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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 51 Records
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1964 (2) TMI 110 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er Section 409-the latter requires some more ingredients to be established-conviction is permissible under Section 403 when the charge was of the offence under Section 409. Then there is the general Section 535, Criminal P. C., to cure the irregularity, if any. The position of the law as to omission to frame a charge or defect in a charge is settled in William Slaney v. State of M.P. (S) 1956CriLJ291 . We do not see any prejudice being caused to the respondent for want of a specific charge under 3. 403, Penal Code, because he has had a full opportunity of meeting the facts constituting the elements of the offence of which we are finding him guilty. 23. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge are set aside. The respondent is held guilty of the offence under Section 403, Penal Code, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The motor cycle seized from the accused shall be delivered to the M.P. Electricity Board.
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1964 (2) TMI 109 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is point. The main petition, as pointed out above, prays for relief not only under sections 397, 398 and 402 of the Act, but also in the alternative for winding up of the Company under section 433 of the Act. It is not possible on the material on the record to arrive at any firm conclusion on this point; rather the first issue in the main petition is whether it is mala fide and that issue will be decided after recording the evidence. 9. The result, therefore, is that as prayed for in Liquidation Miscellaneous No. 115 of 1963 the main petition will proceed despite the withdrawal filed by petitioners 1 to 3 and the remaining evidence of the petitioner will be recorded on 5th March, 1964. Orders on Liquidation Miscellaneous Nos. 107 of 1963 and 120 of 1963, need not, as already submitted by Mr. Sikri, be passed at present and these two should also come up on 5th March, 1964 along with the main case. There will be no order as to costs in Liquidation Miscellaneous No. 115 of 1963.
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1964 (2) TMI 108 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... suggested by Mr. Bal Raj Trikha, a dishonest employee who is guilty of gross misconduct then proper proceedings should be taken should be dismissed on grounds which are wholly untenable. Mr. Trikha has now said that the Railway authorities had every intention of reinstating the petitioner and paying him the wages which are due to him but that the result of the present writ petition was being awaited. Also as the petitioner had been moving one Court or the other, the wages were being withheld. Be that as it may, this petition must be allowed and it is hereby allowed and a writ shall issue directing the respondents to treat the order of dismissal of the petitioner dated 13th December 1961 as wholly illegal, void and ineffective. It is unnecessary in view of the statement of Mr. Trikha to make any order with regard to the wages nor would it be appropriate to make any such order in a writ petition. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs in this Court. 7. Petition allowed.
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1964 (2) TMI 107 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Civil Court at Sagar did not decide and could not have decided, the title to the properties situate within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Sirsi and therefore the judgment of the Sagar Court cannot operate as res judicata. It would follow that the Courts below therefore erred in holding that the judgment operated as re judicata. The Courts have not addressed themselves to the evidence in the case and hence it would be necessary to remand the case for decision on merits. It would be for the trial Court to determine the evidentiary value of the judgment of the Sagar Court in determining the main question at issue. (15) In the result, I allow, the appeal, reverse the judgment of the two lower Courts and remit the suit back to the trial Court for decision according to law in the light of the observations made above. Both parties will be free to lead such evidence as they think fit. Costs of this appeal shall be costs in the cause. (16) Appeal allowed. (17) Case remanded.
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1964 (2) TMI 106 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e case, the appellants necessarily fail in regard to that period. That clearly lays down in effect the propositions in my opinion, that the benefit of S. 4 could not both be suffixed and prefixed to the period of limitation as calculated under S. 14. In other words, the decision of the Privy Council was that where a plaint was filed in a wrong court out of time, it could not be brought within the period of limitation by applying S. 14. In view of this clear ruling of the Privy Council, I do not think it necessary to refer to cases in Ummathu v. Pathumma AIR 1921 Mad 654, Ramalingam Aiyar v. Subbier 8 MLW 256 AIR 1919 Mad 845 and Govindasami Padayachi v. Sami Padayachi 43 ML J 579 AIR 923 Mad 114 which took much the same view of the scope and effect of Ss. 4 and 14 of the Limitation Act. 6. I consider therefore, that the courts below came to the correct conclusion, that the suit was barred by limitation. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. 7. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 104 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h he gets in the business arise out of the transfer of the assets to him. The share of the minor in the partnership business is his income and this income has arisen out of the transfer of the assets. If this argument is accepted, then even if the minor had deposited ₹ 1,000 out of the sum of ₹ 74,721, in the accounts of the firm, the profit to the extent of the whole of his share would be regarded as arising from the deposit made by the minor. This interpretation would not be justified on the language of the section. As I have already indicated earlier, the share of profits which the minor gets in the partnership business is the result of his being admitted to the benefits of the partnership and not the result of his deposit. In our opinion, therefore, both the questions referred to us are to be answered in the negative and the minor’s share of profit in any of these firms is not liable to be included in the assessment of the father, that is, the assessee.
