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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 27 Records
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1956 (7) TMI 55 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te simply by saying that he cannot entertain the petition, filed under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Cods. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate exercising Jurisdiction under that Code are termed Magistrates 1st Class, 2nd Class or 3rd Class and many of the provisions of the Code never refer to or use the expression 'in the Court of a Magistrate'. 'Such Court' in Order 21, Rule 52; Civil P. C., refers only to a Civil Court being ordinarily a Civil Court in the country or a Revenue Court to which the provisions of the. Civil Procedure Code are made applicable. 10. In my opinion, therefore, the order is clearly without jurisdiction and the Magistrate exercised the jurisdiction which he had not and the order cannot be sustained. The revision petition is allowed, the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate is set aside and the petition of the opposite party before the Sub-divisional Magistrate stands dismissed. R.L. Narasimham, C.J. 11. I agree.
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1956 (7) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
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... ... ..... mant asserted that ₹ 20/- could be had. We think that the estimate may be raised by ₹ 5/- so that the total rent per month may be taken to be ₹ 165/-. The annual rent will be ₹ 1980/-. Deducting 25 per cent for taxes and repairs the balance is ₹ 1485/-. For 18 years which may be deemed the appropriate period for the purposes of capitalising the amount will be ₹ 26,730/-. Appellants claim only 5/6th share in the amount of compensation. So in modification of the order of the lower Court 576th of ₹ 26,730/- will be paid as compensation to appellants in R. A. 141/51-52 with statutory allowance of ₹ 15/- per cent and interest at ₹ 6/- per cent per annum from the date the property is taken possession of in the appeal the parties will bear their own costs. 5. There was no justification for filing the cross-objections in both the appeals. They are therefore dismissed with costs. Time for payment three months. 6. Order accordingly.
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1956 (7) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has now stopped. I do not for a moment minimize the gravity and seriousness of the offences charged. But since the enquiry held is plainly defective, and any valid order of punishment will be dependant upon a fresh enquiry, the sooner it starts, the better for all parties concerned. There is no sense in uselessly prolonging the agony. 10. The result is that this rule must be made absolute and a writ in the nature of certio-rari should be issued and the order of removal and/or dismissal of the petitioner made by the Deputy Chief Operating Superintendent, Eastern Railway, respondent 6 on or with effect from 14-4-1952 and in the pleadings mentioned must be set aside and/or quashed, and a writ in the nature of mandamus should be Issued directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to it. If the respondents are desirous of continuing the departmental proceedings against the petitioner they should proceed to do so now, according to law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1956 (7) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this case." The reason for the interpretation, as we understand it, is that it will be curious to interpret an exemption granted in order to foster the co-operative movement as extending to the activities of a co-operative society which are not sustained by its own constitution. 15. We are in entire agreement with the reasoning adopted in Hoshiarpur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, simla 1953 24 ITR 346andhold that the sums of ₹ 14,497 and ₹ 42,826 mentioned in the question referred are not entitled to exemption from assessment under clause (iv) of paragraph 15 of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950We answer the reference accordingly 16. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 17. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1956 (7) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is clear law that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to abandon his own case, adopt that of the defendants and claim relief on that footing. If the plaintiff had put forward the case of agency it is possible that there might be other defences open to the defendants. It is sufficient in this connection to refer to the decision in Ramdayal v. Jummenjoy Coondoo, ILR 14 Cal 791 where their Lordships have held "It would certainly be an unusual thing to allow a plaintiff, who has alleged one state of facts, as "against the defendant who has denied that case and alleged another state of facts, to turn round and ask to be allowed to carry on the suit and claim relief on the ground that the defendant's statement of facts was true and his own false." In this view, the plaintiff cannot be granted any relief except on the basis of a partnership and as this was illegal, his suit must fail. The dismissal of the suit is therefore correct. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1956 (7) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urse of the normal duties of a professional man. In my opinion, the comparative immaturity of the respondent and the manner in which he was approached by the complainant with the offer of a very substantial and highly paid engagement from the not very creditable motive which he himself admitted, are extenuating circumstances which may be taken into account in the respondent's favour. In all the circumstances of the case, we think that the respondent has been guilty of misconduct of the kind mentioned in item (m) of the Schedule to the Act. We think further that the ends of justice require that some penalty should be inflicted, but, at the same time, that the ends of justice will be satisfied by the infliction of a moderate punishment. We accordingly find the respondent guilty of the misconduct of charging fees on a basis of a percentage of the profits and direct that he be suspended from practice for a period of three months from to-day. There will be no order for costs.
