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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 49 Records
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1963 (2) TMI 55 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e final order of the Commissioner under section 33A(2) cannot be challenged in this application under article 226 for a writ of certiorari. Besides, an application under article 226 should not be entertained as regards defects in the assessment proceedings where the petitioner could have but has not pursued his statutory remedy of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. In Abraham v. Income-tax Officer, the Supreme Court observed in no uncertain terms "The Income-tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment of tax and imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the income-tax authorities, and the appellant could not be permitted to abandon resort to that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by a appeal to the Tribunal." In the result the application must fail and the rule discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (2) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is scope for an argument that in cls. (d) and (e) of s. 4 of the Act as they stand after the amendments in 1954 and 1957, respectively, the word "rent" has been used in the wider sense. Assuming that this is so, such use of the word in 1954 and 1957 cannot be -taken into account for the purpose of interpretation, as the Rule under consideration was framed long before these dates. Coming now to the facts of the two cases before us, we find that admittedly, in both the cases. the property that has been assessed was allowed to be used by the employees on leave and license. Whatever payment was received from them was not therefore "rent" within the meaning of cl. (ii). Our conclusion therefore is that no tax is leviable under the Punjab Urban Immovable property Tax Act, 1940, in respect of the buildings in these two appeals. The High Court therefore rightly quashed the orders of assessment. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (2) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... title as there might be in it for a consideration which was to be utilised in financing the litigation." This observation shows that legal expenses that follow in instances where purchaser knowingly "purchases litigations" with a view to perfect known defects of title by litigation may not be revenue expenditure. On the authorities discussed above, we do not consider it appropriate to lay down any rigid or narrow test and this court is content in expressing its concurrence with the èbroad principle indicated above. For reasons stated above we hold that the two sums of money, (1) ₹ 24,498-12-6 and (2) ₹ 9,890, cannot be deducted as an allowance under section 10(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act either under sub-clause (v) thereof or under sub-clause (xv) thereof. We accordingly answer the question in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. LAIK J. - I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (2) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nts or at the time of the hearing of the appeal. This order was passed by the learned Chief justice and Mr. justice Chandrasekhara Sastry, who had made the order allowing admission of additional evidence and also heard the appeal. We are bound to hold therefore that though the appellant did make an application objecting to the admission of additional evidence he did-not press that application. On the principle laid down in Jagarnath Pershad v. Hanumam Pershad (1909) L.R. 36 I.A. 221, that when additional evidence was taken with the assent of both sides or without objection at the time it was taken, it is not open to a party to complain of it later on, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that the additional evidence was taken in this case in breach of the provisions of law. There is nothing therefore that would justify us in interfering with the findings of facts on which the High Court based its decision. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (2) TMI 51 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... than a year. It was then contended by Mr. Choudhuri that clause (b) of the newly added sub-clause (iii) to section 2 of the Wealth-tax Act is attracted and the assessee is not entitled to deduct this amount. The opening sentence of sub-clause (iii) makes it clear that it applies only to the amount of tax payable in consequence of any order passed under the Act and not to any other tax liability. Before pronouncing the judgment Mr. Choudhuri drew our attention to the case of Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealthtax . We respectfully differ from the opinion expressed by the learned judges of the Calcutta High Court that the tax unless it is determined by the income-tax authorities is not a debt which can be deducted from the assets in determining the net wealth. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The reference is answered in the affirmative with costs which we assess at ₹ 100. DUTTA J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (2) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that a provision which is added subsequently, that is, which represents the latest will of the legislature will have an overriding effect on the earlier provision in the sense that despite the fact that some action has been taken by the Municipal Council by resorting to the earlier provision the appropriate authority may nevertheless take action under s. 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, the result of which would be to override the action taken by the Municipal Council under s. 287 of the District Municipalities Act. No action under section 72 has so far been taken by the Government and, therefore, the resolutions of the municipal Council still hold good. Upon this view it is not necessary to consider certain other points raised by learned counsel, For these reasons we allow the appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court and quash the writs issued by it.- There will, however, be no order as to costs as the respondents have not appeared. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (2) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ay High Court in re. Land Acquisition Act , which have held that the civil court is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. There is, on the other side, a line of decisions which say that the jurisdiction of the civil court is confined to considering and pronouncing upon any one of the four different objections to an award under the Act which may have been raised in the written application for the reference. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State v. Bhagvan Prasad, is typical of this line of decisions. There is thus a marked conflict of judicial opinion on the question. This conflict, we think, must be resolved in a more appropriate case on a future occasion. In the case before us the question does not really arise and is merely academic and we prefer not to decide the question in the present case. For the reasons given above, we would dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (2) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing process is carried on, and which involves the consequence that the place is deemed a factory and the persons working therein are deemed workers is not by itself discriminatory so as to infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution; nor does the provision amount to authorising imposition of unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the owner of the factory to carry on his business. The impugned Notification issued under s. 85(1) is also not open to attack on the ground that the State has issued the Notification by selecting for application of the provisions of the Act, some out of the places in which bidi manufacturing processes are carried on. Nor does the Notification in so far as it seeks to apply the provisions of the Act imposing upon the owner or an occupier of the factory obligation to grant annual leave with wages impose any unreasonable restriction, On that view the petition must fail and is dismissed with costs, two sets, one hearing fee. Petition Dismissed.
