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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 59 Records
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1957 (2) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the assessee does after the income has accrued to him. He May spend it on himself, he May give it to his relatives, he May give it to charity. That is a matter of utter unconcern to the Taxing Authorities, and there is no doubt that the application to charity by the assessee is subsequent to the accrual of the income. Therefore the case clearly does not fall under section 4(3)(i) of the Act. The result is that we must answer question (1) in the affirmative, and question (2) in the negative. Questions (3) and (4) do not arise. Mr. Palkhivala says that the assessee has in fact paid to charity the two-third amount of the lagas received by it as provided by bye-law 281. We have no evidence of this on the record, but if what Mr. Palkhivala says is correct, then surely this is a case where the authorities should consider whether relief should not be given to the assessee with regard to the amounts spent on charity. The assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (2) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 94 U.S. 113 24 L. Ed. 77 The preference given to the tenant in possession is an almost necessary ingredient of the policy, and is traditional in English law. If the tenant remained subject to the landlord's power to evict, the attempt to limit the landlord's demands would fail." It should also be remembered in this connection that the impugned Ordinance is an emergency legislation of a temporary character, and, as observed in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi 1950 S.C.R. 519, 526, that is a factor to be taken into account in judging of its reasonableness. As already stated, the Ordinance has since come to an end, and has been replaced by a comprehensive tenancy law. In the circumstances, we are unable to hold that the impugned Ordinance is void as being in contravention of Art. 19 (1) (f). All the contentions raised by the petitioners have failed, and the petitions should accordingly be dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (2) TMI 73 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... account to Akron for the proceeds of the sales less the cost of the goods sold plus 5 per cent. " There is nothing in law that prevents such a finding being made. It is a very natural description of the course of trading that was pursued. But, if so, the Special Commissioners were fully entitled to their conclusion that Akron was trading in the United Kingdom during the years of assessment and that Brentford had constituted themselves their regular agents for the purpose of this trade. The latter point seems to me to be involved almost of necessity in the reading of the facts which I have set out above. I would dismiss the appeal. LORD TUCKER. My Lords, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons which have been stated by my noble and learned friends. LORD COHEN. My Lords, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, and cannot usefully add any further reasons of my own. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors Lovell, White & King ; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1957 (2) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct and in substance curtailing the rights of the assessee to have the notice served within the time mentioned in section 34(1), because if we were to accept the Advocate-General's contention, this must be the result, that after the Legislature has clearly provided that the assessee was entitled to have the notice served upon him within the period of eight years mentioned in section 34(1), in order that there should be a valid assessment under section 34 the Legislature proceeded under section 34(3) to take away that right and provided for the notice being issued within eight years and not necessarily served within eight years. We find that the High Court of Allahabad in a very recent judgment in Sri Niwas v. Income- tax Officer 1956 30 I.T.R. 381, has taken the same view of both section 34(1) and the proviso to sub-section (3). The result is that we must answer the question submitted to us in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (2) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ons who were invested with jurisdiction to try these cases after the commencement of the impugned Act were the Special Judges having jurisdiction over the same and whatever Was done by the magistrates thereafter was without jurisdiction and void. The case of the appellant is unfortunate. For ought we know the Special Judge trying him would acquit him of the offence with which he has been charged in the same manner as the learned Presidency Magistrate himself did, but there is no escape from the fact that he will have to face a re-trial and undergo the expenses and anxiety in defending himself over again. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the order for re-trial of the appellant made by the High Court was correct and the appeal must be dismissed. We hope and trust that the re-trial before the Special Judge will be conducted with all possible dispatch and the trial will be concluded as early as possible. The appeal will accordingly stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (2) TMI 70 - LAHORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are not prepared to accept that technical compliance with the provisions relating to service is so essential that the defect cannot be waived. It is only provisions relating to policy which cannot be waived. It had been urged before us by learned counsel for the assessee that when the assessee appeared before the Income-tax Officer and prayed for time, his acceptance of validity of service was conditional on his being granted time for producing the documents. But if that is what the assessee meant he should have so stated before the Income- tax Officer. Learned counsel makes a request that the application of the assessee for time be summoned and examined, for it may contain this condition. But learned counsel is unable to make a statement at the Bar that there is any such condition mentioned in the application and we do not think any useful purpose will be served by summoning the application. The question is answered in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (2) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Tribunal, the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in coming to the conclusion that there was a succession by the assessee of the business carried on by Abdul Karim Silk Mills. We will therefore answer the first question in the affirmative. With regard to the second question, it depends upon what the true position in law is and that question can only be answered after the Tribunal, properly directing itself in law as indicated in this judgment, gives a finding as to whether there was a succession or not. We will therefore stand over the second question and direct the Tribunal to submit to us a supplemental statement of the case in the light of this judgment. It would be open to both the parties to place before the Tribunal not