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Showing 1 to 20 of 85 Records
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1962 (9) TMI 110 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d, the auction-sale cannot be confirmed. I, therefore, order that the house of the judgment-debtor, Kishan Singh, situated at Gujjarpur Village in Hoshiarpur District be reauctioned after complying with the requirements of Order 21, rule 66. The official liquidator shall make a fresh application giving all the necessary details with respect to location, area, dimension and value of the property and the auction-sale is to be duly advertised and proclaimed. Dharam Singh has deposited Rs. 20,000 in this Court in token of his bona fides as a bidder. This sum shall remain in the Court and will be treated as his first bid at the re-auction. In case the house is auctioned in favour of a person whose bid is higher than that of Dharam Singh, the latter will be entitled to the refund of the amount deposited by him. The official Liquidator shall make an application under Order 21, rule 66, within three weeks. 15. Case to come up on 19th October, 1962. There will be no order as to costs.
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1962 (9) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... perty. But the property he takes is the property of the bankrupt exactly as it stood in his person, with all its advantages and all its burdens. The suit for pre-emption was decreed. In the second case a dispute arose between the vendor defrauded and the trustee in bankruptcy of the Vendee committing fraud whether ownership of the goods obtained by the vendee in pursuance of a contract induced by fraud would vest in the trustee, if the contact had not been rescinded at the date of the commission of the act of bankruptcy. It was held that the trustee acquired the bankrupt's interest in the property subject to the vendor's right to disaffirm the contract. In the last case it was held that the assignee has no higher interest in or better title to it than the bankrupt. Only the defeasible title of the latter to the goods in controversy vested in the assignee. 40. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. By The Court 41. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1962 (9) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... concerned we think that no useful purpose would be served by sending them to jail at this distance of time. Each of them had undergone a few weeks' imprisonment before being released on bail and in our opinion instead of sending them to jail now to serve out the remaining sentence it would be just and fair to reduce the substantive sentence of imprisonment awarded to each of them to the period already undergone and add to it a fine of ₹ 3,000/- each or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. In doing so we have borne in mind three circumstances, one of which we have already indicated. The second is the extreme youth of these persons when the alleged transactions took place and the third is that though they knew what was going wrong and hoped to benefit by it, they acted under the influence of the dominating personality of Lachhimi Narain who was the karta of the family. We modify the sentences accordingly. 27. Appeals partly allowed.
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1962 (9) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... se (a). If it had been used, it would have been possible to contend that the proviso is attracted and that the expression "partner" includes also minor wives like Rajeswari and Mayadevi who have been admitted to the benefits of partnership. The question referred to this court for decision is "Whether the assessment of the share income of the minor married daughters, Rajeswari and Mayadevi, in the hands of their father, the assessee, invoking the provisions of section 16(3) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act, is legal ?" 7. In the light of what is stated above we must answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. We do so, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. 8. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (9) TMI 106 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itating the firm's business. It was never the assessee's case before the income-tax authorities or the Tribunal that the gratuity amount paid to Jagannathji was on the ground of commercial expediency for facilitating the carrying on of the firm's business. That being so, we cannot, in the exercise of our jurisdiction under section 66(4) of the Act, raise a new question and ask the Tribunal to entertain a fresh line of enquiry and record fresh finding of fact after hearing the parties in regard to that question. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1959 37 I.T.R. 11; 1960 1 S.C.R. 249; A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1177. For these reasons our answer to the question propounded is that the sum of ₹ 21,000 paid to Jagannathji is not a deductible item under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 200. Order accordingly.
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1962 (9) TMI 105 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly. If the assessee's family consisting of himself, his son, wife and daughters is an assessable unit capable of holding property as belonging to it and, therefore, an assessable unit under the Indian Income-tax Act, the circumstance that the said family is also a member of another larger unit, which is also an assessable unit under the Income-tax Act, will in no way affect it from being an assessable unit itself. No provision of the Indian Income-tax Act has been pointed out to us which can be regarded as bringing in a prohibition which is suggested by Mr. Joshi. Mr. Joshi has referred us to section 25A of the Income-tax Act, but the provision of that section, in our opinion, does not lead to that result. In the result, therefore, in our view, the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal in the present case was correct. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1962 (9) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in this family. It is true that Ramakrishnier, the father, continued to figure as the partner in the firm of K. G. Ramakrishnier and Co. on and after the 12th April, 1957, the date of the partial partition. The capacity in which he figured as a member of that firm was not the representative capacity of the karta of the joint Hindu family. He did no doubt represent the other persons who became entitled to a one-third share in that capital, but that character was entirely different from that of the karta of the joint Hindu family. The conclusion reached by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that it was the family that earned the income and the division among the three members was only an instance of subsequent application of the income in thus wholly erroneous. We are satisfied that the Tribunal reached the correct conclusion in the matter. The question is answered against the department. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Order accordingly.
