|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 84 Records
-
1962 (8) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r holding that his prosecutor had not a fair chance of bringing the charge home to him. In our opinion, the High Court gave way to considerations which were not relevant to a criminal trial. The High Court was not sitting on a disciplinary proceeding for professional misconduct. It had to apply the same rules of criminal jurisprudence as supply to all criminal trials, and, in our opinion, the only reason given by the High Court for ordering retrial is against all well-established rules of criminal jurisprudence. The fact that the appellant is a practising lawyer does not entitle him to any preferential treatment when he is hauled up on a criminal charge, even as he is not subject to any additional disability because the case was between a lawyer and his client. There was no relationship of lawyer and client so far as criminal case was concerned. Hence, in our opinion, the order of retrial passed by the High Court is entirely erroneous and must be set aside. 5. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (8) TMI 126 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... hunath Rao is a "debt owed by the assessee on the valuation date". This expression came in for construction in Kothari Textiles Ltd., Madras v. Commr. of Wealth Tax, Madras, T. C. No. 210 of 1959 1963 48 ITR 816(Mad) , where we held that a claim against an estate of an unascertained nature cannot be regarded as a debt owed by the assessee on the vacation date. It is not disputed that in the present case the assessment to estate duty was made long subsequent to the valuation date there was no doubt the liability under the Estate Duty Act, but that liability was not ascertained or quantified. In the light of our decision in the tax case referred to above, we must hold that the amount mentioned in the second question cannot be regarded as a debt owed by the assessee and cannot, therefore, be deducted from the valuation of the assets. This question is also answered against the assessee. 15. The assessee will pay the costs of the department Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1962 (8) TMI 125 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ech in the case quoted there and that being the basis of the decision, on a correct interpretation of that speech, it seems to me as already observed that the view taken there was not correct. It follows that for the reasons stated above the first question must be answered by saying that the amount of ₹ 6,000 paid as compensation for leasing out the land was a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt. In view of this answer, as already stated above, the second question does not arise. The reference shall be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, with this answer under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. The assessee shall be entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 200. M.C. DESAI C.J.--I agree with my learned brother that the answer to the first question should be that the receipt of ₹ 6,000 was a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt. I concur in the order proposed by him. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (8) TMI 124 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e, called upon the assessee to pay tax in advance in four installments. That would, to a certain extent, result in hardship to the assessees. For instance, an assessee having an accounting year commencing on 30th of April may be required to pay installment of advance payment of tax on 15th June, i.e., hardly within a period of a month and a half. That would undoubtedly be a hardship because an assessee would be required to pay the tax in advance before he had even an opportunity of earning any income within a period of a month and a half and it is for this reason and to avoid hardship that the provisions of the first proviso have been made. The intention appears to be that the assessee should at least have four and a half months' period to earn income before he is called upon to pay the installment of tax in advance. 11. For reasons stated, we answer both the questions in the negative. Assessee shall pay the costs of the department. 12. Questions answered in the negative.
-
1962 (8) TMI 123 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... provided in the Companies Act; he can share in the assets of the company if the company goes into liquidation and he has also a privilege of getting the right to subscribe to the issuance of new capital as and when issued. These rights are still with the assessee and none of them has been taken away. 16. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the entire amount of ₹ 45,262.50 nP. was a capital gain resulting to the assessee from the transaction in question. The decisions, which we have been referred to by Mr. Kolah, in our opinion, are hardly of any assistance in deciding the question, which we have to consider. None of them deal with the question which we have to deal with in the present case. We, therefore, do not propose to examine these authorities in detail. 17. For reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner. 18. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (8) TMI 122 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... by the father and not the value put by the father on the closing stock of the goods. It will at once be seen that both the cases referred to above are causes of conversion of one kind of stock into another and involve a discontinuance of business or a break between the date of the receipt and the date of conversion. They are not cases of continuity of business and similarity of treatment accorded to a particular asset by the person in whose hands it originally was and the person in whose hands it subsequently came to be. It is, therefore, clear that these cases cannot help the assessee. The answer to the third question must, therefore, be that the cost price of ₹ 27,710 should be taken into consideration in determining the profit. The reference shall be returned to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, with these answers under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. The department shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 200.
-
1962 (8) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 201 cannot be sustained. 21. It may be that Babu Singh and Babu Lal both committed the offence under s. 201 and it is not unlikely that both of them were concerned with the main offence of murder. But in a criminal trial, the presumption of innocence is a principle of cardinal importance and so, the guilt of the accused must in every case be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Probabilities however strong and suspicion however grave can never take the place of proof. That is why we are satisfied that the appeal preferred by Babu Singh must be allowed and be must be acquitted of both the offences charged under s. 302/34 and s. 201 and ordered to set at liberty. Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 1962 preferred by Babu Lal partly succeeds. His conviction and sentence under s. 302/34 is set aside, but his conviction under section 201 as well as the sentence of seven years imposed on him for that offence are confirmed. 22. Cr. A. 121 of 1962 allowed. 23. Cr. A. 140 of 1962 partly allowed.
