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Showing 1 to 20 of 88 Records
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1964 (3) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... se offences was restricted to Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class. This was pointed out by Mr. Justice Beg in Harbans Singh and others v. State AIR1953All179 and was also referred to by Mr. Justice Verma in the opinion in the present case. In our opinion, it is a circumstance which may be taken into account. It is forcefully illustrated in this case. An appeal would have lain against the same decision if the Magistrate had not been given the powers of a First Class magistrate during the trial. The respondents were robbed of a right of appeal. In any event, in view of the clear words of s. 29(1), the trial of these cases ought to have been before a court designated in s. 15(2) and as the trial was before a Magistrate who was not empowered to try the offence the proceedings were rightly declared void under s. 530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We accordingly hold that the decision under appeal was correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the liquidator in his report are not disputed; the effect of those facts was a matter of argument between the parties before the High Court. In such a case, we do not see how the appellants can successfully challenge the correctness of the view taken by the High Court that a case had been made out for the public examination of the appellants. That is why we do not think there is any substance in the argument urged before us by Dr. Seyid Muhammad that on the facts, an opportunity had not been given to the appellants to show that their public examination should not be ordered. We are satisfied that in dealing with the facts of this case, the Courts below have taken into account the reports made by the liquidator and after considering the objections raised by the appellants, they have come to the right conclusion that the appellants should face a public examination. 19. The result is the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... asked to deal with the matter in a normal way in accordance with law. That is why we think we cannot uphold the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Rajagopal Sastri, even though we disapprove of the conduct of the appellants in coming to this Court without attempting to obtain the leave of the learned single Judge of file a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the decree passed in second appeal, we set it aside on the ground that the judgment delivered by the learned judge does not satisfy the basic and legitimate requirements of a judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. The result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and second appeal No. 91 of 1955 is sent back to the Madras High Court with a direction that it should be dealt with in accordance with law. The costs of this appeal would be costs in the second appeal. 11. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . 4(1), without taking into consideration the value of non-agricultural improvements made after that date, must be regarded as invalid. 1 5 . We are not called upon to express any opinion on the question whether the power reserved under s. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by s. 2 of Madras Act XI of 1953 to take possession of lands under the emergency clause for the purpose of working lignite mines in the areas to which the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1953, extends is invalid. No argument has been advanced by either side before us on this question. Nor was the High Court called upon to consider the validity of that provision. 16. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed. The respondents in this group of appeals, except in appeal No. 11 of 1963, have not appeared in this Court. Therefore in appeal No. 11 of 1963 alone, the State of Madras will pay the costs of the respondent. There will be no order as to costs in other appeals. 17. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which are licenced to supply electrical energy to the consumers and in that sense, at the relevant time the respondent was not a monopolist in the matter of supply of electricity. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that when a citizen wants to challenge the validity of any statute on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, specific, clear and unambiguous allegations must be made in that behalf and it must be shown that the impugned statute is based on discrimination and that such discrimination is not referable to any classification which is rational and which has nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the said statute. Judged from that point of view, there is absolutely no material on the record of any of the appeals forming the present group on which a plea under Article 14 can even be raised. Therefore, we do not think it is necessary to pursue this point any further. 23. The result is the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees.
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1964 (3) TMI 131 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the association. And so far as we can see it is nothing else other than an overall charge for all the services performed by the association in respect of the buying and selling of pepper over and above the separate fees prescribed for many of those services. 7. It is unnecessary to discuss the decisions cited at the Bar as the conclusion in this case has to be depend entirely on the construction of annexures "A" and "B" to the statement of the case, and they are not discussed in this judgment. Our conclusion is the same as that of the Appellate Tribunal, and it follows that we should answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the assessee. We do so, but without any order as to costs. 8. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (3) TMI 130 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... ot; is unnecessary for the application of Section 45(d). All that is necessary Is to find out the date of registration and the financial year next following. In this case the date of registration was the 8th November 1951 and the financial year next following 1952-53. It must follow that the five years in respect of which the exemption is available are 1952-53 to 1956-57, both years inclusive. 12. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the exemption from tax granted to the assessee under Section 45(d) of the Act for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 was not rightly granted and answer the question referred against the assessee and in favour of the department. We do so; but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. 13. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by Sub-section (6) of Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
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1964 (3) TMI 129 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee-firm or the members of the assessee firm could enter into a partnership with Damji in their individual capacity. The assessee-firm however could not do so as a firm. This has held by this court in Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income Tax. There was thus a partnership between Damji and the four members of the assessee-firm acting for themselves and indeed the deed which has been produced in this case shows as much. In the affairs of the unregistered firm, the assessee-firm had no locus standi." 12. It is no these grounds that the appeal has been allowed. Mr. Ashgarali, learned counsel for the assessee, frankly concedes that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the answer to the second question will have to be in favour of the Commissioner. 13. In the result, it is not necessary to answer the first question. Our answer to the second question is in the negative. 14. In the circumstances, the assessee shall pay half the costs to the Commissioner.
