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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 81 Records
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1965 (11) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book. In our opinion it was injudicious for the learned Sessions Judge to order the commitment of the appellants particularly so without giving any thought to the aspects of the matter to which we have adverted. Even the High Court has come to no positive conclusion about the propriety of the direction made by the Sessions Judge and has merely said that the Sessions Judge was not unjustified in making the order which he made in each of the applications. For all these reasons we allow the appeals, quash the orders of the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High Court and direct that the trials of each of the appellants shall proceed before the Magistrate according to law from the stages at which they were on the date on which the stay order became operative. 16. Appeals allowed.
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1965 (11) TMI 160 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oes not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. That view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Munnalal v. State of U.P. 1964CriLJ11 That position in law has not been disputed by Mr. Soni on behalf of the appellant. The point was raised in the lower court and the learned Sessions Judge has held that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant. He has in this connection also painted out that this point as to the defect in the investigation was not taken by the accused during the trial. Mr. Soni has not been able to point out in what way the defence has been prejudiced or there has been miscarriage of justice by reason of this defect and therefore the argument relating to the defect in the investigation does not in this case affect the merits of the case. (After considering the facts and the evidence as recorded in paras 16 to 26 the conviction of the appellant was held to be validly made and was maintained along with the punishment awarded)
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1965 (11) TMI 159 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that there is by infraction of the principles of natural justice. As a matter of fact, the assessees availed themselves of the alternative remedy, have filed appeals, which now have been heard, and orders thereon reversed. We find no exceptional justifiable reasons to persuade us to by-ass the statutory remedies. In view of these circumstances, as we said, we accept the contention for the Revenue that we must leave the assessees to the remedies provide under the Act. These remedies include eventually a reference to this Court under S. 66 of the Act. 9. The petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 one set. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners say that it would be desirable that the appeals pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner are disposed of at an early date. We think so. Learned counsel for the Revenue undertakes that he will communicate with the appellate authority, so that it may dispose of the appeals within two months from today.
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1965 (11) TMI 158 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... ountry. In this contention he relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kanal Lal v. Kumar Purunendu Nath 51 CW.N. 227 where S.r. Das J., as he then was, refused to import this rule of construction in the construction of Indian settlement and wills. These contentions raise an interesting question but it is not necessary for us to decide it since this rule of construction, there are several other circumstances to which we have adverted which clearly indicate the intention of the settler to give a vested interest to the assessee in the corpus. (13) In the view of the matter, our answer to the question referred to us that the interest of the assessee in the corpus is neither a spes successions nor a contingent interest dependent on the assessee being alive on 31st March 1987 but is a vested interest and therefore capable of valuation and should be valued as such. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner. (14) Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (11) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Rajasthan is not in our opinion reasonable. All the facts which he has narrated bear upon past events in his official life. Nothing has been said which will show that there is in any manner an interference direct or indirect with the investigation of the offences alleged against him or the trial of the case before the special Judge, Bharatpur. A general feeling that some persons are hostile to the petitioner is not sufficient. There must be material from which it can be inferred that the persons who are so hostile are interfering or are likely to interfere either directly or indirectly with the course of justice. Of this there is no trace either in his petition or in the arguments which were advanced before us. Nor does the petitioner allege anything against the special Judge who is trying the case. In this view of the matter we decline to order trans- fer of the case from the special Judge, Bharatpur. The petition accordingly fails and will be dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 156 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , the revenue has to contend itself against another objection. It is common ground that the rent for which tax is sought to be levied relates to the period 1945-49, that is, before the Act came into force on April 1, 1951. The income is not taxable under the Act. In a recent decision of this court in Ramakrishnan v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, it was held that the Act cannot have retrospective operation so as to take into account an amount which a lessee had become indebted to pay by way of rent to the landlord, on a date long anterior to the coming into force of the Act. It cannot bring in for the purpose of levy the realisation of a claim for arrears of rent which arose long before the Act came into force. The two sums, therefore, are not liable to be taxed. In the result, we answer the first question referred to us in favour of the revenue and the second question in favour of the assessee. The revenue will pay the assessees costs. Counsels fee of assessee ₹ 250.
