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Showing 1 to 20 of 76 Records
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1957 (9) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nditions of services applicable to the appellant. In principle, we cannot see any clear distinction between the termination of the services of a person under the terms of a contract governing him and the termination of his services in accordance with the terms of his conditions of service. The order complained against did not contravene the provisions of Art. 311 and was therefore a valid order. 6. Reversion from a temporary post held by a person does not per se amount to reduction in rank because the temporary post held by him is not his substantive rank. For the purposes of this appeal it is unnecessary to decide in what circumstances a reversion would be regarded as reduction in rank as the appellant has not established as a fact that the order of reversion passed against him was by way of a penalty. The order of reversion, therefore, did not contravene the provisions of Art. 311 and was a valid order. 7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e matter and we have come to the conclusion that having regard to all the circumstances of the case it would be reasonable to compute the benefit of reinstatement which was awarded to the appellant at an amount of ₹ 12,500 (Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred only). 25. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow as well as the award made by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and award that the appellant shall recover from the respondent the said sum of ₹ 12,500 (Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred only) being the computation of the money value of the benefit of reinstatement awarded to him under the terms of the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta dated December 5, 1950. The respondent will pay the appellant's costs of this appeal as well as the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal. 26. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (9) TMI 97 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was done by the clerk, because on his own showing the secretary who was only a honorary secretary was not going to the society daily and the business was left in the hands of the clerk with a check over him by the secretary. This would not make him a person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge and was responsible to the Society for the conduct of the business of the society. The prosecution could have let in evidence when particularly it was prosecuting accused 3 under Clause (1) that the secretary is the person who was responsible to the society for the conduct of the business of the society. In terms of this section, the prosecution has not let in evidence and the evidence let in falls short of the strict standard of proof required for conviction under Section 16 (1). In this view the Secretary, accused 3, cannot be convicted. The acquittal is therefore confirmed but not for the reason given by the lower appellate Court. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 96 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lly in his possession, and in this view of the matter, no steps need be taken to compel him to produce the cattle in Court. 9. Before taking leave of this case I should like to point out two things which clearly call for vigilance on the part of those concerned; first, that it is the duty of Magistrate to exercise greater care than they are accustomed to in complying with the provisions of Section 87 the breach of which entails very serious consequences for the person found in default, but which consequences, in the very nature of things, can be allowed to have effect only if the strict preconditions mentioned in the section are properly observed; and secondly that it appears that the printed forms in use in some of the Courts are defective and are misleading and lead to error and those concerned should see that the printed forms in use are correctly formulated, so as to conform to the relevant form prescribed in Schedule V of the Code of Criminal Procedure (See form No. IV).
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1957 (9) TMI 95 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... when the entire claim is barred; in such a case there is no consideration at all and the agreement will be void unless it is saved by Section 26(3) of the Travancore Contract Act. 11. In the light of what is stated above the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. The lower Court directed the parties to bear their respective costs. In the circumstances of the case there will be a similar order as to costs in this Court as well. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to the following passage in AIR 1934 PC 147 (B) "Indeed, it follows from the idea of an account stated that whatever the consideration for each item, every item must appear in terms of money, since what is being agreed is matter of account." and contended that Ex. A-1 will not amount to an account stated because it is not in terms of money but of paddy. In view of the conclusion we have reached it is unnecessary to consider this question and it is not considered in this judgment.
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1957 (9) TMI 94 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... ty. I do not think that in such a case it is necessary to issue a fresh notice, wiping off the entire certificate proceedings had up to that point of time." 15. I pointed out earlier that the notice of demand was issued by the Collector under the provisions of Madras Act II of 1864. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that notice was unenforceable. That was not a point taken by the petitioner in his affidavit, and I need not rest my decision in this case on that feature of the case. It was not the notice of demand issued by the Collector that was really objected to. What the petitioner really wanted was an immunity from payment of the excess profits tax on the ground that the proceedings taken by the Collector to recover that amount as areas of land revenue were barred by the period of limitation prescribed by section 46(7) of the Act. That contention must be rejected. The rule is discharged and the petition is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee ₹ 150.
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1957 (9) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... the time when the written down value is reduced to a zero; which, in effect, means that he should be given depreciation until the total depreciation exceeds the written down value. The argument, therefore, obviously involves a consequence that we shall have to read in proviso (c) to section 10(2)(vi) the words "written down value" in place of the words "original cost". In our opinion, there is no warrant for adopting any such course. Moreover, the interpretation that Mr. Mehta wants us to put upon the section is opposed to all notions of accountancy or commercial practice, because the aggregate of depreciation allowances can neither in accountancy nor as understood by commercial men ever exceed the original cost to the assessee of the asset in respect of which depreciation has been granted. 6. The result, therefore is that our answer to the question referred to us will be in the negative. 7. Assessee to pay the costs. 8. Reference answered in the negative.