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1964 (3) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ate the grain from the chaff. But. it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. That is what the courts have done in this case. In effect, the courts disbelieved practically the whole version given by the witnesses in regard to the pursuit, the assault on the deceased with lathis, the accused going on a bicycle, and the deceased wresting the bhala from one of the appellants and attacking with the same two of the appellants, the case that the accused attacked the witnesses, and the assertion of the witnesses of their being disinterested spectators. If all this was disbelieved, what else remained? To reverse that metaphor, the courts removed the grain and accepted the chaff and convicted the appellants. We, therefore, set aside the conviction of the appellants and the sentence passed on them. 7. The appeal is allowed and the appellants are directed to be set free.
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1964 (3) TMI 127 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s behalf and that is that he himself treated the income as received in the accounting year corresponding to the assessment year 1956-57. In fact it was not his case either before the Income Tax Officer or before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that this income could be included in the previous assessment year as having accrued or arisen in that year. He proceeded on the assumption that this was income earned by him in the accounting year 1955-56. It is only as an after-thought that before Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, for the first time, he raised this controversy. 32. We are firmly of the opinion that this sum of ₹ 44,000 was not earned in the accounting year 1955-56 or accrued or had arisen in that year and that it was properly included by the department in the assessment year 1956-57. 33. For these reasons, we answer the reference in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Advocates fee ₹ 100.
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1964 (3) TMI 126 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ds that under rule 27 of the Tribunal Rules, when on the merits he has succeeded before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it is open to him as a question of law to agitate this matter before us. The departmental representative claims that if we allow the assessee to agitate this matter now, he must be given an opportunity to rebut it. We may state that in the view we are taking of the case, it is unnecessary to pronounce on this issue." It is elementary that no question of law can possibly arise when the Appellate Tribunal has not pronounced on the matter at all, and in that view we must decline to answer the first of the two questions referred as well. The reference is answered as above; but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1964 (3) TMI 125 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the judgment we have delivered in this reference, we feel that the question referred to us should be reframed. Learned counsel appearing for the parties do not dispute our power of reframing. In our opinion, the question which was suggested by the Commissioner (at page 73 of the paper-book) is the more appropriate question that arises on the facts and circumstances of this case. This question is as follows "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in not allowing the assessee to raise the contention that in respect of the shares in Naskarpara Jute Mills Ltd. and the West Bengal Jute Co. Ltd., the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were not justified in valuing the said shares in the open stock at the cost price which was lower than the market price ?" Our answer to the reframed question is in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Masud, J.-I agree.
