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Showing 1 to 20 of 22 Records
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1959 (1) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here is in these, circumstances nothing to give special importance to the defence founded on time. 50. The appellant, we have found, is entitled to a decree directing the defendant to execute either a deed of release or a deed of conveyance. The appellant's learned Counsel requested during arguments that a decree directing the defendant to execute a deed of conveyance might be passed. We hold that a deed of conveyance is necessary in order to secure title to the plaintiff. 51. We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. There will be a decree directing the defendant to execute a proper deed of conveyance to the plaintiff of the defendant's undivided 1/6th share in the estate in accordance with the terms of Exhibit A-1. Time for execution, two months from this date. In default, a document will be executed by the Court on behalf of the defendant and will be duly registered. The appellant will have his costs in both Courts.
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1959 (1) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation in effect by the fixation of prices in these three regions. The argument that there is discrimination is purely theoretical, in view of the economic factors which control the price of sugar in this country. Thus in fact there is no discrimination after the control of sugar prices in these three regions and the contention that the factories in the other areas are left free to sell at any price is specious and does not merit a moment's consideration. We are therefore of opinion that in effect the impugned notification brought about no discrimination between different regions or between producers and middleman in view of what we have said already in Re. 1(b), and consequently, it is not necessary to consider the last part of the submission under this head. There is in fact no discrimination by the impugned notification and this contention fails on that ground. 9. There is no force therefore in this petition and it is hereby dismissed with costs. 10. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... s income of both the Eluru and Narsapur branches could be computed at ₹ 1,20,000. As we have already stated, the average rate of ₹ 5,000 for each bus on the fleets operating from Narsapur and Eluru, when particularly the results from the books of Eluru have been admitted to be without defect, would amount to a capricious fixation without any basis. 5. In our view, the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable in law and our answer to the question is, therefore, in the negative. While thus answering the reference, we would like to point out that in disposing of the appeals, the order on the face of it should indicate the basis on which the taxable income of the assessee was computed, so that it is possible for the High Court in such reference to ascertain with certainty the correctness and soundness of the basis adopted by the Tribunal. 6. Let the reference be answered accordingly with costs of the assessee. Advocates fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (1) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y further, 11. For the reasons given above, the appeal must be allowed and the case remanded back to the learned Senior Subordinate Judge for disposal according to law. In so far as the revision is Concerned, now that the case has been finally disposed of by Mr. K. Section Gambhir I do not think any useful purpose will be served by setting aside the order of the learned District Judge dated 26th of May 1952. 12. It appears to me that the plaintiff-appellant is not completely free from blame; even the revision filed by him against the order dated 26th of May 1952 was filed in this Court in October 1954; in fairness, therefore, he must be put to terms and he must pay to the respondent a sum of Rs, 100/- by way of costs before he can claim hearing of the appeal in the Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge. The cost should be deposited on or before the 9th of February 1959. Case, to come up on 9th of February 1959. (The rest of the judgment is not material for reporting),
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1959 (1) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r purposes of levy of penalty the assessee had concealed his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, is a question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of the case. There is sufficient material on record to show that the assessee has furnished inaccurate and false statements of accounts. The very fact that he has manipulated his accounts, so as to arrive at an income of ₹ 51,774 for both the branches, while in fact he had in his possession a balance-sheet of only one branch showing income of nearly ₹ 64,000, is itself sufficient to justify the income-tax authorities in levying the penalty. The Tribunal further took into account the excessive nature of the amount of penalty and reduced it to half. It is not open for us to interfere in the quantum of the levy. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative. The assessee to pay the costs. Advocates' fee ₹ 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (1) TMI 33 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g effect "The next point to be considered in the Income-tax Act is that the proceedings are of a most secret character . . . Now it does not follow that because an agent is duly authorised to conduct the business of the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner he is ipso facto authorised to obtain copies of the Assistant Commissioner's judgment or indeed to perform any act preparatory or incident to the conduct of an appeal." I am, therefore, of opinion that in the case before us there is no express authorisation to Mr. B.N. Mohanty to receive the order. Therefore, the date of receipt of the order by Mr. B.N. Mohanty cannot be taken as the starting point for limitation. In my opinion, therefore, the application filed by the assessee under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act should be treated as an application made within the time allowed under sub-section (1) and I direct the Tribunal accordingly. The application is allowed with costs. Barman, J.-I agree.