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1962 (9) TMI 103 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessment under section 34(1)(b) is not the same officer who had made the assessment for the assessment year 1952-53 on January 27, 1954. The material question is whether that officer, i.e., who made the assessment on January 27, 1954, knew that the trust had become revocable or not, and on that aspect of the case, there is no finding by either the income-tax authorities or the Tribunal that that Income-tax Officer had no knowledge that the trust had become revocable. The mere fact that the Income-tax Officer who reopened the assessment had no knowledge can hardly be of any relevance to sustain reopening of the assessment under section 34(1)(b). Considering the case from all aspects, in our opinion, the answer to the first question will have to be in the negative. We answer it accordingly. In view of our answer to the first question, it is not necessary to deal with the second question. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the applicant. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (9) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Act would not apply thereto. The definition of total income does not also refer to income set out in section 4(3) and the computation of total income is called for only in so far as the amount of income, profits and gains referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4 is concerned. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the department that even in respect of income dealt with under section 4(3) of the Act a computation is called for and that only the net income after the deduction of allowances contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act must be regarded as exempt from tax. We are, accordingly, of the view that section 8 of the Act does not either inferentially or in terms justify the disallowance, which is the subject-matter of the question. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (9) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing the activities of any other persons who may be said to be carrying on the profession of a lawer in an establishment. It if either himself or none-else. Therefore, we also fail to see how such a person can be said to answer the definition of "employer" who is required to make an application for registration of the establishment under section 7. 37. We therefore hold that the petitioner or others like him are not liable to have any establishment registered under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act in pursuance of a like notice from respondent No. 2. As the petitioner and other Advocates apprehend that they run the risk of prosecution for failure to comply with the provisions of section 7 read with section 52 of tie Act we direct that the respondents be prohibited from enforcing any of the provisions of the Act against the petitioner and other Advocates. The petition is allowed and Rule made absolute but there will be no order as to costs. 38. Petition allowed.
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1962 (9) TMI 100 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt of case. That also shows that there was no difficulty in running the jute press. He said “We had no difficulty in getting people to run the machinery in July 1943”. Therefore, the story of the assessee that it could not get labourers to run the press and, therefore, had to sell it, cannot be believed. If that be so, a question may be asked why this false case has been made? The obvious reason is that the assessee intended to mask its real intention in purchasing the jute press. It was admitted before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the assessee did not contact any one for canvassing orders for getting jute bales placed in the assessee’s jute press. These are facts which indicate that the assessee never had an intention at the time of purchase to run the jute press. The result is that for the reasons stated above, the question asked should be answered in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to his costs. Dutta, J.-I agree.
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1962 (9) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave entered the assessment of the assessee in any of the assessment years 1942-43 to 1946-47. The assessee, therefore, in this view of the matter also, would have no right to carry forward these losses, even if there be any, to the assessment year 1947-48. Mr. Joshi had also argued that even if the assessee is entitled to carry forward the losses, the losses sustained by him in the year 1941 cannot now be carried forward to the assessment year 1947-48 by reason of the bar of limitation of sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act. This contention was, however, not raised before the Tribunal nor before the income-tax authorities. It is, therefore, difficult to deal with that question as arising out of the order of the Tribunal. For reasons stated above, in our opinion, the Tribunal was not in error in rejecting the assessee's claim to set off the alleged losses. Our answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative. Assessee shall pay the costs of the department.
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1962 (9) TMI 98 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in the short order of the Tribunal, namely, that the officers are relations of a director and their salaries by the rise given to them are doubled in a period of two years and the further circumstance pointed out by the Income-tax Officer that the rise granted in the assessment year 1953-54 is not reflected in the profits of the company cannot by themselves without anything more suffice to serve as proper or adequate material leading to the conclusion that the expenditure is for consideration other than for purposes of business (see Newtone Studios Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 28 ITR 378 and S. Veeriah Reddiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1960 38 ITR 152 ) . In the view that we are taking, our answer to the question is that the Tribunal has acted without evidence in disallowing a part of the increase in the remuneration allowed to the three executive officers during the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55. The assessee will get its costs from the Commissioner.