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1964 (3) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s not been made a party to this petition. Secondly, he never raised these points while he was serving under the State of Madras. It is difficult at this stage to challenge orders, which if quashed, would affect the rights of other civil servants who are not (1) W.P. No 88 of 1962 ; judgement dated January 13,1964. Parties to this petition. At any rate, the petitioner has not been able to show how Art. 16 was infringed before he was allotted to the new Mysore State. The State in its reply has asserted that all the orders complained against were passed by competent authorities, after considering the merits of the petitioner on each occasion. It was for the competent authorities to judge the merits of the petitioner. We find no force in this contention and hold that no infringement of Art. 16 has been established. Accordingly, in the result, the petition fails. In the circumstances of the case we order that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 123 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... consider that as a factor that should influence my decision. As has been stated above; an order made in violation of the rules of natural justice is not a order at all. It is apparent that the authorities waited until the matter was about to be time-barred and then acted with undue haste. The result is that it defeated its own purpose. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I have no option but to make the rule absolute. The application must therefore succeed. The rule is made absolute and there will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 7th February, 1963, made by the Commissioner of Income-tax and there will be issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent not to give effect to it. This however will not prevent the respondents from taking any other steps against the petitioner under the Income-tax Act or any other law, which they are entitled to take, and to proceed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (3) TMI 122 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ationale of the above decisions we held that the machinery provided under S. 69-A is purely of a summary nature and does not contemplate any decision or adjudication so as to attract the principles of S. 11 C. P. C. 13. The appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs suit is decreed as against the superstructures 5A Nowroji Road with costs throughout as against the third defendant. 14. The fourth defendant has preferred Memorandum of Cross objections with regard to the award of costs. In view of the claim made by him he was made a party and he did not state in the written statement that his claim has already been satisfied. On the legal contentions he took up the same untenable pleas as the other defendants. It now transpires that his claim has been fully satisfied. But, in view of his conduct, we think that he is not entitled to any costs either in the trial court or in the appeal. 15. The memorandum of cross objections is therefore dismissed, but without costs. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 121 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w that they were partners of the firm and not that they were in charge of, and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business, or that the offence was the result of their negligence or was committed with their consent or connivance. For want of evidence no charge could be framed against the applicants and they deserved to be discharged of the offence as was done by the Magistrate. The order of the Sessions Judge directing further inquiry is thus against the law and deserves to be set aside. The Drugs Inspector would have been well advised to make the complaint alter collecting the necessary evidence. Whether he can make another complaint after making a proper investigation is not in issue in the present revision and no opinion need be expressed on this point. 10. The revision is hereby allowed and the order dated 21-5.1963 of the Additional Sessions Judge directing further inquiry is set aside. The applicants shall be deemed to have been discharged of the offence.
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1964 (3) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amount paid by way of penalty for breach of the law was not an amount which could be allowed as a deduction under section 10(2)(xv). Clearly, the facts of the case before the Supreme Court are distinguishable from those in the instant case. The facts in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 49 ITR 156 are also distinguishable, for in that case the payment made was towards expenditure incurred by the assessee in an infructuous attempt to vindicate itself from an offence committed by it. We are, therefore, of the view that the payments of ₹ 13,517 and ₹ 3,723 are permissible deductions under section; 10(2)(xv) of the Act. In this view of the matter the question must be answered in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is also assessed at ₹ 200.
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1964 (3) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id not transgress any of the constitutional limitations. Such a law therefore must prevail and in the presence of such a law there can be no question of recognition by the Union of the right to exemption, if any, under the agreement with the Ruler of the former Jodhpur State. Therefore, with respect to both the claims raised in that case there was a law which clearly applied to the Mills and it was held that there was no recognition by the new sovereign. In the present case we have only the continuance of the old laws and the valuable evidence afforded by Art. VI of the Covenant and there is nothing to show that the right to claim refund was taken away by any law competently passed. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the appellant can derive no assistance from the case of Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills(A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 953). The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. Res- pondent in Appeal No. 887 will get his costs from the appellant. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le 19(1)(f) and (g), and so, it would be necessary for the courts to examine the validity of the orders passed under Section 87B whereby consent has been refused in part only, with meticulous care. That is why we are disposed to hold that in the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the statements made in the affidavit filed by the respondent, the order passed by the respondent should be construed as an order according con-sent to the institution of the suit which the petitioner proposes to file and treat the latter portion of the order in regard to the properties described in Schedules B, C, D and X as being invalid. 13. The result is, the petition, in substance, succeeds and we grant him the declaration that the order passed by the Central Government is an order which accords consent to the institution of the suit which he proposes to file against the Maharaja Okendrajit Singh. The petitioner would be entitled to his costs from the respondent. Order accordingly.
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1964 (3) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... riable in a court of law, it would not be fair or just that the said citizen should be prevented from inviting a court of competent jurisdiction to deal with his dispute. If the power to grant sanction is exercised in a sensible way and is not used for stifling claims which, are not far-fetched or frivolous, that may prevent the growth of discontent in the minds of litigants against the artificial provision prescribed by s. 87B. In the present proceedings, it does appear, prima facie, that the petitioners have a genuine grievance against the Central Government's refusal to, accord sanction to them to get a judicial decision on the dispute between them and respondent No. 2. That, naturally is a matter for the Central Government to consider. However, since it is not possible to accede to the petitioner's argument that s. 87B is invalid, we see no alternative but to dismiss the writ petition. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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