|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 49 Records
-
1961 (7) TMI 71 - KERELA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he assessees. The assessees were selling cotton regularly and therefore they must be regarded as dealers in cotton and cotton waste and could be charged to sales tax." 16.. The frequency, regularity and the volume of sales of cattle by the assessee in the present case are such that they can be regarded as "an activity in the course of the business of the assessee". We therefore accept the view taken by the Sales Tax Authorities that the petitioner's sale of dry cows was part of its business, constituting it a dealer within the meaning of the Sales Tax Act, and attracted liability to taxation in respect thereof. 17.. In the result, we affirm the view taken by Raman Nayar, J., with the concurrence of one of us (M.S. Menon, J.) in T.R.C. No. 21 of 1957. The revision petitions fail and are dismissed. As the question involved is the same in both the cases, the department will have its costs in one case only; Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Petitions dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 70 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Abdul Kadir v. The Sales Tax Officer(2) on which the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes relied is clearly distinguishable. That was a case in which the excise duty was paid by the buyer to the warehouse licensee. In the view that I take, it becomes unnecessary for us to consider the second contention urged on behalf of the company that the Commercial Tax Officer included in the turnover of the company excise duty paid in respect of goods other than those purchased by it from Baliga and Co. In my opinion, this writ petition should succeed and the order of the Commercial Tax Officer made on 8th October, 1957, should be quashed and it is ordered accordingly. The order made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer on 15th January, 1957, is restored. The excess tax, if any, paid by the petitioner-company should be refunded to it. The petitioner-company is entitled to get the costs of this writ petition, the Advocate s fee being fixed at Rs. 100. KALAGATE, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 69 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the name of millets , namely, (1) maize (mokka jonna), (2) grain sorghum (jonna), (3) finger millet (raghulu), (4) pearl millet (sajja) and (5) fox tail millet (korra). Wheat is not included in the list. In the light of the meanings given in the various dictionaries mentioned above, we are inclined to think that the expression millets does not include wheat. In common parlance also the word millet is used with reference to grains Grain sorghum (jonna), finger millet (raghulu), pearl millet (sajja) and fox tail millet (korra). Therefore, the dealers in wheat cannot have the benefit of the single point tax contemplated by Schedule III of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. Hence wheat is subject to multiple point tax. In the result, the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which confirmed those of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer is confirmed and the revision case is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 68 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ear. This argument is founded on the language of the clause the period within which such assessment may be made. The learned counsel urges that this expression connotes the commencement of the assessment year and not the end of the assessment year . We do not think that we can accede to this proposition. This rule clearly indicates that the period will be three years from the time when the assessment could have been made. Indisputably, the assessment could be made before 31st March, 1955, for the assessment year 1954-55. If that were so, it is futile to contend that limitation starts from the beginning of the assessment year itself. We are not convinced that rule 17 is in any way repugnant to section 19(2)(f) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. As such, it cannot be said that the rule is in excess of the rule-making power of the Government. This contention fails. No other point is argued before us. In the result, the tax revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 67 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he proviso above referred to, in the same commodity, but this is a question of fact. Whether the petitioners here stand in that position, and if so to what extent, is more than I can say at present this is a matter for the taxing authorities to determine. 5.. The learned counsel for the petitioners had a further contention that the exclusion of rubber from the definition of agricultural or horticultural produce in section 2(a) of the Act is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, being devoid of any rational basis of classification. In the view I have taken, it is unnecessary to examine the soundness of this contention. Other objections raised to the assessment are still open to the petitioners before a final assessment is made on them. The notices now impugned having been issued, overlooking the jurisdictional point, as to whether the petitioners are dealers or not, cannot therefore be sustained and are quashed accordingly the petition is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the assessing authority was based merely on suspicion or on pure guess. There was sufficient material which could furnish a basis for making the estimate. Jami Narasayya Prusty and Brothers v. State of Orissa 1958 9 S.T.C. 648. is of the same category as Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar 1957 8 S.T.C. 771. In that case, the estimate was made merely on the basis of reputation. There was evidence that the sales of five watches costing Rs. 125 were not brought into account. This led the assessing authority to add a sum of Rs. 15,000 as having been suppressed merely on the ground of reputation. The High Court of Orissa found that mere reputation could not furnish a proper ground for making an arbitrary estimate. We, therefore, think that this case also does not furnish any analogy here. In our opinion, no exception could be taken to the assessment in question. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 65 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in Gannon Dunkerley and Co., Madras (Private) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Mattancheri 1957 8 S.T.C. 347., but the Division Bench did not uphold the objection on the ground that the Legislature, which had enacted that law, was not circumscribed by any limitation of powers similar to item 48 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. The same view has been reiterated in Subhodaya Corporation, Trivandrum v. Sales Tax Officer and Another 1959 10 S.T.C. 356., which is after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court and on the same grounds. The learned Judges have again held that the Legislature and H.H. The Raj Pramukh had prior to the inauguration of the Constitution plenary powers and, therefore, the limitation on Part B States under Entry 54 of List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would not retrospectively operate to invalidate the earlier law. 12.. In the light of what is stated above this T.R.C. has to be dismissed and we do so. