|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 38 Records
-
1959 (4) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... contended that the intention clearly was to make provision only for butter prepared from milk or cream and to exclude butter obtained from curd. This argument cannot be accepted for the reasons which I have given above. It seems to us that reference was made to cream in this rule by way of abundant caution and not in order to exclude butter prepared from curd. According to the ordinary meaning of the word "butter" it would include butter prepared from curd. In fact, in common parlance, butter prepared from dahi or curd would be regarded as butter prepared from milk. The language used in rule A. 11.05 is not such as to exclude the ordinary meaning of the word "butter". 7. With respect, therefore, we do not agree with the view taken in 60 Bom LR 434. In our opinion, Rule. A. 11.05 applies also to butter prepared from dahi or curd. The reply to the question referred to the Full Bench will, therefore, be in the affirmative. BD/V.B.B. Answer in the affirmative.
-
1959 (4) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er the amendment) against the appellant in respect of the Salouna asthal and the properties appertaining thereto. It would be open to the respondents to take such steps as may be available to them in law to get it determined by a competent authority that the trust in question is a public trust. 22. We would accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated September 13, 1954, and direct the issue of an appropriate writ quashing the order of the respondent Board calling upon the appellant to file a statement of income and expenditure with regard to the properties of the Salouna asthal and also prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the rights of the appellant in the management of the Salouna asthal and the properties appertaining thereto, unless and until the respondents have obtained the necessary determination that the Salouna asthal is a public trust. The appellant will be entitled to his costs throughout. 23. Appeal allowed.
-
1959 (4) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as been commented on before us at great length by learned counsel for the respondent. That doctrine and the decisions bearing on it we have considered at some length in our decision relating to the Charusila Trust, Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955. We do not wish to repeat what we have said therein. 18. The conclusion at which we have arrived is that the Act and its several provisions do not suffer from the vice of extra-territoriality in the sense suggested by learned counsel for the respondent and there is no such conflict of jurisdiction as learned counsel for the respondent has suggested. Accordingly, the Act is good and applies to the Baidyanath temple and the properties appertaining thereto. 19. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and order of the High Court dated October 9, 1953, are set aside and the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution made by the respondent must stand dismissed with costs. 20. Appeal allowed.
-
1959 (4) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... e final order of the High Court disposing of the appeal on merits or otherwise. If that be the true effect of Section 116B, in our judgment, the order disposing of the appeal on withdrawal by the original appellant, must be regarded as a decision of the High Court, which is final and conclusive. 6. The Act does not provide for any review of the judgment of this Court on any ground, and it is well settled that a Court is not invested with a power of review unless such, power is expressly conferred. The Legislature has not only not conferred a power of review upon this Court to review decisions in appeal under the Representation of the People Act, but has declared the order final and conclusive. 7. On that view of the case, in our judgment, the application filed by Jagannath Bhau Patil must be held not maintainable and must on that ground be rejected. There will be no order as to costs of the application. The same order in Application No. 2423 of 1958. 8. Application dismissed.
-
1959 (4) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r books ". 13. Taking a most dispassionate view of the matter, the only conclusion which we are led to adopt is that the-books are meant to pander to the prurient taste of the public and appeal to their baser instincts. They are found to be "obscene" within the meaning of Section 292 I. P. C. In our opinion the appellants have been rightly convicted. 14. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think a sentence of rigorous imprisonment is called for. The ends of justice will be fully met if the sentence is reduced only to a fine of ₹ 250/- in default S. I. for 6 weeks in case of appellant No. 1 and of ₹ 100/-only in case of No. 2 and in default S. I. for 3 weeks, under Section 292 I. P. C., there being no separate sentence under Section 292/109 I. P. C. and we order accordingly. Subject to the modifications as to sentence only pointed out above the appeal stands dismissed. Debabrata Mookerjee, J. 15. I agree.
-
1959 (4) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ance of excess profits tax by the assessee if his incorrect return had been accepted. The facts enumerated by us earlier show that the result of the proceedings for assessment for the subsequent chargeable accounting period October 14, 1944, to November 1, 1946, was that there was no excess profits tax liability on the assessee during any of the earlier chargeable accounting periods so that there was no maximum amount at all to the extent of which penalty could have been imposed. We, consequently, answer the second question referred to us in the negative. The second question having been answered in the negative, the first question no longer arises. Let the papers be returned to the Income Tax Appellant Tribunal with this answer to the question referred to us. The assessee will be entitled to his costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 400. The same amount of ₹ 400 shall be assessed as the fee of learned counsel for the Department. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1959 (4) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the High Court has done is to correct what may be errors in appreciation of documentary evidence or errors in drawing inferences. We are, therefore, of opinion that there was no error of law apparent on the face of the record in this case which would justify interference by the High Court with the order of the Deputy Custodian General, who undoubtedly had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and did not in any way exceed that jurisdiction or fail to deal with the matter in accordance with the essential requirements of law which he was authorized and required to administer. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and restore that of the Deputy Custodian General. As all this trouble has arisen because the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated May 6, 1952, was not to be found on the record and was, therefore, overlooked when the order of July 15, 1952, was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, we order the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
-
1959 (4) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r to take up the position that under section 44 he should not be made liable. There can be no doubt that the petitioner is taking two inconsistent positions in the two applications. However, the notices in the two cases are not the same, and if there was a real lacuna in the law then I do not think that the application could have been thrown out on the ground of res judicata or principles analogous thereto or on the ground of estoppel. The result is that I must hold that even before the amendment of section 44 of the Act, it was possible to proceed against the partners of a firm which had been dissolved and had completely stopped doing business. Accordingly, the notice under section 34 upon the petitioner was quite legal and no grounds have been shown for my interference. The application is dismissed. The rule is discharged, interim orders vacated. There will be no order for costs. The operation of this order is stayed for a month to enable the petitioner to prefer an appeal.
