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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 58 Records
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1960 (8) TMI 91 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of law taken by the learned Commissioner appears to be correct and not that which was held by the Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Mr. Kan Singh, on behalf of the department, however, p points out that in some areas basic agricultural operations appear to have taken place. He refers to the observations in the letter of reference where the Tribunal says that "the trees are coppiced in such a manner that the coppiced shoots may come up without any assistance and at places where there are gaps the planting is done after excavating pits, circular trenches and ordinary trenches." To the extent that the income is derived from basic operations, the income can be said to be agricultural income; but that of course is a matter of evidence which will have to be investigated by the department itself. We, therefore, answer the point under reference as stated above. The petitioners are entitled to their costs of ₹ 50 in each case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (8) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a public purpose or for a Company. What was a mere proposal under s. 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, it is not correct to say that any defect in the notification under s. 4 is fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a Company and the purpose"" has to be investigated under s. 5A or s. 40 necessarily after the notification under s. 4 of the Act. The other attack under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution is equally futile in view of the decisions of this Court in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another ( 1955 1 S.C.R. 777.) and Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay ( 1957 S.C.R. 721.). Nothing was said with reference to the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, though that Article has been referred to in the grounds in support of the writ petition. For the reasons given above, this petition must be dismissed with costs to the contesting parties. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 89 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with the litigation. Since the very existence of the company was threatened in this litigation, it was part of the business of the company to defend this litigation, and it is clear that, following the decision of the House of Lords in Morgan (Inspector of Taxes) v. Tate & Lyle Ltd.( 1954 26 I.T.R. 195), these are expenses which are deductible under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The matter having been well settled by authority (there are other similar cases to which a reference need not be made), no question of law arises for the opinion of this court under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act. We, accordingly, dismiss both these petitions. There will be no order as to costs. MAHAJAN, J.--I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 88 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee's books of account and disallow the loss claimed by the assessee for the business. Gujrat Pottery Works, for the assessment year 1947-48, but we are of opinion that he could not refuse to grant the depreciation allowance claimed by the assessee in respect of that business for that year. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is the final authority to find facts under the Income-tax Act and we are of opinion that there was material before the Tribunal on which it could disallow the loss determined by the Income-tax Officer (sic.). For the reasons already stated above, we are of opinion that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could not disallow the depreciation claimed by the assessee in respect of the business of Gujrat Pottery Works mentioned above. Under the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of these proceedings. The fee of the learned counsel for the Income-tax Department is assessed at ₹ 200. reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (8) TMI 87 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he two orders before the Appellate Tribunal similar view was taken by the Tribunal also. The petitioner was thus pursuing his remedy under the Act and having failed to persuade the proper authorities to go into the matter of the invalidity of the proceedings had no other alternative but to approach this court when the matter went back again to the Income-tax Officer. The final order was passed by the Appellate Tribunal on November 30, 1959. In view of these proceedings, it cannot be said that the petitioner is guilty of laches or acquiescence by which article 226 of the Constitution. In the result, therefore, the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, in my opinion, are without jurisdiction and the petitioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition, directing the opposite party, the Income- tax Officer, not to proceed with the reassessment in pursuance of the notice dated March 19, 1951. We make no orders as to costs. C.P. SINHA C.J.--I agree. DEKA J.--I agree. Writ issued.
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1960 (8) TMI 86 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t (X of 1949) and its counterpart in the Companies Act (VII of 1913), namely, section 277F. The securities in question were sold by the company to meet its liabilities as a banker and any loss suffered by the sale thereof would certainly be loss of a revenue nature. Mr. Mahajan, who appears for the Department, relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Kishan Prasad & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 27 ITR 49 and contended that the decision in Kishan Prasad's case (supra) would apply to the facts of the present case. We are unable to agree with this contention. In Kishan Prasad's case (supra) the shares that were sold were acquired by way of investment of capital and, therefore, any loss or appreciation by the sale of those very shares would be loss or appreciation in capital. For the reasons given above, the answer to this reference is in the affirmative. The respondents will have their costs which are assessed at ₹ 250. Khosla, C.J.-I agree.
