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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 35 Records
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1957 (5) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he detention itself irrespective of whether it was to be for a period longer than three months. It is clear that here Mahajan, J., was not considering the meaning of the words such detention . He was not concerned with deciding whether these words meant detention simpliciter or detention for a period longer than three months. His observations in Gopalan's case 1950 S.C.R. 88, that I have earlier set out, would in my view indicate that the Advisory Board is required to give an opinion as to whether detention for a longer period than three months is justified or not. It cannot therefore be said that Mahajan, J., held the view that the words such detention in Art. 22(4)(a) mean simply preventive detention. 59. I therefore come to the conclusion that there is nothing either in Makhan Singh's case 1952 S.C.R. 368, or Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar's case 1952 S.C.R. 612, which takes a view contrary to that which I have taken. 60. In the result I would allow the appeal.
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1957 (5) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... only on sanction given by Financial Commissioner and reference is made to page 82, paragraph 7 of Chapter (iv) which lays down the principles of allocation. It is pointed out that the allotment of land in Ratauli in favour of the appellants were made by the Director General and were never sanctioned by the Financial Commissioner. Further the Rehabilitation authorities charged with the duty of making allotments have exercised their discretion and for cogent reasons state in the Deputy Custodian General's order the allotment to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were not disturbed. There is no reason to interfere with that decision on an application under Article 226. None of the pre-requisites for the issue of a writ of certiorari exists and the claim of the appellants as against the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was therefore, rightly rejected. It was not a proper matter to be decided on a petition under Article 226. 12. For reasons stated above this appear must be dismissed with costs.
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1957 (5) TMI 48 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... able without the permission of the Court, and from the affidavit of the victim of the assault, namely Sardar Birbal Singh, it is clear that the offence was compounded sometime in the third week of September, 1956 and such composition has the effect of acquittal and consequently the conviction and sentence passed on this petitioner cannot subsist. Section 345 (5) (A), Cr. P. C., expressly allows such a composition even at the stage of filing a criminal revision in the High Court. I would, therefore, allow the revision petition of Lachma'n Sindhi, set aside his conviction and sentence, and acquit him under Section 345, Cr. P. C. 10. The prayer of Namdeo Sindhi and Buranmal Sindhi for review of my drder dated the 28th September, 1956 is rejected. They should surrender to their bail bonds to serve out the unexpired portion of their sentences. It is doubtless open to the State Government to remit a portion of their sentences if so advised. The revision is thus allowed in part.
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1957 (5) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... course of assessment proceedings but pursued and completed as proceedings otherwise independent of the assessment proceedings. We are clearly of opinion, that section 44 did not authorise the Income-tax Officer to levy a penalty under section 28(1) on the assessee in this case, a "person" who had ceased to be in existence on the relevant date, 20th May, 1954. There is as much a lacuna in section 44 as in section 25A of the Act. Neither provides for the imposition of any vicarious liability for penalty. The rule nisi issued in each of these cases is made absolute. In each of these cases a writ of certiorari will issue to set aside the order of the Income-tax Officer dated 20th May, 1954, and the further order of the Commissioner thereon declining to revise the order of the Income-tax Officer. The second petitioner will be entitled to his costs in W.P. No. 943 of 1955. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. There will be no order as to costs in W.P. Nos. 944 and 945 of 1955.
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1957 (5) TMI 46 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... persons who are liable to pay tax and with regard to whom a finding or direction is given in assessment proceedings with regard to a third party, and persons who are liable to pay tax and with regard to whom no finding or direction is given. It was submitted that there was no rational basis for the distinction made between these two categories of assessees and there was a violation of the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution. I do not propose to examine this question or attempt to funish an answer to it, for no such question had been argued before the Appellate Tribunal and no such question has been referred by the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. For the reasons I have already given, I would answer the question of law referred to the High Court by the Appellate Tribunal against the Income-tax Department and in favour of the assessee. The assessee in entitled to costs of this reference. Kanhaiya Singh, J.-I agree.
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1957 (5) TMI 45 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... in London and persons living in the country. Nor would it happen that those advancing the interests of a good cause would write to advise the subscribers as to a way of protecting themselves against paying more than they were paying. In my judgment, the invitation to the existing members of the league in the early part of 952 was an invitation to sign covenants so that they would pay subscriptions for the ensuing seven years at the then existing rates and so avoid the newly prescribed rates. Members were reminded that though by paying they were promoting good work, they were themselves also receiving, in that they were receiving the incidental benefits of membership which were quite fairly described as considerable. Though these benefits might in fact be availed of by few, they were available for all, and they cannot be ignored as being minimal and negligible. In the result, therefore, I cannot regard the subscriptions as being pure income profit. I would dismiss the appeal.
