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1959 (9) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nferred such a power on the State Government is also supported by the provisions of s. 27 of the Act. Under s. 27(1), the bye-laws made by the Market Committee for the regulation of business and conditions of trading in the market area are subject to the rules made by the State Government under s. 26. This indicates that under s. 26 of the Act, the State Government has also power to make rules for the regulation of business and conditions of trading in the market area, and that power can be spelled out from the provisions of s. 26(1) of the Act, Therefore, s. 26(1) confers ample power on the State Government to make r. 65. In this view, it is not necessary to invoke the provisions of s. 26(2)(e) to sustain the power of the State Government to make r. 65. 14. The third contention though raised was not pursued in view of the word "business" in r. 65(1) which is comprehensive enough to take in even forward contracts. 15. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal wrongly held that the limestone quarry at Rajanka and the factory at Jhinkpani were separate establishments. In our view, they constituted one establishment within the meaning of clause (iii) of s. 25E of the Act. It was conceded on behalf the respondent workmen that the lay-off in the factory was due to the non-supply of limestone by reason of the strike in the limestone quarry and the strike was decided on by the same Union which consisted of the workmen at the factory and the quarry. That being the position, the disqualification in clause (iii) aforesaid clearly applied and the workmen at the factory were not entitled to claim lay-off compensation. 28. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribunal is set aside. In the circumstances of the case in which a difficult question of interpretation arose for decision for the first time, we pass no order as to costs. 29. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llow the appeal of Munna Lal, set aside the order passed by the appellate tribunal and direct his reinstatement on the same terms and conditions on which reinstatement of the other 136 employees has been directed by the appellate tribunal. Subject to this modification the appeal preferred by the employees fails and is dismissed. Since the appeal has succeeded in respect of Munna Lal, we direct that parties should bear their own costs of this appeal. K. Subba Rao, J. 71. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Gajendragadkar, J. I agree with his conclusion. I would prefer not to express my opinion on the construction of s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for the reason that the argument which called for a consideration of the said section had not been raised at any of the earlier stages of the dispute, but was raised for the first time in this Court. 72. Appeals Nos. 519 and 520 dismissed. 73. Appeal No. 521 allowed in part.
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1959 (9) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed the distinction may be an indication that in its view there is relevant difference between a lambardar and village accountants. We would therefore, hold that a village headman cannot be brought within the words “the like” in the said clause. In this view, it is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether a lambardar is a person in the service of the Government within the meaning of s. 123(7) of the Act. Before parting with this case, we must express our feeling that the final disposal of the election petition should not have been delayed so long. The elections were held on February 24, 1957, the respondent was declared elected on February 25, 1957, and the election petition was filed on April 11, 1957. Though 2 1/2 years have elapsed, the petition has not yet been finally disposed of. We hope that the election petition would be disposed of on other issues as expeditiously as possible. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1959 (9) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Company's account books. On this clear evidence it is manifest that the fourth charge, namely, the attempt to cheat the Government of India by submitting bills on the basis of the inflated costs of the machinery purchased from Ramdas and Sons, has not been established. If this charge fails, the third charge also must fail. That charge relates to the offence of forgery of Ex. D and user of the said forged document. The charge refers by incorporation to the first charge indicating thereby that the intention to fabricate the document was only to cheat the Government in the manner stated in the first charge. As we have held that the accused did not make any claim in the bills on the basis of Ex. D or the accounts written on the foot of Ex. D, the necessary ingredient of the third charge was also not established. 16. In the result, we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges of the High Court, though for different reasons. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e to get back the land in the event of a partition. Further complications would arise if such a permanent settlement was granted by only one of the co-sharers but was acquiesced in by the others. In such an event it would have to be seen whether the acquiescence was of such a nature as to operate as an estoppel against the other co-sharers, who were no parties to the permanent settlement. This is the view of the matter which has not been considered by any of the Courts below. In our opinion the case has not been properly tried and must be remanded to the trial court for a rehearing in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. 25. The evidence already on the record shall be treated as evidence at the rehearing but parties shall have liberty to adduce further evidence if they like. 26. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the case is remanded to the trial court for rehearing. Costs of this appeal shall abide the final result. Braja Kanta Guha, J. 27. I agree.
