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Showing 1 to 20 of 61 Records
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1966 (1) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... achment before judgment was made in this case. He has requested us to direct that the attachment be continued so as to facilitate the recovery of decretal amount in case there is default in its payment. The request is reasonable. 14. The appeal is partly allowed. The decree passed by the court below is confirmed subject to the following modifications - (1) The rate of interest recoverable by the plaintiff-respondent as from 1st July 1954 to 1st August 1959 will be calculated at the rate of four per cent per annum and not at the rate of five per cent per annum. (2) The attachment made before judgment under Or. 28, C.P.C will continue for a period of two years in view of the instalment decree. (3) The decretal amount principal, interest and costs will be payable by the defendant-appellant within a period of two years from the date of the decree of this Court by equal monthly instalment. (4) The plaintiff-respondent will get costs of this Court also from the defendant-appellant.
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1966 (1) TMI 91 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ection 40(1) of the Act is immaterial inasmuch as the Government does not generally as pointed out by the Supreme Court in AIR 1905 SC 046 (supra) state in so many words in the agreement whether the proceeding is under Clause (a) or Clause (aa) or Clause (b) of Section 40(1) of the Act. It appears to us that this contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 6 has considerable force, but in view of our finding that the proposed acquisition is justifiable under Section 40(1)(b) of the Act, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion on this point. This disposes of all the points which have been raised on behalf of the parties appearing before us in this appeal. 21. In the result, this appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed with costs to the respondents, hearing fee being assessed at five gold mohurs for each set of appearing respondents. 22. Let the operation of this order remain stayed for one week from this date. B.C. Mitra, J. 23. I agree.
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1966 (1) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... butions demanded for the pre-discovery period but that will be a matter for which relief will have to be claimed on proper grounds in an application under S. 7-A of the Act. There are therefore no grounds for inferring a discriminatory operation of the provisions of the Act. 18. We therefore allow the appeals in part as indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. In the case W. A. 80 of 1963 the order of Jagadisan J. issuing a writ of mandamus will be set aside but with observation that it will open to the petitioner to urge a claim for necessary reliefs including claims in respect of damages and also in respect of contributions relating individuals like those who have left the employment, and so on, during the period 1-11-1952 to 30-4-1957, in an application to be filed before the appropriate authority under S. 7-A. in the case of W. A. 81 of 1963 while allowing the appeal from the decision of Veeraswami J. we also make a similar observation. No costs. 19. Appeal partly allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the High Court has finally decided the question of jurisdiction. It is obvious that if the High Court had decided to hold that there was no jurisdiction, the debt would have stood discharged. The order once again revived the debt. Now the order of the Commissioner was challenged on the ground of jurisdiction in a separate proceeding. The High Court decided to dismiss the petition and the order that was passed must be regarded as final for the purpose of appeal to this Court. As the other requirements of the article were satisfied the High Court was in error in refusing the certificate in this case. 18. The appeal must, therefore, succeed. The order dated February 1, 1965 is set aside and the case will now go back to the High Court for disposal according to law. The first respondent shall bear the costs of the appellant. 19. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2180 of 1965 was not pressed and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this petition. 20. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itution mentioned earlier by us cannot help, partly because they are irrelevant and mainly because no such arguments appear to have been advanced in the High Court. We accordingly reject the contention that s. 44-B or the resumption under it were invalid. There remains only the question of adverse possession. In Boddapalli Jagannadham and anr. v. Secretary of State(1 it was held that there is no period of limitation prescribed by any law within which alone Government. should exercise its prerogative of imposing assessment on land liable to be assessed with public revenue. This case was followed in Subramaniam Chettiar v. Secretary of State(2) . As the resumption was of the melwaram only these rulings apply. Mr. Ramchandra Aiyer admitted that he had no authority to the contrary. This point has no force. This appeal (Civil Appeal 389 of 1964) must also fail. The two appeals will accordingly be dismissed with costs. There will be a right to set off the costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the property before 1947, for, admittedly the property was worth more than ₹ 100 and it is not disputed that a registered sale deed was necessary to pass title from Abdul Aziz Khan to the appellant. No registered sale deed was executed in this case and therefore the property did not pass from Abdul Aziz Khan to the appellant even up to the time when Abdul Aziz Khan became an evacuee. It may be that if Abdul Aziz Khan had tried to get back the property, s. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act would come to the aid of the appellant in defence. But the present suit has been filed to establish the right of the appellant as owner of the property and in such a suit the appellant cannot take the benefit of s. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. We, therefore, hold in agreement with the High Court that the suit is clearly barred under s. 46 (a) of the Act. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 86 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is a natural method of transfer, and it is certainly not necessary for the donor to withdraw sums in cash from the firm to be reinvested by the donee or donees in the firm. Once the bona fides of the gift or gifts is accepted, there remains little or no difficulty in accepting the validity in ordinary circumstances. The statement of facts in the present case shows that, if the parties had wished, the cash could have been realised and given to the donees, but this was not necessary and the amounts of the gifts were credited in their already existing accounts, and sums had been withdrawn by some of the donees from the amounts standing to their credit in the year following the gifts. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the question referred to us must be answered in favour of the assessee and in the affirmative. The assessee will receive his costs from the Commissioner. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.00. D. K. MAHAJAN J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (1) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m of ₹ 1,50,000 formed part of the compromise or settlement and, therefore, should be regarded as a payment towards capital. We are content to rest our decision on the ground that where a certain sum received has not been brought into the assessee's account, and, therefore, it is not possible to attribute to the receipt any particular method of accounting and there is no appropriation of the sum so received, and it is, therefore, an open payment by a debtor to the creditor, in a question between the assessee or taxpayer and the revenue, the presumption laid down by the Board that the taxpayer is entitled to appropriate payments as between capital and interest in the manner least disadvantageous to himself is applicable. The assessee must, therefore, succeed on the third question. We answer the first two questions against the assessee and the third question in his favour and against the revenue. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel's fees, ₹ 250.
