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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 84 Records
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1961 (4) TMI 142 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. If it was delivered by the postman at the Shop No. 16, ordinary courtesy requires that that shop would have sent over the letter to the neighbouring Shop No. 19. The appellant's conduct in not taking any action to find out what was the result of his representation to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports is consistent with the view that he did receive the reply of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. In the circumstances, an expression of opinion that the letter would have reached the appellant cannot be said to amount to a misdirection. 34. The learned Judge is perfectly justified to ask the jury to take into consideration the probabilities of a case, where no definite evidence, in connection with an incidental matter, exists. 35. We do not consider that the contentions raised do amount to misdirections. 36. In view of the above, we see no force in this appeal and accordingly dismiss it. 37. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 141 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estion were the lost property of the Railway on which hypothesis he convicted the accused under Section 403 Indian Penal Code. If a theory of loss could be assumed, a theory of sale or transfer by the Railway employees involved also could be assumed,- but none of these was the prosecution case. Therefore, when the learned Sessions Judge held the view that no theft was established in respect of these bales of cloth as seized, - he ought not to have proceeded further with the theory of loss and misappropriation of the same by the accused in the matter of stacking or storing in his godown. For a conviction under Section 403 Indian Penal Code mens rea had to be established by the prosecution for which there was no attempt made. The evidence as to any active part taken by the accused either in the matter of receiving or removing the articles from the truck is to a great extent doubtful. Therefore, no clear case was made out against the accused-petitioner justifying his conviction.
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1961 (4) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be regretted that the respondent, acting through its Labour Minister, appears to have assisted in bringing about a settlement contrary to the terms of the Act. If the respondent thought that such a settlement was necessary in respect of Trichur factories it may consider the question of withdrawing the notification in respect of that area and in fairness may also reconsider the problem in respect of all the other areas and decide whether any modification in the notification is required. It is not appropriate that the respondent should be associated, though indirectly, with the settlement which is in breach of the provisions of the Act. We would, therefore, suggest that the respondent should seriously consider this aspect of the matter and should not hesitate to do what may appear to be just, reasonable and fair on an objective consideration of the whole problem. 19. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. 20. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which this contention was based was that "salary" was not included within the term "wages". In our opinion, no good reasons have been adduced before us for not following the aforesaid decision of the Federal Court. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, that is to say, the declaration granted by the Trial Court that the Order of the Government impugned in this case is void, is restored, in disagreement with the decision of the High Court. The claim as regards arrears of salary and allowance is allowed in part only from the 2nd of June, 1951, until the date of the plaintiff's retirement from Government service. There will be no decree for interest before the date of the suit, but the decretal sum shall bear interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit until realisation. The plaintiff-appellant will be entitled to three-fourths of his costs throughout, in view of the fact that his entire claim is not being allowed. 7. Appeal allowed in part.
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1961 (4) TMI 138 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tanding non-mention therein of the particular municipal number of the said other premises, namely, 63/1, Harrison Road. In matters like these, the substance and not the form should prevail. Any other view would lead to evasion of the statute by unscrupulous persons and I do not feel obliged or justified to permit such evasion. Moreover, in the present case, no such objection was taken at the time of the search of this premises No. 63/1, and apparently, all the interested parties, including the petitioners concerned, described it as premises No. 63, Harrison Road (Vide Exhibit 'G' to the petition, -- page 30 of the printed paper book Volume 1), for which, admittedly, there was a proper authorisation letter. 149. In the circumstances, I feel neither inclined nor compelled to accept Mr. Sanyal's above argument and it is rejected. 150. For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss these applications and discharge these Rules and concur in the order, proposed by my Lords.
