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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 58 of 58 Records
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1960 (8) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Sales Tax Officer or statements made to him otherwise than under process of law, or orders passed by him, are not made or passed in official confidence. In the present case, it is said that there is a statement of the plaintiff in the file, but it is not known, whether it was recorded under process of law or not the above test has to be applied to it and to any other document, if any. 3.. I therefore come to the conclusion, that the privilege under rule 47(1) of the General Sales Tax Rules, 1950, cannot preclude the Court from requiring production of the documents, and directing that copies be furnished, except to the extent that section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act comes into play and excludes any of such documents. This has to be decided by the Court below. The order passed by the Court below is set aside, and the matter will be disposed of afresh, in the light of the above observations. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of as above no costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1960 (8) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Editor of the Searchlight, an English daily newspaper published from Patna, was called upon to show cause before the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly why he should not be proceeded against for the breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly for publishing an inaccurate account of the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. He moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the said proceeding and the question for decision in substance was whether the said privilege conferred by Art. 194(3) of the Constitution was subject to the fundamental - Held, that the general principles of res judicata applied and the judgment of this Court could not be allowed to be reopened and must bind the petitioner and the Legislative Assembly of Bihar and the reconstitution of the Committee of Privileges in the meantime could make no difference.
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1960 (8) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Company challenges the authority of the Commercial Tax Officer, Lyons Range, Calcutta, to demand payment of ₹ 41,14,718-12 nP. to the West Bengal Government as tax leviable under the Central Sales Tax Act, No. 74 of 1956, in respect of certain sales of steel goods
Held that:- The Commercial Tax Officer had, in our judgment, to ascertain before he could order payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, whether on the materials he was satisfied, (a) that the goods at the time of transfer of documents of title were in movement from the State of Bihar to the State of West Bengal, (b) that the place where the sale was effected was under section 4, clause (2), within the State of West Bengal. The Commercial Tax Officer has, in our view, failed to apply the correct tests and has made assumptions which are not warranted and on a true interpretation of the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, the order of assessment discloses an error apparent on its face and a writ of certiorari must issue quashing the assessment. It will be for the Commercial Tax Officer of West Bengal to reassess the company in respect of transactions of sale which are properly taxable within the State of West Bengal by the application of the tests which we have already set out.
On this view, the rule is made absolute and it is directed that a writ of certiorari will issue quashing the order of assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer, Lyons Range, Calcutta, West Bengal. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under section 5, clause (vi) of the Act, the liability to pay sales tax in respect of hides and skins could only be at a single point
Held that:- The judgment of the High Court in regard to the ultra vires nature of rule 16(5) and the inapplicability of section 6-A of the Act was erroneous and the appeal must, therefore, be allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court set aside and the respondent's petition dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Change in constitution of managing agency firm ... ... ... ... ..... e with intent that ultimately an application may be made for approval and accord by the Central Government to the change in the constitution of a firm is merely an application towards enforcement of his rights by a partner. I do not see how the provisions of these two sections affect such a right of a partner. In this connection it is relevant to point out that the application for extension of time was made on behalf of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and was made to support the rights of the plaintiffs in this suit. The partners were obviously divided in two groups, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 forming one group while defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and plaintiff No. 1 forming the other. There was accordingly no doubt that the numerical majority of partners was in favour of making applications for obtaining extensions. I do not accept the contention that an application for extension of time under section 346 in respect of a managing agency firm must be made for and on behalf of all the partners.
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1960 (8) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company – Incorporation of and Winding up – Power of Tribunal to make calls ... ... ... ... ..... ay acquire citizenship after that date. This is an anomaly which can only be remedied by legislation. The petitioner company being a citizen, is entitled to all the fundamental rights granted under article 19, or at least those which can be reasonably applied to a corporation or a company. This preliminary point, therefore, fails as I hold that the petitioner company can claim the privileges granted by article 19(i)( g) of the Constitution. His Lordship then proceeded to consider the question whether the power of revocation of a permit, if it did not exist under the Control Order, was constitutionally permissible and held that the power to revoke or cancel written orders or permits under clause 8, without any restriction imposed by directions given under clause 17, was a naked and arbitrary power, and constituted an unreasonable restriction , on the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on its business under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and was therefore void.