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1963 (2) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d those alone which arise out of an order of the Appellate Tribunal under section 33(4) of the Act and, secondly, holds that events that took place after the order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal under section 33(4) of the Act could not be gone into or taken into consideration. Here I hold that the question of the competence of this reference and the maintainability of the appeal are questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal under section 33(4) of the Act. No question of taking into consideration events after the order of the Tribunal arises in this case. Therefore, the Punjab case also is of no assistance to Mr. Meyer. For these reasons I agree with my learned brother that this court should return an answer in the negative to the question asked in this reference by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in not admitting the appeals filed by the assessee, and I also agree that there should be no order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (2) TMI 46 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... house in good repair. Two sets of expenses have gone to its production, the original purchase and the subsequent repair. Neither by itself produced the asset. If the contention of the Revenue were adopted the taxpayer would be charged twice over for the same benefit, with the additional injustice that he would be charged, as if on an income perquisite, on a cost that may well have a largely capital element, for example, the cost of extensive renewals necessitated by dry rot or installing a new water system which will have twenty or thirty years of life in it. One can imagine frivolous expenditure that could be described as having no asset-producing character, but the renewal of a hothouse boiler, a fireplace and a water main could certainly not be so described. For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Reid, I would allow the appeal. Appeal allowed. Solicitors Smith, Braithwaite and Co. for Shepherd and Wedderburn W.S. Edinburgh; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1963 (2) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
Scope and effect of the provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution questioned
Held that:- The High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the order of demotion 'Passed against the respondent in the present case was invalid on the ground that the respondent had not been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the said action under Art. 311(2). The appeal accordingly succeeds, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.
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1963 (2) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the dismissal of the workmen mentioned in the attached list is justified ?
What relief by way of reinstatement and/or compensation are they entitled to?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal, therefore, enquired into the case for itself. Mr. Nichols and Mr. Dhawan gave evidence which the Tribunal was not prepared to accept. It pointed out that their testimony conflicted on vital points. Since the Tribunal had the opportunity of hearing and seeing Mr. Nichols and Mr. Dhawan we should be slow to reach a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal. In addition, in such cases, it is not the practice of this Court to enter into evidence with a view to finding facts for itself. Following this well settled practice we see no reason to interfere with the conclusion of the Tribunal.