-
1959 (4) TMI 36 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s in accordance with the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax fixing up the time and place for payment of the tax failing which treating the petitioner as a defaulter and then proceed to issue necessary certificate to the Collector for the recovery of the amount as if it were a land revenue. Without issuing such a demand notice and treating the petitioner as a. defaulter in case he fails to deposit the amount within the time prescribed, the respondents have no justification to issue a certificate to the Collector to collect the arrears of income-tax taking coercive process. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to succeed in these writ petitions. In the result, therefore, these writ petitions are allowed. A writ as prayed for by the petitioner will issue in these two petitions. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents. We fix advocate's fee at ₹ 100 (Rupees one hundred) in each of these petitions. Ahmed Ali Khan, J.-I agree.
-
1959 (4) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... loss he was not entitled either to submit a return or to insist that the amount of his losses should be ascertained and determined by the Income-tax Officer, he would not, if the view taken in Ahamed Sahib's case (supra) were right, be entitled to have that loss carried forward and set off against any profit he might make in the sixth year. That would defeat the purpose of the provisions contained in section 24 which was and is to enable an assessee to carry forward his unadjusted losses and set them off against the profits of future years. We, therefore, think that the case of Ahamed Sahib' s case (supra), was wrongly decided in this respect, and overrule it. The assessee is entitled to have his losses-less those already adjusted for refund purposes-for the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50 determined and carry forward the loss so determined to be set off against the profits for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52. The assessee will be entitled to his costs.
-
1959 (4) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oresaid order of the Minister dated the 21st January, 1959, and bold that the petitioner was lawfully elected as the Chairman of the Ajmer Municipal Committee at the resumed meeting held on the 17th December, 1958, and we, therefore, direct that the opposite parties shall- admit the petitioner as the lawfully elected Chairman of the Ajmer Municipal Committee in the vacancy caused by the resignation of the outgoing Chairman Jwalaprasad. We further hold that the election of respondent No. 5 Pratapchand Jain as Chairman of the said Committee cannot be upheld as valid and must be set aside and we consequently order him to vacate this office forthwith. As to costs we think that a good deal of the trouble and the complications which have arisen in this case have been occasioned by the capricious attitude adopted by the respondent No. 1 Zahoor Ahmed Zaid and therefore, we consider it just that he should be made to pay the costs of the petitioner in this Court. We order accordingly.
-
1959 (4) TMI 33 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT (WALIOR BENCH)
... ...
... ... ..... il with his consent it takes over the promoter's liability. The defendant respondent No. 1 seems to have been very sure of his personal immunity and has not filed any appeal or cross-objection, This is unfortunate because the trial Court's judgment does appear difficult and obscure at places, and the defendant could possibly have tried to reverse the findings on fact; but that became impossible now. 10. The result is that on the finding the defendant No. 1 ordered the building work as the promoter and the amount decreed is still payable to the plaintiff on that account, as I hold that the promoter is personally liable. In these circumstances the appeal is to be allowed and the decree passed by the trial court against defendant No. 1 altered to one with personal liability of defendant No. 1. Costs and pleader's fee in the present appeal be calculated according to the rules payable by defendant respondent No. 1 to the plaintiff appellant. A.H. Khan, J. 11. I agree.
-
1959 (4) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on the Sir land, it cannot be disputed that they have not acquired any rights under the aforesaid provisions. As the operation of r. 5 is conditioned by cl. (v) of sub-rule (2) of r. 4, there is no scope for invoking the former provisions unless cl. (v) of sub-rule (2) of r. 4 applies to a given case and also an order of stay has been made thereunder. In this case, as the suit lands are found to be Sir lands and as the appellants have not acquired any of the rights mentioned in cl. (v) of sub-rule (2) of r. 4, the said sub-rule cannot apply, and, therefore, r. 5 cannot also be invoked. Further, this contention was raised in the revision petitions filed by the appellants to the Revenue Board, and the latter by its order dated September 6, 1953, held against them and that order has become final. For the said reasons, we must hold that the suits could not be abated under r. 5 of the amended Rules. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1959 (4) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y, the petitioner company has pleaded in the petition a letter dated the 2nd December, 1946, from Baddley himself that he would pay the income-tax on the commission which he had earned and he would undertake to deal direct with the Income-tax Department. That agreement, however, cannot affect the right of the income-tax authorities to make the company liable for payment. Whatever the private arrangements between the company and its sales manager Baddley may be, the company's liability under the statute is clear. No arrangement or agreement privately arrived at between the petitioner and Baddley can affect or alter or modify the statutory liability of the petitioner under section 18(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act to deduct tax at the appropriate rate from the payments made to Baddley. As no other point was urged before me, this petition must fail. The rule is, therefore, discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs Petition dismissed.