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1960 (8) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. and Enforcement of orders of courts
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1960 (8) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Meeting and proceedings – Proxies, Winding up - Liquidator to exercise certain powers subject to sanction
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1960 (8) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... Indian Companies Act, 1913, but on the ground that it really does not form part of the funds of the company therefore, even applying sections 2(d) and 28(5) of the Provincial Insolvency Act in view of section 229 of the Companies Act, the said amount does not really vest in the liquidator. There is ample authority for the view I am taking mdash see In re Hindustan Commercial Bank (India) Ltd. 1938 8 Comp. Cas. 101 , Kshetra Mohan Dass v. D. Basu 1943 13 Comp. Cas. 54 and Ganesh Export and Import Co. v. Mahadeolal Nathmal 1955 25 Comp. Cas. 357 . The 1939 Madras and 1956 Calcutta cases consider fully decisions such as In re Manekji Petit Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1933 3 Comp. Cas. 50 (dissented from in In re Fazalbhai Mills Ltd., 1936 6 Comp. Cas. 351 ), Ram Chand v. Mokd. Akram Khan Sahib AIR 1937 Lahore 444 and G.K. Malvankar v. Credit Bank of India Ltd. 1915 27 I.C. 343 relied upon by the liquidator and it is hardly necessary to discuss them here. I make no order as to costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up - Powers of liquidator and Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... a Murthy, the learned counsel for the auction-purchaser, naturally makes much of the fact that the State Government has not published any notification as required by that section (section 13). But the rules framed by this court and published in the official gazette do provide (under rule 1, clause (2) of those rules) that a Bench of two judges shall hear all appeals coming within the scope of section 13 of the Mysore High Court Act. These rules were made and published with the consent of the State Government. Therefore, in substance, if not in form, they may be considered as having been published by the Government by notification in the official gazette. The true scope of section 483 of the Indian Companies Act, if I may say so with respect, is as laid down by Chagla C.J. in the case of Bachharaj Factories Ltd. v. Hirjee Mills Ltd. 1955 25 Comp. Cas. 227 . In the result, these appeals are allowed in the manner indicated in the leading judgment delivered by my learned brother.
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1960 (8) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called, Directors - Power of
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1960 (8) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not the first respondent has jurisdiction to exercise the powers under the relevant provisions of the new Act 1956?
Whether the relevant provisions of section 240, which empower respondent No. 1 to issue the relevant notices by which the appellant was called upon to give evidence and to produce documents, offend against the fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by article 20(3)?
Held that:- High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the inspector appointed under section 138(4) of the old Act must by the legal fiction, which is authorised by section 645, be deemed to have been appointed under section 235 of the new Act, and if that is so, respondent No. 1 had authority and power to issue the impugned notices under section 240 of the new Act. The challenge to the validity of the impugned notices on the ground that respondent No. 1 had no authority to issue the said notices must, therefore, fail.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that section 240 does not offend against article 20(3) of the Constitution.
If the relevant provisions of the Act dealing with enquiries and investigations of the affairs of the companies are considered from this point of view there would be no difficulty in holding that article 14 is not violated either by section 239 or section 240 of the new Act. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proceedings taken against the appellant under section 34 of the Act were valid?
Held that:- The place where an assessment under section 34 can be made has to be decided under section 64. Now the appellant was not carrying on any business, profession or vocation. He was working as the Defence Minister of the Government of India and residing in Delhi. He could be properly assessed by the Income-tax Officer, Delhi, under section 64(2) if the assessment was the original assessment. This is not in dispute. It follows that no objection can legitimately be taken by the appellant to his assessment under section 34 by the Income-tax Officer, Delhi.Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction in this case to call for the supplemental statement?
