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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 82 Records
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1965 (3) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ow the claim for past mesne profits. For mesne profits pendente lite from the date of the institution of the suit the Plaintiff is relegated to proceedings under Order XX, Rule 12 , Code of Civil Procedure. As the suit is being decreed against the first Defendant, the decree claimed by the Plaintiff in the alternative against the second Defendant has to be and is hereby set aside. 35. So far as the costs of the action are concerned, this is a fit and proper case where the second Defendant should pay the costs of the Plaintiff and first Defendant both in the trial Court and in this Court. There will be a decree accordingly against the second Defendant for the costs of the Plaintiff and the first Defendant in both the Courts. As Defendants 3 to 6 disclaimed all interest in the suit, the dismissal of the suit as against them will stand. The appeal against them is therefore dismissed. But as no relief has been claimed against them there will be no order for costs in their favour.
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1965 (3) TMI 110 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inty. The decision in the case of Haji Latif Abdulla (supra) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is not of much help, because it is a case of provisional certificate, the terms of which are also not known. It does not appear again whether on the certificate the expression 'without prejudice' was there or not. It might be mentioned that there is no evidence in the instant case that the terms were accepted by the plaintiff. For these reasons the further decree passed by the Court of Appeal below is unsustainable and should be set aside. 11. Nevertheless as the learned Subordinate Judge has not decided the appeal applying the above principles, the appeal must go back to him. The said. Court is directed to re-hear the appeal according to law and in the light of the observations made above. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. There will be no order for costs in this appeal. Further costs will be in the discretion of the Court of Appeal below. Let the records go down early.
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1965 (3) TMI 109 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld the facts alleged by the defendants be proved at the trial, will they "afford a good, or even a plausible, answer" to the plaintiffs' claim? I am satisfied, they will. It is not for me therefore to withhold leave. It is not for me either to impose conditions which at the time of hearing I was keen on imposing. After having given the matter further and better consideration, I am clear, it will not be proper on my part to do so. It will be far more improper on my part to demand cash deposit which, I confess, I had hinted at one stage of the hearing. I therefore grant unconditionally the leave prayed for and issue the following directions. A. Written statements by March 26, 1965. B. Discovery and affidavit of documents by March 26, 1965. Inspection forthwith. C. The Suits do appear at the top of the list in the peremptory board on April 5, 1965 irrespective of any cause part-heard. 15. Costs will be costs in the cause. Liberty to mention. Certified for counsel.
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1965 (3) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of this was that on the death of J.K. Rudra his widow became entitled to the same share as a son and as he left only one son, she became entitled to one moiety of the property with her son. 5. By reason of the operation of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, Section 14, the limited interest which she got under the Act of 1937 was converted into that of a full owner. But for Income Tax purposes we have got to see whether her share and that of her son, who were the owners of the property, were definite and ascertained. If so, income from the immovable properties left by J.K. Rudra could only be assessed in their hands under Section 9(1) read with S.C. which could not be treated as income belonging to a joint family even if there was no partition between the widow and her son. 6. In the result, the answer must be in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee did not appear before us. There will therefore be no order as to costs. Syed Sadat Abdul Masud, J. 7. I agree.
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1965 (3) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is view of the matter, I hold that the appeal by Nirmala Bala from the decree in Suit No. 67 of 1955 is maintainable. I would, therefore, have examined the contention of the appellant with regard to Ex. 11 on the merits, and then disposed of the appeal. But as the majority view is that the appeal is not maintainable, no useful purpose will be served by an examination of the merits of the appellant's case with regard to Ex. 11. ORDER 34. Following the judgment of the majority, Appeals Nos. 966 and 968 of 1964 are allowed with costs throughout. It is declared that the properties in deed Ext. 11(a) were absolutely dedicated in favour of the deity Sri Gopal Jiu. Suits Nos. 79 & 80 of 1954 will therefore stand dismissed. This will, however, be without prejudice to the concession made on behalf of Nirmala that she was benamidar of her husband Balai in respect of the properties settled by the deed Ext. 11(a). Appeal No. 967 of 1964 is dismissed with costs in favour of Balai.
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1965 (3) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... view of the High Court as to the interpretation of s. 259. It may be mentioned that before the year 1940 there was r. 42 in the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937 which expressly authorised the Board to recover all arrears of rent and "other payments" under the Rules by resorting to s. 259 of the Act. But that rule was repealed in 1940. It was represented to us by Mr. Gopal Singh that this was repealed because in view of the wide language of s. 259 there was no need felt for the retention of the rule. Whatever that may be, the position is, if I may repeat, that if the word rent is given a restricted meaning as has been done by the High Court, that word would become purposeless. On the other hand if the expression is interpreted in the way suggested here it will serve a purpose for which it was intended. 27. For these reasons I am of the view that the appeal should be allowed. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed.
