|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 92 Records
-
1962 (4) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... purposes of the present appeal. The Ordinance in question is not included in the Schedule and so, it is clear that the said Ordinance was not intended to apply to Sirohi. It is not suggested that any other law passed by the Rajasthan State or any other instrument executed in that behalf made the Ordinance in question applicable to Sirohi. Therefore, we are satisfied that the respondent cannot rely upon the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Ordinance 1949 to support the demand for customs duty against the State of Sirohi. 15. In the result, the appeal must be allowed and the writ issued in favour of the appellant declaring that the appellant is not liable to pay the customs duty in question and quashing the orders passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Customs & Excise as well as the Minister of Excise & Taxation and the demand notice issued by the Collector at the instance of the excise authorities. The appellant would entitled to its cost throughout. 16. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ch breach that would constitute a cause of action in the technical sense and it was on their account that the sum of ₹ 74,935/8/3 was claimed as damages. In the plaint, however, the cause of action was different. By that date the allegation was that the contract had been broken by the government repudiating it and taking over the shops after cancelling the licence. The cause of action then was the breach of the entire contract and the items set out in the plaint were the heads of claim under which the damages were computed. In view of these circumstances we have no hesitation in holding that even on a very narrow and strict view of section 80 there was no compliance with its terms. 26. The result therefore is that the entire claim in the suit must fail for the reasons we have indicated earlier. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we considered that the parties should bear their own costs in this appeal. 27. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s. 44. On a proper construction of the words that were actually used, viz., "any decree passed by a civil court in a part B State", we see no reason to think that the legislature intended to use to mean ,,decrees made by a civil court in an Indian State, which later became a Part B State" Section therefore as it stood after the amendment of June 3, 1951 is of no assistance to the decree-holder. Section 43 was further amended by Act 11 of 1951 and the words as they stand at present have already been set out. The appellant rightly does not contend that s. 43 as it now stands applies to the present decrees. Our conclusion therefore is that the Allahabad Court had no power to execute the decree either under sections 38 or under ss. 43 or 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, even if the decree was not a foreign decree, the decree-holder's application for execution was rightly dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... overnment to fix the ceiling at a lower rate. The Government having examined the matter came to the conclusion that the more equitable and reasonable course to adopt would be to divide the agricultural lands into two well-known categories and fix the ceiling by reference to them. Now in the very nature of things, the Legislature must have anticipated that the exercise of the power under s. 6(2) might cover all the areas in the State and that may mean that the general ceiling prescribed by s. 6(1) may not apply to any land which is covered by the notification. If s. 6(1) is not a general rule and s. 6(2) is not an exception to it, then the consequences flowing from the issue of the impugned notification cannot be characterised as an exception swallowing up the general rule. That, in substances, is the view which the Mysore High court has taken in the matter and we think that the said view is right. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 117 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... s Act. But what is contended before us is that studio buildings cannot have the advantage of full depreciation allowance as factually they do not suffer as much depreciation as other factories do. As the Tribunal has rightly pointed out, we are not concerned whether in a particular case, the studio buildings suffer a higher or equal depreciation than other factories; what we have to see is whether the building in question comes within the term "factory" building as employed in rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules. Once it comes within that definition, the assessee will be entitled to depreciation allowed under that rule, whether the nature of the buildings or the character of the work that is carried on is of such a character that will entail only a comparatively small depreciation in relation to regular factory buildings. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs of the assessee.
