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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 62 Records
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1961 (1) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt is restored. The Sessions Judge will have liberty to frame appropriate charges against the said accused. (2) A separate trial should be held against accused Nos. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 13 i. e. Respondents Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 and Appellants Nos. 1 and 2, for conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and for 24 offences selected by the Presidency Magistrate and alleged to have been committed by them in pursuance of that conspiracy. This trial should be held by the Presidency Magistrate. He will have liberty to frame appropriate charges in respect of the offences. (3) In regard to accused No. 7, he should be tried, along with accused Nos. 1, 2 and 6, separately in respect of each of the seven transactions. The trials should be held by the Presidency Magistrate and he will have liberty to frame the appropriate charges. 14. In the result the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Presidency Magistrate is restored subject to the aforesaid modification.
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1961 (1) TMI 101 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sunam Court for execution of the decrees obtained by him. Section 150 has already been reproduced in the beginning of this judgment. The Government notification under which boundaries have been altered is not before us. It was urged on behalf of the decree-holder that where territories are altered as in the present case it must be assumed that the business of that Court is also transferred to the Court to which the territory has been attached. I am unable to accept this contention. It is impossible to hold that the transfer of territories is proof per se of the transfer of business of the Courts concerned,--vide Inter alia Ramier v. Muthu Krishna Ayyar and others A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 418 (F.B.). It is a question of fact in each case whether at the time of transfer of territories the business of the Courts has or has not been transferred. 18. The result is that these Letters Patent appeals fail and I dismiss them with costs. S.B. Capoor, J. 19. I agree. S.S. Dulat, J. 20. I agree.
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1961 (1) TMI 100 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dant failed on the merits in his application dated the 10th March, 1960 to have the ex parte decree, passed against him, set aside, the trial Court having dismissed this application on the 8th of August, 1960 and he then filed an appeal in this Court on the 19th of August, 1960, he cannot be held entitled to have deducted, out of the normal period for filing the appeal to this Court, the period spent by him in the prosecution of his application to have the ex parte decree set aside, that is, from the 10th of March, 1960 to 8th of August, 1960; and if that is the correct conclusion to come to in the circumstances of the case on the state of the law we have discussed above, there is no escape from the conclusion that the present appeal is barred by time. 10. In the result, we hold that the objection as to limitation must prevail, and this appeal must be dismissed as barred by time. But, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we would not make any order as to costs.
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1961 (1) TMI 99 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... also allowed the donees to withdraw moneys from time to time. In the case of any gift of such a nature, the court has to satisfy itself that there is a substitution of some other obligations for the original one and that there is the animus novandi. There is, in our opinion, ample material which satisfies the legal requirements of a completed and a valid gift... Once you accept the genuineness of the facts relating to the transaction, there is little scope, in the facts and circumstances of the case, for suggesting that what was done was inchoate or incomplete or invalid in law. 11. It seems to us that the facts of this decision are closely parallel to the facts of the present case and must lead to the conclusion that the validity of the gifts to the two daughters cannot be questioned. 12. It accordingly follows that the question has to be answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (1) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... court may, on the application of a party, direct that a higher fee than would ordinarily be admissible under these rules be allowed to a party." Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that there was no similar enabling rule under the rules framed to regulate proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution. Order V also prescribes maxima and minima for proceedings in court. To the extent specific maxima and minima have been prescribed, rule 7(2) would exclude the operation of the maxima and minima prescribed in Order V. But rule 16 of Order V will, in our opinion, govern proceedings under article 226 of the constitution also. There is nothing in those rules inconsistent with rule 16 of Order V, to attract the operation of the principle that a special provision excludes the operation of a general provision of law. In our opinion, the court has jurisdiction to fix a fee higher than Rs. 250 referred to in rule 7(2). Our orders fixing the fee at Rs. 500 will stand.
