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Showing 1 to 20 of 70 Records
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1965 (2) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g to that illustration, the person committing breach of contract has to pay to the other party the difference between the contract price of the articles agreed to be sold and the sum paid by the other party for purchasing another article on account of the default of the first party, but the first party has not to pay the compensation which the second party had to pay to third parties as he had not been told at the time of the contract that the second party was making the purchase of the article for delivery to such third parties. 15. We therefore hold that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant suffered no such damage which he could recover from the respondent. 16. In view of what we have said above, it is not necessary to discuss whether the correspondence between the parties in June-July 1952 made out a completed contract or not and whether the appellant committed breach of contract or not. 17. The result is that the appeal fails and it dismissed with costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch it may deem to affect the public interest." This would suggest that the power so conferred would extend to matters which may not be in the public interest. For, that would be the effect of introducing the fiction created by the words "for any reason which it may deem". There is no guidance in the Act for determining what matters, though not in public interest, may yet be capable of being deemed to be in the public interest by the State Government. In the circumstances it must be held that the power which conferred upon the State Government being unguided is unconstitutional. For this reason I hold that section 14 in so far as it confers power on the State Government to require a seat of a member of a committee to be vacated for any reason which it may deem to affect public interest as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional. In the result each of the appeals is allowed with costs and I accordingly do so. 15. Appeals allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ustice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. The circumstances found by the High Court, which we have stated earlier, lead to the only conclusion that the accused must have committed the murder. No other reasonable hypothesis was or could be suggested. Further, in this case, as we have noticed earlier, P.W.s 11, 13 and 15 deposed that they clearly heard the accused say when he opened the door of the house and came out at 60'clock in the morning of the fateful day that he had "finished Sunderpatti, his daughter-in-law, and thereby finished the daily quarrels". We hold that this extra- judicial confession is relevant evidence it certainly corroborates the circumstantial evidence adduced in the .case. In the result, we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court both in regard to the conviction and the sentence. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (2) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ounter-affidavit filed by the State from the relevant Manuals and other books and documents show that the Fort wall was a historical monument and was treated as such, being the wall built around the famous Sree Padmanabhaswami Temple. It is not an archaeological site for exploration and study, but an existing structure surviving from a former period. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the Fort wall is a monument and the State Government was within its rights to issue the impugned notification under s. 3 of the State Regulation 1 of 1112 M.E. We are not deciding in this case whether the wall in dispute is part of the Fort wall. Such and other objections may be raised under the provisions of the Act in the manner prescribed thereunder. In this view, it is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether Art. 363 of the Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the petition. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (2) TMI 132 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ces of the particular case which have to be taken into considera- tion in coming to a finding whether the two businesses are one or separate and distinct. In the present case all the material on record was duly con- sidered in arriving at the findings of fact and the well-settled principles having been kept in mind by the Tribunal in drawing the legal inference from proved facts, it is not possible to say that the conclusion arrived at that the business of cloth and cotton waste was not the same as share and jobbering business was one which it could not possibly have arrived at. For the reasons given above, the second question is also answered in the affirmative (sic) but against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. As both parties have partly succeeded in this reference, they are left to bear their own costs. The Commissioner of Income-tax will however get his costs in Income-tax References Nos. 169 and 170 of 1962 which we assess at ₹ 100 in each case.
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1965 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... i after the evidence of the guard that he found the seals and rivets intact when he left Mughalsarai with the train. On a careful consideration of the evidence therefore we are of opinion that a fair inference cannot be drawn from the evidence of the railway that there was misconduct by the railway or its servants at Mughalsarai during the time when the wagon was there. If the evidence of the guard is accepted, and we do accept it, there can be no doubt that the loss of the goods took place be-case of theft in the running train between Mughalsarai and Buxar. There is no evidence on behalf of the respondent to prove misconduct and as misconduct cannot fairly be inferred from the evidence produced on behalf of the railway, the suit must fail. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that of the Additional Subordinate Judge. In the circumstances of this case we order parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 129 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the decision that we are taking it is possible for the department to urge before the Tribunal when the matter goes back to it after we have answered the questions, the department may, if so advised, urge those contentions before the Tribunal and the Tribunal may consider them for what they are worth. In our opinion, therefore, questions Nos. 2 and 4 must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. As we have already pointed out earlier question No. 3 will be answered in the affirmative since the counsel for the assessee has not pressed it and has accepted the conclusion of the Tribunal with regard to the point involved in the said question as correct. The result, therefore, is that the question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative. Questions Nos. 2 and 4 are answered in the negative. Question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative. In view of the fact that the department as well as the assessee have succeeded partially, there will be no order as to costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 128 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cealed. It has been found that the amount concealed is only ₹ 24,000. The penalty imposed is ₹ 62,000, nearly two and a half times the amount concealed. The quantum of penalty has not been referred to us. A view has been taken in some cases that the quantum of penalty is not a question of law but a question of fact. Section 28 only provides the utmost limit to which penalty could be imposed. The quantum of penalty is left to the discretion of the Income-tax Officers, and it has been pointed out in a decision to which the learned counsel for the revenue had made reference, that the income-tax authorities in this matter should exercise the discretion in a judicious and equitable manner having regard to the extent of concealment. However, on the question referred to us it does not lie within our power to grant any relief to the assessee. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner.
