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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 42 Records
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1963 (12) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of their possession by the creditors of the mortgagor, dispossession having taken place in 1937 the suit filed on July 12, 1946, regarded as one to enforce the claim to recover the mortgage money under s. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act was barred by the law of limitation. This appeal will therefore be partially allowed. The decree passed by the High Court will be set aside and there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff only in respect of the mortgage dated August 27, 1922. The trial Court will draw up an appropriate decree in that behalf. The plaintiff's appeal will fail in respect of the mortgage dated June 14, 1922. The plaintiff will pay the costs of the fourth defendant who alone has defended this appeal. The plaintiff will be entitled to her costs in respect of the mortgage dated August 27, 1922, from the original mortgagor's heirs and the transferees-in-interest of the property which was the subject-matter of the said mortgage. Appeal partly allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the conclusion that this a fit case where the sentence of fine imposed on the accused by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate is not adequate and is required to be enhanced. It is also urged on behalf of the accused that six months' time has passed since the case was decided and now to send the accused to jail will be a great hardship. I do not think that this circumstance has any bearing in consideration of the question of proper sentence, which should have been passed by the trying Magistrate. (13) I therefore accept the revision application and direct that in addition to the sentence of fine of ₹ 2,000/- on each count imposed by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate on the accused, the accused shall further suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months on each count. Both the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. The accused will surrender to her bail. Revision application filed by the State is allowed. Rule made absolute. (14) Sentence enhanced.
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1963 (12) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... rt from defect of not pleading this further ground which is fatal as aforesaid, there is no substance in this ground on merits. 20. The Company's Workers' Union who supports the winding up petition has itself no locus standi to present an application for winding up. The position of the workers of the company has been sufficiently made clear in the said agreement with the State of Orissa dated March 29, 1963. Under Clause 9 of the agreement, the company has undertaken to take suitable steps to provide for the transfer of the provident fund account of the employees of the company to be managed by the Orissa Electricity Board according to law. However, the question of the workers' alleged grievances, if any, are matters outside the scope of the winding up petition. 21. In this view of the case, the application for winding up is dismissed. All interim orders passed herein stand vacated. The petitioner is to pay the costs of this application. Hearing fee ₹ 100/-.
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1963 (12) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble into money does not also alter this position. Hence, we are of opinion that the lower Court was in error in treating the sale proceeds of the house as movable property and applying the law of succession applicable to Ezhavas in Travancore. 36. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we dismiss the appeal excepting regarding a half of the net proceeds of sale of house No. 75-Wood House Road. Regarding this half we allow the appeal; and the appellant 1st defendant will get this half for himself and the other half will be divided among all the other sharers, because the 2nd defendant has already agreed to such a course, and the plaintiffs will get their share from out of it. Regarding the other assets of Dr. Krishnan in Schedule C the decision of the lower Court is confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, all parties will suffer their respective costs before us. The direction regarding costs of the lower Court given by the learned Subordinate Judge will, however, stand.
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1963 (12) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Courts dispose of cases on the basis of the submissions made by Counsel, it is not possible to say that the omission of Counsel absolves a Court from the duty of following clear provisions of law. We do not think that the omission of the tenant's Counsel to draw the Court's attention to the provisions of Section 57 can be a reason for the High Court to refuse to interfere. In our opinion, this was a proper case in which the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under Section 35 of the 1952 Act and made an order set-ting aside the order made by the Courts below striking out the tenant's defence against ejectment. 18. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the Courts below and order that the plaintiffs application for striking put the tenant's defence against ejectment be rejected. In the peculiar circumstances of the case we order the parties to bear their own costs. We hope the suit will be dealt with expeditiously by the Act.
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1963 (12) TMI 44 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ee held that, though it must always be difficult to draw a line yet, unless there is some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it, it cannot be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Their Lordships further held that the income from the sale of forest trees growing naturally and without the intervention of human agency, even if the land is assessed to land revenue, is not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a). To the same effect is the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sri Rajah Ravu Venkata Mahipathi Gangadhara Rama Rao Yuvarajah of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1949 17 I.T.R. 445 (P.C.).. For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the first question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the assessees. Our answer to the second question referred to is in the negative and in favour of the assessees. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1963 (12) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... indirectly by him from the admission. The basis for the decision was that the supply of capital by him was connected with his admission to the benefits of the partnership and the interest earned was an income derived, even if indirectly, from the admission ; if he had not been admitted he could not have contributed to the capital and would not have earned any interest on it. The learned judges distinguished interest paid on capital investment from interest paid on a deposit which cannot be connected with the minors' admission. In the result our answer to the question is in the affirmative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income-tax as required by section 66(6) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1963 (12) TMI 42 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that in the facts and circumstances of this case the assessment made upon the Manager, Court of Wards, Bettiah Estate, in respect of the income of the Bettiah Estate for the assessment year in question is illegal and the first question referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. It was conceded by learned counsel for both the parties that the second question referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has become academic and it is not necessary to answer the second question referred to the High Court. It will be open to the income-tax authorities either to decide the question of escheat for themselves upon the materials available or to await the decision of the title suit pending before the court of the Subordinate Judge, and thereafter proceed to make an assessment in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs with regard to this reference.