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1959 (1) TMI 32 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ettlor intended to convey all her estate to the settlee as persona designata and not by reason of his answering a particular description. 29. We may also point out that in fact this contention was not advanced in the Courts below- What was urged there was that the legatee i.e., Ramayamma, under the will of Sreeramulu, as his wife had obtained only a limited estate and that the adoption of the respondent had resulted in the divesting of the estate taken by her. In other words, the plea related to the character and the amplitude of the estate taken by the legatee under the will of Sreeramulu. That point was not raised before us and rightly, in our opinion, having regard to decided cases, namely, AIR 1937 PC 139 ILR 50 Mad 508, and Lakshmjnarasimham v. Rajeswari, . For these reasons, we negative this contention also. No other question was argued before us. 30. It follows that the decrees and judgments of the Courts below should be confirmed and the appeals dismissed with costs.
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1959 (1) TMI 31 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the giving of contracts. In the present case there was no clear connection between the money-lending business of the assessee and the giving of the guarantee to the bank. The guarantee was not on behalf of himself and his partner but on behalf of the firm in which he held some shares and of which he was a director. This connection, in my view, is too remote to warrant the assumption that the guarantee was given in the ordinary course of the assessee's business. The advantage which he gained by the giving of the guarantee was indirect and it cannot, therefore, be said that the enforcement of the guarantee amounted to losses in business. It was nothing more than a loss in capital. Therefore the assessee is not entitled to claim exemption either under section 10(2)(xi) or 10(2)(xv) or in general terms of the Income-tax Act. We answer the reference accordingly. The assessee will pay costs of these proceedings which we assess at ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (1) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... own why the parties should not be held to their bargain and why the court should not enforce it by staying the suit. The prima facie leaning of the Court is to stay the suit if the disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement. We are not satisfied that the necessary evidence cannot be produced at Zurich in the event of arbitration being held at that place. The mere fact that the parties may have to incur larger costs in the event of the arbitration being held at Zurich is not a sufficient ground for refusing the stay. It is not shown that the learned Judge has exercised his discretion on wrong principles. We are not inclined to interfere with his discretion. 10. Mr. Meyer on behalf of the appellant concedes that if the suit is stayed so far as the first defendant is concerned, he could not reasonably say that the suit ought not to be stayed so far as it concerns the defendant No. 2. 11. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. K.C. Das Gupta, C.J. 12. I agree.
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1959 (1) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that where an assessee fails to prove satisfactorily the source and nature of certain amount of cash received during the accounting year, the Income-tax Officer is entitled to draw the inference that the receipts are of an assessable nature." This indicates that the learned judges did not make any distinction between the entries in the names of partners and those in the names of third parties. Therefore, our conclusion is that the credits in the names of third parties are not distinguishable from those in the names of the partners and even in regard thereto, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it is open to the Department to infer that these monies also belong to the assessee and represent the suppressed income. It follows that the appeal was rightly dismissed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The reference is answered accordingly. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (1) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ilur Rahman and the evidence of the complainant is that Khalilur Rahman had asked him to hand over the money to the appel- lant. If Khalilur Rahman is acquitted and therefore the offence under s. 161 is held not to have been committed, then in this case no question of intentionally aiding by any act or omission the commission of the offence arises. It may be as counsel for the respondent contended that the acquittal of Khalilur Rahman is wrong and it appears and we say so with respect that the findings of the High Court are inconsistent but as the matter of Khalilur Rahman is not before us by way of appeal against acquittal we do not express any opinion on that question. We are of the opinion that on the facts found and circumstances established in this case and as Khalilur Rahman has been acquitted the appellant's conviction cannot be upheld. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of conviction. The bail bonds shall also stand discharged. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (1) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al and has rendered the final orders of conviction and sentence invalid. We must accordingly set aside the orders of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant in all the three cases. That takes us to the question as to the final order which should be passed in the present appeals. The offences with which the appellant stands charged are of a very serious, nature; and though it is true that he has had to undergo the ordeal of a trial and has suffered rigorous imprisonment for some time that would not justify his prayer that we should not order his retrial. In our opinion, having regard to the gravity of the offences charged against the appellant, the ends of justice require that we should direct that he should be tried for the said offences de novo according to law. We also direct that the proceedings to be taken against the appellant hereafter should be commenced without delay and should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Appeal allowed. Retrial ordered.