-
1962 (8) TMI 120 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as either an infraction of the law or a business activity which ran outside the sphere of a lawful activity. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We indicated earlier that the account year of the assessee, the previous year relevant to the assessment year, ended on the 31st October, 1955. We stated also-records show it to be so-that the assessee abandoned the appeal in the English High Court only on 7th November, 1955. Mr. Ranga-nathan, for the department, argued that in any event the allowance could not be claimed for the assessment year 1956-57, as the liability could not arise so long as the matter was pending adjudication in a court of law. We notice however that this aspect of the question was not put in issue before the Tribunal, nor did the Tribunal deal with it. It cannot, therefore, be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal and we express no opinion on this contention. The assessee will be entitled to its costs.
-
1962 (8) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... gam was a police informer and that he was really not concerned in the appeal before the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Therefore, he points out, it would be reasonable to hold that no offence under s. 165 had been committed by his client. We find however that the High Court granted the certificate only on the ground that the question raised by the Counsel as regards the interpretation of the word "subordinate" in the section was a substantial question of law, which was not covered by any specific authority and was also a question of public importance. In view of this we do not think it right to investigate the further question sought to be raised by Mr. Kumaramangalam in this case and we have not allowed him to argue that matter. 11. We think it proper to add that we have not been able to appreciate why the High Court thought it necessary to reduce the sentence imposed by the Trial Court. 12. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 13. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (8) TMI 118 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ther take another share. It is further mentioned in the will "the corpus of my residuary estate shall devolve in two equal shares, one share being taken by my children, Arthur St. John White, Miss Dorothy Daphna White and Miss Carmel White jointly. The other share shall devolve on my children, Edward, Oswald and Blossom, jointly. If either set of persons taking a share of my residuary estate predeceased me the residuary corpus of the deceased set of persons shall go to the surviving set or the surviving sets." From this it is clear that the testator intended to bequeath the residuary estate to two different sets of persons and not to the six children separately. Hence it must be held that the executors represent the two sets of persons mentioned in the will. From this it follows that the executors should be assessed accordingly. Our answers to the questions formulated above are as mentioned above. The parties to bear their own costs in this court. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (8) TMI 117 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... come of the previous year and would not become income of the subsequent year. We must reject this argument of the learned counsel for the department. In reaching the conclusion it did, the Tribunal has ignored a very material circumstance which has a bearing upon the assessability of the amount in question. It is not a case where the Tribunal has examined the matter and reached a conclusion of fact. Had it done so, this court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 66 of the Act would have been powerless to interfere, unless such a conclusion could be declared to be perverse. But, in our view, that is not the case here. This is clearly a case where the Tribunal has not applied its mind to very material and relevant circumstances. It should, therefore, follow that the finding of the Tribunal in this regard cannot be sustained. The question referred to us is accordingly answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs.
-
1962 (8) TMI 116 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... vestments in the present case by the trustees may have been influenced by the advice given by the beneficiary with a view to making profit by dealing in share business. The circumstance pointed out is again of an inconclusive character and does not warrant a necessary inference such as is suggested on behalf of the department. Moreover, both of these circumstances were pointed out to the Tribunal and it has taken the view that they are not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the intention of the trustees in varying the investment was to deal in shares. Since neither of the circumstances is such as taken by itself or along with the other a conclusion contrary to that arrived at by the Tribunal must necessarily follow, no error of law can be said to have been committed by the Tribunal in arriving at its decision. In our opinion, therefore, our answer to the question is in the negative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (8) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ral against the decision of the High Court, we do not propose to make any consequential order in favour of the appellants, because the learned Advocate-General has fairly conceded that he does not want any such order in the present appeal. It appears that the respondent has, in June, 1962, passed his Intermediate Examination and it has been fairly conceded that there is no intention to disturb his career under the present circumstances. The learned Advocate-General wanted a decision from us in this appeal because he apprehended that the reasoning adopted by the High Court in setting aside the order passed against the respondent may be construed to mean that under Art. 226, the High Court can examine the merits of the order passed by appellant No. 1 in such cases. 14. The result is, though we agree with the appellants that the order passed by the High Court was not justified, we refrain from setting it aside for the reasons just explained. There would be no order as to costs.