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1963 (12) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the 1st of April, 1956, forming an identifiable part of the reserves. 12. In this case the Appellate Tribunal's definite finding is that the assessee-company having received the premiums upon the issue of shares first entered the receipts under the head of share premium account and at the end of the year transferred it to the reserve fund or other reserves account. The same figure was being brought forward from year to year after the transfer and nothing has been appropriated from the said account or nothing has been written off from the said account. According to the Tribunal the amount of receipt against the premium on shares is a known figure and is an identifiable part of the company's reserves. 13. In the face of these findings, we are of opinion that the Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion in this matter. The answer to the question framed is in the affirmative. 14. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Sen, J. - I agree.
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1963 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ehind a decree and probe into the genuineness of the debt on which it is founded, it is not necessary to consider the contention as to whether the Insolvency Court is a Civil Court or not for the purpose of s. 11 of the Act. 44. We therefore hold that the head of department had the power to decide, under s. 4 of the Act, whether the alleged defaulter was a defaulter or not, that no Civil Court can consider this matter in view of s. 11 of the Act and that the Insolvency Court is however not precluded from enquiring into the question whether the alleged debtor was really a debtor and liable to pay sums said to be payable by him. The Insolvency Court has found that the respondent had not executed the surety bond and that therefore he could not be liable to make good any payment under it. The order of the Court below in dismissing the insolvency petition is, therefore, correct. 45. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs, though for different reasons. 46. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tatutory provision has been made in filing the appeal against the order of refusal of registration passed by the Income-tax Officer. If after filing two separate appeals any irregularity was noticed, it might, according to the discretion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, be condoned. It has already been pointed out that if the demand notice could not be filed in Form D-II appeal, it might at best be treated as an irregularity and not an illegality. To sum up, my decision is that in view of the provisions contained in section 23(4), section 30 and the statutory forms prescribed, viz., Forms B, D-I and D-II, it appears that two appeals in a case like this are required to be filed. In the premises our conclusion is that the question should be answered in the negative. Considering the circumstances, each party in this reference is directed to bear its own costs. Certified for counsel as against respective clients. S.P. MITRA J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (12) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hildren of those marriages could not have claimed to be legitimate. The Act was however in terms retrospective and validated marriages that had taken place before the Act between parties belonging to different castes, sub-castes and sects. It is idle to contend that the object of the Legislature was only to regularise the status of the husband and the wife. That certainly was part of the object. But equally important, or perhaps more important object was that the children of the marriages would become legitimate. 7. We have therefore come to the conclusion that even if the trial Court was right in thinking that Padmavathi was a Brahmin girl and not a Shudra, the position in law was, as found by the Court below, viz., it was a valid Hindu marriage and Bhakthavathsalam a legitimate son of Sadagopa with all the rights of a coparcener in regard to the joint family properties and other matters. 8. No other point was urged in appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1963 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... out that even if the Division Bench was right in holding that the impugned order should be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari, it would have been better if it had not made its own findings on the evidence and passed its own order in that behalf. In writ proceedings if an error of law apparent on the face of the record is disclosed and a writ is issued, the usual course to adopt is to correct the error and send the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted Tribunals. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the orders passed by the High Court in the two writ petitions filed by the respondent are set aside and the said writ petitions are ordered to be dismissed with costs. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s a decree for the whole amount due under Ex. C and realises the same, the plaintiff will not be entitled to ignore the decree in this case in respect of the above sum ₹ 3,792/2/1 and interest thereon". Learned counsel for the appellant -faintly suggested that the learned Judges were in error in passing a decree for this further sum of ₹ 3792/2/1 in this suit. It is, however, unnecessary for us to go into the merits as to whether the learned Judges were right in the construction of Ex. J and the legal results flowing therefrom as we are satisfied that the appellant is not entitled to raise this point. This was not one of the points raised in the grounds of appeal to this Court when an application was made for the grant of a certificate of fitness, nor is this objection to the decree to be found in the statement of the case filed. In the circumstances, we need say no more about it. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rt. 14 of the Constitution. For the same reasons Rule 149(3) cannot also be regarded as invalid. But the orders imposing upon the public servants determination of employment in exercise of the powers under Rule 149(3) made applicable to them when prior to the date on which the Rule was framed they were not applicable to them would be void as infringing Art. 311(2) of the constitution As, however, on this part of the case there has been no investigation by the High Court, I would remand appeals Nos. 837-839 of 1963 to the High Court and dismiss appeals Nos. 711-714 of 1962. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority Civil Appeals Nos. 711-713 of 1962 and Civil Appeal No. 714 of 1962 are allowed with costs. The writ petitions filed by the four appellants in the three High Courts are granted and Orders directed to be issued in terms of the prayers made by them. Civil Appeals Nos. 837-839 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees in each group.
