Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1957 1957 (10) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 3 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 21 to 29 of 29 Records

• 1957 (10) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... that the right to pass on the tax is an essential requirement of a tax on the sale of goods for a tax might be levied at the stage of the last purchase before consumption. I might add that a tax at purchase point which is legal does not enable this facility to be enjoyed by the taxpayer. Though in the affidavit in support of the petition some point was made of the assessment being on the basis of best judgment of the assessing authority Mr. Venkatasubramania Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, did not press this point in view of the fact that the assessment complained of in the petition was only provisional and was liable to adjustment on the basis of the turnover of the assessee computed at the end of the year. The result therefore is that there are no merits in these petitions which fail and are dismissed. The rules nisi will be discharged. The respondents are entitled to their costs which is ordered in W.P. No. 625 of 1956. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 24 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ner should not be assessed in respect of those transactions. Under the Rule, when goods are exported outside the State, the tax is to be levied from the dealer who was the last dealer not exempt from taxation under section 3(3) . It is asserted in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners in this case were the persons who were assessable to tax under section 3(1) in respect of exports made by dealers to whom they sold the untanned hides and skins which dealers did not have an assessable turnover under section 3(3) in view of the fact that they are not licensees and also that there was no sale in their hands which would be assessed in the State in view of their being unlicensed. This statement of the Commercial Tax Officer in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit is not challenged before me. This submission, too, cannot be accepted. Thus there is no substance in this writ petition. It must therefore fail and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ay that in a sense the two articles with which we are dealing are cleansing agents, but that process of cleansing is not brought about by the action of alkali on fat. Mr. Shah says that vaseline is a fat or a fatty substance but he has not been able to point out any authority for the proposition that vaseline is a fat. On the other hand, Webster s Dictionary says that vaseline is a trade mark for petroleum or certain other petroleum products. It is a matter of common knowledge that Barium sulphide is and alkali, the absence of the fat in these preparations cannot make either of them a cleansing agent by virtue of the action of alkali on fat. In our opinion, therefore, they are not soaps and are not taken out of the category of toilet preparations enumerated in entry 6 of Schedule I and are therefore liable to special sales tax. Our answers to the questions referred to us are (1) In the affirmative. (2) In the negative. Applicants to pay costs. Reference answered accordingly.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... in section 11A but, I think, when such is the situation, it is difficult to say that the Sales Tax Officer s action was without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction. On the question of limitation, Mr. Mehta may be right or may not be right. In the Sales Tax Act a machinery is provided. If, after the assessment, the applicant feels aggrieved, he can take the matter in appeal. He can next go to the Sales Tax Tribunal. If there is a machinery provided under the law, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to entertain this application especially when the Sales Tax Officer is, in my view, acting within jurisdiction. On the further question raised by Mr. Mehta, about the question of limitation, we express no opinion on the point. It would be open to Mr. Mehta to agitate the question before the authorities competent to deal with the question. On this ground, I think, the application must fail and the rule will be discharged with costs. Application dismissed.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
  

  On account of the continued illegal stoppage of work, ’glow down’ tactics, and strikes indulged in by the workmen despite the advice of their Union, the appellant company issued a notice dated August 23, 1953, that in consequence of the illegal strike the Management has no option but to declare a lock-out of the entire works except the special shifts with effect from August 24, 953 The services of all other workers shall be deemed to be discharged with effect from August 24, 953." Subsequently, the company lifted the lock-out. and gave notice on September 17, 1953, to the effect that all employees on the Works rolls of the Company on August 23, 1953, and who wish to report for duty, must resume work on September 18, 1953 A third notice gave extension of time to the workmen to resume work. The question was whether the notice dated August 23, 1953, terminated the services of the respondents by discharging them with effect from August 24, 1953, and the notice dated September 17, 1953, merely gave them an opportunity of reemployment at the pleasure of the company on fulfilment of certain conditions - Held, that, on a construction of the notices, the expression "shall be deemed to be discharged" had to be read in the context of the declaration of a lock-out, and the intention of the company was that the employees whose employment bad been refused during the period of lock-out were to be permitted to resume work without any conditions if they reported for duty by a particular date, and on fulfilment of a condition if they reported for duty after that date. Where some of the workmen who were taken in custody by the police applied for leave when in custody but were refused leave by the company acting under Standing Order No. o, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal took the view that as the http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 14 workmen were in custody the company was not justified in refusing leave, held, that whether in such circumstances leave should be granted or not must be left to the discretion of the employer, unless, it was proved, that it was a case of colourable or mala fide exercise of power under the Standing Order.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 20 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
  