-
1962 (8) TMI 114 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... der to assist him to compute the leave wages which he claims when the finding is that the actual work he has done is of a different kind from that contemplated in the standing orders. 20. in the result, therefore, we make the rule absolute, allow the petition and set aside the order of the Payment of Wage; Authority. The Payment of Wages Authority is now directed to dismiss the application filed by the worker, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 21. At this stage Mr. Kukday prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c). There is a conflict of views as to the correctness or otherwise of the decision of this Court in Birdichand's case and the question involved is of general importance to all workers in the Bidi industry. Mr. Phadke on behalf of the petitioner has nothing to urge against the grant of leave. In the result, he grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Article 133(1)(c). A certificate shall issue.
-
1962 (8) TMI 113 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nse and any expenses and deductions which will be properly regarded in the commercial sense as expenses incurred for the purpose of earning the profits or gains will be deductible under section 10(1) even if there may not be a specific provision for such a deduction under section 10(2). That may be quite all right, but deductions, which can be claimed on this basis under section 10(1) have got to be deductions, which are in the nature of revenue deductions. Money, which has been paid in the present case for the acquisition of capital assets, cannot go to revenue account and there will be no question of allowing this payment as by way of deductions in computing the profits and gains of the business even under section 10(1). The claim for the deduction under section 10(1) also is, therefore, unsustainable. In the result, therefore, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (8) TMI 112 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Assistant Commissioner, however, has not been accepted by the Tribunal. Before us Mr. Joshi has argued that the payment was made by the assessee to Dr. Jariwala because the assessee company wanted to get rid of Dr. Jariwala and secure afresh the managing agency of M/s. Estrella Batteries Limited. The case does not appear to have been put in that form before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has found that the payment was made to get rid of a disturbing element. This is a finding of fact and, having regard to the context and the long pendency of the litigation against the company for over four years, it appears that Dr. Jariwala was a disturbing element to the business of the assessee. 8. For reasons stated above, in our opinion, the answer, on the facts found by the Tribunal, will have to be in favour of the assessee. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is in the affirmative. Commissioner shall pay the cost of the assessee. 9. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (8) TMI 111 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n clause (i). It is expressly stated that the family must consist of a brother or brothers on the one hand and the son or sons of a brother or brothers on the other, thereby implying that at least one of the original brothers of the family must be alive. In the Orissa Act however the definition given to the expression "brothers only" in the Schedule was of a very inclusive nature as already mentioned. We see therefore no reason to differ from the view taken by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision and the Patna decision in Province of Bihar v. Gajendra Narain Singh, which is based on identical provisions in the Old Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act of 1938 will be applicable. Question No. 2 is therefore answered also in the affirmative. 4. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The department must pay the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 100. There will be one set of costs in all the three S. J. Cs. Das, J. 5. I agree. Order accordingly.
-
1962 (8) TMI 110 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not mean that those assets continued to carry any value whatsoever. The book value of the relevant assets was accordingly nil and when in replacement of these assets the assessee obtained compensation from the War Damages Commission, the entirety of that amount has, therefore, to be treated as profit liable to tax. The second question relates to the replantation dividend receipts. This question came up for our consideration in two earlier cases V.S.S.V. Meenakshi Achi v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 50 ITR 206 (Mad.). The contention that was then put forward by the assessee was that this constituted a capital receipt. On a consideration of the relevant statute of Malaya which granted this replantation dividend to the assessee, we held that it was a receipt which was assessable to income-tax. Learned counsel for the assessee concedes that this decision is against him. In the result, we answer both the questions against the assessee who will pay the costs of the department.
-
1962 (8) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... )(ii ). The learned judges took the view that the supply of capital by a person could not but be on the basis of his relation to the partnership, that is, his admission to the benefits of the partnership so that this interest receipt arose directly from that relationship. Though the learned judges referred to the Bombay decision and observed that case of contribution of. capital differed from deposits made by the minor with the firm, it seems to us that the reasoning which they applied to the capital contribution and their conclusion that the right to receive interest thereupon arose only by reason of the relationship of the parties to the partnership applies equally to a case where under a clause in the partnership document a member of the firm and a minor admitted to the benefits of the partnership receives interest on the profits standing to his credit. It follows that the question has to be answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
-
1962 (8) TMI 108 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion that this was an item of usual financial deal, then the loss suffered by him, financing being his stock-in-trade, would be a revenue loss. We find it difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Mehta, because, in our opinion, the terms on which this transaction has been entered into by the assessee, and particularly the term under which the assessee undertook to share the losses, takes the transaction completely out of the category of financing transactions. There can be no doubt that the intention of the assessee in entering into this transaction was to invest his moneys in the business of another with a view to earn the share of profit therein. The loss suffered by the assessee, therefore, was clearly a capital loss and not a revenue loss which would be deductible under section 10(2)(xi) or section 10(1) of the Act. Our answer therefore to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Question answered in the negative.
|