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1956 (7) TMI 49 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice. It is also manifest that under section 23(4) of the Act the assessee will render himself liable to assessment by the Income-tax Officer to the best of his judgment. The filing of return is, therefore, not a matter of option; it is a matter of obligation on the part of the assessee, and there can, therefore, be no question of waiver. For these reasons I think that the argument of the learned counsel on the question of waiver must be rejected. For these reasons I hold that the proceedings for assessment under section 34 against the assessee were legally invalid and the assessments made by the Income-tax Department on the income of the assessee under section 34 are illegal. I would accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. RAJ KISHORE PRASAD, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (7) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act makes it quite clear that the policy-holder can elect to come either under nomination under Sub-section (6) of Section 39 or under trust under Sub-section (7) of that section but if he does elect to nominate, then such nomination takes it out of the trust under Section 6, Married Women's Property Act. In this view, attachment of the moneys payable under the Insurance policy by the decree-holder of the deceased judgment-debtor is not illegal". (See also Matin v. Mahomed Matin, AIR 1922 Lah 145 (Z14) Gresham Life Insurance Society Ltd. v. Collector of Etawah, AIR 1933 All 1 ILR 54 All 1026 (Z15); British Equitable Assurance Co v. Great Western Ry., (1868) 38 LJ Ch 132 (Z16); Mangles V. DixOn, (1852) 3 HLC 702 (217); Lakshmikutty Kettilamma v. Vishnu Nambissen, AIR 1939 Mad 411 (Z18); AIR 1937 Sind 181 (Zl2)." 36. In the result, the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge are unassailable and we there-fore confirm them and dismiss this appeal without costs.
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1956 (7) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stands now, whatever might have been the position when the vendor sold this plant, machinery etc. to the company, the attempt is to tax the assets of the company represented by plant, machinery etc. If the intention of the Legislature was to tax all these assets proper language could have been used to convey that intention, or if the intention of the Legislature was that the goods exempted from tax under section 6(3)(ii) should be taxed in the hands of the dealer when he suspends business, again there was no difficulty in giving clearly expression to that intention. But as the matter stands we cannot agree with the Advocate-General that there is any liability upon the company to pay sales tax on plant, machinery and other equipment and laboratory apparatus. We will therefore send this matter back to the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, with a direction that he should dispose of the suit in the light of this judgment. Costs to be costs in the cause. Ordered accordingly.
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1956 (7) TMI 46 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y, and are to be used against him. In other words, if the authorities find from enquiry that any information given by him is not correct, then they would be bound to acquaint him with this, and give him an opportunity of explaining the same. Thus construed, I do not think that the rule is violative of the rules of natural justice, or arbitrary or unjust. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner was given an opportunity of being present when the enquiry, or at least the most important part of the enquiry was made. Upon this point he has come to Court with a false statement and that alone might have been a reason for throwing out his application. However, it is not necessary to do so. The case fails on the merits. For the reasons stated above, all the points taken on behalf of the petitioner have failed and this application must be dismissed. The Rule is discharged, all interim orders vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1956 (7) TMI 45 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... transactions in the course of inter-State trade, no right of his is infringed nor has any provision of the Constitution been violated by indirect taxation of his purchases. I have dealt with this aspect of the matter above. The State of Assam is perfectly within its rights to tax sales made to registered dealers in Assam when they are purchasing for resale outside the State. That right is undoubted. But the provisions contained in section 15(1)(b) and rule 80 do expose themselves to the charge of constitutional invalidity levelled against them. They founder on the rock of constitutionality. The decision on the question has become necessary to dispose of the petition, even though no right of the petitioner has been infringed by reason of the indirect taxation of his purchases for resale at Calcutta as these transactions cannot be regarded as sales in the course of inter-State trade. In view of the conclusion reached I agree that the petition may be allowed. Petition allowed.