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1963 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g himself into an investigating agency and there is therefore every possibility of the accused being prejudiced and that might be the very reason why the sub-section has been framed in a manner to avoid this result. The position is, of course, different under s. 251-A(2) where the examination is by virtue of the statute and so it stands in a class apart, and we are not concerned to consider whether an examination under that provision might prejudice the accused. We, therefore, hold that where there is no evidence recorded under sub-s. (4) of s. 207-A, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to examine an accused under s. 207-A(6) and consequently the Magistrate in the present case had no jurisdiction to direct the accused to appear before him for examination. We would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Magistrate directing the accused to appear before him for being examined, ORDER In view of the Judgment of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... adjudication; but the provision contained in s. 10(1) read with s. 12(5) clearly shows that even where a breach of s. 25F is alleged, the appropriate Government may have to consider the expediency of making a reference and if after considering all the relevant fact the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to make the reference, it would ’be competent to it to refuse to make such a reference. We ought to add that when we are discussing this legal position, we are necessarily assuming that the appropriate Government acts honestly and bona fide. If the appropriate Government refuses to make a reference for irrelevant considerations, or on extraneous grounds, or acts mala fide, that, of course, would be another matter; in such a case a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. o p /o p The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1963 (12) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld give rise to disputed questions of fact which we would not ordinarily entertain on a petition under article 226 of the Constitution and he, therefore, stated that he would not press this particular objection to the validity of the notices but would take it up before the Income-tax Officer himself. Since this objection was not pressed before us, it is not necessary for us to say anything in regard to the same. The result, therefore, is that in each of the petitions the rule will be made absolute and a writ of mandamus will issue quashing and setting aside the notices dated 31st January, 1962, in respect of the assessment years 1943-44 and 1946-47. The rule will stand discharged in respect of the notices dated 31st January, 1962, in respect of the assessment year 1950-51. The respondent will pay the costs of the petition to each petitioner. Costs in Special Civil Application No. 370 of 1962 will be fixed at ₹ 500. In the other petitions, costs will be the usual costs.
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1963 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ct it was the father who purchased the property with the intention of conferring the beneficial interest solely upon the mother. Such a transaction must therefore amount to - a gift. In that view the property would not fall under cl. (d) of s. 10 of the Act but under cl. (b) of that section. Therefore, the appellant would be -the sole heir of her mother and the non-joinder of her brothers would not defeat the suit so far as she is conceded. In the result I would set aside the decree of the courts below in so far as the property in question, Beverly Estates, is concerned and decree the appellant's suit with respect to it in addition to the property with respect to which she has already obtained a decree in the courts below. I would further direct that the respondents will pay to the appellant proportionate costs in all the courts. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appellant need not pay court fees.
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1963 (12) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st in the minds of the taxing authorities that a claim for refund could not be validly entertained unless certificates of finality were produced is not in consonance with the provisions of the Act. In the light of what we have stated, the question is answered in favour of the assessee who will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Two writ petitions have been filed by the assessee. In W.P. 532 of 1959, a writ of certiorari is prayed for to quash the orders of the concerned authorities leading to the order of the Appellate Tribunal rejecting the claim to refund. In W.P. No. 533 of 1959, a writ of mandamus has been prayed for to direct the Income-tax Officer to entertain and dispose of the application for refund. In the light of our decision in Tax Case No. 72 of 1962, the reliefs prayed for in these writ petitions have already been granted therein. It is unnecessary to pass any orders in these writ petitions. They are dismissed. No costs in these petitions.
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