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1966 (1) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... me to time. If the register is carefully maintained, it will greatly facilitate the speedy and satisfactory disposal of claims to vacant village offices, which, owing to want of such a register at present are made the subject of lengthy enquiries." It is not, therefore, correct to say that the principle of heredity does not apply to the appointments of shanbhogs in the district of South Kanara. The fact that the Board's Standing Orders have not been repealed in their application to the district of South Kanara, which is now part of the State of Mysore, will not make any difference since the Board's Standing Orders recognize the principle of heredity underlying the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act. The schedule to the impugned Act specifically repealed the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act and the Madras Karnams Regulation. The points raised by the appellants must, therefore, fail. The result is that the appeals are dismissed with costs, one hearing fee.
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1966 (1) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iciable. There is no force in this point. Accordingly we hold that there is no infirmity in the order of detention dated February 3, 1964. In Criminal Appeal No. 144 of 1964, the appellant P.P. Sanzgiri, adopted the arguments of Mr. Garg and further urged that he had been validly detained by order of the District Magistrate dated November 11, 1962, and there had been no proper cancellation of this order. But he says that this order was bad because there was no confirmation of it. As pointed out above, we are not concerned with the previous orders of detention because the appellant is detailed now under the order dated February 3, 1964, and we need not go into the point. We may mention that in three appeals, Criminal Appeal No. 225/64, Criminal Appeal No. 226/64 and Criminal Appeal No. 227/64, the orders of detention are dated February 14, 1964, but nothing turns on this difference in the dates of detention. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r Art. 226 of the Constitution where orders of detention passed under R. 30 of the Rules are challenged, the High Court has jurisdiction to grant bail, but the exercise of the said jurisdiction is inevitably circumscribed by the considerations which are special to such proceedings and which have relevance to the object which is intended to be served by orders of detention properly and validly passed under the said Rules. We have already indicated that the learned Advocate-General has fairly stated that the appellant has brought the present appeal to this Court not for the purpose of challenging the correctness, propriety or reasonableness of the order under appeal but for the purpose of getting a decision from this Court on the important question of jurisdiction raised by the said order. We do not, therefore propose to consider the question as to whether the order under appeal is proper, reasonable or valid. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat it is not possible to maintain in butter-milk the same percentage of solids-not-fat content as is found in curds or milk, for water will be added in the process of making butter-milk owing to the fact that butter grains in the churn .are washed with cold water which will run off into the butter- milk. Anyhow, we would prefer to rest our judgment on the absence of fixation of any standard in respect of butter- milk rather than on the process of conversion of curds into butter-milk. We should not be understood to have expressed any view on the question whether a prosecution could be launched for adulteration of butter-milk under some other clauses of the definition of "adulterated" in s. 2 of the Act, for in the present case the prosecution was only for not maintaining the standard. In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside and that -of the District Magistrate is restored. The fine, if it had already been collected, shall be refunded Appeal allowed.