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1965 (2) TMI 127 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fore the income-tax authorities or the Tribunal. Shri Chitale supplemented the arguments of Shri Palkhivala by adding that there was a distinction between the case of Firm Bhagat Ram Mohanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 29 ITR 521 (SC), and the present case as here there was no partnership in any coparcenary property. It seems to us unnecessary to consider this contention when the case of the assessee-firm has all along been that Sir Hukumchand and his son, Rajkumar Singh, became partners of the assessee-firm on behalf of a Hindu undivided family and the share and interest in the firm held by them beneficially belonged to the Hindu undivided family. For the foregoing reasons, our answer to the question propounded is that the assessee-firm was entitled to registration under section 26A of the Act for the assessment year 1954-55 and that the Tribunal was right in directing the Income-tax Officer to register the firm. The assessee-firm shall have costs of this reference.
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1965 (2) TMI 126 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n six persons should hold more than 50% of the total voting power was an additional safeguard against a very small number of persons controlling the company. The fact that the shareholding of 50% by the public was reduced to 40% in the case of a company engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods only shows that the legislature was stretching a point to foster industries and develop industrial growth in the country. The legislature was further of opinion that even if only 40% of the shares were held by the Government, the mischief of withholding distribution of dividends was not likely to occur in view of the Government's influential position. Thus it will be noticed that there is no arbitrariness behind the fixing of the percentages of shareholding mentioned in the Explanation to sub-section (9) of section 23A. In the result, the answers to both the questions are in the negative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of this reference. Masud, J.- I agree.
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1965 (2) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ocument construed by this court in Rachpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka, MANU/SC/0046/1950 1950 1SCR548 and is covered by the decision in that case. We accordingly reject the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the respondents on this aspect of the case. 13. For the reasons expressed we hold that the view taken by the High Court must be overruled and the plaintiff must be granted a mortgage decree for the amount of ₹ 31,000 odd, as claimed in the plaint together with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the institution of the suit and costs. The plaintiff is accordingly granted the usual mortgage decree under Order 34, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, and it should be stated in the decree that if the defendants do not pay the amount within the period of six months from this date the mortgaged properties described in the schedule to the plaint would be sold for the satisfaction of the amount owing to the plaintiff. 14. We accordingly allow this appeal with costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hort period after it delivered its judgment, is found to be erroneous; and the impugned notification would continue in operation without the appellant getting an opportunity to show cause why it should not continue to be in operation. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court should have granted the prayer made by the appellant for the issue of an appropriate writ cancelling the impugned notification. Though the impugned notification has been issued in 1956 for five years, its life gets statutorily extended, and the only way in which the appellant would be able to show cause why the said notification should not be extended in respect of his Kattalai is to quash the said notification. 19. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court, and direct that an appropriate writ or order be issued quashing the notification issued by the respondent State on August 4, 1956. The appellant would be entitled to his costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 123 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... the case of Mahmed Husain Khan v. Radha Kishun, AIR 1944 All 15 wherein a distinction has been made between a suit and an appeal, and in that case it was held that Section 296 of the U. P. Tenancy Act applied to only suits and execution applications and not to appeals. (6.)To sum up my view is that when a suit under Section 209 is pending before the trial Court at the time when the amendment of 1962 was passed it is desirable that U. P. State be impleaded as a party to the suit under the direction of the Court, but at the time when this amending Act was passed if a suit has reached the appellate stage it is not at all necessary to direct the impleadment of U. P. State to the prejudice of the successful party. TO set aside a validly obtained decree for impleading U. P. State is against all canons of justice and in my view is not warranted by the provisions of law as discussed above. In view of the above I find no force in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ged that the sentence which occurs in both the applications, namely that the requirements are not available at Deoria, shows that the purpose for which the iron and steel was required was for construction of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria. This argument is sought to be reinforced by asserting that a District Magistrate was not empowered to recommend applications for iron required for works to be constructed outside the District, and therefore it must be held that the purpose was construction of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria. However, no orders showing the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate in respect of this matter has been shown to us, and we are unable to conclude from the applications that the purpose was construction of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria alone. Accordingly we hold that the respondent has not contravened cl. 7 of the Control Order. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (2) TMI 121 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... salary to the gains and profits of the partnership. The first question is accordingly answered in favour of the department and against the assessee. As regards the second question we feel that the Tribunal was not justified in its conclusion that the same need not be decided. It would have been a different matter if the allocation was not made by the Income-tax Officer as referred to in the statement of the case (page 4 of the printed papers, lines 34, 35). When once an allocation is made it is not disputed that it has become final and cannot be revoked in subsequent proceedings. That being the correct position the Tribunal ought to have gone into this question and given its decision thereon. We are, therefore, obliged to send this back to the Tribunal for a consideration of the second question. However, in view of the fact that the second question was not answered, and, therefore, it is being sent back for consideration, we fix in this case counsel's fee at ₹ 150.