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1960 (8) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of transactions, nor any portion thereof, could Vinayagam have been taxed under section 42(1) of the Act. Vinayagam was no doubt an agent of Subramaniam--the declaration under section 43 stands--but in the year of account he was not shown to have transacted any business in his capacity as the agent of Subramaniam. With reference to the second of the questions referred to this court, the real issue to be decided is not whether the arithmetical computation of ₹ 33,396 was correct. The real question is whether Vinayagam was liable to be taxed on any sum by the application of the provisions of section 42(1). That question we answer in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Thus on no portion of the estimated income of Subramaniam, ₹ 50,000, was Vinayagam liable to be taxed. As the assessee has succeeded in avoiding the tax liability in its entirety, he will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (8) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nted out under question 1, the assessee was liable to be taxed on the entire income up to December 19, 1952, in his status as an individual. That was independent of the order under section 25A. In answering the second question we have pointed out that after December 19, 1952, the assessee was entitled to exclude from his assessable income the income from the properties allotted to the minor children under annexure "B". That again was independent of any order under section 25A. In form we answer the third question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. C.M.P. No. 127 of 1960. The documents produced by the assesses were really unnecessary for the determination of the questions at issue between the Department and the assessee. It is on that ground that we direct that the petition be dismissed. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the executive for carrying it out, there will be an end of the doctrine of the rule of law. If the contention be correct., the legislature in the present case could have stated in the preamble that they were making the law for fixing the maximum rent and could have conferred an absolute power on the Government to fix suitable rents having regard to the circumstances of each case. Such a law cannot obviously be valid. When the decisions say that the legislature shall lay down the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct, they do not mean vague and general declaration of policy, but a definite policy controlling and regulating the powers conferred on the executive for carrying into effect that policy. I must, therefore, hold that s. 6(2) of the Act is void inasmuch as it exceeded the permissible limits of legislative delegation. In the result the appeals are allowed with costs. BY COURT In view of the majority judgment, the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 82 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccrued to the assessee and not to the original managing agents; it had, in fact, been paid to the assessee and, therefore, it could not be said that any part of this commission was notional. These cases are, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In the case before us the profits, which the assessee is claiming, are entirely notional; he may get nothing it all, as the suit may go against him. That being so, it cannot be said that the failure of this suit has entailed actual loss to him, because it is deprivation of a notional profit--not an actual loss--which occurs on the date his suit ultimately fails in the High Court or the Supreme Court if an appeal is taken to it. In this view of the matter, it is quite clear to me that the income has not accrued and the amount was rightly excluded from the taxable income of the assessee. I would, therefore, decline to issue a mandamus requiring the income- tax authorities to state a case for the opinion of this court. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Petitions are filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the orders of the Assistant Controller of Imports and Exports. the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Pondicherry, the Board of Revenue, and the Government of India, and for an appropriate direction requiring the respondents to refund the amount realised from the petitioners
Held that:- Paragraph 6 of the Order saves the transactions entered into by the petitioners and that the respondents had no right to confiscate their goods on the ground that they were imported without licence. In this view, no other question arises for consideration. In the result, the orders of the respondents 2, 3 and 4 are quashed and they are directed to refund to the petitioners the amounts illegally collected from them. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there has been failure of justice in this case?
Whether the civil court or the revenue court has jurisdiction the decision of the original court is allowed to stand in certain circumstances if there has been no failure of justice?
Held that:- Review application dismissed. This Court was not bound to decide the question of jurisdiction on the facts and circumstances of this case when it had come to the conclusion in dealing with an appeal Under Art. 136 of the Constitution that there was no failure of justice. The review application therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 78 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion that a person was chargeable and if there was no such information. the Court could and should interfere to stop further proceedings by a writ of prohibition. On this authority the appellant is clearly entitled to a writ of prohibition to restrain the taxing authority from proceeding under section 11-A against him, when it had not come into possession of any information envisaged by section 11-A. 10.. For these reasons we are of the opinion that this appeal should be allowed. The decision of the learned single Judge is accordingly set aside. The notice issued to the appellant under section 11-A is quashed and the opponents are restrained from taking any proceedings against the appellant under section 11-A of the Act. The appellant shall have costs of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and costs before us. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 75 in each Court. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 77 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cing that section has retrospective effect. According to the view taken in Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ghanshyamdas 1958 9 S.T.C. 179., the limitation provided by section 11-A cannot be read back into section 11 as the case of first assessment does not fall within any of the four contingencies for which limitation is provided in section 11-A. A contrary view has been taken in Bisesar House v. State of Bombay 1958 9 S.T.C. 654. but we prefer to follow the view of the Division Bench of this Court and hold that section 11-A does not apply. 