  Application of premiums received on issue of shares

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... le view to take is to regard the provision of section 69 relating to the minute. I shall not trouble about section 70 mdash as inapplicable to cases where the reduction involves either the writing down or the writing off of the share premium account, so far as regards the share premium account. I think that the convenience of the matter and the doubts which have been thrown on the possible reconciliation of section 4 and section 56 make it desirable to alter the practice. I shall therefore propose in this case to accede to the application which has been put forward by Mr. Instone and direct that the minute shall make no reference to the share premium account. I therefore approve the minute without the proposed reference to the share premium account, with the slight exception that the word additional in front of shares in the last line of the minute as appearing in the petition should be omitted. There will be the usual directions as to advertisement. Solicitors Nordon and Co.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
  

  Winding up - Powers of liquidator

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ny of these purposes. The broad principle on which an order or direction can be issued being the same, we are of opinion, on the basis of such facts as are not in dispute in this case, that it is not open to the respondent to say that if a writ cannot be granted a direction or order should be made. We think it is not possible for this court in summary proceedings under article 226 to grant any order or direction such as is sought by the respondent. In our opinion, therefore, the third preliminary objection raised against the petition on behalf of the appellant is well founded and the petition should have been dismissed on the ground that no effective relief under it could be granted to the respondent. The petition could not, therefore, succeed. In the view indicated above it is not necessary to consider the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. The appeal, in our opinion, must succeed. It is consequently allowed and the petition dismissed with costs throughout.

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to reject the assessee's books of account, which have been accepted by the Income-tax Officer ?

  Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner appeal to invoke the provisions of rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax on Rules for the purpose of computing the income of a non-resident, the Income-tax Officer not having done so ?

  Held that:- While we agree that, in the first instance, the Income-tax Officer as the first assessing officer has to form an opinion about the applicability of the proviso to section 13, we do not agree that it is not open to any other authority, which is lawfully in seizin of the order of assessment of which the method of accounting under section 13 is only a part, to come to a different conclusion with regard to the applicability of the proviso. The present is not a case where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has travelled outside the ambit of his jurisdiction under section 31 of the Act. For the reasons given above, we would answer question No. 1 in the affirmative.

  As to question No. 2, only a few words are necessary. A similar expression occurs in the rule : "In any case in which the Income-tax Officer is of opinion etc." For the same reasons which we have given with regard to question No. 1, the answer to question No. 2 is also in the affirmative. Appeal allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated 4th March, 1953, is set aside and the two questions referred to the said High Court are answered in favour of the Revenue

  ---

• 1957 (10) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether the petitioners had previously been prosecuted and punished for the same offence for which they are now being prosecuted before the Additional District Magistrate?

  Held that:- The proceedings before the Customs authorities were under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. Under Section 186 of that Act, the award of any confiscation, penalty or increased rate of duty under that Act by an officer of Customs does not prevent the infliction of any punishment to which the person affected thereby is liable under any other law. The offences with which the petitioners are now charged include an offence under Section 120B, Indian Penal Code. Criminal conspiracy is an offence created and made punishable by the Indian Penal Code. It is not an offence under the Sea Customs Act. The offence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore, quite separate offences.

  It is true that the Collector of Customs had used the words "punishment" and "conspiracy" but those words were used in order to bring out that each of the two petitioners was guilty of the offence under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioners were not and could never be charged with criminal conspiracy before the Collector of Customs and therefore Article 20(2) cannot be invoked. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

12