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1959 (1) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s in question, has in his affidavit stated that he took all due and reasonable diligence and care to ding out the residential addressees of the partners of Motilal Somani & Co., that he was prevented from getting these addresses and that in to circumstances the only way in which he could serve the notices was by affixing it on the premises which was the last known address of the firm and where the petitioner at any rate has been carrying on his business. In these circumstances it is not possible to accept Mr. Palkhivala's contention that the service was invalid in any way so as to affect in any event the jurisdiction of the first respondent to proceed with the assessment under section 34 of the Act. These were the only contentions raised by Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of the petition. In my view none of them can be accepted. The petition must therefore fail. The rule is discharged. The petitioner will pay to he respondents the costs of this petition. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the Mysore Cinematograph Shows Tax Act of 1951 (Mysore Act XVI of 1951) challenged
Held that:- The only other argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants is that even if the tax comes under entry 62, its quantum is so large that it destroys the appellants' business. This is a point which necessarily involves an investigation into facts and depends upon the evidence that may be adduced. No such evidence has been led. Further, as stated in the same judgment, the court has no concern with the wisdom of the legislature and that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the views of the members of the court as to the serious consequences of excessive taxation to lead to a conclusion that the law is 'ultra vires'. Moreover, this is a point which was never urged before the High Court and no evidence was led in support of it and in the circumstances the appellants cannot be permitted to raise this new point at this final stage. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there were other cinema Houses similarly situate as that of the appellant's cinema Houses?
Held that:- It may not be unreasonable or improper if a higher tax is imposed on the shows given by a cinema house which contains large seating accommodation and is situate in fashionable or busy localities where the number of visitors is more numerous and in more affluent circumstances than the tax that may be im. posed on shows given in a smaller cinema house containing less accommodation and situate in some localities where the visitors are less numerous or financially in less affluent circumstances, for the two cannot, in those circumstances, be said to be similarly situate. There was, however, no material on which the trial court could or we may now come to a decision as to whether there had been any real discrimination in the facts and circumstances of this case. It may be that the appellant may in some future proceeding adduce evidence to establish that there are other cinema houses similarly situate and that the imposition of a higher tax on the appellant is discriminatory as to which we say nothing; but all we need say is that in this suit the appellant has not discharged the onus that was on him and, on the material on record, it is impossible for us to hold in this case that there has been any discrimination in fact. For reasons stated above this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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1959 (1) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100 of 1956) passed by Parliament was wholly repugnant to the provisions of the U. P. Act and therefore the law became void under the provisions of Art. 254(1) of the Constitution, with the result that at the present time there is no valid law where under the State can prohibit the appellants exercising their fundamental right under the Constitution, namely, carrying on the business of motor transport?