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1962 (9) TMI 97 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aking purchases for the shop in the wholesale market, in checking the incoming goods and supervising the work of the salesman and other workers of the shop and checking the credit facilities granted to customers. He was also in charge of the cash of the firm. A perusal of this letter clearly indicates that this person was employed to render services to the firm rather than to the individual partner. In fact, the principle on the basis of which their Lordships of the Supreme Court negatived the payments of salaries by the Hindu undivided family which was a partner of a firm to two junior members of the family employed in connection with the firm would fully apply to the facts of the present case. We have no hesitation in holding that the payment of ₹ 2,000 was not in the circumstances of the case an allowable deduction from the share income of the assessee. The question is answered accordingly. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsels fee ₹ 150.
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1962 (9) TMI 96 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g terms "13. (1) The Public Companies (Limitation of Dividends) Ordinance, 1948 (XXIX of 1948), is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, any rules made, action taken or thing done in exercise of any power conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been made, taken or done in exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act, as if this Act had come into force on the 29th day of October 1948." In the said provision, we are unable to read that operation of clauses ( a) to (e) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act have been in any manner interfered with. We are, therefore, unable to accept Mr. Joshi's contention that we have to assume for the purposes of this case that the Ordinance has been completely obliterated from the statute book and to treat it as if it had not been promulgated. For reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1962 (9) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssee received his share only as part of the estate of the deceased, Arunachala. This question does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal and the questions referred to us for decision do not cover this ground. It is not open to the assessee to urge it now before us. But we may also observe that there is hardly any substance in this contention. The interest payment enured only in favour of the persons who shared the estate of the deceased, Arunachala. The benefit of such payment accrued to them only in their individual capacity. The estate duty itself became payable only after the death of the last owner of the estate and a claim by the successor of the estate resisting the collection of the duty should only be attributed to his personal capacity. In the matter of receipt of the interest, it cannot be said that the persons who received it did so in any representative character. Both the questions are answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department.
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1962 (9) TMI 94 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st the assessee for reassessment. All that has happened is that even though the statement made, which is reproduced above, was made by Mr. Desai before the Tribunal, dealing with the appeal relating to assessment year 1948-49, the Tribunal thought it reasonable to allow the deduction to the extent of ₹ 3,000. In fact, the Tribunal in its order of November 27, 1950, so observes. But when appeals relating to the four assessment years in question were heard by a different Bench of the Tribunal, on the same material it was considered that no deduction should have been allowed at all. In short, what has happened is change of opinion by the Tribunal on the same material which was before the income-tax authorities when they made the assessment orders. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is in the negative. In view of our answer to the first question, it is not necessary to record any answer to the second question. The Commissioner shall pay the costs to the assessee.
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1962 (9) TMI 93 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is final subject to the provisions of the Act, as under sections 34, 35 and 36 the decisions of the revenue courts are final and cannot be challenged in civil courts except as provided in section 37. I would, therefore, conclude that the Certificate Officer, the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue while dealing with matters under the Public Demands Recovery Act are courts within the meaning of item No. 3 and the Public Demands Recovery Act; the Board of Revenue has powers to deal with contempt- as if it were a High Court-under section 7 of the Act II of 1913 (The Board of Revenue Act). The powers, as stated above, of the revenue courts are not confined to particular items of revenue but to generally all matters of revenue, as may be gathered from the schedule referred to above. I am, therefore, of opinion that the matter is covered by item No. 3 and Act XI of 1961 is a valid Act. I, therefore, agree with the observations and to the order proposed by my Lord.
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1962 (9) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e assessee company and although for the purpose of assessment to income-tax, the income from the partnership had to be included in the assessable income of the assessee for the account year, it did not form any part of the actual profits available for distribution from the account year, which could be expected to be distributed by way of dividend by the company. If this amount of ₹ 70,895 were left out of consideration, there is no dispute that the company's profits available for distribution would be too small for declaring any dividend. In our opinion, therefore, the order under section 23A passed against the assessee company for the assessment year 1951-52 was not such as could be said to be justified under the said section. In view of our above conclusion, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative for the first year, i.e., assessment year 1950-51, and in the negative for the second year, i.e., assessment year 1951-52. No order as to costs.
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1962 (9) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no material on which the tax authorities could come to the conclusion that the firm was not genuine. The question whether, on the circumstances relied on by the Tribunal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Officer, an inference about the existence and genuineness of the partnership can be drawn in this case is not a question of fact. The inference to be drawn is as regards the legal effect of the facts and circumstances found in the light of the provisions of the Partnership Act and of the personal law of the parties. This is a mixed question of law and fact. On a consideration of all the circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that there was no material on which the finding of the taxing authorities that the firm was not genuine can be rested. For these reasons our answer to the question propounded is that the partnership deed dated 3rd February, 1949, is a genuine and not a sham transaction. The assessee shall have the costs of this reference.
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