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1961 (1) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act, on the other hand, gave power to the District Magistrate to authorise officers other than the Additional District Magistrates empowered by the Provincial Government, by defining the term "District Magistrate" differently. 16. In view of the above, it is hardly necessary to go into the reasons given by Brij Mohan Lal, J.; but even those reasons are, with all due respect, equally valid. By the act of transferring the case to the Additional District Magistrate, the District Magistrate must be deemed to have authorised him to exercise his powers under s. 3 of the Eviction Act. However, it is not necessary to rely upon this aspect of the case because, in our opinion, s. 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure gave ample powers to Mr. Brijpal Singh Seth to accord permission for bringing the suit, and the order of the District Magistrate, even if treated as a transfer, was valid. 17. In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... such a power. The question is whether it exercised it correctly under the Statutes and Ordinances. We are quite clear that the Executive Council did not. We may say here that we have not accepted the contention that the action of the Executive Council was based upon malice or any indirect or oblique motive. The error was in thinking that there were cumulative or alternative powers, even after the adoption of the special procedure under Statute No. 30. We are, therefore, of opinion that the impugned Resolutions were ultra vires and should be quashed. 42. In the result, the appeals are allowed. Resolutions Nos. 90, 94 to 96 and 99 to 102 dated May 15, 1960, of the Executive Council of the Banaras Hindu University are quashed, and an appropriate writ or writs shall issue to the respondents to that effect. The respondents shall pay the costs of these appeals, as also of the High Court. Only one set of hearing fee here and in the High Court shall be allowed. 43. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Rajasthan Government could continue to levy and collect the duty in question. The agreement between the two Governments completely displaced the operation of Art. 277 in regard inter alia to the levy of this duty so far as the State of Rajasthan is concerned. It is clear, thereafter, that the High Court was in error in holding that Art. 277 was any answer to the claim of the Government of India and should override the provisions of Art. 278 read with the agreement. On a proper construction of these provisions, in our opinion, the result is just to the contrary. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the other arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants, whether Art. 295 should prevail over Art. 277. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed and the decision of the High Court set aside. The result is that the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court stands dismissed with costs here and the High Court. 13. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the court of the District Judge and in the High Court. It is this point which was urged by counsel for the trust; his plea was that his case was not covered by s. 91, as being a religious trust it had no profession and was carrying on none. That is a matter which, in our opinion, should have been decided, and as neither the District Judge nor the High Court has given a finding on that point, it is necessary to remit the case to the High Court with the direction that the appeal be reheard and that particular question be decided on the materials on the record. Nothing that has been said in this judgment must be taken to be an expression of opinion on the merits of this plea taken by the appellant Trust. Appeal No. 502 of 1958, is therefore, allowed and the case remitted to the High Court for decision. The costs in this Court and in the High Court will abide the decision of the appeal in the High Court. Appeals nos. 499 to 501 dismissed. Appeal no. 502 allowed. Case remitted.
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1961 (1) TMI 93 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no transfer of shares till the sale deed was executed. In re Kunjamal & Sons 1941 9 ITR 358 (All.) illustrates the principle that till a regular instrument of transfer is written and registered, there could not be said to be any transfer or sale of the property, and that section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act does not invest the transferee with any title to the property. It was observed that title to the property became complete only on the execution of the sale. It is unnecessary to multiply citations on this topic. Suffice it to say that it is only when a proper instrument is executed and registered that the sale can be said to have taken place. When once it is registered, the making of the sale deed dates back to the date when it was actually executed. In this case, that does not make much difference because both the execution and the registration of the document occurred on the same date. For these reasons, we answer the second question also against the assessee.
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1961 (1) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ined to include a large class of persons who could not under ordinary circumstances have been brought within it. Can there be then any justification, where the managing agent happens to be a firm for excluding the associate of a partner although both in law and in fact the partner exercises all and every power that the firm could exercise? Exclusion would rather be strange. I do not see any injustice in applying the general principle. In view of the other provisions of the Act and having regard to the objects of the Act in general and of Section 261 in particular I am inclined to accept Mr. Gupte's argument, that each of the partners must be regarded a managing agent and if that is so it cannot be argued that defendant No. 2 is not an associate of B. M. And Co., under clause (d) of subsection (3) Section 2 of the Companies Act, total number of members being only twenty-three. (The rest of the judgment is not material for the purposes of this report). (23) Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ence to the validity of the partnership and its registrability. It would be remembered that these members of the joint family had been members of the partnership even from 1934 and the partition deed itself indicated that though there had been a division in the family, these two members should continue as members of the partnership in respect of the ten annas share hitherto owned by the family. The facts in the present case are no different from the facts dealt with in Charandas Haridas case (supra) by the Supreme Court and we are not satisfied that the circumstance that the partition was antecedent to the partnership makes any difference. In the result, the first question is answered in the negative; that is to say, the order of the Commissioner cancelling the registration of the firm for the three assessment years is erroneous, and the second question, that the firm is entitled to registration for those years. The assessee will be entitled to its costs from the Department.
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1961 (1) TMI 90 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n converted into an annuity." It follows that a payment still claimable by the person making it would not be in respect of contract for an annuity, where its being capital had not ceased to exist. We, therefore, think that contributions by the society have been wrongly taxed, and that being the position our answers to the several questions are as follows (1)The employer's contribution under the terms of a trust deed are not perquisites as contemplated by section 7(1) of the Income-tax Act. (2)The employer's contributions were not allowed or due to the employees in the account year as they conferred no immediate benefit on the employees in that year. (3)The legislature not having used the word "deferred" with annuity in section 7(1) and this being a taxing statute we think deferred annuity would not be hit by paragraph (v). Let the aforesaid answers be accordingly sent and ₹ 100 be costs in each reference. This judgment will govern both the cases.