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1961 (4) TMI 137 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... respondent No. 1 was bound to follow the principles of natural justice in holding the enquiry. Their Lordships referred to the observations, which I have already quoted, in the decision of the Supreme Court in (S) . 10. In the result, therefore, I hold that the manner in which the enquiry in this case has been conducted is violative of all principles of natural justice. On that ground the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore, dated 12-2-1960 has to be set aside. 11. Having come to this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary for us to go into the other contentions raised before us by the learned Advocate for the petitioners and we express no opinion on the said contentions. 12. In the result, therefore, this petition succeeds and we make an order quashing the impugned order, i.e., the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore, dated 12lh February, 1960. There will be no order as to costs of this petition. Somnath Iyer, J. 13. I agree. 14. Petition allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 136 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot; 23. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that the petitioner acted merely as a broker, a middleman who affected no sale or supply in the nature of sale or transferred any title in the property. In fact at no point of time he had any title to pass. The price paid by the State to the collieries could not be included in the taxable turnover of the petitioner. The order of the Sales Tax Officer, dated 20th December, 1956, is, therefore, not authorised by law to the extent it relates to the price paid by the State of Rajasthan to the collieries for supply of coal. To that extent only the order dated 20th December, 1956, is quashed. As a logical corollary the order imposing penalty for the non-payment of tax on this part of the turn-over is also quashed. We make no orders regarding future assessments for we hope they will be made in the light of this decision. 24. We allow this petition but in the circumstances of this case leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... etitioner No. 1. Two specific queries were put by the Chief Inspector in his letter dated November 20, 1956. One was whether any managing agents had been appointed for the factory and the other was whether Mackenzie was one of the directors. No reply was given to either of these queries by Chatterjee in his letter dated November 22,1956, which purported to be a reply to the Chief Inspector's letter of Nov. 20, 1956. In the circumstances, therefore, the Chief Inspector of Factories was perfectly right in refusing to act on the application signed by Mackenzie and in requiring the factory to file a proper application for renewal of the licence. 4. Even when the matter went up before the High Court no attempt was made to show that the ultimate control of the factory was transferred to Mackenzie either by execution of a document or by passing a resolution. In the circumstances the High Court was right in dismissing the petition. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with-costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lement was real or not, Government could not interfere with the petitioner's right to hold Mela on the lands. On the law as it now stands, the question whether the settlement was benami or not becomes important. Proceeding, however, on the well established principle that the apparent state of things should be taken to be the real state of things, unless the contrary is shown, we think that on the materials on the record, the petitioner Shanti Devi should for the purpose of the present petition, be held to have become genuinely a raiyat under her husband, before the date of vesting. The order of the High Court issuing the writ of certiorari in her favour should, therefore, stand. 6. The appeal is dismissed with costs. It would, however, be open to the State and its officials to establish in appropriate proceedings before a competent Court, that the settlement of 1944 in favour of the respondent is sham and nominal and was not intended to convey any real title to the lands.
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1961 (4) TMI 133 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... handed over that property and also mutated her name in favour of the petitioner on the petitioner becoming a major. In so far as the estate of Ramaiah Chetty is concerned, which vested in the petitioner, it could not be said that this property is one which the widow was competent to dispose of or had an interest therein, and that passed on her death. If there is any property as admitted by the petitioner himself to the extent of jewellery or otherwise which belongs to Lakshmi Devamma over which she had power of disposal, the estate duty authorities are perfectly entitled to proceed against the same under the provisions of the Estate Duty Act. In this view, the notice in so far as it affects the estate of Ramaiah Chetty which vested in the petitioner as adopted son is quashed and a writ of prohibition be issued restraining the Estate Duty Officer from proceeding with the proposed assessment. This petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Petition allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 132 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot; is to have the same meaning as in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. "Partnership" is defined in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, as the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. In our view the test of partnership has been fully satisfied in the present case and the Baroda City Ice Co. has been constituted a partnership firm under the deed of partnership dated August 20, 1951, and is entitled to be registered as such. There are no other points urged before us. The question as framed needs slight modification. We would reframe the question as follows "Whether, oil the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Baroda City Ice Co. was entitled to be registered as a firm under the provisions of section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act ?" Our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1961 (4) TMI 131 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oration on its food products. On the facts of this case and also in the interest of business morality, it is impossible to exercise my discretion under sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act and order concurrent registration of the mark "Monarch" in favour of both of the petitioner corporation and the respondent company. (43) In the result, the petition is allowed. The order passed by the Joint Registrar of Trade Marks on the application filed by the respondent company for registration of the mark "Monarch" is set aside and the applications are dismissed. The respondent company to pay the costs of the petitioner corporation of the proceedings before the Joint Registrar of Trade Marks as also of this petition and also to pay the costs of this petition to the Registrar of Trade Marks. As far as the costs of this petition payable to the petitioner corporation are concerned, they shall be taxed on the long cause scale with two counsel. (44) Petition allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 130 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e 46-B and Article 55-A of Schedule 1. Under Section 6 of the Stamp Act if an instrument is so framed as to come within two or more of the descriptions in Schedule I where the duties chargeable thereunder are efferent, it will be chargeable only with the higher of such duties. We have, therefore to hold that parts of the document have to be levied with stamp duty under Article 46-B. We have already held that the document falls within the ambit of Section 5 as it comprises distinct mallets. The document indicates that there has been a dissolution of three partnerships (i) groundnut shop, (ii) the Mylapore Cafe and (iii) the Mylapore Silk House and Modern textiles. Accordingly a stamp duty of ₹ 20 in respect of the dissolution of each of such a business is chargeable. In addition as a part of the document amounts to a memorandum of agreement between the executants a stamp duty of ₹ 1-50 nP is chargeable under Article 5(c). 35. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1961 (4) TMI 129 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ms 2 and 3 and 27 cents in item 10, 82 cents in item 11 and also item 16 and half of item 17 of the A schedule. The finding of the trial court as regards the share and as regards the properties available for division have not been questioned before me by either side. 21. In the result, the second appeal is allowed, and there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for partition and separate possession of a 1/12th share in the properties which have been held to be joint family properties under issues 5 and 6 in the judgment of the trial court. It is needless to state that the plaintiff will be entitled to his share of the income form the lands from the date of the plaint. The same shall be ascertained in the final decree proceedings. Considering that he plaintiff had not chosen to make any demand for partition for years after becoming a major, I think this is a fit case where the parties must bear their respective costs themselves throughout. No leave. 22. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 128 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion that has been framed in this case is of an academic character. An abstract proposition of law is sought to be elucidated by the question. By that question we have been asked to consider whether a partnership in which one partner is the benamidar of another partner could be registered under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act. We have already dealt with this question in the course of the judgment. This question does not really bring out the true matter in controversy between the parties. It is necessary to reframe the question and the question as reframed by us is the following "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the partnership constituted under the instrument of partnership dated March 6, 1956, could be registered under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act ?" In our view the answer to the question is in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the sum of ₹ 500 as and by way of the costs of the reference.