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1956 (7) TMI 44 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er of the machineries would not, however, affect the nature of the original transaction which, in my opinion, amounts to a sale of the machineries mentioned in Group A by the Corporation to the contractor. The courts below, therefore, have taken a correct view of the law, and rightly held that the transaction constituted a sale within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons given above, I would answer the reference in the affirmative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee, by saying that the property in the goods included in Group A mentioned as Schedule A in the reference did pass to the contractor, and the transaction amounted to a sale within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act, and, therefore, the petitioner was liable to be taxed to sales tax on this transaction, and the assessment against him is correct. The State of Bihar will be entitled to costs from the petitioner hearing fee Rs. 250. RAMASWAMI, C.J. I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1956 (7) TMI 43 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 35, by virtue of the notification dated the 22nd of March, 1949, as we have already stated. The effect of this notification is that section 16 of the Amendment Act was also applicable to Chota Nagpur and, therefore, the amendment made to sub-section (1) of section 4 was deemed to be effective in Chota Nagpur with effect from the date on which the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, came into force. It is clear, therefore, that the Act was applicable to Chota Nagpur with re- trospective effect because of the notification issued by the Governor of Bihar under section 92(1) on the 22nd of March, 1949. We are quite clear that the assessment of sales tax imposed on the assessee in this case is legally valid and the question stated by the Board of Revenue must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. As Mr. S.N. Dutt practically conceded the point of law involved in this reference, we do not propose to make any order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (7) TMI 42 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... both may not be oral. Even for the purposes of taxing authorities the record of the decision would be necessary in order to proceed further if the dealer does not comply with the requisition made under section 29. A mere statement that a dealer was verbally asked to register would not satisfy the requirements of section 29. The dealer must know under what section of the Act he is being asked to register himself. It does not appear that he was so told. Assessment in the circumstances of the case is vitiated by an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. The validity of section 52(2)(i) and rule 74 has also been challenged. The learned Chief Justice has found these provisions constitutionally valid. The same conclusion was reached in Banwarilal v. State of AssamA.I.R. 1955 Assam 195. , when this contention was first raised in this Court. I was a party to that decision. The view then taken receives support from the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (7) TMI 41 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der the Travancore- Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, as provided by section 13 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125 (2) Recovery under section 19 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125, by proceedings before a Magistrate of the First Class or (3) Recovery by a regular suit. I see no reason to confine the courses open to the State to the three mentioned above and thus deny the State the ordinary right of adjustment available to its citizens under similar circumstances. 5.. An attempt was made to give different legal personalities to the Agricultural Department from which the amount was due and the Sales Tax Department to which the tax was payable. Such an attempt must naturally fail as the various Departments of the Government have no legal personality apart from that of the Government itself. 6.. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (7) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the United Provinces took place in this State. It is clear therefore that even if the submissions made by learned counsel with regard to the true interpretation of the word dealer and the proper construction of rule 6 of the rules made under the Act are correct this appeal is bound to fail, for it is not suggested that the respondent company comes within the definition of a dealer if the sales which it effected took place outside this State. In these circumstances it is unnecessary for us to express an opinion on the two points which have been argued by learned counsel for the appellants, and it is un- desirable that we should do so as we have not heard argument on behalf of the respondent company thereon. The fact that we are not expressing an opinion on these points must not be taken to mean that we necessarily concur with the views expressed by Mr. justice Chowdhary. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (7) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en the parties in each case was inferred from the facts of that case. In Ireland v. Livingston(1) the right to detain goods in transitu which is ordinarily recognised as the right of an unpaid vendor appeared to furnish an indication that the relation- ship between the parties was that of a vendor and purchaser yet Lord Chelmsford observed that the relationship was to be regarded as one between principal and agent though in some respects it may be looked upon as that of a vendor and purchaser so as to give the consignor a right of stoppage in transitu. The observations made by Fry, L.J., in Cassaboglou v. Gibb(2) have put the matter beyond doubt. We are, therefore, of opinion that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative.(1) L.R. 5 H.L. 395. (2) (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 797. As the applicants succeed they are entitled to their costs which we assess at Rs. 200. The fee of the learned standing counsel is fixed at the same amount. Reference answered in the negative.
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1956 (7) TMI 38 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion of the principle of natural justice and the evidence tendered by the assessee was improperly rejected by the Income-tax Tribunal and the assessment made could not be upheld as legal. It is obvious that the material facts of the present case are different and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(1), has no application to the present case. For these reasons I hold that in the circumstances of this case the assessment of sales tax upon the assessee for both the periods, namely, for the period from 1st of July, 1947, to the 31st of March, 1948, and 1st of April, 1948, to 31st of March, 1949, is legally valid. Accordingly the question referred to by the Board of Revenue and as reframed by me must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. There will be a consolidated fee of Rs. 250 for both these cases. RAJ KISHORE PRASAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (7) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould not be borne by them. However important it may be to establish the law, upon a question of this kind, it would be very wrong to put the party to so great expense in a case where so small amount is at issue . In these circumstances we intimated to the Advocate-General that this was a case in which, in our opinion, leave to appeal should not be granted unless the State was prepared to pay the costs which would be incurred by the respondent firm. The Advocate-General has now given this Court an undertaking that the State will, in any event, pay the costs, charges and expenses incurred by or on behalf of the respondent firm as taxed by the Supreme Court. This undertaking being given, we are of opinion that this Court is justified in granting the application. We certify that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 1949 76 I.A. 244. (2) 4 Moo. I.A. 353. (c) of the Constitution. We make no order as to costs of this application. Application allowed.
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1956 (7) TMI 36 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e State of Madras, In re(1) gives proper effect to the relevant statutory provisions. Sub-rule (3A) empowers the Commercial Tax Officer to condone the delay in filing the return as required by sub-rule (3) provided that the registered manufacturer has maintained a true and correct account of his business showing all the particulars required by sub-rule (3). So long as the assessment is not completed, the concerned officer has power to condone the delay in the submission of the return or condone even an omission to submit a return. Therefore, in respect of the period which is anterior to the period mentioned in sub-rule (3), the manufacturer can apply to the competent authority who, in his discretion, can condone the delay or omission or both. We answer the question accordingly. ORDER After receipt of the opinion of the Full Bench, the Court made the following order Following the Full Bench decision the revision is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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