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1963 (2) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the business in which the dealer is engaged, i.e., article which by itself has a commercial value and which can be the subject-matter of sale for a price in course of the business of selling or supplying in which the dealer is engaged. There is no reason to exclude the chopping of timber into firewood from the ambit of manufacturing process. If firewood is a manufactured article, then the second branch of the argument of Mr. Panda must fail. The last argument advanced by Mr. Panda was that the petitioner was at first taxed on timber and again taxed on firewood. This, he concluded, amounted to a double taxation which must not be allowed to remain. This argument is not very well conceived. The petitioner was no doubt taxed on timber. After he manufactured firewood from timber, there was no reason to escape assessment on the manufactured commodity. All the three arguments made by Mr. Panda fail and this Rule is discharged. I, however, make no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
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1963 (2) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bove will also be consistent with the rule of construction of statute that when a class of persons are selected for enjoying a benefit conferred by the statute then the clauses in the statute providing any exception ought to be construed strictly so that the real intention of the statute conferring the benefit should be available to as large a class of persons as intended therein. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that on the facts of the present case the turnover in dispute cannot be held to be the turnover of confectionery sold in sealed containers. The question is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee. We assess the costs of this reference at Rs. 100 which shall be paid to the assessee by the opposite party. A copy of our judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the revising authority and the Commissioner of Sales Tax as required by sub-section (6) of section 11 of the Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (2) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en fixed on the thing. Since it makes no difference whether an article is a ready-made article or is prepared according to the customer s specifications, it should also make no difference whether the assessee prepares it separately from the thing and then fixes it on it or does the preparation and the fixation simultaneously in one operation. In the instant case what the customer wanted was the construction of bodies on the chassis of his buses. The assessee could have prepared the bodies first and then fixed them on to the chassis or could have started the construction of the bodies by putting one plank after another on the chassis themselves. All the materials were to be supplied by the assessee. The element of sale predominated over the element of contract of work. I, therefore, agree with my learned brother that the contract was of sale and not of work and that the assessee was liable. I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (2) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any interest and are not required to be read at all can hardly be placed in the category of water, salt etc. By including (1) Miscellaneous Case No. 295 of 1954 decided on 14th December, 1962 since reported at 14 S.T.C. 299. newspapers in section 4 the Legislature did not contemplate newspapers which have ceased to be of any use as newspapers by lapse of time. Therefore, what was sold by the assessee was waste paper though it might have been once newspaper and waste paper is not exempted under section 4. The answer to question No. (1) is, therefore, in the negative. We direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, and to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the Commissioner of Sales Tax will get his costs of this reference, assessed at Rs. 100, from the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (2) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ards the third question, our answer is that the assessment order under section 21 could not be illegal on the ground that there was no fresh information on which the assessment order under section 21 was made. The learned counsel for the assessee has not been able to satisfy us that the grounds on which the learned Judge (Revisions) repelled this plea were erroneous. We think that the learned Judge (Revisions) for good reasons held that for an assessment under section 21 the law does not require that there should be any fresh information on the basis of which an assessment can legally be made under that section. We assess the cost of this reference at Rs. 100 to be paid by the assessee to the respondent. We direct that copies of this judgment be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required under section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (2) TMI 38 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aled Act but he had also a right to be so assessed. It follows that the assessment made on 23rd May, 1959, is within the ambit of the proviso to section 19(1) of the new Act. 10.. Since the Sales Tax Officer has erroneously decided the ques- tion of limitation and proceeded to tax the sales which had escaped assessment more than three calendar years from 23rd October, 1957, the proceedings initiated by him cannot be sustained. 11.. The petition succeeds and is allowed. The proceedings initiated by the Sales Tax Officer, Circle No. 1, Jabalpur, for taxing the peti- tioner s sales during the period 3rd November, 1956, to 23rd Octo- ber, 1957, which had escaped assessment, the notices issued by him for that purpose including the one dated 23rd October, 1962, and the order dated 29th October, 1962, are quashed. The respondent shall bear his own costs and pay those incurred by the petitioner to whom the security amount shall also be refunded. Hearing fee Rs. 50. Petition allowed.
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1963 (2) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t since the assessee had already disclosed in its return the figure of Rs. 34,000 as the amount of excise duty and vend fee but had t included it in his turver and the assessing authority had t taxed it on that amount, there was concealment on its part and the assessing authority again could t assess on that amount on the ground that it had escaped assessment. This submission on behalf of the assessee is untenable and cant be supported by the language of sec- tion 21 as explained above. Our answer to the second question is in the affirmative. Having answered the above two questions against the assessee, we assess the costs of this reference at Rs. 100 which would be paid by the assessee to the opposite party. The copies of this judgment will be sent under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the Court to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., as required under section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (2) TMI 36 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be determined on the facts and the circumstances of each case, for, the word manufacture appears to have various shades of meaning and the petitioner s counsel has not succeeded in showing that the process of extracting oil employed by his clients is not manufacture. Certain other points relating to the merits of the assessment were also sought to be argued before us, but, in our opinion, those points should properly be agitated before the departmental authorities and not in writ proceedings, for, these proceedings are not meant to serve as a substitute for appeals. Recently, we have declined to entertain similar points in writ proceedings in a number of cases some of them being Civil Writ No. 1542 of 1961 and Civil Writ No. 238 of 1962 decided on 14th February, 1963. No other point having been raised before us, in view of the foregoing discussion, all these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed but with no order as to costs. MEHAR SINGH, J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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