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 64 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rther held that on such a summary rejection of the appeal, the original authority s order is confirmed and consequently the statutory power of appeal should be liberally construed so as to include not only orders passed on appeal, after going into the merits of the assessment, but also orders disposing of the matter on preliminary issues such as limitation and the like. In view of this later pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the observations contained in an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Bansidhar Mohanti v. Commissioner of Income-tax A.I.R. 1955 Orissa 1 28 I.T.R. 625., which were based on Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. MTT. AR. S. AR. Arunachalam Chettiar1953 23 I.T.R. 180 A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 118. , can no longer be taken as authority for the contrary proposition. 4.. We therefore uphold the order of the Tribunal and answer the question in the affirmative. There will be no order for costs. R.K. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1961 (7) TMI 62 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... were at Modinagar clearly means that the sale as such was only for delivery at Modinagar while the subsequent despatch instructions constituted separate arrangement to suit the convenience of Messrs Krishna Kumar Om Prakash and were not part of the sale contract itself. It would thus appear that, on the material which was available before the Judge (Revisions), the correct finding should have been that the assessee had failed to show that the sales of those goods, in respect of which rebate was being claimed under section 5 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, were for delievery outside Uttar Pradesh, so that the first question has to be answered against the assessee. We answer it accordingly. In view of this answer to the first question, the second question becomes unnecessary as the assessee would get no relief even if the second question is answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs to the department which we fix at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1961 (7) TMI 61 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is concerned it appears the petitioners are perfectly justified in mentioning that certain goods which they purchased for use in the execution of contract should be included . On the basis of this observation, Mr. Ghosh contends that this is a finding of fact and should not be disturbed by the High Court and should be taken as conclusive on the point that the petitioner is a dealer. To my mind, this is not the correct position. The reading of the judgment of the Member, Board of Revenue, does not give such an idea at all. There is, therefore, not much force in this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. Thus the petitioner, not being a dealer, is not entitled to the benefit under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. 10.. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I would answer both the questions in the negative. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances the parties are to bear their own costs. G.C. DAS, A.C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1961 (7) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law. The above passage was quoted and followed in Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, and OthersA.I.R. 1956 S.C. 77. 8.. We are unable to gather any different intention from the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1957, and the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, which in any way militates against the preservation of the petitioner s immunity from taxation at the sale point. If the immunity survived the repeal and the re-enactment, we must also hold that it cannot be destroyed by any notification issued by the Government. 9.. It follows that the petition has to be allowed and we do so, though in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. In view of the conclusion we have reached, it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner and they are not considered in this judgment. Petition allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 59 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ent made by the learned Government Pleader, it follows that the State or its officers have no jurisdiction to take any action against any of the petitioners in these cases. 12.. The learned Government Pleader raised a subsidiary contention that in some cases the parties have taken the matter in revision before the appropriate authorities. This by itself, in our view, does not debar us from giving appropriate relief, if otherwise the petitioners are entitled to such relief. We have already held that the essential condition precedent to invoke the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act is totally absent in these cases and, therefore, the fact that one or other of the officers in the hierarchy may have demanded or confirmed an order of demand, is of no consequence in law. Therefore, all the writ petitions are allowed and the various orders under attack in these writ proceedings are also quashed and set aside. Parties will bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... le and the export-were said to be integrated. 9.. There is a full survey of the cases bearing on the subject in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1960 11 S.T.C. 764. In that case the Supreme Court after dealing with the decisions on the subject said It follows that every sale or purchase preceding the export is not necessarily to be regarded as within the course of export. It must be inextricably bound up with the export, and a sale or purchase unconnected with the ultimate export as an integral part thereof is not within the exemption. It may thus be taken as settled that sales or purchases for the purpose of export are not protected, unless the sales or purchases themselves occasion the export and are an integral part of it. 10.. In the light of what we have stated in paragraph 7 above these Tax Revision Cases have to be allowed and we do so with costs, Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in both the cases together. Petitions allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 57 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... btedly apply to pending proceedings see Syed Mohammed Rovoother v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tirukoilur 1958 9 S.T.C. 1.. Hence the aforesaid third proviso to sub-section (6) of section 12 would apply when the Sales Tax Authorities ordered re-assessment on the 12th September, 1955. By that time the ambiguity, if any, had been clarified by the Legislature which expressly excluded sub-section (7) of section 12 from the scope of the period of limitation prescribed in the second proviso to sub-section (6). After the date of amendment there can possibly be no doubt on this question. It is indeed strange that the Sales Tax Tribunal should have taken a contrary view. 7.. For these reasons I hold that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the assessment for the quarters in question was barred by time. The question is answered in the negative. As there is no appearance for the other side there will be no order for costs. R.K. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1961 (7) TMI 56 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... eriod contemplated by section 20(3) would expire four years after service of notice of assessment on the assessee. We do not know when this notice was served on the assessee but clearly the notice to revise the assessment was served in 1958. In this connection, it should be remembered that this point was not raised before the Revenue. Nor was it urged even in the memorandum of the grounds of appeal. The point bearing on limitation also was not raised before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. However, as it was represented to us that this is a pure question of law, we allowed the learned counsel to argue the matter. For the reasons, we find that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant lack substance and have to be negatived. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each appeal. Writ Petition No. 312 of 1961 filed by way of an alternative remedy is also dismissed but without costs. Appeals and Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the expression "cooked food" used in certain notifications issued under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U.P. Act 15 of 1948) can be construed as including within its meaning "biscuits" also?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court of Allahabad has in an earlier case in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jassu Ram Bakery Dealer [1976 (8) TMI 131 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] held that biscuit was not cooked food. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has also taken the same view in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Shri Ballabhdas Ishwardas [1965 (4) TMI 104 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] thus we approve of the views expressed in the aforesaid decisions.
-
1961 (7) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notification issued by respondent 1 on October 24, 1953, was valid, and item 27 in the list notified brought the articles in question within the mischief of the Sales Tax Act and so the petitioners were not entitled to any writ as claimed by them?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The first condition is that the impugned law must be one which is made by the Legislature of a State which obviously means a State which came into existence under and after the Constitution; and that shows that the impugned law must be a law made by the Legislature of a State subsequent to the Constitution. This condition is satisfied in the present case because the impugned notification has been issued by virtue of the authority delegated to respondent 1 by Act 30 of 1950 and this Act was passed after the Constitution was adopted.
The declaration made by the Act was intended to be prospective in operation and it would affect laws made after the commencement of the Act, and that clearly must mean that if a law had been passed prior to the com- mencement of the Act, and it authorised the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of certain commodities its validity cannot be challenged on the ground that the said commodities have been subsequently declared by the Act to be essential for the life of the community. The impugned notification with which we are concerned and the Act under which it has been issued are thus outside the purview of section 3 of the Act
-
1961 (7) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the construction of the agreement dated the 4th June, 1942, between the assessee Messrs Rohtas Industries Ltd. Dalmia Nagar (along with 3 other manufacturing companies) and the Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd., the cement delivered, despatched or consigned by the assessee to the Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd., or to their order or in accordance with their directions are sales to the latter within the meaning of the Bihar Sales Tax Act (Bihar Act VI of 1944)?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As agreeing with the view of the High Court, that clause 24 does not qualify the legal effect of the other important clauses of the agreement, and that the cement delivered, despatched or consigned by the manufacturing companies to the Marketing Company or to its orders or in accordance with its directions was sold by the manufacturing companies to the Marketing Company and the sale was liable to be taxed under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944.
-
1961 (7) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Directors - Power of ... ... ... ... ..... ger and that the same had been added in the books of the company in liquidation. These alleged entries were made during the years 1951-52 and 1952-23. During those years, the present claimant was the managing director of the company. The balance-sheets of the company were prepared under his direction and the books of account maintained by the company were audited by the auditors of the company. At no time did the claimant complain that there were wrong entries except in the present claim made after the lapse of several years. It was rightly pointed out by the liquidator that the claimant had not substantiated his claim by the production of any oral or documentary evidence and that he had not even examined himself in support of the claim. In these circumstances, the rejection of the applicant s claim under the aforesaid three categories is, in my opinion, correct and needs no interference. This application is, therefore, dismissed with the taxed costs of the auction purchaser.
-
1961 (7) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases ... ... ... ... ..... versy have in a way been adjudicated upon. We have earlier pointed out that the learned judge has merely stated that there is a prima facie case for further investigation, by the Government under the provisions of section 237. It cannot obviously be said that the merits of the case have been finally disposed of. There is a possibility of the management being vindicated at the investigation even otherwise the results of the investigation would lead only to the initiation of appropriate proceedings. We are therefore not satisfied that the order of the learned judge in this case fulfils the test laid down in the various cases as to what a judgment is. In our opinion, an order by court directing the investigation under the provisions of section 237 of the Indian Companies Act will not amount to a judgment within the meaning of the term judgment in clause 15 of the Letters Patent so as to entitle an aggrieved party to appeal therefrom. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
|