20.. Accordingly, the assessment for all the three periods is in time. 21.. In the light of the above discussion, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in both the cases. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee in this case is fixed at Rs. 100 and in the connected case at Rs. 50 only. The balance of security deposit, after deducting the costs payable, shall be refunded. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 76 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can the High Court be considered to be a revising authority in the sense in which the term is used in rule 18. It is always open to the High Court to rectify any mistake apparent on the record under section 152, Civil Procedure Code, in so far as its orders are concerned. In our view, the rule clearly contemplates the correction of mistakes by the authority which made the mistake or by an appellate or revising authority where the mistake is brought to the notice in appeal or revision. If within three years from the date of the order passed by the authority committing the mistake no application is presented to correct the mistake, no application would lie to correct the mistake by any other authority even though that application may be within three years from the date of the final order of that authority. Since no revision has been filed from an order rejecting the correction of the mistake, this application is incompetent and is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... solved, the assessment proceedings against the firm were going on before the Sales Tax Officer. He did not receive any intimation from the petitioners about the dissolution of the firm. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted wrongly or without jurisdiction in continuing the assessment proceedings and passing final orders thereon. In our opinion, therefore, there is no force in the argument, which has been advanced by Mr. Mehta, that the petitioners firm could not be assessed to sales tax, to which it had become liable, after the firm was dissolved. In this view it is not necessary to consider the other objection which has been raised to the maintainability of the petition and that is that as the petition had been made about four months after the petitioners had received intimation of the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal, it cannot be entertained. The rule will, therefore, be discharged. The petitioners should pay Rs. 250 to the opponents for their costs. Rule discharged.
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1960 (8) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... years extended what was then granted. It follows that the petitioner would become entitled to exemption on his sales of kerosene for the aforesaid three assessment years, should he be found to have sold in accordance with the licence that had been renewed in his favour under section 9, after the taxing authorities had seen the agreement of 1st June, 1952. We would, therefore, remand the cases to the Appellate Tribunal to determine what were the terms of the licence. It is clear that the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of section 9, only when it is established that he did the business in the three assessment years according to the renewed licences after the taxing authorities had seen the agreement. Accordingly, we allow the revision petitions, vacate the earlier judgments, and remand the cases to the Appellate Tribunal to decide afresh the appeals before it, in view of what we have held to be the legal position. Costs will abide the final result. Cases remanded.
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1960 (8) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m alone. Since he died on the 23rd of September, 1957, no notice under section 15 could be issued to anyone in respect of the turnover which has escaped assessment. For both these reasons, we hold that the notices issued by the Sales Tax Officer are bad in law and are quashed. Upon the view we have taken, we do not want to say anything regarding the point of limitation urged before us by Mr. Advani. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and direct that a writ of mandamus be issued against the respondents restraining them from proceeding against the appellant on the basis of the notices issued by the Sales Tax Officer. Costs of the appeal and the petition will follow the event. So far as the appeal is concerned there Will be ordinary taxed costs and so far as the costs in the Court below are concerned the respondents shall pay Rs. 250 to the appellant. Liberty to the appellant to withdraw the amount of Rs. 300 deposited in Court. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 72 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e notice issued by the Board of Revenue. As appears from the above narration, the appellant was given a week s time for filing the objections. Instead of doing so, he asked for two months time. This request was rejected obviously for the reason that if he was given the time asked for, the proceedings would have been barred by limitation. That apart, we cannot say that it was quite unreasonable on the part of the authorities concerned to require the appellant to file objections within a week. In our opinion, the time was quite sufficient. Apart from that, even now the appellant is unable to say what objections he could raise to put section 20 into operation, except the one he urged in the shape of the argument stated above. We, therefore, cannot accept the argument that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken by the Board of Revenue. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs.100. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 71 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and some other persons came to the help of A-1 and they in an equally uncere- monious and effective manner retrieved the books from P.W. 1. It does not appear that any force was used in excess of what was barely necessary for recovering possession of the books. No injury was caused to P.W. 1 or P.W. 2 or P.W. 3. It is clear that P.W. 1 acted bona fide in the discharge of his duties. But, it is also clear that the accused could have acted bona fide in getting back the books which could have been liable to lawful seizure. Hence, it cannot be said that the accused had no right of private defence in view of section 99, Indian Penal Code, or that they committed any offence. I, therefore, allow the revision petition, set aside the convictions and sentences passed against each of the petitioners and acquit each of them of the various charges framed against them. The amount of fine, if paid already, will be refunded to them. Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. Petition allowed.
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