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1965 (3) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the explanation that is placed before us for the first time, there is nothing in the accounts to indicate the truth of that explanation. We have given careful consideration to the question. If an assessee maintains accounts in such an unintelligible fashion and his accounts contain records of credits which did not show that they have been drawn from other transactions contained in the accounts themselves, the Income-tax Officer seems to us to have been perfectly justified in inferring that these sums should have come in from a totally different source. It was not even unreasonable for him to infer that the entire series of transactions have been kept in this fashion only with a view to conceal the real source of these sums of money, and if so much could be inferred, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that section 28(1)(c) is not attracted. We accordingly answer the question referred to us against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
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1965 (3) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a cheque, then only it could be called "income" such as would be liable to payment of tax, otherwise not. In the admitted circumstances of this case, the interest entered in the books of account at the time when the assessees sent moneys to their branches for the purpose of doing money-lending business through their agents is not income but only a prospective interest on the moneys placed at the disposal of the branches. That money might not be lent out at all and might not earn interest. It would not be just and equitable to treat unrealised interest, although formally credited in the books of account maintained at the head office, as income, profit or gain derived or accrued or received for the purpose of the Income-tax Act. In the result, we answer this point also in favour of the assessee, viz., that the sums of ₹ 9,778 and ₹ 9,676 cannot be held to be interest receipts and as such part of the income of the assessees' headquarters' business.
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1965 (3) TMI 103 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r was entitled to a charge upon the property transferred in the hands of the mortgagor judgment-debtor for the amount of the purchase-money and for interest thereon, and that the charge could be enforced by sale of the property under S. 100 of the Act and under O. 34, R. 15 C. P. C. as in the case of a simple mortgage. (6) In view of these pronouncements, I cannot accept the view taken by both the Courts below that the seller is entitled to possession of the property in default of payment of the purchase-money. The decrees of both the Courts below have, therefore, to be modified. (7) The appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiff-respondent's suit is decreed to the extent of ₹ 685 (O. S.) equivalent to ₹ 587-2-4 (I. G.). In default of payment of the amount, the plaintiff-respondent will have a charge upon the suit property. The appellant will be entitled to costs throughout. No leave. (8) Appeal allowed.
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1965 (3) TMI 102 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave also held that the same principle would apply to the lists prepared under Art. 16(4). The State Government therefore has not committed any mistake in withdrawing the lists, as they clearly offend both Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. We do not therefore think that in with drawing the lists the State Government did not bona fide or validly exercise the discretion which the Constitution vests in it. This Court therefore cannot in a discretionary matter issue a writ of Mandamus. 35. In the view which we have taken we do not think it necessary to attach much importance to a technical ground that the relief sought by the petitioners was only in regard to the Notification issued by the Public Service Commission and that the impugned G.O. was not directly asked to be quashed. 36. For all these reasons we see no force in the Writ Appeal as well as in the writ petition. They are therefore dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1965 (3) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ption and since the appellant did not claim the benefit of that Exception in the High Court, we do not think it would be open to the appellant to press his point that we should examine the question as to whether the trial Judge erred in not allowing the appellant to bring these documents on the record. That is why we did not look at these documents and have not considered the question raised by Mr. Bhasin at the time when the interlocutory judgment was delivered in this case. In other words, the appellant is not allowed to raise his plea that the allegations made by him in the impugned statement are true. 42. Even so, in view of our conclusion that the appellant has succeeded in showing that he is entitled to the protection of the Ninth Exception to s. 499, the appeal must be allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant set aside. If the fine imposed on the appellant has been paid by him, the same should be refunded to him. 43. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (3) TMI 100 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the procedure laid down in section 23 will have to be followed again and unless there are fresh defaults in relation to the said assessment, there could be no best judgment assessment. If, in the present case, the best judgment assessment already made is set aside and the Income-tax Officer is directed to make a fresh assessment, he will not be able to rely upon the failure to comply with the notice under section 22(2) in not submitting a return if the assessee, before the fresh assessment order is made, furnishes the return. In our opinion, therefore, all the contentions which are urged on behalf of the assessee by the learned counsel do not avail him in persuading us to come to the conclusion that the view taken by the Tribunal is erroneous. The result, therefore, is that our answer to the question, which has been referred to us, is in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner. There will be no order on the notice of motion and no order as to costs.
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1965 (3) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llusion or that it obtained the decree by fraud or collusion. The appellants alleged that their partners, Jagat Pershad and Shib Chander Kumar, had entered into the agreement dated September 26, 1956, and had utilised the moneys received under it in fraud of the appellants and without their authority, but the appellants are not entitled to raise these pleas in the application under O. 21 r. 50(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants were admittedly partners of the firm of Jagatsons International Corporation at the time when the cause of action accrued. In the absence of any pea questioning the decree on the ground of collusion, fraud or the like, respondent No. 1 is entitled to an order under O. 21, r. 50(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure giving it leave to execute the decree against the appellants as partners in the firm. The third contention of Mr. Mukherjee must, therefore, be rejected. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (3) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that there was an implied undertaking on its part to pay godown rent at that rate. We have already discussed the question of reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for storage of the iron sheets and for reasons already given, we hold that the finding of the High Court on this issue is correct. In the result, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the decree with regard to items (a) to (f) as mentioned in the judgment of the High Court, i.e., Rs. as. p. (a) Godown rent ₹ 300 per month for a period of 59 months from July, 1944 to the end of May, 1949 17,700 0 0 (b) Chowkidar's salary 2,360 0 0 (c) Terminal Tax 760 0 0 (d)Cartage 2,105 14 0 (e) Unloading charges 825 5 0 (f) Cooliage 800 0 0 24,551 3 0 and not to interest, i.e., item (g). We accordingly allow Civil Appeal No. 43 of 1963 and modify the judgment and decree of the High Court to the extent indicated above. Civil Appeal 44 of 1963 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of both these appeals.