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1961 (1) TMI 89 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t duty so imposed for any duty imposed in Great Britain on any such shares or debentures." Section 76 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, provides "If a person accountable under section 53 pays any part of the estate duty in respect of any property not passing to him, it shall, where occasion requires, be repaid to him by the trustees or owners of the property." Section 53 speaks of legal representatives, trustees, guardians and persons in whom the property passing may become vested. It does not seem to cover the assessee, and our attention has not been drawn to any provision of the Act by which the assessee is entitled to recover the duty it has paid under section 84 of the Act. In the light of what is stated above we cannot but hold that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion and answer the question referred in the affirmative. Judgment accordingly. As the case is one of first impression uncovered by specific decision or commentary, we make no order as to costs.
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1961 (1) TMI 88 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... meaning to be attributed to entry 16 of Schedule I is that ad valorem court fee is leviable on the amount of tax in dispute and not On any other amount. On this aspect of the matter the conclusion that we reach is in favour of the petitioner, 28. In the result, the petitioner will have to pay court fees in accordance with entry 16 of the First Schedule and the fee will be one half of ad valorem fee leviable on the amount of tax in dispute. It will be the difference between the amount of tax actually assessed and the amount of tax which, according to the assessee, is payable by him. The; petition will be placed for admission after proper court fee is paid by the petitioner. There will be similar orders in the other petitions which are on our List and raise the same questions. 29. We have heard counsel on the question of costs. In our opinion, the fair order for costs would be that each party should hear its own costs of this hearing. 30. Similar orders in the other petitions.
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1961 (1) TMI 87 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he appellant. Nor the agreement can be of service, because it contains no provision for their carrying the business under the direction and control of the appellant. It is true that he had been given the right to enter and inspect; but such a right is conferred only when the amount due to the appellant be outstanding and, therefore, clarifies his position to be of the creditor. In such circumstances, there is no collateral bargain, and therefore, the authority of the Supreme Court is not of much assistance to the appellant. 10. Lastly, it was argued that the appellant should be allowed return of his properties. But Sujan Singh v. Sardara Ali (1960) 2 WLR 180 is against the contention, and the appellant cannot still be treated as the owner of the properties. It follows that the suit has been rightly dismissed. 11. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed but, having regard to the circumstances of the case, we feel the appellant should not be sad died with the costs in this Court,
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1961 (1) TMI 86 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act and the rules, as stated before, is that only an approved person specially licensed should be allowed to sell opium. Thus the decision of the Punjab Chief Court is quite distinguishable and it is not possible to see how the Tribunal could properly apply the law laid down there to the facts of the present case which is one of registration under section 26A of the Income Tax Act which was not one of the matters which had to be decided by Chitty J. Even if the partnership was not per se unlawful, it cannot be said that it did not become unlawful when it intended to conduct the business jointly on a licence granted to only one of its partners as was observed in Mohideen Sahib & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 1950 18 I.T.R. 200. . In this view of the matter, the question that has been referred must be answered in the negative. As there was no appearance on behalf of the assessee, we make no order as to costs. Mehar Singh, J. I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (1) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rcumstances, we do not think that the first contention on behalf of the a Appellants has any substance. 10. Regarding the second contention, it is true that after the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure an offence under Section 448 is triable as a summons case and Mr. Go-swami adopted the procedure prescribed for a case triable as a warrant case. We are, however, of the opinion that this irregularity does not vitiate the proceedings and is curable by the provisions of Section 537, as no prejudice to the accused has been established in the case. 11. As to the third submission, in our opinion, this is not the stage to express any opinion on it. A charge under Section 448, IPC, had been framed by Mr. Goswami and it will be for the court trying the Appellants to decide whether any offence had been committed and whether the matter is merely in the nature of a civil dispute rather than an offence having been committed under the IPC. 12. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 84 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... each particular case in the manner above indicated." The principles enunciated in this passage are very helpful in the determination of the question relating to the character of the expenditure. An application of these rules to the instant case will establish that the amount in dispute is an allowable deduction. That apart, there can be little doubt that the instant case is governed by the principle laid down in Mohanlal Hargovind 's case (supra) the situation in both being similar. The sole aim and object of the assessee, which normally is the determining factor in deciding the nature of the expenditure, was to run the business and make a profit out of it. It follows that the assessee was entitled to a deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act as the expenditure was incurred to work the business with the object of making a profit. We, therefore, answer the reference in favour of the assessee. He is entitled to get his costs from the Department.
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1961 (1) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rant interest. Learned counsel for Durga Datt claimed interest as damages; but it is well- settled that interest as damages cannot be awarded. Interest up to date of suit, therefore, was not claimable, and a deduction shall be made of such interest from the amount decreed. As regards interest pendente lite until the date of realisation, such interest was within the discretion of the Court. The rate fixed is 6 per cent. which, in the circumstances and according to the practice of Courts, appears high. Interest ,shall be calculated at 4 percent. per annum instead of at 6 per cent., and the decree shall be modified accordingly. Except for reduction in the amount decreed by ₹ 3,750 and of interest up to the date of the filing of the suit which has been disallowed arid of the rate of interest pendente lite until realisation, the appeals shall stand dismissed. In view of the substantial failure of the appeals, the appellant shall pay the costs in this Court. One hearing fee.
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