Held that:- The express words used in clause (b)certainly take in the scheme framed under the -repealed Act. It was a thing duly done under the repealed Act. Section 24 deals with the continuation of orders, schemes, rules, forms or bye-laws. made or issued under the repealed Act. But that section applies only to the repeal of a Central Act but not a State Act. But the exclusion of the scheme is sought to be supported on the basis of the argument that in the case of a repeal of a Central Act, both the sections apply and, in that context, a reasonable interpretation would be to exclude what is specifically provided for from the general words used in s. 6. Whatever justification there may be in that context, there is none when we are concerned with the repeal of a State Act to which s. 24 does not apply. In that situation, we have to look to the plain words of s. 6 and ascertain whether those words are comprehensive enough to take in a scheme already framed. We have no doubt that a scheme framed is a thing done under the repealed Act.
The provisions starting from s. 68C only contemplate a scheme initiated after the Amending Act came into force and therefore they cannot obviously be inconsistent with a scheme already framed under the State Act before the Amending Act came into force. We, therefore, hold that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act saves the scheme framed under the U. P. Act.
In all the circumstances, we cannot hold that the said appellants accepted the alternative routes. If they or some of them choose to accept any alternative routes, they are at liberty to do so, in which event they will not be entitled to any compensation.
It appears that the Regional Transport Authority renewed his permit on October 11, 1956 with effect from November 1, 1953 to October 31, 1956. In the circumstances, as the petitioner was not a permit-holder when the Government made the order, no relief can be given to him in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 20 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hen made. According to the learned Government Pleader the notification is sufficient to sustain the levy of a surcharge in respect of 1956-57 (1st April, 1956, to 31st March, 1957). 10.. The submission is not correct. What section 6 authorises is the removal of difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. What the Government has done is to give a retroactive operation to the Act which the Legislature had not chosen to give. 11.. This is clearly unsustainable. We cannot but hold that the notification to the extent it permits a surcharge in respect of 1956-57 (1st April, 1956, to 31st March, 1957) is invalid as contended by the petitioners. 12.. In the light of what is stated above these petitions have to be allowed and we do so though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. 13.. Various other contentions are raised in these petitions. They were not pressed before us, and are not, therefore, considered in this judgment. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (1) TMI 19 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... termine the relevant facts and to make the assessment on the basis of those facts, and there is a provision for the settlement of disputed questions of law by the High Court. Mr. Sibal, who appears for the petitioners, is unable to mention any convincing reason why in the present case the petitioners, who are sought to be assessed, should not be left to avail of the ordinary remedy provided by the Sales Tax Act itself instead of being allowed to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. As I have already said, the main dispute is about the facts and they must be left to be settled by the tribunals a pointed for the purpose. In my opinion, therefore, there is no occasion for us at this stage to go into this controversy and I would, therefore, decline to interfere and dismiss the petition as it stands. In all the circumstances, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. KHOSLA, C. J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 18 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on a date after the period to which the taxes relate. In the second instance the form purports to show that the President, Refugee Cloth Merchants Association, Barnala, was a member of the assessee Syndicate. The present petitioner was not the President of the Barnala Association either during the period to which the taxes relate or on the date when form S.T. 1 was filled in. He has clearly stated in para 1 of his affidavit that he was President only during the year 1953 A.D. The petitioner being neither a dealer nor a partner cannot be held liable to pay any part of the taxes levied against the Syndicate by means of Annexures A and B . In the result I accept the petition and order that an appropriate writ be issued quashing the orders of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Patiala, and the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, contained in Annexures H and I to the petition. In the peculiar circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1959 (1) TMI 17 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nsumer against cash payment inside Bihar and where title passed to the purchaser in each of the transactions for which the tax has been imposed. These questions of fact have not been investigated before any of the Sales Tax Authorities, and, in any case, the point taken by learned counsel is outside the scope of the question referred to by the Board of Revenue. We cannot, therefore, permit the assessee to raise this point at this stage. For the reasons already given, we hold that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the assesse has been lawfully taxed with regard to the sale of goods delivered for consumption in the State of Bihar for the assessment periods in question. We accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee in both these cases. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 250 for both these cases. References answered accordingly.
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