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Showing 1 to 20 of 34 Records
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1963 (1) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Court to be a gaming house the law leaves any one found in it during any gaming, to explain his presence on pain of being presumed to be there for gaming. 17. Considering the fact that gambling is an evil and it is rampant, that gaming houses flourish as profitable business and that detection gambling is extremely difficult, the law to root out gambling cannot but be in the public interest. Such a law must of necessity provide for special procedure but so long as it is not arbitrary and contains adequate safeguards it cannot be successfully assailed. In our opinion the Act with which we are concerned contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that there is no danger to any one except to those who are proved to the satisfaction of the Court to keep a gaming house or who can be presumed unless the contrary be proved to be there for the purpose of gaming. We are satisfied that the impugned provisions are constitutional. The appeal fails and is dismissed. 18. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (1) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave already referred to a Bench decision of this High Court in AIR 1960 AP 273 , according to which the transaction of this nature is a pledge and not a mortgage. As I have come to the conclusion that the suit falls within Section 23(2)(b) it is unnecessary to go in the details as to the scope and nature of Section 23(1). For the reasons mentioned above my concluded opinion is that the court-fee payable on the first relief should be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or at which such relief is valued by the Court, whichever is higher. The revision petition, therefore, is allowed and the Court below is directed to find out whether the plaint valuation regarding the first relief is correct and if not, what is the value which the Court puts on such a relief and collect from the petitioners under Section 23(2)(b) of the Act Court-fees keeping in view the valuation which is higher. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.
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1963 (1) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... radesh, though it related to property situated in West Bengal and was received in that State for registration. The first dutiable event was the execution, which took place in U.P.; the second dutiable event was the receipt in West Bengal. When it came before the officers of Uttar Pradesh for decision whether it was duly stamped or not, the officers of Uttar Pradesh were bound to hold - for the reasons we have discussed earlier - that the instrument was not duly stamped as it did not bear Uttar Pradesh stamps. The fact that the instrument had been stamped in accordance with the law of West Bengal could not justify a conclusion that it had been stamped in accordance with the law in force in India. The Officers of the State of U.P. therefore rightly held that the original mortgage deed was not duly stamped. 26. The petitioners are not, therefore, entitled to any relief. In the circumstances of the case, we order that the parties will bear their own costs. 27. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (1) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... e Judge should also consider the question whether it would not be proper to direct the first defendant to invest these amounts in the names of the minor girls themselves, so that the amount may be available to them on their attaining age and be useful for celebrating their marriages. 16. Subject to the modification referred to above, the decree of the court below is confirmed. This litigation is a result of an unseemly fight between a father and his son. The son was no doubt obliged to file the suit as the father appears to have been very adamant. The plaintiff has also not been considerate towards the father, even, to the extent to which it was possible for him, as he obtained an ex parte order for the appointment of a Commissioner to take an inventory of the moveables of the household, a few days after the commencement of the Tamil New year in 1958. In the, circumstances, we are of opinion that the parties should bear their respective costs both here and in the court below.
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1963 (1) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... doubt', said Willes J., 'the general rule is that the language of an Act is to be read according to its ordinary grammatical construction unless so reading it would entail some absurdity, repugnancy, or injustice, . . . But I utterly repudiate-the notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act in order to bring it in accordance with his views of what is right or reasonable'." 75. Keeping the above observations in view, I am of the opinion that the words "at any time" should carry their plain meaning and it is not open to the Court to circumscribe or restrict their operation. 76. I agree with the final order proposed to be passed about the acceptance of the appeals but only on the ground that the schemes of consolidation were ordered to be revoked and varied without notice to the respective appellants, who were parties interested and without giving any opportunity to them to submit their objections about the proposed change.
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1963 (1) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... blished their industries in Pudukottai, it does not follow that the opening of the branch itself was intended for purposes other than those of normal banking business. We are not clear wherefrom- the Tribunal drew the inference that there was no field for investment in Pudukottai. It is the normal function of the banks to collect the moneys lying idle in non-productive areas and to make the funds available for industrial or other production elsewhere. Even assuming that there was no scope for investment inside Pudukottai, that would only indicate that any investor with the local bank at Pudukottai would be aware that his funds would be utilised in some lucrative fields elsewhere. The extract above does not justify the conclusion that a mere knowledge that banking transactions might effect the transference of the money from place to place amounts to a basic arrangement between every depositor with the Pudukottai branch and that branch with regard to the transference of funds.
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1963 (1) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case it is not necessary for us to dissent from the ruling of the Division Bench in Santhamma's case (supra), as we are of opinion that in the face of a specific power entrusted to Parliament under entry 97 of List I, it would not be proper to strain the language of entry 47 and deprive Parliament of its legitimate jurisdiction by holding that every kind of transfer is involved in succession. The Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Kerala High Court, have taken the view that the Gift-tax Act is valid in its operation on transfer of agricultural lands. These decisions arc reported in Sesharatnam v. Gift-tax Officer 1960 38 ITR 93 and Joseph v. Gift-tax Officer 1962 45 ITR 66 . The Mysore High Court has taken the contrary view and that decision is reported in Hazareth v. Gift-tax Officer 1962 45 ITR 194. With respect we agree with the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh and the Kerala High Courts. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The rule nisi is discharged.