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1965 (2) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e loss. The scheme of the Act shows that, unless the amount of depreciation has actually been allowed, the question of a balancing charge will not arise. In this view of the matter, there was only material for the finding that the sum of ₹ 5,063 and ₹ 3,797 was depreciation which was "actually allowed" during the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50, i.e., a total of ₹ 8,860 and for eight trucks that sum alone can be taken into consideration in computing the excess profit under the second proviso to section 10 (2)(vii) of the Act. Our answer therefore to the question is that the actual depreciation allowed alone should be taken into consideration in computing the written down value and determining the excess under the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Act. The question is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200. Question answered accordingly.
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1965 (2) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... committed an offence and for whose arrest a warrant could issue, was within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 13. The appellant held two offices--one an executive office and the other a judicial office. He pleaded protection against the liability arising out of his action substantially on the ground that ha acted in the discharge of his duty under the direction given by his superior officer. In so pleading he was relying primarily upon his executive office. The Court of First Instance and the High Court have come to the conclusion that the appellant had "acted recklessly and maliciously" in arresting the respondent. That conclusion is based upon appreciation of evidence and has not been challenged before us. As a Judicial Officer the appellant has no protection, because he is not shown to have acted in ordering that the respondent be arrested in the discharge of the duties of his office as a Magistrate. 14. The appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed with cost.
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1965 (2) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o s. 10 with regard to the saving of the right to the trees in favour of the jagirdars. We are accordingly of the opinion that after coming into force of the Jagirs Abolition Act respondents 1 to 11 became occupants in respect of the forest lands in the 36 villages and the only rights which they have are those of occupants under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and such rights do not include the right to cut and remove the trees from the forest lands of the villages in question. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in holding that the respondents were entitled to cut and remove all species of trees standing in the forest lands of the 36 villages in question. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated January 14, 1959 in Special Civil Application no. 2146 of 1958 and order that the Special Civil Application should be dismissed. The appellants are entitled to costs both in this Court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 117 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot the case where the assessee is merely earning a rental from property. He is doing something more. That is, he is carrying on the business of a paying guest establishment and the building in which this business is carried on is an integral part of the assessee's business venture. It is not necessary to further dilate on the matter in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income- tax v. National Storage Private Ltd. 1963 48 I.T.R. 577, which has fully dealt with the matter and has laid down the requirements to be kept in view in determining when rental income from property falls to be assessed under section 9 or under section 10. The present case is covered by proposition No. 6 in the Bombay High Court decision already referred to. For the reasons recorded above, the first question, as re-framed by us, is answered in the affirmative and the second question is answered in the negative. There will be no order as to costs. S.K. KAPUR J.--I agree.
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1965 (2) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ors, and though he intimated to Mr. Mehta that he desired to examine his doctors, Mr. Mehta failed to give him an opportunity to do so. That, in our opinion, introduces a fatal infirmity in the whole enquiry which means that the respondent has not been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself within the meaning of Art. 311(2). On that view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the High Court was right in its other conclusions that the second notice served by the appellant on the respondent was defective and that the final order was also defective inasmuch as it did not appear that the appellant had taken into account the representation made by respondent. It is not disputed by the learned Attorney-General that if we hold that the enquiry conducted by Mr. Mehta contravened the mandatory provision of r. 55, the decision of the High Court could be sustained on that ground alone. In the result. the appeal fails and is dismissed with cost. Appeal dismissed.
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