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1966 (1) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ct, no legislative power was conferred thereby on the State Government, and on that account the provisions are not invalid. The High Court also observed that the period in respect of which various orders were passed had expired and it was therefore immaterial for the purpose of the petition to consider whether s. 9 of the impugned Act is invalid. In our opinion, on the averments made in the petition and the materials brought before this Court, it is unnecessary to enter upon the question as to the validity of s. 9 and the orders issued thereunder. No specific Removal of Difficulties Order affecting the rights or -the Society has been brought to our notice. But we may state that nothing in this judgment may be understood as according approval to the views expressed by the High Court on the validity of s.9 or the orders issued thereunder. We leave that question open. to be canvassed when a suitable occasion arises. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he report made against him has not been supplied to the respondent, and even when he was heard before the order of dismissal was passed against him, he had no means of knowing what grounds had weighed with the enquiry committee when it made a report against him. Having regard to the procedure adopted by the State authorities in appointing the enquiry committee, in formulating the questionnaire containing the charges against the respondent, in making the report, and in dealing with the recommendations made by the Chief Secretary from time to time, we are satisfied that High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the respondent had not received a reasonable opportunity to make his defence, and, that the proceedings of the enquiry and the report made by the committee, as well as the final order of dismissal passed against the respondent, have contravened the safeguards guaranteed by S. 14(2) of the Ordinance.The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (1) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed public conscience. As a consequence, the controversy raised before us in the present appeal has today become a matter of mere academic interest. We feel confident that the view which we are taking on the merits of the dispute between the parties in the present appeal not only accords with the true legal position in the matter, but it will receive the spontaneous approval and response even from the traditionally conservative elements of the Satsang community .Whom the appellants represent in the present litigation. In conclusion, we would like to emphasise that the right to enter temples which has been vouchsafed to the Harijans by the impugned Act in substance symbolises the right of Harijans to enjoy all social amenities and rights, for, let it always be remembered that social justice is the main foundation of the democratic way of life ,,enshrined in the provisions of the Indian Constitution. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... court had no jurisdiction and dismisses the appeal even though the trial court might have dismissed the suit on the merits.) In this view of the matter, the appeals must fail, for the trial court had in the present case decided all the four suits on the merits including,the decision on the common issues as to title. The result of the dismissal on a preliminary ground of the two appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 was that the decision of the trial court was confirmed with respect to the common issues as to title by the High Court. In consequence the decision on those issues became resjudicata so far as appeals Nos. 365 and 366 are concerned and s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would bar the hearing of those common issues over again. It is not in dispute that if the decision on the common issues in suits Nos. 77 and 91 has become res judicata, appeals Nos. 365 and 366 must fail. We therefore dismiss the appeals with costs, one set of hearing fee. Appeals dimissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It is hardly to be suggested that this obvious anomaly was allowed to exist. It would, therefore, appear that in speaking of a pending suit, the legislature was thinking not only in terms of the suit proper but also of those stages in the life of the suit which ordinarily take place before a final executable document comes into existence. The words of the section we are concerned with, speak, of a suit pending on the, commencement of the Act and it means a live suit whether in the court of first instance or in an appeal court where the judgment of.,,the court of first instance is being considered. It only excludes those suits in which nothing further needs to be done in relation to the rights or claims litigated, because an executable decree which may not be reopened is already in existence. The decision of the High Court was right in applying s. 3 of the Usurious Loans Act (as amended) to the case. The appeal thus fails and it will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1027) and on the passage at pp. 394 and 395 in Lindley’s Partnership under the head "Form of Transfer’ in support of his argument. Both the cases relied upon deal with contracts with third parties and not with agreements between partners inter se concerning retirement or dissolution. The passage from Lindley deals with a case where there is an actual transfer of immovable property and is, therefore, not in point. Mr. Chatterjee brought to our notice some English decisions in addition to those we have adverted to in support, which agree with the view taken in those cases. He has also referred to the decisions in Prem Raj Brahmin v. Bhani Ram Brahmin(I.L.R. E 1946 1 Cal. 191) and Firm Ram Sahay v. Bishwanath(A.I.R. 1963 Patna 221). We do not think it necessary to discuss them because they do not add to what we have already said in support of our view. For these reasons we uphold the decree of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (1) TMI 74 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hearing which also includes the payment of the required amount of tax. There is virtually no difference between excusing the delay in presentation of appeal and extending time for completing the presentation either by payment of the required amount of tax or by furnishing necessary particulars in the prescribed form of appeal. In one case, the discretion is exercised after the period of limitation and in the other, before the end of that time. The purpose and effect is the same in both the cases. Filing a defective appeal within the period of limitation is not a proper presentation. When the defects are removed, the appeal comes to the stage of being entertained . If by that time the period of limitation expires and the appeal is entertained, the appellate authority does so on condonation of the delay in its discretion. This reference is disposed of as stated above. In the circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no order for costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (1) TMI 73 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nover of the assessee. Turnover used in relation to a dealer liable to tax under the Act means the aggregate of the sale prices received or receivable by him. The notion of aggregate is coupled with the frequency of sales which is the main feature of a business of selling. For all these reasons I am of the view that the amended definition of dealer means any person who sells or supplies any goods in connection with his business. Any casual sale of another kind of goods will not make the seller a dealer . In the present case the sale of machineries was not in the course of the assessee s business. Admittedly they were casual sales. The assessee was not liable to pay sales tax in that respect. This disposes of the reference in favour of the assessee. Since the changed definition gave rise to the view taken by the department, and there was some apparent justification for that, the department shall not be liable to costs. S.N.P. SINGH, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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