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1961 (4) TMI 127 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... age of the deed dated 29th June, 1939, considered with the conduct of the parties leaves no doubt that the intention was to bring into being the new firm before Act VII of 1939 and to postpone the claim for relief under sub-section (4) or subsection (3) of section 25 till the business was either discontinued or succeeded to by another person. That is what precisely happened and the claim for relief was consequently made not in 1939 as it would have been in different circumstances but in 1943 when firm Rai Bahadur Jodha Mal Kuthalia was dissolved. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by Gosain J. that the case of the assessee firm falls within the terms of sub-section (4) of section 25 of the Income-tax Act and that the Income-tax Tribunal was wrong in holding that the assessee firm was not entitled to the benefit provided in section 25(3) or 25(4) of the Income-tax Act in relation to the assessment in dispute. The assessee will get the cost of the reference.
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1961 (4) TMI 126 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ence thereof. The same procedure be followed where a reduction is due to an order under section 35 of the Act. (See Income-tax Circulars by Romesh C. Sharma, 1957-58 edition, page 83)”. According to counsel for the department the communications sent by the Income-tax Officer to the petitioner subsequent to the decisions in appeal will do duty for notices of demand even if we take the view that fresh notices are required in cases where the original assessments are confirmed or reduced. The communication in respect of 1953-54 is dated 17th December, 1958. The last sentence in that communication directs that the tax should be paid immediately. To the same effect is the communication in respect of 1954-55 dated 17th November, 1958, and the communication in respect of 1955-56 dated 17th December, 1958. We see considerable force in the submission made on behalf of the department. In the light of what is stated above this petition has to be dismissed, and we do so with costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 125 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be assessed, even at source, that is, in the hands of the person managing the property and receiving that income. The extent of the liability of such manager is specifically limited for the reason that such manager might in the generality of cases be in management of different estates on behalf of different persons. In such an event, the law provides that the assessment of the income in relation to each estate should be made to the same extent as upon the person on whose behalf the income is derived. This seems to us to be clearly a case where section 41 applies. Notwithstanding the residual power given to the department to tax the beneficiary under section 41(2), the law contemplates that in a case such as this the assessment shall be made on the manager only to the extent of the interest of the beneficiary in the income received by the manager. On the facts, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 124 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ociation of persons as arose from assets transferred to such person or association of persons, it has separately legislated about it by enacting the provisions contained in section 16(3)(b). When the subsequent transfers of properties took place among the members of the Hindu undivided family as a result of partition by metes and bounds, that transaction could not be regarded as a transfer by the assessee to his wife or minor child. The two transactions, viz., the one of throwing the separate property of the assessee into the hotch-pot of the joint family and the other of partitioning the joint family properties, are separate, genuine, independent transactions. Neither by the one nor by the other there has been any transfer, direct or indirect, effected by the assessee to his wife or minor son within the meaning of section 16(3)(a)( iii) and section 16(3)(a)( iv). Our answer to the question is in the negative. The Commissioner of Income-tax to pay the costs of the reference.
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1961 (4) TMI 123 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the claim of gratuity, there is a note of the directors that the balance-sheet depicts to the shareholders a correct picture of the affairs of the company and the value of its assets and liabilities. The balance-sheet further shows that the gratuity actually paid to its employees in the course of the accounting year has been shown as a current expenditure in the profit and loss account. These being the facts and circumstances of the case, the third question will have to be answered against the assessee. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative. The second question is answered in the affirmative so far as the deduction of the estimated business profits tax is concerned, subject, of course, to the verification of the figures by the Wealth-tax Officer. We answer the question in the negative so far as the estimated liability of income-tax is concerned. We answer the third question in the negative. The assessee shall pay half the costs of the department.
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