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1957 (9) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore, an essential pre-requisite for the collection of a water rate is that the building should either have a private supply from the municipal main or a resident of the building should have water from municipal mains. Here again, the rate is imposed directly in exchange for services rendered to the owner or occupier of the building, and in both cases, therefore, it cannot be said that the conservancy tax or the water rate became payable by reason of the mere fact that the property existed and, in addition, that it was payable in exchange for service rendered. In our opinion, therefore, in respect of these two taxes it cannot be said that they are taxes "in respect of the property" within the meaning of the third proviso to section 9, sub-section (2), and the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion on this issue. 7. Our answer, therefore, to the amended question shall be in the negative. 8. The Income Tax Commissioner to pay costs. 9. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (9) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f defendants 1 and 2. The further proceedings in this appeal will therefore be confined to the dispute in relation to the other items of property covered by Exhibit B-1. 20. As I have already indicated it will not be possible to decide this appeal properly in relation to the items other than the residential house covered by the memorandum of cross-objections without a finding on the question as to whether the plaintiffs and those impugning the deed of gift Exhibit B-1 had proved that there had been no delivery of possession to satisfy the requirement of Muhammadan law. The learned Subordinate Judge will submit a finding on the point just now indicated after recording such further evidence as the parties might adduce in proof of their respective cases. The finding will be submitted to this Court within three months of the receipt of the records by the Trial Court. Time for objections 10 days. The second appeal will be posted for final disposal after the receipt of the finding.
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1957 (9) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onsideration. Learned counsel for the Department urged for acceptance the view put forward by the Tribunal in its further statement of the case, that from the fact that the amount was assessed, it could be implied that the Tribunal had found against the assessee on both the questions. We are unable to agree. When calling for a further statement of the case, we pointed out that these aspects did not appear to have been considered at all by the Tribunal. There was no evidence either to support any possible finding, whether express or implied, that the amount in question was income that accrued to the assessee in the relevant period, 1st April, 1944, to nth October, 1944. The Tribunal could have been fair to the assessee and helpful to the court by stating so, when it was given an opportunity to submit a further statement of the case. We answer the question referred to us In the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1957 (9) TMI 89 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to do so with his father before the making of the will; and since this is so, quite obviously the sum of ₹ 5,877 is assessable to tax in his hands. 6. We gather from the assessee that this amount has already been taxed by the Department in the hands of Dinbai. It becomes necessary sometimes for the Department to tax the same income in the hands of two different individuals as a precaution against the Court in one of the assessments taking the view that the income could only be assessed in the hands of one of the two assesses ;but we have always assumed that the State does not desire to tax the same income in the hands of two persons, and if and when the answer that we have given to the issue becomes final and conclusive between the parties, we have no doubt that the Income Tax authorities will refund the tax paid by Dinbai. 7. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us will be in the affirmative. 8. Assessee to pay costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 88 - ANDHRA PARDESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts tow the same line, recognise her subordinate interest in her husband's property and enforce his personal obligation by creating a charge on his properties either self-acquired or ancestral. A wife, therefore, is entitled to be maintained out of the profits of her husband's property and, if so, under the express terms of section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, she can enforce her right against the properties in the hands of the alienee with notice of her claim. 40. Applying the aforesaid principles, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to enforce her claim against items l to 16 of the plaint C schedule settled on the second defendant. As regards the quantum of maintenance, we do not see any reason to differ from the Court below. 41. In the result, the decree of the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge is restored. The appellant will have her costs throughout. Court fee due to the Government will be paid by the first respondent.
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1957 (9) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... want of authority of the Income-tax Officer to proceed against the trustees would be the assessees and not the Income-tax Commissioner, and we fail to see how this question came to be raised as a corollary to the question which the Income-tax Commissioner required to be raised. In any event, neither the assessees nor the Income-tax Commissioner wish that we should decide or answer this question. We, therefore, do not answer the question. In the last paragraph of the statement of the case, the Tribunal refers to a question which the assessees desired the Tribunal to refer to us ; but it does not state that it refers that question to us. On the other hand, it states that there is clear authority on that question. The assessees do not wish that the question should be treated as raised because Mr. Palkhivala concedes that it is covered by a decision of this court and he does not wish to have the question answered. Therefore, the question contained in paragraph 17 is not answered.