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1963 (1) TMI 60 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... absence of special circumstances like fraudulent representation, or in the absence of other features from which a Court can infer a contract to be one of indemnity, as defined under Section 124 of the Indian Contract Act the liability of the surety is only ancillary and rests only on a valid obligation on the part of the party whose debt or obligation is guaranteed. 16. We respectfully follow this view. It must be said, in fairness to the learned Judge, that the decision in AIR1957Mad164 does not appear to have been mentioned to him. We are of the opinion that, where the liability of the principal is held to be not enforceable, on the ground of the contract being illegal there is no question of the surety being made liable. Therefore, this finding of the learned Judge is also reversed. 17. The appeal is allowed, and the decree of the trial Court is restored. The appellant will get the costs of the appeal as well as of the Letters Patent Appeal from the contesting respondent.
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1963 (1) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... agent of a foreign principal who sold the goods to the plaintiff he falls squarely within the exception under Section 230. In order to avoid personal liability, the second defendant must show that by express words or by necessary implication he contracted out of such liability. In regard to the liability of damages cl. 26 referred to by my learned brother in his judgment quite clearly exempts him from liability of any kind. But in regard to the refund of the advance amount, there is no specific provision in the contract excluding his liability. It is not part of the claim for damages. Eves it the plaintiff was the party in breach, he would do entitled to a refund of the advanced amount subject of course to the claim of the defendant by way of cross claim to recover damages from him. We have, therefore, no doubt that the plaintiff's claim for refund of the advance from the second defendant is well founded. I agree with my learned brother in the judgment and decree passed.
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1963 (1) TMI 58 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be ruled out. The object of the imposing the time limit in section is to expedite the proceedings, and dispose of the claims so as to obviate the threat to breach of peace, within a very short period. With this end in view, the various provisions of Section 145 have been laid down. It is, no doubt, true that if the parties are permitted to file additional documents at every stage, the object of this enactment would be defeated. But, as observed above, the procedure is always subservient to the abject sought to be achieved, viz., a fair disposal of the case on a date adduced to the satisfaction of the parties. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that, if the petitioners are able to satisfy the Magistrate that for reasons beyond their control they could not file certain documents which support their claim in regard to actual possession, the Magistrate would not be precluded from accepting the same, in being so satisfied. 6. The revision case is dismissed with these observations.
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1963 (1) TMI 57 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case 1943 11 I.T.R. 454 and Senthikumara's case 1957 32 I.T.R. 138) with approval, noticing that in those two cases the assessee did not contravene a statute but merely committed breach of contract. In paragraph 15 of their judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after reviewing all the previous decisions, both Indian and English, observed that disbursements, to be permissible deductions, must be shown to have been made "for the purpose of earning profits of the business" and that it would not suffice if they were shown to have been made in the course of, or arose out of, or concerned with, or made out of, the profits of the business. Here also, it cannot be held that the penalty which the assessee had to pay for supplying the bad quality rice and paddy against the express terms of the agreement was for the purpose of earning profits out of his business. The question of law referred by the Income-tax Tribunal must therefore be answered in the negative.
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1963 (1) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble. We have no doubt that in the context of this provision the words "financial years" mean and can only mean "the assessment years". The words used are "financial years next following the previous year in which such buildings are erected". The scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act is only to tax income of the previous year in the relevant assessment year. If the contention of the learned counsel were to be accepted, it would mean that for the special purpose of allowing extra depreciation allowanced, it is not the previous year that would be relevant but the financial year. This is opposed to the whole scheme and tenor of the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act. The decision of the Tribunal holding that the assessee is not entitled to relief under section 10(2)(via) is well founded. This question is answered against the assessee. The assessee in each of these cases will pay costs to the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 in each case.
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1963 (1) TMI 55 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ay is absolutely without merits. I express no opinion as to whether the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that no appeal lies is correct or not. I also make it clear that I do not accept all the reasons given by the Income-tax Officer in the orders in question for holding that he has got jurisdiction to pass the orders in question. From the above discussion it will be seen that my approach to the question of jurisdiction of the officer is entirely different. But I agree with his final conclusion that he has got jurisdiction to pass the orders in question. As I mentioned earlier, no other points have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in these proceedings. The result is that the attack made as against the jurisdiction of the officer to initiate proceedings for purposes of reassessment under section 35(10) of the Indian Income-tax Act fails and all the writ petitions are dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs in all these writ petitions.