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1959 (9) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... question referred to by the learned judge, but the limited question "whether receipts of the cheques at Bhavnagar amounted to receipts of sale proceeds in Bhavnagar" which could not cover the question "whether the posting of the cheques in British India at the request, express or implied, of the appellant amounted to receipt of sale proceeds in British India". Mr. Kolah frankly stated that this is an obvious inaccuracy which has crept in, in the judgment of the learned judge. 105. In my view, the question of law that has been raised by the Tribunal in the present case is sufficiently wide to cover the aspect of the case sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the Revenue. He seeks to confine himself to the facts as set out in the statement of the case and I do not see any reason why that argument cannot be entertained and given effect to. 106. In the result, my answer to the question is in the affirmative. 107. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (9) TMI 67 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... set off loss of profits or gains under one head against income, profits or gains under any other head." In the proviso which is before us the words used clearly modify the method of computation under section 10 of the Act. The question arose for interpretation in the Bombay High Court in Keshavlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 31 ITR 7 . While appreciating the rule that a proviso operates within the main enactment, the learned Judges found that the express words in the proviso in dispute implied that it governed section 10 of the Act. We are in respectful agreement with this decision. Our conclusion is that in computing the profits and gains chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business, profession or vocation" the losses sustained in speculative business cannot be adjusted against the profits under other items within that head. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative. As the assessee has not appeared, we make no order as to costs.
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1959 (9) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the duty of the publisher is merely to give his name and place of publication for being, printed cannot prevail. It is also his duty to see that the book or paper complies with Section 3 and to refrain from publishing it if the requirements are not satisfied. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed as regards the 1st respondent and dismissed as regards respondents 2 and 3. The 1st respondent is found guilty and convicted under Section 12 of the Act. With regard to punishment, it is conceded that the offence is a technical one. It is not as if the 1st respondent wanted to make a secret of his connection with Ex. P-1 and of his responsibility for publishing it. Sri V. V. Siva Rao states, without contradiction, that the 1st respondent is a political worker with no means. In the circumstances, I sentence him to pay a fine of ₹ 10/- (Rupees ten only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. Three weeks' time is granted for payment of the fine.
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1959 (9) TMI 65 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d but was not pursued. It has been held repeatedly that a question which has not been raised before the Tribunal cannot be raised before this Court. In Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 30 I.T.R. 388., a Full Bench of this court held that if a question of law has not been raised or considered by the Appellate Tribunal, that question cannot be held to arise out of the order of the Tribunal within the meaning of section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the question cannot therefore be referred to the High Court under section 66 of the Act. There can be little doubt that the debts which were due to the assessee were debts of the trade the profits of which are not being computed. For these reasons I am of the opinion that no question of law arise in this case or even if on arises it was not raised before the Appellate Tribunal and cannot now be agitated before us. The petition must be dismissed with costs which I assess at ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 64 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fts made by a person in the course of a year for the purpose of assessment and more they are bound to do it, as otherwise they would be violating the mandatory provisions of the Act. This point also fails and is negatived. In W.P. No. 458 of 1959, it is argued that neither of the two gifts is subject to gift tax for the reason that one is not a transfer but only a partition of the family properties and the other does not exceed the limited imposed by section 5(2), being a gift in favour of the wife of the petitioner. If so, it is open to the petitioner to raise this point before the authorities concerned. In W.P. No. 459 of 1959, the complaint is that the authorities concerned have arbitrarily fixed the value of the gift. This is also a matter to be considered by the Department. Any question, which is foreign to this enquiry, can be gone into by the Revenue. In the result, all the petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 75 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ional case, to which we have referred, applied. We are accordingly of the view that the appellants having proved their case of benami acquisition of these properties - a case which is not now questioned - the fact that the signatures of Prahlad Rai and others on some relative documents were not their own, cannot disentitle the plaintiffs-appellants to a decree. The exceptions to the rule contained in the maxim were not considered by the High Court, which proceeded entirely upon the supposition that every illegality or fraud disentitled a plaintiff to a judgment. That, however, is not the law. We accordingly hold that the appellants were entitled to a decree in their favour, and with respect, it was wrongly disallowed by the High Court. 26. We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court of Patna, and restore those of the Subordinate Judge, Motihari. In the circumstances of this case, we think that we should make no order about costs of this appeal. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her lenient. Subsequently, the legislature thought that the possession of a wireless transmitter was a graver offence; sometimes involving the security of the State, and so an amendment was introduced in 1949 constituting the possession of such apparatus a graver offence and imposing a more severe punishment. Therefore, it cannot be said that s. 6(1-A), inserted in the Act XVII of 1933 by the amending Act of 1949, is either covered by the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, or a surplusage not serving any definite purpose. Even from the history of the legislation we find it not possible to say that it disclosed an intention different from that envisaged in s. 6-A of the General Clauses Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that s. 6 (1 -A) of the Act continued to be on the statute book even after the amending Act of 1949 was repealed by Act XLVIII of 1952, and that it was in force when the offence was committed by the appellant. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have now fixed, from the date of the plaint the interest would be six per cent. 9. We may mention that though we have been taken through the evidence bearing on the subject we have purposely refrained from making any reference to an alleged agreement between Dr. Gopala Menon and the plaintiff relating to the discharge of the four mortgages because that agreement was not acted upon, nor was it pressed on us by either side. Such an agreement cannot assist us in any manner to decide whether the rate of interest provided in the mortgages was excessive at the time when the mortgages were executed. 10. Though the point appears to have been raised before Ramaswami J. that the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act cannot be availed of by a transferee of the equity of redemption, before us this point, was not pressed and rightly by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. In the appeal there will be no order as to costs. Time for redemption six months. 11. Order accordingly.