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1964 (2) TMI 103 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssued the notice. The successor of the Income-tax Officer who issued the notice was, therefore, entitled to apply his mind to the materials before him and to make the order of penalty which has been impugned in the present petition. The validity of the order of penalty must, therefore, be upheld and the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners must be rejected. In this view of the matter the petition must succeed in so far as the order of reassessment and the orders of penalty in respect of the assessment year 1950-51 are concerned, and in so far as the order of penalty in respect of the assessment year 1952-53 is concerned, the petition must fail. The rule will, therefore, be made absolute in regard to the order of assessment and the orders of penalty in respect of the assessment year 1950-51. The rule will stand discharged in respect of the order of penalty relating to the assessment year 1952-53. The respondents will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioners.
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1964 (2) TMI 102 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... given by the Central Board of Revenue confirming the conclusion of the Deputy Controller on that aspect of the case, is clearly unwarranted. In the first, place, there, is nothing in section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act or in any other provision of that Act which prohibits a transfer or a gift of part of an actionable claim. Secondly, there is ample authority to show that a transfer of a part of an actionable claim is not only not barred under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, but is permissible. Since the learned Advocate-General, with his usual fairness, stated that he would not press this aspect of the case and further conceded that there can be a valid transfer of part of an actionable claim, the finding given by the Central Board of Revenue was obviously incorrect and cannot be sustained. In the result and for the reasons aforesaid, our answer to the question is in the negative. The respondent will pay to the petitioner the costs of this reference.
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1964 (2) TMI 101 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which the taxable income is determined and not the assessee who actually becomes subject to the payment of tax." In other words, the view that we have taken, namely, that the eligibility to claim depreciation must arise in the very first year of acquisition of the asset is not at all affected by this decision of the Madras High Court. In the present case, in the years the new ships were acquired, the assessee-company did not claim any depreciation. Its claim for depreciation under clause (via) was made when the income arising from those ships were taken into account by the Indian income-tax authorities, but during the years the claims were being advanced, the ships were not new but had already become old. Having regard to the principles discussed in this judgment we are unable to sustain the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The respondent will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference. Sen, J.-I agree.
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1964 (2) TMI 100 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tock exchange but in the instant case the Tribunal did not depend upon this document as the shareholdings of the beneficial owners remained static in the two years of account indicating thereby that there were no dealings in the open market and that the shares were controlled by the Bangur group of shareholders. This being a finding of fact cannot be interfered with by this court. (6)In the instant case, clause 13 of the articles of association of the assessee-company shows that the directors have absolute discretion to refuse to register the transfer of any share to any person who is considered by them as undesirable without assigning any reason. Such a restrictive clause is an impediment to the shares being freely transferable within the meaning of the alternative clause of the second condition of the said Explanation. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The applicant shall pay costs to the respondent. Sankar Prasad Mitra, J.-I agree.
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1964 (2) TMI 99 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... late Tribunal is no more in existence in view of the order of this court in I.T.R.C. No. 15 of 1959 since reported as Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lakshmamma 1964 52 ITR 789 . The effect of the order of this court in that case is to restore the order of the Income-tax Officer. That fact is not disputed. We are informed that no appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed as against the order of this court in I.T.R.C. No. 15 of 1959 since reported as Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lakshmamma 1964 52 ITR 789 and that the order of this court has become final. 7. Hence, our answer to the question of law referred is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the claim for the deduction of the liability of ₹ 1,51,215 for the tax and ₹ 27,000 for penalty under the Income-tax Act should have been allowed in computing the principal value of the estate of the deceased. In other words, our answer is in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 8. No costs.