-
1959 (4) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... been received and considering. In these circumstances, the view expressed at an earlier stage of the case, which has not yet been decided by the appellate court, do not bind that appellate court when giving its final decision. On that analogy, in the present case, the Tribunal, when giving its final judgment on the 29th of July, 1947, could not be bound by any observations or findings which may have been recorded at the time of making any of the earlier remand orders. By none of these remand orders had the Tribunal ceased to exercise jurisdiction in the appeal, so that it remained open to the Tribunal to reconsider its views when finally deciding the appeal. This expresses our opinion on the second question. As a result, the reference is answered in accordance with our views expressed above. Let the record be returned with this opinion to the Tribunal. The Department will be entitled to its costs from the assessee which we fix at ₹ 500. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1959 (4) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... partment next referred to the decision in Bhatnagars and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (S) , and contended that before this court can interfere it must be satisfied that there is no evidence whatsoever on the basis of which the Collector of Central Excise could have come to the conclusion he did. Now, as I have tried to explain there is no legal evidence whatever to support the conclusion of the Collector of Central Excise that the petitioners either imported the gold or were concerned in its import. The various circumstances referred to by the Collector of Central Excise might justify the belief that they knew that the gold had been imported into the country unlawfully. It may also be that the petitioners were attempting to evade various other laws. All that will not suffice to bring them within the scope of item 8 in the schedule to Sec. 167. That being so, these writ petitions must be and are allowed. The orders complained of are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1959 (4) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ts terms and the licence has duly received the price of the undertaking as fixed in accordance with clause 9 of the licence. The Supreme Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram(1) has held that the contract because of this defect is not void and it is always open to the Government to ratify it. By carrying out the terms of the licence the Government has obviously ratified it. This contention of the learned counsel also therefore fails. It follows from the above discussion that in the present case the exercise of option by the Government to purchase the undertaking was as a result of a contract between the parties and mounted to a sale. My opinion on the question referred to us therefor is that the transaction in the present case amounted to a sale within section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Commissioner is entitled to get costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. BHANDARI, C.J.--I agree. Question answered in affirmative.
-
1959 (4) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... differences of opinion which then existed in the different High Courts. That decision was taken as settling the law on the subject and on the faith of that decision a half-sister has been held in subsequent cases to be entitled to the benefit of the Amending Act. The High Court dealt with the case in 1951 after the Constitution had come into force and the Privy Council jurisdiction in Indian appeals had ceased. No point was taken on behalf of the appellant in the High Court that the Privy Council decision should be reopened and the question of the right of a half-sister re-examined. In these circumstances, we did not allow learned counsel for the appellant to argue the correctness or otherwise of the Privy Council decision. The contentions as to the admissibility of Ex. 1 and the oral evidence of Janardan Misra and Dharanidhar Misra being devoid of merit, the appeal fails. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs in favour of the contesting respondents. Appeal dismissed.
-
1959 (4) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... here is infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Marketing legislation of this type is for the welfare of the general public. As regards the procedural right, it is enough to point out that it is not an uncommon feature in enactments dealing with local bodies not to provide a right of appeal. In such a case the assessee has got right of resort to the civil court if the assessing authority exceeded its jurisdiction. The levy of cess could also be challenged if prosecution is initiated to enforce it in a criminal court. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the provisions of the Act offend the equal protection of law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. (22) In the result, I am of opinion that the Market Committee cannot properly call upon the petitioner to pay the cess for groundnut purchased from 23-11-1955 to 30-6-57 under S. 11(1) of the Madras Crops Markets Act, as S. 11(1) is invalid. A writ will issue. No order as to costs. (23) Writ issued.
-
1959 (4) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... edings. In the one suit which was tried in the High Court the question did not arise as no amendment was allowed. Therefore, in these cases there are no materials on which the question as to the nature of the trust can be determined, though in Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 (1) in which also judgment is being delivered today, we have held that having regard to the preamble to the Act, the provisions in s. 3 and the provisions of sub-s. (5) of s. 4 the definition clause of 'religious trust' in the Act must mean public trusts express or constructive, recognised by Hindu law to be religious, pious or charitable. That finding, however, is of no assistance to the appellants in the present cases. The fate of these cases must depend on the sole question whether the Act is constitutionally valid or not. We have held that the Act is constitutionally valid. In the result we hold that the appeals are without any merit. They are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
|