-
1962 (4) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that cultivating rights in the sir land have also been transferred. We see no reason for placing such an interpretation on the provisions of cl. (a) of s. 49(1) of the C. P. Tenancy Act. When it says that the transfer of cultivating rights in sir land has to be made expressly all that it means is that a transfer by implication will not be enough. Finally Mr. Sinha's point is that the words "all the rights and privileges" in the recital do not govern the interests specified in the clause just preceding these words but they govern following words "sixteen anna in muza Gondkhami and twelve anna in mauza Amaldihi to Seth Kaluram etc.... " Apart from such a construction rendering the expression meaningless it would be ungrammatical to read the expression as applying to "sixteen anna in mauza Gondkhami and twelve anna in mauza Amaldihi etc." Therefore, there is no substance in the appeal and accordingly we dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so, the section gives no now powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of that Act". With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and. powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the police station. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The investigation will now proceed in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Appellate Assistant Commissioner for reassessment on the basis of the assumed larger dividend income, but, even in respect of the other two reassessments, there does not arise any further question of limitation for reassessment on the assumed larger divided income. If the Income-tax Officer could reassess the assessee on the basis of the income shown in the return even after the expiry of four years, he could also reassess it on the basis of the deemed dividend income. We accordingly answer the second question in the negative, i.e., we hold that none of the three reassessment orders was invalid on the ground that it was made more than four years after last day of the assessment year. Let a copy of this judgment be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5). The Commissioner of Income-tax shall be entitled to recover his costs, which we assess at ₹ 200, from the assessee. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (4) TMI 113 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wed to be carried forward and set off against the income for the assessment year 1950-51 which was not in fact the subject-matter of further appeal and was not actually considered in that appeal, could not be regarded as having been adjudicated upon by the Tribunal by implication and so having merged in the Tribunal's order. Indeed, in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider that matter at all. That being so, the above-mentioned principles of merger did not apply and the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to rectify that part of the order dated May 29, 1957, remained unaffected. In the view we have taken, the three grounds urged in support of the petition are untenable. That being so, this petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioner shall been its own costs and pay out of the security amount those incurred by the respondents. The remaining amount of security shall be refunded. Hearing fee ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 112 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hole of the remuneration in question and the General Commissioners, on appeal, held that they (the General Commissioner's) had no jurisdiction in the matter. The House of Lords in majority judgment held that the sum of ? 30,000 paid in respect of the unexpired coal contracts was not an admissible deduction in computing the profits of the business for the purposes of excess profits duty for the accounting period from the 7th of March, 1915, to the 31st of December, 1915, on the ground that it was a capital expenditure. The cases mentioned above, though not directly on the point which is before us, lend considerable support to the view that we are taking. For the reasons mentioned above we would answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. We direct the assessee to pay the costs of the department which we fix at ₹ 200. The fee of learned counsel for the parties is also fixed at the same figure. Questions answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (4) TMI 111 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... .T.R. 451; 1952 S.C.R. 1. In that case the assessee being itself unable to use the dyeing plant, allowed another to run it against a certain amount received as consideration. Mahajan J. held that amount was a revenue receipt liable to assessment of tax. In the case of Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1952 22 I.T.R. 484; 1953 S.C.R. 177, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the income of the company would be considered from the particular facts in each case. Having considered the facts of this case, we have, for reason already mentioned above, come to the conclusion that the sum of ₹ 10,000 was in the nature of revenue receipt liable to assessment of tax. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department which assessee at ₹ 200. The fee of the learned counsel for the parties is also fixed at the same figure. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (4) TMI 110 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it is for the assessee to establish that he source of the capital which he invested in the construction of the cinema was from borrowings locally made and did not come out of remittances. These orders are under appeal before the appropriate authority and we are not convinced that there was any failure to exercise a jurisdiction on the part of the Income- tax Officer for that the order which he made under section 46(1) of the Act is otherwise vitiated. We are accordingly unable to accept the contention that these orders are liable to be quashed. The result accordingly is that W.P. No. 366 of 1962 and W.P. No. 977 of 1961 will stand allowed and order will issue quashing the assessment for the year 1954-55 and the order under section 46(1) relevant thereto. All the other writ petitions are dismissed. Since the petitioner has succeeded only to a very limited extent, he will pay the costs of the department in W.P. No. 977 of 1961. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (4) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s to have been done in pursuance of these rules and regulations. The trustees themselves were appointed only on July 28, 1945, under the indenture of trust executed on that day. The contribution of the first sum of money was made by the assessee to the fund in the calendar year 1945 and of the other sum of money in the succeeding calendar year. There is nothing on the record to show that any contribution was made to the fund prior to the appointment of trustees or that any accumulated balance in any such fund was transferred to the trustees after their appointment. The provisions of section 58K have, therefore, no application. The preliminary objection had, therefore, on force and was rejected. The reference should be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, with the answer as stated above under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. The assessee should pay the costs of the reference assessed at ₹ 200. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1962 (4) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... have already quoted. The only reasonable inference which can be drawn from all these facts is that the Government in fact wanted to punish him for what it thought was misconduct on his part and, therefore, reverted him. The omission of the Government to give reasons for the reversion does not make the action any the less a punishment but as the requirements of Art. 311 (2) were not fulfilled, as they ought to have been, the Government wanted to give the reversion the appearance of an act done in the ordinary course entailing no penal consequences. The circumstances clearly show that the action of the Government was mala fide and the reversion was by way of punishment for misconduct without complying with the provisions of Act. 311(2). The reversion of the appellant is, therefore, illegal. We, therefore, allow the appeal, quash the order dated May 28, 1952, reverting the appellant and direct that costs here and in the High Court will be paid by the Government. Appeal allowed,
-
1962 (4) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . The amount of tax payable in the one country could not be determined until the amount of the deductions allowable there had been determined; but one deduction would be the amount of tax payable in the other country. The amount of tax payable in the other country could not be determined until the deductions allowable there had been determined but one of those deductions would be the amount of tax payable in the first country. I see no way in which this circle could be broken..." These observations were made as illustrating the difficulty of rationalising a claim to an allowance of this kind. But on general principles also, it was definitely held that a tax deduction was not expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning the profits. The result is that the Tribunal's view cannot be supported in law and the question has to be answered in favour of the department. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1962 (4) TMI 106 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ecy. of State, reported in ILR 43 Bom 221 (AIR 1919 Bom 30). In our opinion the above decisions are of no assistance to the petitioners. In those cases, the authorities concerned relied on the) evidence of persons examined behind the back of the persons proceeded against even without giving them any opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The ratio of those decisions has no bearing on the facts of the present case. 12. The only other contention of Sri Ganji Veerappa which remains to be examined is that out of the eight ingots of gold seized, only six of them bear foreign marks and therefore the Collector was not right in confiscating the remaining two gold ingots. On proved facts, and circumstances established, taken along with the presumption arising under Section 178-A, the only reasonable conclusion is that those ingots were also smuggled. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
-
1962 (4) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... men are entitled to it in future years even in an year of loss and offertory so in a year when the profit are inadequate to justify that payment. In these circumstances it stands to reason that there must be an earlier year in which payment has been made in such circumstances as to serve as a precedent for the future, i.e., to establish the custom for payment in later years. Is in the present case it is admitted that there has been an adequacy of profits to justify the payment of one month's bonus during Diwali during all the earlier years the declaration granted by the Tribunal is without justification and the finding in that regard has to be set aside. The result therefore is that I would allow the appeal in part, reduce the profit bonus to basis wages for two months including the one month's basis wage as bonus already paid, and delete the declaration as to customary bonus. BY COURT - In view of the judgment of the majority, the appeal stands dismissed with Costs.
-
1962 (4) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ard to the proof of basic or primary facts the Court has to judge the evidence in the ordinary way, and in the appreciation of evidence in respect of the proof of these basic or primary facts there is no scope for the application of the doctrine of benefit of doubt. The Court considers the evidence and decides whether that evidences proves a particular fact or not. When it is held that a certain fact is proved, the question arises whether that fact leads to the inference of guilt of the accused person or not, and in dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt would apply and an inference of guilt can be drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his guilt. It is in the light of this legal position that the evidence in the present case has to be appreciated. The Court then considered the evidence and the findings of the High Court and dismissed the appeals. Appeals dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... less than ₹ 5,000/-. If the Arbitrator rejects the claim and refuses to award anything the case would, in our judgment, fall within the 2nd proviso to Rule 19 as being one where the amount of compensation awarded does not exceed ₹ 5,000/-. The 2nd proviso to Rule 19 enacts a rule of which a parallel is difficult to find. The right to appeal does not depend upon the claim made by the claimant either before the acquiring authority or the Arbitrator or before the High Court it depends solely upon the amount of compensation awarded by the Arbitrator. But, however, unusual the rule may, appear to be, it would not open to the Court to extend the right to appeal and to enable a claimant whose claim has been rejected completely to appeal to the High Court. The right to appeal is exercisable only if the amount awarded exceeds Re., 5,000/. In that view of the case, the High Court was right in not entertaining the appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 102 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ., Elliott v. Guastavino 1924 8 Tax Cas. 632 and the Merchiston Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Turner 1910 5 Tax Cas. 520, were cited before us. We have examined them but the facts there were entirely different from the facts before us. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to deal with these cases specifically. Another argument advanced before us was that the business of the company was in a dormant state or a state of suspended animation during the three years in question. In the face of the clear finding that no business at all was carried on by the company subsequent to February 14, 1950, and that the company had no intention of carrying on any business, no question of the company's remaining a dormant state or a state suspended animation can possibly arise. The question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the negative, as we do. The department shall be entitled to the costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
|