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1963 (1) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... High Court and uphold the validity of s. 37. The result is that the appeals preferred by the Tilkayat, the denomination and Ghanshyamlalji fail and are dismissed. So does the writ petition filed by the Tilkayat fail and the same is dismissed. The appeals preferred by the State substantially succeed and the decision of the High court striking down as ultra vires part of s. 2 (viii) in relation to the idols of Navnitpriyaji and Madan Mohanlalji; part of s. 16 in so far as it refers to the affairs of the temple; s. 28 (2) and (3), s. 36 and s. 37 is reversed. We however, confirm the decision of the High Court in so far as it has struck down s. 30 (2) (a) in regard to the qualifications for holding the office of the Goswami but we reverse its decision in so far as it relates to the latter part of s. 30 (2) (a) which deals with the allowances payable to the Goswami. In the circumstances of this case, we direct that parties should bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (1) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... given as a loan to begin with became a kind of a purchase price for the relinquishment of the rights of these two sons in the joint family. But, then, significantly enough, there is no such entry in the books of account of the assessee-Hindu undivided family. No entry shows that the loans have been written off as price paid to these two sons for relinquishment of their respective rights in the Hindu joint family. Independently, therefore, of all questions of presumption or otherwise, and entirely on the facts and the evidence on record, the conclusion is irresistible that there was no separation. It follows, therefore, that the income from these two businesses started by these two sons was rightly included in the total income of the assessee-Hindu undivided family. The answer follows. The second question must also be answered in the affirmative. I agree with my learned brother that the assessee should bear the costs as proposed by him. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (1) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly a matter of procedure. No party has a vested right to have his appeal heard by a specified number of judges. An appeal lay to the High Court and the appeal in question was in fact heard, and disposed by the High Court and, therefore, no right of the party has been infringed merely because it was heard by two judges and not by three judges. No doubt in certain classes of cases, as for instance, cases which involve an interpretation as to any provision of the Constitution the Constitution provides that the Bench of the Supreme Court hearing the matter must be imposed of judges who will not be less than five in number. But it does nOt follow from this that the legal requirements in this regard cannot be altered by a competent body. We therefore overrule the contention of the learned counsel and hold that the appeal was rightly heard and decided by a Bench of two judges. In the result, we affirm the decree of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (1) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... blic at large. We are, therefore, reluctant to accede to the plea made before us by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad that we should reprimand the Advocate for his misconduct and pass no further orders against him. Having carefully considered all the relevant circumstances in this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of the profession itself, it is necessary to direct that the name of the Advocate should be removed from the rolls for five years. We also direct that the Advocate should pay the respondent's costs of the enquiry before the Tribunal and of the hearing before us. Before we part with this matter, we ought to add that it has been conceded before us both by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad and by the learned Solicitor-General that Part V of the Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961) has not still been brought into force and so, s. 50(4) of the said Act is still not applicable, and that means that the present proceedings have to be dealt with by the Court in accordance with the existing law.
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1963 (1) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urther enquiry. As there was no material on record we could not know what happened to the, enquiry against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal after the dismissal of their application for revision by the High Court. We, therefore, called for a report from the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, 24 Parganas. That report has been received. It would appear from that report that on March 22, 1961, the High Court directed that the commitment proceedings against these two persons be stayed pending the disposal of the present appeal by this court. We cannot appreciate the argument that an enquiry against a different person with reference to the same offence cannot be undertaken. It will be open to the court before which commitment proceedings against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal are pending to consider whether they should be stayed pending the result of the enquiry with reference to the respondent before us, but there can be no legal impediment to the enquiry against the respondent. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (1) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... order of the Governor. Definitions under s. 32 are however to be read subject to anything repugnant in the subject or context or to any contrary intention, and that makes us back to the Business Rules framed under Art. 166 of the Constitution, where the power to deal with a case of this kind is given to the Minister-in-charge under r. 21. 'the definitions therefore of "Government" and ',the State Government in the Rajasthan General Clauses Act are of no help to the respondent once it is held that r. 31 (vii) (a) of the Business Rules when it speaks of "compulsory retiring of any officer" refers only to compulsory retirement as a penalty under r. 14 of the Classification Rules and not to the two other kinds of retirement (namely, superannuation under r. 56 or retirement under r. 244 (2) of the service Rules). The appeal is therefore allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (1) TMI 48 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n, although we should not be understood to express any firm or considered opinion on this aspect of the case. We called upon learned counsel for the department to satisfy us that the result we apprehend was not possible. He candidly conceded that a contingency like that was possible. That being so, we have no manner of hesitation in saying that that is a kind of procedure which does not commend itself to us and is definitely one which we should not be prepared to encourage. For the reasons mentioned above, we have come to the conclusion, though not without a certain amount of regret, that we must decline to answer this reference in the form in which it has been made to us. It will be open to the Tribunal to make a proper reference after deciding all the questions which were raised before it, should it become necessary to do so according to law. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs of the hearing in this court.
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