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1964 (2) TMI 98 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s at the time of the original partnership it cannot be said that the partnership was not a real partnership but merely a make-believe affair. In our opinion, the principle laid down in these authorities applies to the present case. There was no material before the income-tax authorities in this case to support the conclusion that the partnership constituted under the partnership deed dated the 26th April, 1955, was not a valid and genuine partnership. We are of opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case the firm constituted under the deed of partnership dated the 26th April, 1955, is a genuine partnership and should have been granted registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. In the circumstances of the case we do not propose to make any order as to costs. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1964 (2) TMI 97 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d above, it is clear that he is precluded by his own conduct, from now putting forward the contention that the R.T.A. had not been properly constituted. Therefore, the last ground of attack also cannot, in any way be helpful to the petitioner. Sri Shamsunder has also brought to our notice the fact that two petitions (W. Ps. 311 and 313 of 1961) in which the validity of the constitution of the R.T.A. had been challenged on the same ground, were both dismissed for the sole reason that those petitions were filed as late as in March 1961, i.e., a period of more than three years after the constitution of the R.T.A. (which was on 31-12-1957) and that the petitioner was, therefore, disentitled to any relief. The present petition does not stand on a different footing from those two writ petitions. (8) In the result, this petition is dismissed with costs of respondents 1 and 5 (respondents-5 being transferee from Respondent-4). Advocate's fee ₹ 100). (9) Petition dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 96 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT (FB)
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... ... ..... #39;Civil Court' within the meaning of Section 3, Civil Procedure Code and that it is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. I would, therefore, answer the question referred as follows - "The Tribunal constituted under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment), Act, 1951 (LXX of 1951) is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code and a revision lies under Section 113 Civil Procedure Code against an order passed by such a Tribunal," 77. BY THE COURT In accordance with the view of the majority, the question referred to the Full Bench is answered as follows - "The Tribunal constituted under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (LXX of 1951) is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code and a revision lies under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code against an order passed by such a Tribunal."
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1964 (2) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was treated as a deposit and should be confined to his case that this was a loan and not a deposit, for he never pleaded at any time before the authorities concerned that even if it was a deposit the recovery would be barred by time. We are of opinion that there is force in this contention on behalf of the respondents and we are not prepared to allow the appellant to raise the question whether the recovery would be barred even if the amount is treated as a deposit. In this view of the matter, it would not be necessary to consider the exact effect of s. 48(3) and to decide whether it will apply even to cases where the recovery had become barred under the Limitation Act before October 22, 1956. We therefore do not allow the appellant to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was a deposit. 8. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in that case. It is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad and another, the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea. 6. Reading the plaint as a whole, we agree with the High Court that a case based on possession after the purchase was not stated in the plaint and the decision of the High Court in the circumstances of this case was therefore proper. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 7. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was effected' between the 1st defendant and his brother the properties. specified in 'C' schedule were allotted to the share of the 1st defendant. If so, the plaintiff would be entitled to have a mortgage decree in respect of the said properties. In the-result there will be a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for the recovery of the sum of ₹ 20,434- 15-0, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum thereon till the said amount is paid The period of redemption will be three,, months from today and in default the 'C' schedule properties will be sold for the realization of the same. Liberty isreserved to the plaintiff to apply for personal decree against the 1st defendant in case there is any deficiency after the. hypothetic has been sold. The decree of the Subordinate Judge and of the High Court are set aside and there will be. a decree in the said terms. The 1st and 3rd defendants will pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout. Appeal allowed,
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1964 (2) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a mistake apparent from the record; the record itself showed that the assessee derived some income from firm "B" and yet it was not included in his assessable income. This apparent mistake continued right up to the moment of the second rectification and justified it. Question No. 2 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. As question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, question No. 1 also is answered in the affirmative. It was not shown to us that there was any illegality in the order imposing the penalty if the second rectification was legal and valid. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income-tax as required by section 66(6) of the Act. We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax his costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1964 (2) TMI 91 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt Income-tax Officer found as a result of the information received by him that the entire basis on which the annual value of the said immovable property was arrived at by the previous Income-tax Officer was wrong inasmuch as the rateable value fixed by the Municipal Corporation was not on the basis of the hypothetical rent which the said immovable property would fetch from year to year but was on a concessional basis. We are, therefore, of the view that the intimation received by the Income-tax Officer from the Assessor and Collector of Municipal Taxes was information within the meaning of section 147(b) on the basis of which the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that the income of the petitioner from the said immovable property had escaped assessment and the first condition of section 147(b) was satisfied. The notice impugned in the present petition was accordingly a valid notice. In the result the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 90 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... manufacturing business as also industrial gases, this part of the activity of the assessee was not carried on through the industrial undertaking which was subsequently set up. It is clear that the non-industrial business activities of the assessee could be carried on independently of the industrial undertaking, that is the factory, and it could be carried on even though the factory was not subsequently installed at all. Looking at it from another point of view, the factory itself, when set up, could be run even if the assessee ceased to carry on the non-industrial business activities which it had already been carrying on before the factory was set up. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal's order in the instant reference must be sustained and the answers to both the questions which arise for our consideration are in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. SEN J.--I agree. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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