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1957 (5) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the meetings of the conspirators as directors of the Jupiter and that the evidence against him was more or less on the same footing as that against Jhaveri, accused 3, who has been acquitted, at least in so far as it relates to the period of conspiracy and that his case has been affected by the prejudice which may have been engendered in the minds of the jury by the evidence relating to the acts of Lala Shankarlal beyond the period of conspiracy. On behalf of the prosecution we have been shown by Mr. Khandalawala enough admissible evidence against him which, if the jury choose to accept, could reasonably be the basis for conviction. 71. Having given our best consideration to all the arguments addressed on both the sides, we have come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient reason for interference in special leave with the convictions, based on the acceptance by the trial Judge of the verdict of the jury. All the appeals are accordingly dismissed. 72. Appeals dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cember, 1951, all that he asked was for time to obtain stay of collection from the Central Board of Revenue. We have already extracted passages from that letter. It was not his contention then that he had no money of his non-resident principal in his hands. If subsequent to that he denuded himself of all the funds that belonged to the non-resident principal, the petitioner, Ahmed Koya, should not be heard to complain or to ask for any discretionary relief under article 226 of the Constitution. Such was the contention of the learned Advocate-General. The question would really assume importance only if the assessment was in the name of the petitioner Ahmed Koya. We have already held that factually the assessment was made under section 42(1) in the name of the non-resident principal. The rule nisi issued in W.P. Nos. 601 and 602 of 1953 will stand discharged; and the petitions are dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 42 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... reasoning in the Bibby case 29 T.C. 167; 14 I. T.R. Suppl. 7 is not inconsistent with this, and therefore does not overrule the reasoning upon which the decision in the Clark case 1941 2 K.B. 270; 10 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 67 was based. The decision in the Clark case 1941 2 K.B. 270; 10 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 67 and the guidance of the British American Tobacco case 1943 A.C. 355; 11 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 7 lead me to the conclusion that the directors of S. Berendsen Ltd. had a controlling interest in the company. Had it been necessary to decide the case uninstructed by authority, this is the conclusion which would have commended itself to me. I find myself also in complete and full agreement with the judgment that has been delivered by my Lord, the Master of the Rolls. I would allow the appeal. PEARCE L.J. I agree with all that my Lords have said, and I have nothing to add. Appeal allowed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Solicitors Denton, Hall & Burgin; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1957 (5) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ified in the order". The effect of this sub-section is that the order made under s. 18A must be subject to the condition that it cannot have effect for a longer period than 5 years. When, therefore, an order once made under s. 18A is sought to be amended with the aid derived from s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, the amendment must observe the condition laid down in sub-s. (2) of s. 18A. Such amendment is subject to the conditions in the main Act. The amendment cannot, therefore, extend the operation of the order beyond the period of five years mentioned in the main Act. In the present case the amending order of November 7, 1956, complied with this condition and, therefore, it was properly made in compliance with the provisions of s. 21 of the General Clauses Act. For this reason, in my view the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the amending order was invalid must fail. I, therefore, agree with the order proposed by S. K. Das J. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder section 41(1) the liability of the joint receivers was the same as that of the persons whom they represented. In this case the liability of the co-sharers was to be assessed as an association of persons. It was that liability that section 41(1) authorised the Department to impose on the joint receivers. The learned counsel for the Department contended that independent of section 41, the Department was entitled to tax the profits of the business in the hands of the joint receivers who had earned its profits, treating them as forming an associatiou of persons. He relied on Hotz Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1930 5 ITC 8 which dealt with trustees appointed under a will to carry on the business of hotel management. As a determination of that question is not strictly necessary for the disposal of this case, we express no opinion of ours. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference.
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1957 (5) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... any course should be permitted which may lead to controversy as to what a Judge stated in Court and what view he held. Such matters are to be determined only by what is stated in the record of the Court. That which is not so recorded cannot be allowed to be relied upon giving scope to controversy. To permit the atmosphere of the Court to be vitiated by such controversy would be detrimental to the very foundation of the administration of justice. 7. It is regrettable that the learned Advocate in spite of a hint from one of the members of the Court at the early stages of this hearing did not see the impropriety of the course he has adopted and has persisted in it before us. 8. We have permitted ourselves to make the above remarks since we felt that we would be failing in our duty otherwise. 9. We think it right also to say that what we have said above has not in any manner weighed with us in our consideration of this review application, which we have dismissed as above stated.