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1965 (11) TMI 155 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rections of court, and partake the status of an "association of persons" producing income by their joint act or venture, these characteristics, in our view, are reflected on the beneficiaries as to the source, character and liability to tax of the income which ultimately belongs to them. The shares of the beneficiaries here are no doubt determinate. But, having regard to the source of and the mode in which the income was derived, we are of the view that the receivers were rightly assessed as an "association of persons" under section 10 and that the jurisdiction to so assess them is under section 41. Notwithstanding the approach made by the revenue and the Tribunal, and also the frame of the question under reference, the proper way to look at it, as we consider, is that the assessment should be treated as one made under section 10 read with section 41. We answer the question referred to us in favour of the revenue with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1965 (11) TMI 154 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave made false and defamatory statements. 21. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion of the several authorities, it is clear to me that the English Common law rule pertaining to absolute privilege enjoyed by Judges, advocates, attorneys, witnesses and parties in regard to words spoken or uttered during the course of a judicial proceeding is applicable in India, at any rate, in relation to civil suits filed for damages for libel or slander. The preponderance of authority obtaining in the matter, as I have indicated above, favours this view and I, therefore, feel no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that having regard to the fact that the alleged defamatory statements were made by defendant No. 6 on an occasion which was absolutely privileged, the plaintiff's suit to recover damages for the said slander would be not maintainable. 22. In the result, the two preliminary issues are answered in favour of the defendants and consequently the suit is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (11) TMI 153 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ne whether the Company Court has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with a particular matter relating to a company, the line of enquiry should be whether the Act has, in regard to that matter, created a right or liability not existing under the general law and has also, at the same time, given a particular and special remedy for enforcing it. BY THE COURT This petition is allow ed. The order dated the 18th February, 1965 of the Civil Judge, First Class, Rajnandgaon holding that he has jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the respondent Hajarimal is set aside, and the learned Civil Judge is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff with proper endorsement as required by Order 7, Rule 10, C. P. C. The respondent Hajarimal shall pay to the petitioners costs here and in the Court below. Counsel's fee of this petition is fixed at ₹ 200, which shall be paid by the respondent Hajarimal. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners.
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1965 (11) TMI 152 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uyer subsists and that he has power to transfer the same. This is applicable only to case where there is representation which the buyer accepted though he might have been aware of the defect but hoping that the defects would not affect him. But when the buyer himself knew full well that the seller had no title and was entering into the transaction with full knowledge of want of title this implied warranty cannot be invoked. The validity of the contract itself is questionable as opposed to section 23 of the Contract Act as the object of the agreement itself is fraudulent involving injury to the person or property of another. In the circumstances it has to be held that the plaintiff cannot recover the expenses incurred by him in the prior litigation. 5. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside an those of the trial court restored. There will be no order as to costs here. No leave. 6. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (11) TMI 151 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... r, 1961 (Annexure III), we must quash not only the orders of the Superintendent of Excise but also the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise, Patna, and the order under revision passed by the Government of India (Annexure III). It does not appear that the appellate authority gave the petitioned an opportunity of being heard before disposing of the appeal. ( 16. ) For these reasons, I would quash the orders of the Superintendent of Central Excise dated the 13th March, 1961, and 17th March, 1961 (Annexures I and II), the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise dated 30th June, 1961 (Annexure II-A) and the order of the Central Government in the Ministry of Finance (Government of Revenue) dated the 21st December, 1961 (Annexure III) and direct the Collector of Central Excise, Patna, to rehear the appeal of the petitioner after giving him a reasonable opportunity of representing his case and dispose it of according to law. There will be no order for costs.
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1965 (11) TMI 150 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e majority judges in Jadavji Narsidas's case (supra), after arriving at their conclusion in the passage quoted above, made it clear that they were not deciding what would be the position if a partner in an unregistered firm claimed to adjust his share of loss in his individual assessment. The majority judges said “Whether the partners in their individual assessments would be able to take advantage of section 16(1)(b) and the decision of the Privy Council in Arunachalam Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1936 4 ITR 173 (PC) (a point almost conceded before us) is not a matter on which we need pronounce our opinion.” This decision does not, therefore, assist the contention urged on behalf of the revenue and cannot be invoked by the revenue to negative the construction which we are inclined to place on the relevant sections of the Act. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee.
