the negative, the very basis for excess profits tax and business profits tax disappears and the second referred question becomes purely academical. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the loss of ₹ 55,030 suffered by the appellant in this transaction was a capital loss or was a trading loss or a bad debt incurred by the appellant in the course of carrying on his business of timber?
Held that:- The old pronotes jointly executed by the appellant and others, which were submitted before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not carry the case of the appellant far enough and stopped short of proving the custom alleged by the appellant in its entirety. The transaction in question could not, therefore, be deemed to be one entered into by the appellant in the course of or in carrying on his timber business. Procuring finances for his timber business would no doubt be an essential operation in the course of his carrying on his business, but the same thing could not be predicated of this transaction of his joining Mamraj Rambhagat as surety for procuring ₹ 1 lakh from the Imperial Bank of India, which was wholly to finance Mamraj Rambhagat's business and not the timber business of the appellant. Appeal dismissed.
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