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1957 (5) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... also argued that the mortgage bond in question had been executed and registered and given effect to beyond two years from the date of adjudication and that therefore this transaction could not be brought within the mischief of s. 35 of the Insolvency Regulation. In view of our findings on the other and more direct and important issues it is not necessary to pronounce upon these additional grounds urged on behalf of the appellant. In view of our findings on the main issues in the case, the appeal must be allowed, the judgments and orders of the courts below annulling the usufructuary mortgage bond in question set aside and the transaction held binding on the estate of the insolvents. It follows that the lease back to the mortgagors being a part of the same transaction is equally binding on the estate of the insolvents. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout, to come out of the estate in the hands of the Official Receiver who must pay his own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (5) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tam did in the subsequent litigation. In our opinion, therefore, it is unnecessary to consider the merits of the contention which Mr. Tatachari attempted to raise before us. Since we hold that the compromise decree had not created a public trust, it is unnecessary to consider any other point. We wish to make it clear that Mr. Alladi Kuppuswami expressly told us that his clients have always agreed that the properties in their hands are burdened with the obligation to discharge the charities mentioned in the deed of trust executed by Purushottam in 1919. We accordingly declare that the properties in the hands of the appellants are subject to the charge in favour of the said charities. However since the plaintiffs’ case for a scheme has failed the appeal must be allowed and the plaintiffs’ suit dismissed. As the Advocate-General has appeared before us to support the case of the charities, we direct that the parties should bear their costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (5) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of registration. It is, however, not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide definitely whether the petitioner s case would come under section 11(1) of the Act, the petitioner having been registered on 17th February, 1953, and the notice that was issued in Form No. VI having been issued thereafter on March, 1953. If section 11(1) is applicable to the petitioner s case then unless the petitioner could show that the petitioner had suffered any injustice by reason of an irregularity in the procedure which was adopted by the Assistant Commissioner in making assessment under section 11(2) of the Act this Court would not have interfered under Article 226 of the Constitution. But as I have pointed out already, in my opinion, the case of the petitioner comes under section 11(2) of the Act, and so this question need not be considered any further. In my view, this petition should fail. The rule is accordingly discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... escaped assessment of tax cannot be reopened beyond the period of one year cannot be described as a matter relating to procedure only and it was a matter which was more than one relating to procedure, that is to say, it touched a right in existence . In Ramanathan Chettiar s case(1950) 2 M.L.J. 624., the learned Chief Justice pointed out that it was well settled that the law of limitation was procedural law. It should, however, be noted that in East Asiatic Co. v. State 1956 7 S.T.C. 299 A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 168. , the relevant assessment years were 1945-46 and 1946-47 the notices issued to him under rule 17 were dated 24th February, 1950, and were received by the assessee on 4th March, 1950 the order of revision was dated 31st March, 1950. Since neither of the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner commends itself to us, we direct that the rule be discharged and the petition be dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the present context). In our judgment section 6-A conceives of the restrictions imposed by a notification under section 6 as those which are capable of contravention. The construction however which the learned Government Pleader invites us to adopt of the expression restriction is as a restriction on the specified class of goods which are the subject of exemption. If the word restriction were construed in that sense, it would be clear that there could be no contravention of such a restriction . It is for this reason that we hold that the restriction contemplated by section 6(2)(b) is only a restriction as to the manner in which a dealer to whom exemption is granted is required to conduct his business, say in the matter of keeping his accounts, filing returns etc., and not a restriction of the articles or goods as regards which the exemption is granted. The rule nisi is discharged and the petition is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 32 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stomers than dealers whose turnover exceeded those limits, for the latter have to add the sales tax to the prices of their goods. But no discrimination is involved in this classification which is perfectly reasonable when it is borne in mind that the State may not consider it administratively worth while to tax sales by small traders who have no organisational facilities for collecting the tax from their buyers and turn it over to the Government. Each State must, in imposing a tax of this nature, fix its own limits below which it does not consider it administratively feasible or worth while to impose the tax. It is idle to suggest that any discrimination is involved in such classification. If this rule is applied to the present case, then it is obvious that no discrimination is involved in the present case. For all these reasons I have no hesitation in dismissing this petition, but I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs and I order accordingly. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (5) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a similar principle has been laid down by a Bench of this High Court. It was held there that section 13 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, imposed no charge on the subject and it was merely a part of the machinery of assessment and that the liability to pay sales tax was founded upon sections 4 and 5 which were the charging sections. It was also held that the jurisdiction to assess and the liability to pay tax did not depend on the issue or non-issue of the notice under section 13. For the reasons we have attempted to express, we are of opinion that in the circumstances of this case the assessment under section 13 (5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act was validly made for the period from the 1st of July, 1947, to the 30th of September, 1948, and the question referred to the High Court by the Board of Revenue must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (5) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conferred by such an Act or Ordinance that can be exercised at any time after the Act had been published and before the coming into force of the Act. If the Act or Ordinance had already come into force, the exercise of any powers under that Act would not be the matter for whose validity resort could be had to section 22 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of section 22 of the U.P. General Clauses Act as amended by U.P. Act V of 1957 do not apply to the impugned notification and therefore fail to validate it which admittedly could not have been issued under the unamended section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act of 1948 as it stood on the 31st March, 1956. BY THE COURT. This petition is allowed, and a writ of certiorari will issue quashing the assessment order dated the 14th September, 1956, and the demand notice dated the 15th September, 1956. The petitioner is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 300. Petition allowed.
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