only the materials which were already before the Tribunal when it heard the appeal, but any other materials which they think relevant for the decision of this issue. No order on the motion. Costs costs in the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (2) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... leging that in pursuance of, a partnership agreement they had delivered ₹ 4,001 worth of cloth to, the defendants. The Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiffs did, deliver the cloth, but came to the conclusion that no partnership was created. At the appellate stage, the plaintiffs; abandoned the plea of partnership and prayed for leave to amend by adding a prayer for the. recovery of ₹ 4,001. At that date the claim for the money was barred by limitation. It was held that the amendment was rightly allowed, as the claim was not a new claim. The same principles, we hold, should apply in the present case. The amendments do not really introduce a new case, and the application filed by the appellant himself showed that he was not taken by surprise; nor did he have to meet a new claim set up for the first time after the expiry of the period of limitation. For these reasons, we see no I merit in the appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (2) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th regard to bad debts makes the position of the assessee extremely difficult. He may write off a debt in a particular year and May claim it and the claim May be disallowed. In the next year he cannot make that claim because it would be urged against him that he did not write off the debt in that year. Therefore, the assessee always finds himself on the horns of a dilemma and it is the duty of the Department to take a sympathetic view of the matter if in fact the debt was never recovered. Therefore, if the debt was not allowed to the assessee in the year of account, there is no reason why the Department should not consider allowing him this debt in the next year when admittedly the debt became irrecoverable, although the assessee May not have written it off in that year. The result is that we must answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. Assessee to pay the costs. No order on the motion. No order as to costs of the motion. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (2) TMI 66 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uestion of apportionment, it is clear that this question does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has not decided on the merits of the contention with regard to apportionment and this question would only arise if after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has decided against the assessee, decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. But at the present stage all that has happened is that the Tribunal has asked the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to determine whether there is any case for apportionment, and if so, how the income should be apportioned. 20. With regard to question (1) under the excess profits tax reference, that question must also stand over for the same reason as question (2) under the income-tax reference. Question (2) under the excess profits tax reference must be answered in the affirmative and question (3) also in the affirmative. 21. Assessee to pay three fourths of the costs of this reference. 22. Questions answered accordingly.
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1957 (2) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e been different if the residuary legatee was making this claim, but inasmuch as the executors who represented the estate of the testator made the claim, it was obvious that the claim was untenable inasmuch as what had been paid had been paid our of the estate under the directions of the testator himself. In our opinion, therefore, the sum paid by the assessee partner to Bhagirathibai did not form part of his income and therefore his income should be reduced to that extent. The question that has been referred to us does not clearly bring out the contention which has been put forward by Mr. Kolah before us. We will therefore reframe the question to read "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount paid by the assessee partner of Bhagirathibai is to be deducted before ascertaining his taxable income?", and the answer to the question as framed will be in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (2) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , kept going all the year round, although he only wanted it for a short time. Luckily, he was in relation with a company who were the owners of it, and he could do that without owning it. It is an accident. It might have been that he could do that with a relations, or a friend, or a philanthropist, or anybody; but in fact there was this house for him; and a lease would not pout him in any better position so far as having the house and the availability of it, and the power of coming to it, were concerned." In our opinion, therefore, on the facts of this case the house in Kaira was dwelling house of the father of the assessee and it has not been established by the Taxing Department that that house was maintained for the assessee as a dwelling house nor has it been established that the assessee himself maintained it as a dwelling house. We must, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (2) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd respected status and reputation of its own and this status carries with it corresponding obligations. Naturally the Bar must zealously safeguard the highest standards of professional morality and integrity. In fairness to the Bar, we ought to add that cases of this nature are very rare but unfortunately when such cases come before the courts, the courts must take a serious view of such reprehensible lapses and must pass deterrent orders. It is our duty to express our disapproval of such unworthy practices as emphatically as we can because the legal profession must be saved from persons who do not feel any hesitation in corrupting public officers by unworthy and illegal considerations for the temporary and immediate benefit of their clients. We must, therefore, hold that the order passed by the High Court directing the removal of the appellant’s name from the rolls is fully justified. In the result, the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (2) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . We are unable to see any real basis on the facts proved in this case to apply the principle laid down in Devarajulu Chetty v. Commissioner of Income-tax. It could not be the case of the assessee that it purchased the coffee for sale in India, with a preexisting contractual obligation to pay a higher price, to be quantified on ascertainment at a later stage. It should be remembered that it was in breach of its contractual obligations that the assessee sold the coffee in India. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in rejecting the claim of the assessee. The requirements of section 10(2)(xv) were not satisfied. The payment was not even really incidental to the trade itself, as that principle was explained by Loreburn, L.C., in Strong v. Woodifield#. We answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. Since the assessee has failed, the assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (2) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and the Department's contention is that the appeal does not fall within the terms of section 30 of the Income-tax Act. What has been urged by Mr. Joshi is that an assessee can only object to the amount of tax determined under section 23 and the determination of the interest payable is not the determination of tax. It is said that after the tax is determined credit is given to the assessee in respect of the interest to which he is entitled and the giving of credit does not constitute determination of the tax and therefore no appeal lies in respect of the quantum of credit for interest given to the assessee. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to decide this question as on the merits we have taken the view that the Department is right. The result is that we must answer the first question referred to us "Up to the 30th of March, 1948." Question No. (2) does not arise. Assessees to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (2) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... given by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks under the provisions of Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. That point has, however, not been pressed before me by Mr. Sava ksha. 11. In may view the conclusion to which the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks has come to is sound. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. 12. Mr. Vaidya for the petitioners has urged before me that in this case costs should not follow the event as the petitioners were litigating the question for the benefit of legal practitioners in general, and that the fair order to make would be that each party should bear its own costs. Mr. Shava ksha presses for costs. I do not think I can accede to the request of the petitioners' Advocate in the is connection. The petitioners have brought this matter before me by way of appeal and they must bear the risk of costs in the event of the appeal not succeeding. I order that the appellants do pay to the respondent the costs of this appeal. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (2) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the nature and character of that limitation. It is not as if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has completely unqualified powers; his powers are limited to the subjectmatter of the assessment and we have attempted to define what the subject-matter of the assessment is. Two questions have been submitted to us. We will take question (2) first, viz., "Whether in the circumstances of the case the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner remanding the case to the Incometax Officer for re-assessment is valid in law ?" Our answer will be in the affirmative. Question (1) really does not arise because it is not correct to say that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had enhanced the assessment with regard to ₹ 4,00,000. All that he had done is to have remanded the matter to the Income-tax Officer for his consideration. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference. No order on the notice of motion. No order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (2) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cting on their surmises for which there was no basis and which had no support from any material on the record. In these circumstances, it must be held that there was no material for holding that the sum of Rs. 25,000 being the value of high denomination currency notes exchanged in pursuance of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, represented income of the assessee company from some undisclosed sources. This view of ours is in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Mehta Parika and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay ( 1956 30 I. T. R. 181), in which case their Lordships of the Supreme Court also approved of a decision of the Patna High court in Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa ( 1955 27 I. T. R. 602). Let the record be returned with our opinion on the second question as expressed above. The assessee company will be entitled to its costs from the Department which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1957 (2) TMI 56 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contract. What was further urged by Mr. Palkhiwalla was that the contract had stipulated for compensation for loss of office and it was by reason of this stipulated that an amount was being paid to the employee and it was urged that in law there could be no difference in principle whether an employee received compensation for loss of office by reason of a stipulation arrived at between the contracting parties or whether he received that compensation de hors the contract and even gratuitously as a mere voluntary payment on the part of the employer. The question is an interesting one but in view of our holding that the communication of the 23rd of March, 1948, constitutes a notice, it is unnecessary further to speculate as to what is the correct view of the law. The question may be decided when it directly arises for our determination. The result is that we will answer the question submitted to us Capital receipt . Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered accordingly.
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1957 (2) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Confiscation of the consignments of soda ash and against the seizure of his licences by the investigating authorities challenged
Held that:- The contention that a finding made by a competent authority is based on no legal evidence is easy to make but very difficult to establish. Such a contention can succeed only when it is shown that there is really no legal evidence in support of the view taken by the appropriate authorities. In the present case, it is impossible to accede to the assumption that there is no legal evidence against the petitioner. His poor financial resources, his conduct at all material times when consignments were ordered, the suspicions attaching to the very existence of the firm Messrs. N. Jivanlal & Co. in Bombay and the prominent part played by this firm at all stages of the transaction in regard to the consignments as well as the reckless allegations which were made by the petitioner before the authorities which were found to be untrue by the appropriate authorities, cannot be summarily dismissed as being irrelevant or as not constituting legal evidence. At the highest it may be said that there are some circumstances on which Shri Umrigar wants to rely in favour of the bonafides of his client whereas there is. a large number of circumstances against him. If all the appropriate authorities, on considering these circumstances, concurrently found against the petitioner, that obviously is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated in the present petition. That is why we do not propose to deal with this aspect of the matter any further. Appeal dismissed.
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