Held that:- First limit to the jurisdiction of the High Court as laid down by this court is thus not exceeded by the High Court in exercising its powers under section 66(4) of the Income-tax Act. The question is wide enough to include the alternative line of approach that if there was a request, express or implied, to send the amount due under the bills by cheque, the post office would be the agent of the assessee, and the income was received in the taxable territory when the cheques were posted.
The direction be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal in giving the finding must confine itself to the facts admitted and/or found by it, the direction cannot be described as in excess of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It would have been better if the High Court had given directions confined to the record of the case before the Tribunal; but, in the absence of anything expressly to the contrary, we cannot hold that the direction would lead inevitably to the admitting of fresh evidence. This, at least, now cannot be done. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 14(2)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, as it stood on April 1, 1950, granted an exemption, and that this exemption was not affected by the amendment of the said provision in 1953 even though the amendment was retrospective from April 1, 1950, unless the Finance Act, 1950, which applied the Income-tax Act to this area was also amended?
Held that:- The fiction in the amendment made the exemption to disappear as if it had never been granted, and unless there was a saving, the amendment must operate to obliterate the exemption. In fact, the whole purpose and intent of the amendment was to reach this result from the assessment year 1950-51 onwards, and there could be no saving. The argument assumes the premise that the Income-tax Act was incorporated in the Indian Finance Act, 1950, but there is neither precedent nor warrant for the assumption that when one Act applies another Act to some territory, the latter Act must be taken to be incorporated in the former Act. It may be otherwise, if there were words to show that the earlier Act is to be deemed to be re-enacted by the new Act.
The Indian Finance Act, 1950, was concerned with the application of the Indian Income-tax Act to this area, which it did by amending the definition of "taxable territories" in the Indian Income-tax Act, and by applying that Act to the territory. Thereafter, the Indian Parliament could amend the Income-tax Act retrospectively, and the amendment would apply also to the new taxable territory. In our opinion, both the arguments are not valid. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the profits of the Panrope Corporation and the non-resident company in respect of the consignment goods were received in the taxable territories on their behalf ?
Held that:- Unable to agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court. The terms of the agreement make it abundantly clear that the goods " received on consignment " from the foreign corporations were received by the S. K. F. as their selling agent and not as purchaser. The goods, it is true, were sold by the S. K. F. in its own name and not in the name of the foreign corporations, but the goods were still sold for and on behalf of the foreign corporations and the sale proceeds received by the S.K.F. were received not on its own behalf but for and on behalf of its principals.
In the view taken by us, the question will be answered in the affirmative in respect of sale of all goods where the price has been received by the S. K. F. in the taxable territories, and irrespective of whether the remittance has been made in respect of the goods sold before or after the price was received. Appeal allowed in part
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1960 (8) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the exemption granted by the notification covers the case?
Held that:- Once there is this extension of the business of a co-operative society, the general words of the notification include the profits from such business within the exemption, and it would require more than a supposed underlying intention to negative the exemption. To gather the meaning of the notification in the light of an alleged intention is to reverse the well-known canon of interpretation. In our opinion, the profits were exempt under the notification, and the answer to the question ought to have been in the affirmative.Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... nder one licence under four different consignments. Again the articles imported by them were inadequate for assembling 30 complete auto cycles, for the simple reason that no tyres, tubes and saddles could have been provided for the auto cycles. It is admitted before us that the tyres and tubes used on these motor cycles are not of the standard type and are not manufactured in India. There is nothing to show whether the saddles used on these motor cycles were of the standard type. In the circumstances, therefore, it could not be said that by following a devious method the Respondents could be said to have imported 30 motor cycles into India in a completely knocked down condition. The Collector s conclusion that this is what the Respondents intended to do, was the result of an erroneous approach to the matter, and, therefore, interference in the writ jurisdiction was permissible. Upon this view, we uphold the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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