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1965 (3) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hem and which is not of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them. A fortiori it would also follow that the ultimate order made by it by whatever name it is characterised cannot in law operate as an acquittal. In the Privy Council case it was interpreted by Sir John Beaumont who delivered the opinion of the Board to be an order of discharge. It is unnecessary for us to say whether such an order amounts to an order of discharge in the absence of any express provision governing the matter in the Code or it does not amount to an order of discharge. It is sufficient to say that it does not amount to an order of acquittal as contemplated by s. 403(1) and since the proceedings before the Special Judge ended with that order it would be enough to look upon it merely as an order putting a stop to the proceedings. For these reasons we hold that the trial and eventual conviction of the appellant by Mr. Bhattacharjee were valid in law and dismiss the appeal. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (3) TMI 96 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xcept the said picture the defendant company is not liable to make over possession of any one of the other 5 items of artistic goods in suit. x x x x 23. In the result, there will be a decree as follows It is declared that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the articles mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint. There will be a decree for possession as against the defendant company of only one item, namely, item No. (vi) in paragraph 5 of the plaint or its value assessed at ₹ 5,000. As against the defendant Maharaja, there will be a decree for possession of the remaining items or their value, as indicated above (Omitted-Ed). 24. In the facts of this case, the plaintiff will pay only the costs of the Receiver. The plaintiff will get costs from the defendant Maharaja on undefended scale. Save as aforesaid, the parties will bear their own costs certified for two counsel. 25. An injunction has been issued by this Court. The injunction will stand dissolved after six weeks.
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1965 (3) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 25B and 2(eee) in one place, adding some other matters which are not relevant to the present purpose, but the purport of the new provisions is not different. In fact the amendment of s. 25F of the principal Act by substituting in cl. (b) the words "for every completed year of continuous service" for the words "for every completed year of service" now removes a discordance between the unamended section 25B and the unamended cl. (b) of s. 25B. Neither before these several changes nor after is uninterrupted service necessary if the total service is 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months. The only change in the new Act is that this service must be during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made. The last amendment now removes a vagueness which existed in the unamended s. 25B. We accordingly hold that the decision under appeal is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (3) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... specific mention of overhead cables or wires is made. But, in our opinion, on that account it cannot be said that electric machinery in clause E should be read as excluding from its scope overhead cables and wires. The use of the expression "electric plant, machinery, boilers" in clause E appears to have been made in a comprehensive sense so as to include parts of the plant as well as electric machinery. Clause E seems to be in the nature of an exception to clause C and where it concerns electric supply undertaking, a consolidated rate is fixed for electric plant, machinery, boilers, without reference to the various parts which go to make up the plant, machinery or boilers. 5. It follows therefore the Tribunal was right in allowing 10 depreciation and restoring the order of the Income Tax Officer on that matter. The reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. Counsels fee ₹ 250. 6. Reference answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (3) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... any persons. But this is not a matter proper to influence the House unless in a doubtful case affording foothold for balanced speculation as to the probable intention of the legislature." In the present case the language of s. 178 of the Contract Act is clear and explicit and if any hardship and’ inconvenience is felt it is for Parliament to take appropriate steps to amend the law and not for the courts to legislate under the guise of interpretation. For the reasons expressed, we hold-that Civil Appeal 474 of 1962 brought by the plaintiff-bank should be dismissed and Civil Appeal 475 of 1962 brought by the Union of India through the General Manager, Central Railway should be allowed with costs and’ the suit of the plaintiff-bank should be dismissed with costs throughout. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the majority Judgment. Civil Appeal 474 of 1962 is allowed and Civil Appeal 475 of 1962 is dismissed,plaitiff’s suit is decreed with costs throughout.
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1965 (3) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sion in Babburu Basavayya and four others v. Babburu Guravayya(I.L.R. 1952 Madras 173) is not shaken by what this Court has said. One of the grounds given is that the former relates to a suit for partition while the latter to a suit for possession simpliciter. It is not necessary for us to consider whether the decision of this Court can be distinguished upon this ground, but we feel that when a suitable occasion arises it may become necessary to reconsider the decision of this Court as to future mesne profits. In the present case the plaintiff did claim not only partition and separate possession of her half share of the properties but also past mesne profits. The defendant No. 1 admitted the plaintiff’s claim and in substance prayed for a similar decree in her favour. The decision of this Court would, therefore, not apply to a case like the one before us. In the result therefore we uphold the decree of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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