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1959 (9) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by one of the plaintiffs, which is quite sufficient in view of the decision of their Lordships ot the Privy Council in ILR 17 Cal 580. In regard to presentation Of the plaint, as already observed, the plaint need not be presented by plaintiff or sny person authorized by him. Presentation of the plaint by the pleader of one of the plaintiffs is quite proper. As regards verification ot the plaint, unfortunatrly, even today the plaint is not properly verified by one of the plaintiffs or by any person acquainted with the facts of the case. But this however is a matter of mere irregularity in regard to procedure and does r.ob make the suit filed on 18-2-49 detective. The lower Court was therefore wrong in holding that the suit must be deemed to have been instituted only on 24-4-51 and that it was therefore barred by limitation. I thereiore agree with my learned Brother's view that the suit is within time notwithstanding the irregularities in the plaint. 32. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... payment to any shareholder of any paid up capital. The reasons which prompted the legislature to provide this was thus explained by Jessel M. R. In. re Ebbw Vale Street, Iron and Coal Co. (1877) 4 Ch. D. 827.at p. 832, Now what is the meaning of that? It means; that the company is give notice to the world that it is a company which previously offered to the public the security of a larger amount of nominal capital, that is, of a larger capital, that is. of a larger amount of liability on the part of the shareholders, than it offers now. The use of the words ''and reduced" is really intended to serve as a warning to the public that the capital of the company has been reduced. In re Pinkney and Sons Steamship Co., 1892-3 Ch. 125. But instead of one month, I direct that the words "and reduced" be added for a period of six months from this date. 18. This petition is allowed and the petitioner company will take the costs of this application from its funds.
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1959 (9) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... the body was placed, the seizure of blood -stained earth from another spot pointed out by the accused, the medical evidence itself, all amply and materially corroborate his retracted confession. His guilt was established overwhelmingly, and beyond any reasonable doubt. ( 12. ) We would therefore confirm the convictions, both upon the charge of murder and the charge of causing disappearance of evidence of the crime. The sentence of death imposed with reference to the charge of murder is the only one that could be fitly imposed, in the circumstances of the case. The accused seems to have planned the offence, and there is absolutely nothing to suggest that he acted suddenly, in the heat of passion or anger, or even that some kind of altercation preceded the murder, The accused had no rights over the woman, and there is, again, nothing to Indicate that any particular conduct on her part was an immediate provocation. We therefore confirm the sentence also, and dismiss the appeal.
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1959 (9) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... with wages but there is no provision either in Section 79 or any other section of the Factories Act which operates as a bar to the grant of leave with wages for workers in seasonal industries which from their nature cannot be carried on for 240 days in an year. It cannot therefore be held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant leave with wages irrespective of the total number of working days in a calendar year. The finding on issue (4) does not therefore require modification. 14. It follows from the conclusions reached above that the award requires modification in respect of the following matters. (1) The workers will get one holiday with wages for Onam and not two; (2) The finding on issue (3) regarding compensation for period during which the factories remain closed is quashed; and I order accordingly. The original petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above and are dismissed in other respects. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their costs.
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1959 (9) TMI 56 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e petitioners, was that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in ton-firming the composite sentence awarded by the learned trial judge in spite of the fact that he acquitted the petitioners of the offence under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the sentences awarded to the petitioners should have been proportionately reduced. There is no substance in this contention. It cannot reasonably be urged that the sentences awarded to the petitioners are in any way severe. I am of the opinion that the sentences awarded to any of the petitioners do not call for any interference. 11. In the result, therefore, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. The first petitioner is on bail and should surrender to his bail and undergo the imprisonment and also pay the fine. The sentences of fine awarded to the other petitioners shall be enforced if they have not already paid the fine amounts. 12. Revision dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... We understand that the defendant No. 1 has now resigned from the managing committee. and, therefore, no further question as to his right to continue to manage the trust remains to be considered. We set aside the decree in so far as it determines the amount due to the temple and confirm the rest of the decree. The matter is referred to he triawl Court for reassessment of the amount due to the temple having due regard to the observations made by us in our judgment. (16) In view of the fact tha we are remitting the case to the trial Court we direct that so far as the order for costs made by the learned Trial Judge is concerned it will be confirmed but so far as the costs of this court are concerned the respondent will bear his own costs. The costs of the appellants and the Charity Commissioner will come out of the estate. (17) Cross-obections are dismissed with costs. The costs of cross-objections will be credited to the trust for the purpose of the appeal. (18) Case remanded.
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