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1965 (11) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ness and propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate. In our opinion, the position about the Comissioner’s powers was not different even under the unamended provision. It may also be relevant to point out that the power conferred on the State Government at all material times by s. 7-F was very wide. As we have already indicated, in exercise of its powers under s. 7-F, the State Government can pass such orders as appear to it to be necessary in the ends of justice. Therefore, there is no doubt that the relevant provisions of the Act did not intend, even prior to the amendment of 1954, to limit the jurisdiction of the Commissioner only to cases where irregularity or illegality bad been committed by the District Magistrate in granting or refusing, to grant permission. The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal is set aside, and that of the District Court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (11) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ; used in the Explanation and also in sub-s. (2) of s. 14 clearly indicates that the object of the section is to make a Hindu female a full owner of the property which she has already acquired or which she acquires after the enforcement of the Act. It does not in any way confer a title on the female Hindu where she did not in fact possess any vestige of title. It follows, therefore, that the section cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser. In other words, the provisions of s. 14(1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the 'date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property. For these reasons we hold that the judgment of the High Court is correct and this appeal should be dismissed. We do not propose to make any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 147 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... only to prove that the debt became bad in the course of the accounting year, but also that it was a good debt at the commencement of the year. The argument on behalf of the department that no registered notices were issued, nor legal proceedings were taken and, hence, the debt could not be written off has no substance in view of the evidence already referred to. At any rate, we cannot say that the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in this regard is not based on evidence, and warranting interference by this court. For all these reasons, we hold that the assessee is entitled to the allowance of ₹ 89,140 under section 10(2)(xi) of the Act on the ground that it is a bad debt and that the department was not justified in disallowing it. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in favour of the assessee. The costs of this reference, ₹ 250, will be paid to the assessee by the Commissioner of Income-tax. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (11) TMI 146 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... emuneration which had accrued to him. If the resolution, therefore, in this case is to be read as having the effect of denying the salary during the period of nine months to the assessee or if it is to be taken that the assessee had waived the accrued remuneration, such denial, withdrawal or waiver occurred subsequent to the assessment year, and it would, therefore, be totally ineffective in the computation of the income for the assessment year which would be liable to tax under section 7. The entries made in the folio page relating to the assessee in the books of the company, having particular regard to the terms of the agreement, would appear to be irrevocable entries and it would not be open to the board of directors to cancel those entries in their effect by the resolution. On this view also, the remuneration for the period of nine months can be rightly brought to tax. The question referred to us is answered against the assessee with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1965 (11) TMI 145 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come-tax Officer in this very case for arriving at the income of ₹ 42,257 for the first 18 days of the year 1956, allows the assessee to pay the surplus up to 7.49 per cent. to the shareholders and, so long as this provision is not infringed and, in pursuance thereof, the assessee had credited ₹ 78,266.50P. long before there was any question of any transfer, this computation of market value cannot be questioned. We, therefore, hold that the calculation of the Income-tax Officer by which he arrived at ₹ 10,81,688 as being the value of the business on the basis that ₹ 3,06,930 was the share of surplus payable to the shareholders is wrong and that the market value must be placed at ₹ 16,54,969." We are unable to hold that, in taking that view, the Tribunal was unreasonable. We answer the question in this reference against the revenue. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250, one set. Questions answered accordingly.
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1965 (11) TMI 144 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l is right here and has the support of Neptune Assurance Co. v. Life Insurance Corporation. But there can be no distribution to the shareholders out of a mere right which had not fructified into an actual refund. For the assessees our attention is drawn to Girdhardas and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, and it is stated that a notional or deemed dividend for the purpose of section 23A cannot be regarded as dividend paid out of accumulated profits within the meaning of section 2(6A)(c). Though the analogy of this decision is not precisely in point, learned counsel for the assessee, in our opinion, is right when he contends that, on the fictional basis relied on by learned counsel for the revenue, it cannot be held that the sum of ₹ 1,49,444 represented accumulated profits on the date of distribution, to wit, March 10, 1955. We answer the question under reference in relation to both the sums against the revenue with costs; counsel's fees ₹ 250 (one set).
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1965 (11) TMI 143 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... venant or incident of the contract of sale . In the case before us, the transport of manganese ore from Katangjhiri, that is from the State of Madhya Pradesh, to Gondia and Vishakhapatnam Port, places outside the State, was clearly the result of the contracts of sale entered into between the assessee and the purchasers referred to earlier. The sales were, therefore, clearly inter-State sales and not liable to be taxed under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The Sales Tax Tribunal was thus right in holding that the sales were not liable to be taxed under the local Act, and in remitting the matter to the Sales Tax Officer for assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the question placed before us is that the turnover of the assessee amounting to Rs. 2,77,976.45 P. was the turnover of inter-State sales of manganese. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (11) TMI 142 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nk that a rule nisi should have been issued in the petitioners application. We accordingly order as follows The appeal is allowed and the order appealed from is set aside. There should be a rule nisi directing the respondents to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue quashing the orders and/or resolution and/or proceedings sought to be impugned by the petitioners. If the taxes have not yet been realised there should also be an injunction restraining the respondents from realising the sales tax before disposal of the rule. The rule is made returnable by 10th January, 1966, before the learned judge taking applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are given liberty to amend the petition by inserting an additional ground in paragraph 13 stating that the order sought to be challenged by them in this petition is a nullity. The costs of this appeal will be costs in the application to be heard. G.K. MITTER, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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