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1957 (9) TMI 86 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt in the paragraph extracted above should suffice. Counsel for the Department submitted to us that the ground on which we are answering the question in the negative was not raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Trivandrum, or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, and that the assessee should be precluded from raising it on that account. This point was never urged before us at any time prior to our order of September 16, 1955 The memoranda of the two appeals also are not before us. We must hence hold that the Department is not entitled to raise the contention at this stage, and refuse to consider the case from that point of view. The question referred is answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal, Madras, as provided by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1957 (9) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ries and law lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers. It is sufficient for our purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons, it is well recognised that the word demand' may mean simply a 'claim or 'due', without importing any further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay the claim or due. For the reasons given above, we hold that not one of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant is worthy of acceptance. The election petition was rightly decided, as the appellant was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Municipal Board in question on the day he filed his nomination, under cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of respondent 3 who alone contested the appeal before us. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 84 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s what the Income-tax Officer holds to be a reasonable profit on the sale of the produce in question, as agricultural produce. Actual sale of the produce is not contemplated in either case and what is contemplated is only the existence or otherwise of a market for the produce. Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act appears to be a variant of rule 23(2) of the Indian Income-tax Rules, but whereas the latter is limited to the computation of market value for the purposes of rule 23(1), corresponding of section 8(1) of the Bengal Act, rule 4 applies to the computation of the market value for all purposes. For the reason given above, the answer to the question referred must, in my opinion, be Question (1) "Yes." Question (2) "Yes." The Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal, will have the costs of this reference, including the costs of the previous hearing. GUHA, J.--I agree. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as in this case they undoubtedly are ; but we might have had the case of an assessee where an unregistered firm made losses far exceeding the profits made by a registered firm in which case the losses less the profits would have been carried forward. The law cannot be one in a case where all losses are absorbed and in another case where only a part of the losses are absorbed; and we cannot interpret the provisions of the Act merely with a view to prevent the consequence that a loss which might have been carried forward, being unabsorbed, ceased to be available for being carried forward by reason of the fact that it is absorbed by other profits made. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal erred in coming to the conclusion that the assessee's share of profits in the unregistered firm could not be set off against the assessee's share of loss in the registered firms and our answer to the question raised in paragraph 7 of the statement of the case is in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion". The supposed doctrine that in revenue cases "the substance of the matter" may be regarded as distinguished from the form or the strict legal position, was given its quietus by the House of Lords in Duke of Westminster v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 1936 19 Tax Cas. 490, 520, 524 and by the Privy Council in Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1940 8 ITR 522 , 326.We can only have regard to the real nature of the transaction and considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, and particularly the grant of the village, which was no more than a bounty, and the fact that the resolution was clearly the result of a mutual agreement between the assessee and the Saurashtra Government, we are of the opinion that the sum of ₹ 35,807 granted to the assessee was not a maintenance allowance exempt within the meaning of paragraph 15(i) of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950. The question will be answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 81 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... share can be registered in the name of the Hindu undivided family because although it is an assessable entity under the Income-tax Act, it is not a legal entity as such. When you have a case of an income which is deemed to be distributed under the provisions of section 23A, the section in terms provides that the proportionate share of the shareholder in such distribution shall be included in his income. If the Hindu undivided family is not a registered holder, obviously it cannot be its income nor can it be taxed as such. How it brings about the result that the provisions of section 23A are defeated, we are quite unable to see; but in any event we are bound to follow a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in Cambatta's case (supra) and following that decision, we answer the question raised in the negative. A second question has been raised, which only arises if our answer to the main question was in the affirmative. We, therefore, do not answer that question.
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1957 (9) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 33 1 ITR 135, by reason of this declaration of trust the income from these shares was diverted from the income of the assessee by an overriding title and never became his income at all, and, therefore, it cannot be taxed as income. No doubt, Mr. Kolah is right that there was an overriding title and the income was diverted and did not ever form part of the income of the assessee; but it is not because it is income of the assessee that it is to be included in the income of the assessee. Section 16, sub-section (3), deals with income which primarily is not the income of the assessee, but which is to be included in the income of the assessee if the conditions laid down in that sub-section are satisfied. In other words, this is the deemed income of the assessee and not his actual income. Therefore, Dudhuria's case (supra) cannot help Mr. Kolah for the purpose of claiming exemption. The result, therefore, is that the question referred to us will be answered in the affirmative.
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